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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE ROLE OF NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PRODUCTION OF 
GENTRIFIABLE URBAN SPACE: THE CASE OF WYNWOOD, MIAMI’S PUERTO 
RICAN BARRIO 
by 
Marcos Feldman 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Alex Stepick, Major Professor 
 Partnerships between government and community-based actors and organizations 
are considered the hallmark of contemporary governance arrangements for the 
revitalization and gentrification of economically distressed, inner city areas. This 
dissertation uses historical, narrative analysis and ethnographic methods to examine the 
formation, evolution and operation of community-based governance partnerships in the 
production of gentrifable urban space in the Wynwood neighborhood of Miami, FL 
between 1970 and 2010. This research is based on more than four years of participant 
observation, 60 in-depth interviews with respondents recruited through a purposive 
snowball sample, review of secondary and archival sources, and descriptive, statistical 
and GIS analysis. 
This study examines how different organizations formed in the neighborhood 
since the 1970s have facilitated the recent gentrification of Wynwood. It reveals 
specifically how partnerships between neighborhood-based government agencies, 
nonprofit organizations and real estate developers were constructed to be exclusionary 
vii 
 
and lead to inequitable economic development outcomes for Wynwood residents. The 
key factors conditioning these inequalities include both the rationalities of action of the 
organizations involved and the historical contexts in which their leaders’ thinking and 
actions were shaped. The historical contexts included the ethnic politics of organizational 
funding in the 1970s and the “entrepreneurial” turn of community-based economic 
development and Miami urban politics since the 1980s. Over time neighborhood 
organizations adopted highly pragmatic rationalities and repertoires of action. By the 
2000s when Wynwood experienced unprecedented investment and redevelopment, the 
pragmatism of community-based organizations led them to become junior partners in 
governance arrangements and neighborhood activists were unable to directly challenge 
the inequitable processes and outcomes of gentrification. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 I approached the exit ramp for North Miami Avenue on my way to inspect an 
apartment for rent during the summer of 2006 in Wynwood, known as Miami’s Puerto 
Rican barrio since at least the 1950s. The view south from the airport expressway 
revealed a neighborhood in the midst of an unprecedented physical upheaval. The 
seemingly abandoned and decaying industrial warehouses visible from the highway were 
wrapped in graffiti murals, billboards advertising the neighborhoods’ edgy and artistic 
entrepreneurs. Beyond the 20 foot high piles of debris filling the construction staging 
grounds that lined the base of the highway at Wynwood’s northern edge, a sign hanging 
from the wall of one of the ubiquitous boxy warehouses asked, “Need Space in 
Wynwood?”  I leaned forward in the driver’s seat to see the top of the Midtown Miami 
condo and shopping complex under construction, rising 34 stories above single-story 
bodegas and cafeterias where residents buy groceries and socialize. The four lane avenue 
had been reduced to two – one in each direction – as the city upgraded the street 
infrastructure simultaneously with the construction of the Midtown complex which 
stretched seven-by-two city blocks. Traffic crawled through the dust clouds. 
 One of the oldest neighborhoods in the City of Miami, where half of the nearly 
5,500 residents lived in households that earned no more than $13,813 in annual income in 
2000, Wynwood was in the throes of rampant gentrification at the height of one of the 
largest real estate bubbles in the history of Florida. In addition to the Midtown complex 
that was under construction, Wynwood had become home to a burgeoning Art District. 
On one block houses were crumbling while on the next I found a newly built art gallery 
fortified by steel walls and security cameras. The contradictions of gentrification were 
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everywhere, the most pronounced of which was the destruction of the Roberto Clemente 
Park Community Center, condemned and closed for years because of termite damage 
during the investment boom. Although an activist campaign arose to force the 
reconstruction of the Community Center, I learned over the course of living in Wynwood 
and studying its’ community politics that gentrification was and continues to advance 
without organized opposition. 
 In this research I examine not only the processes of the gentrification of 
Wynwood and its impacts on residents during the last five years, but also, through 
historical and narrative analysis, how gentrification was produced to be uncontested. 
With respect to the latter, I focus on the role of community-based organizations in 
shaping Wynwood’s community politics since the 1970s, with special attention to the 
inter-organizational partnerships and conflicts that developed in the context of recent 
gentrification processes. My research is not only relevant to other neighborhoods and 
cities to the extent that gentrification has become a “global urban strategy” (Smith 2002), 
but it also fills an empirical gap in our understanding of the micro-politics of 
neighborhood change as new community-based governing arrangements flourish under 
the aegis of an ever-changing and locally contingent neoliberal urbanism (Ruben and 
Maskovsky 2008; Addie 2009; Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2009). While the patterns in 
urban governing arrangements that are uncovered here are likely to be found in other 
cases of gentrification in the U.S., the Miami context may also point to the future of 
regions of the world characterized by similar dynamics - rapid growth fueled by 
speculative investment and high immigration and transience (Portes and Stepick 1993; 
Nijman 2011). 
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Figure 1.1: Images of Major Construction Transforming Wynwood in 2006 
 
 
Source: Photos by author, June, 2006. Images of a construction staging ground for the Midtown 
complex, visible in the distance (top), and a view of the reconstruction of N. Miami Avenue 
between Midtown and residential Wynwood (bottom). 
 
The Problem of Unopposed Gentrification 
Despite decades of debate over the definition of gentrification (e.g., Smith and 
Williams 1986; Bridge 1995; Boddy and Lampert 2002; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008), 
4 
 
many analysts have settled on Hackworth’s (2002, p. 815) more expansive notion of “the 
production of space for progressively more affluent users.”1 Innumerable quantitative and 
qualitative case studies, meta-analyses, and philosophical and theoretical treatises have 
demonstrated that gentrification has become a “global urban strategy” for re-capitalizing 
disinvested inner cities through state and corporate strategies of urban redevelopment 
(Lefebvre 1976; Smith 2002; Swyngedouw and Kaïka 2003; Atkinson and Bridge 2005; 
Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008). The voluminous studies of gentrification have made clear 
that gentrified space is produced through the political machinations linking the real estate 
and “symbolic” or cultural economies (e.g., Zukin 1989) as well as through the 
demographic growth and changing lifestyles of the “new” middle-classes (e.g., Bridge 
2007). 
The processes and outcomes of this re-urbanization are also filtered through 
political contests over urban space. Case studies of the politics of gentrification explain 
how neighborhood resistance to gentrification sometimes forces modifications or 
“renegotiations” in the way space is produced or otherwise describes how resistance is 
circumvented (e.g., Castells 1983; Robinson 1995; Smith 1996; Betancur 2002). Yet, 
political variation is treated theoretically as the inevitable local “noise” generated by the 
                                                 
1 Some analysts have argued that direct displacement of one class by another is the necessary condition of 
gentrification and, moreover, they are careful to distinguish the particularities of the gentrifier class from 
other forces shaping “frontier” inner city landscapes, such as commercial investment or public works 
projects (Boddy and Lampert 2002; Davidson and Lees 2005). Nevertheless, more critical analysts have 
effectively responded that despite the diverse forms and processes through which new development occurs, 
such projects “are appearing both in reaction to and to stimulate further demand from a specific class of 
resident—the middle-class consumer. The middle classes are the gentri- part of the word, and they are 
moving into new-build residential developments—built on formerly working-class industrial space [for 
example]—which are off limits to the working classes. Furthermore… such developments have acted like 
beachheads from which the tentacles of gentrification have slowly stretched into the adjacent 
neighborhoods” (Slater 2006, p. 745). In the latter view, gentrification occurs whether or not the lower 
income residents were displaced decades ago and are no longer visible in the vicinity, or whether the gentry 
are arriving now or later (see Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008). 
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contradictions of uneven urban development but which does little to alter the outcomes in 
terms of the distribution of the costs and benefits of growth. 
 
While the general availability of capital for the secondary (real estate) circuit may 
govern in cyclical fashion the overall intensity of activity in the real estate sector, 
it cannot explain the specific form which development takes. Sociospatial patterns 
of development are explained by the actions of growth coalitions and networks 
along with the negotiations and conflicts involving those groups and other class 
fractions. This is frequently played out as a clash between pro growth and no 
growth ideologies; however, most often the property sector works unopposed--
and for this reason it constitutes the leading edge of the Late Capitalist production 
of space. 
(Gottdiener 1994, p. 227) 
 
Given the substantial costs borne unevenly across social groups and especially by 
the city’s poorest workers, how can we explain the absence of “negotiations and 
conflicts” in most cases of gentrification beyond observing that “most often the property 
sector works unopposed”? City dwellers are neither oblivious to the inequality inherent to 
urban redevelopment nor numb to the pain of losing control over their community space. 
Moreover, as gentrification becomes increasingly common and widespread globally, how 
is this global urban makeover implemented to be mostly unopposed? Are socio-spatial 
politics at the neighborhood and city level structured to pre-empt the possibility of 
oppositional movements or practices in urban space? 
Research on the possibilities of resisting gentrification has focused on the 
structural challenges, particularly as many scholars have lamented the decline in anti-
gentrification activism since the 1980s (Wilson and Grammenos 2000; Hackworth and 
Smith 2001; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008). As Lees, Slater and Wyly (2008, p. 249) 
summarize, “resistance has diminished due to the twin factors of (1) continued working-
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class displacement robbing a city of activists, and (2) the authoritarian (neoliberal) 
governance of urban places making challenges to gentrification extremely difficult to 
launch.” There is little empirical research on the extent and effect of the first factor, 
which has elsewhere been termed “political displacement” (Gibbs-Knotts and Haspel 
2006; Martin 2007). Indeed, critical analysts have become alarmed at the “gentrification 
of gentrification research” and lack of attention paid to the issue of displacement (Slater 
2006, 2008, 2010; Smith 2008; Wacquant 2008). 
While the displacement of potential activists in the form of existing residents may 
be a crucial factor undermining potential resistance, the fact remains that in many if not 
most cases gentrification proceeds largely uncontested, even as it displaces existing 
residents (sometimes callously, as I will show later). Several studies in recent years have 
documented the frustration and bitterness of residents coping with the seemingly 
unstoppable forces and impacts of neighborhood change (e.g., Martin 2007; Cahill 2006, 
2007; DeSena 2006; Boyd 2008; Sullivan and Shaw 2011), while fewer have noted 
residents’ ambivalence toward or embrace of gentrification (e.g., Freeman 2006). The 
lack of resistance to gentrification has contributed to vigorous debates over whether 
gentrification is helpful or harmful to the poor (see e.g., Vigdor 2002; International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research 2008, v.32, no.1). Whereas few areas have 
histories of anti-gentrification activism, such as those in San Francisco or New York 
(Robinson 1995; Smith 1996), all cases of gentrification experience in some form the 
“neoliberal governance of urban places” that makes resistance “difficult to launch” (Lees, 
Slater and Wyly 2008, p. 249). 
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Focusing on a case where resistance to gentrification never existed or, at best, 
emerged late and ineffectually, this project seeks to incorporate the production of 
political thinking and action as part of the production of gentrifiable urban space, rather 
than a reactive “clash” of different growth ideologies and class fractions. My research 
traces a “history of the present” (Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996) in a gentrifying 
neighborhood to understand how over decades an “apparatus” (Foucault 1977, 1979a; see 
also Deleuze 1992; Rabinow and Rose 2003; Huxley 2008) of governance ideologies and 
techniques were used to produce gentrifiable urban space and shape its attendant socio-
spatial politics. Marginal urban spaces were made governable through such techniques, 
not merely by setting the stage for gentrification in terms of public subsidies to revitalize 
housing and infrastructure, but actively working to produce the socio-political conditions 
for “unopposed” real estate development. Accounting for but going beyond the strategic 
actions of growth-oriented urban regimes (Jonas and Wilson 1999), this research 
examines how residents’ political engagement with urban growth processes is affected by 
government policies and practices as well as structured through a network of non-
governmental organizations and institutions. 
 
Contentious Politics, Neighborhood Organizations and Governance 
Theoretical approaches from three different subject areas are relevant to 
understanding the work and role of community organizations in the governing 
arrangements of neighborhood gentrification and offer useful concepts for examining the 
problem of unopposed gentrification. While social movement theory sheds light on the 
emergence, form and evolution of organized political action, research in organizational 
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sociology and Foucauldian approaches to power emphasize the role of organizations as 
mediators of the relationship between residents and broader structural forces in society. I 
describe the key concepts from the respective fields of research and then discuss how I 
seek to apply their inter-related insights to the case of Wynwood's community politics. 
 
 
Social Movement Theory 
Three sets of social movement (SM) concepts are useful for explaining how and 
why collective action against prevailing patterns of urban development and specifically 
gentrification have not developed in Wynwood: those relating to political opportunities, 
mobilizing structures and framing processes (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, pp. 3-
20). (1) Political opportunities refer to “changes in the institutional structure or informal 
power relations of a given... political system” (p. 3). Although the concept is typically 
applied to national political systems in line with the focus of much SM research on 
broad-based social movements, political opportunity structures (POS) can be found at all 
levels of social organization, including cities and neighborhoods. The relative openness 
of a political system to change is thought to be shaped not only by the nature of access to 
formal political channels (e.g., single majority vs. proportional electoral systems), but 
also by the stability of the “broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity,” 
the “presence of elite allies” and propensity for government repression (p. 10).  
(2) Mobilizing structures are “those collective vehicles, informal as well as 
formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (p. 3). 
Mobilizing structures may be informal groupings such as friendship networks within a 
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neighborhood (and the informal public or private spaces that contain them, such as 
neighborhood parks or cafeterias) or more formal arrangements such as homeowner 
associations, churches or professional activist organizations. These structures are crucial 
as a basis for the organization and mobilization of resources to carry out collective action 
for a given cause. In the case of professional organizations, external resources may also 
change the form and behavior of the mobilizing structures.  
(3) Framing processes have to do with the “shared meanings and definitions that 
people bring to their situation” and how these frames mediate “between [political] 
opportunity, organization and action” (p. 5). Snow and Benford (1988, 1992) delineate 
three functions of collective action frames (see Martin's [2003] use of their typology). 
They are motivational in defining the community that acts collectively; diagnostic in 
specifying the problem and its cause; and frames provide a prognosis in clarifying the 
means to solve the problem through collective action. Framing is a particularly salient 
concept for analyzing collective action in response to gentrification, as gentrification 
involves a complex, politically diffuse set of processes which conspire to mystify 
residents' perception of the problem and possibly solutions (Henig 1982; Cordova 1991; 
Martin 2007). Since gentrification is felt by residents as a place-bound problem, it is 
useful to consider whether and how residents espouse a place-based, collective identity 
(e.g., Martin 2003; Martin 2007) in addition to whether and how they individually and/or 
collectively interpret gentrification, and what course of action, if any, is prescribed. 
The three social movement concepts of political opportunities, mobilizing 
structures and framing processes are interactive and interdependent in locally contingent 
ways. As McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996, p. 8) put it, “no matter how momentous a 
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change appears in retrospect, it only becomes an ‘opportunity’ when defined as such by a 
group of actors sufficiently well organized to act on this shared definition of the 
situation.”  Moreover, political opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing 
processes within the same set of social movement actors may differ across diverse scales 
of political action, including national, state and local.  
While SM concepts help to reveal the dynamics that shape organizational and 
collective action in relation to gentrification, they are not as useful in explaining the lack 
of organizational action. SM theories may reveal that collective action in response to 
gentrification did not emerge because of inadequate mobilizing structures or framing 
processes, or because of a political context not conducive to challenging urban 
development processes. These forces are theorized in binary terms (present/absent) 
without sufficient attention to how they operate on as well as through organizations to 
shape the thinking and action of organizational leaders and members who live in the 
neighborhood. The object of SM theories are “collectives” and, as such, are not equipped 
with finer grained tools for examining how the subjectivities and practices of the 
individuals within those collectives both affect and are affected by the political 
opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes. Such finer grained tools are 
especially important for studying the absence of collective action over time as opposed to 
the usual subject of SM researchers - the emergence and evolution of social movements. 
For the former concepts I turn to recent work in organizational sociology as well as the 
Foucauldian approach to the development of political subjectivities and the adoption and 
implementation of a particular mentalities of governing. 
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Organizations and Governmentality 
McQuarrie and Marwell (2009, p. 256) argue that formal organizations are too 
often “treated as derivative rather than productive of urban social life,” calling for more 
attention to the ways that organizations “mediate the relationship between system-level 
institutions – such as the state and the economy – and urban communities and 
neighborhoods.” The perspective draws from structuration theory (Giddens 1991), 
focusing on the flexible, relational functioning of organizations, both among each other 
(in the network) and as “meso level” mediators (McQuarrie and Marwell 2009). Also 
relevant to understanding the role of neighborhood organizations in the governing 
arrangements of gentrification are the insights of the notion of “governmentality” 
(Foucault 1979a; Foucault et al. 1991), which “refers to the rationalities and mentalities 
of governance as well as the range of tactics and strategies that produce social order” 
through “a set of apparatuses operating across distances of time and space” (Fairbanks 
2007, p. 112). For Foucault (1977, p. 10), the apparatus is a “heterogeneous grouping 
composing discourses, institutions, architectural arrangements, policy decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic, moral and philanthropic 
propositions.”2 As a relational entity that links these various components, a governing 
apparatus effects a “disciplinary normalization” on urban space not merely by codifying 
norms as laws, but also through spatial practices (see also e.g., Lefebvre 1976; Merry 
2001) and the “mediating” functions that are the focus of McQuarrie and Marwell’s 
(2009) organizational sociology. Inherent to both of these approaches is the perspective 
                                                 
2 McQuarrie’s  (2010, p. 239) definition of “governance arrangement” is similar, albeit perhaps not as 
expansive: “By governance ‘arrangement’ I mean a lash-up of organizations, practices, institutional logics, 
technologies, metrics and objects that collectively produce a given outcome.” 
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that power is productive.3 But the Foucauldian concepts go beyond structural 
configurations to consider the rationalities that permeate entire networks and governing 
arrangements and also, crucially, approach the subject of governance as a historical 
process (Rabinow and Rose 2003; Crampton and Elden 2007). 
I highlight these concepts to draw attention to some of the key elements of 
community-based governance involved in producing gentrification: the relationship 
between ideas, techniques and organizations, the evolution of these formations through 
different political contexts, and normalizing effects on urban space. The governing 
arrangements that have shaped gentrification in Wynwood link key ideas to spatial 
practices: the notion of crime prevention through environmental design is mobilized 
through the architecture of redevelopment planning and projects (see Garland 2001; 
Herbert and Brown 2006); the concept of the frontier, rooted in Wynwood’s history of 
“territorial stigmatization” (Wacquant 2007), disinvestment and deprivation, underpinned 
a period of punitive spatial discipline which was key to the growth of the Art District in 
the early 2000s. Moreover, the variegated governing arrangements that have facilitated 
the growth of the Art District and the creation of the Midtown complex were made 
possible by the ideology of “community” self-governance that for decades has supported 
the decentralization of policymaking and service provision through nonprofit 
organizations. In this way, “governance takes place through rather than despite civil 
                                                 
3 In Discipline and Punish (1977, p. 194), Foucault explains: “The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom 
of an ‘ideological’ representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of 
power that I have called ‘discipline.’ We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in 
negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power 
produces: it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the 
knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production”.  Although my focus is not specifically on 
the formation of individual subjectivities, this productive notion of power is useful to keep in mind when 
considering the role of organizations as relational intermediaries between residents and broader urban 
political processes. 
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liberties” (Fairbanks 2007, p. 112) as freedom is redefined under the imperatives of the 
entrepreneurial city. As I will show in the case of Wynwood, the embrace of 
decentralized governance produces highly malleable, unaccountable political spaces that 
reproduce and sometimes exacerbate inequalities in the name of community participation. 
 While a static snapshot of the governing arrangements reveals the inequalities 
inherent to gentrification processes in Wynwood, it does not adequately explain the lack 
of organized opposition and the propensity of community-based organizations to become 
supporters and facilitators of the neighborhood’s redevelopment and gentrification. This 
role is grounded in the historical constitution of community politics through the 
experiences, successes and failures, partnerships and conflicts that have shaped those 
organizations. Many of Wynwood’s Puerto Rican organizations were created through the 
“ethnic politics” of “collective consumption” characteristic of the 1970s in Miami and 
elsewhere (Castells 1983; Fainstein 1987). In the 1980s and 90s, the rationalities and 
practices of these organizations and their leaders evolved with the turn toward 
“entrepreneurial” community development, declining government support and intensified 
inner city disinvestment (Eisinger 1988; Harvey 1989; Swanstrom 1999). The 
bureaucratic enfranchisement of Puerto Rican activists turned their political energies 
inward, led to conflicts and divisions, and gradually eroded the capacity of these 
organizations to produce a politics of neighborhood defense. Faith-based activism 
emerged to defend Wynwood against disinvestment and environmental degradation; 
however, through the church’s pragmatic political orientation and territorial rationality of 
service, redevelopment was construed as a “reality” that could not be changed. By the 
turn of the 21st Century, Puerto Rican organizations had been stripped entirely of their 
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activist politics and limited to the provision of social services. Thus Wynwood’s 
community-based organizational representatives were amenable to the partnerships of 
urban redevelopment espoused by the “gentlefication” discourse of developers, arts 
entrepreneurs and city officials. 
Although the governance arrangements of gentrification and the historical 
formation of Puerto Rican community politics are the principal themes I address in this 
research, I also examine examples of strategic choices by social justice activists to not 
campaign against gentrification. The evolution of social movement-building into flexible 
network formations is considered crucial in order to overcome the fragmentation and 
“post-political” ethos of decentralized, community governance (DeFilippis, Fisher and 
Shragge 2010; Benner and Pastor 2011; Macleod 2011). However, as with the governing 
arrangements of gentrification, the various episodes of activism that I examine reveal 
tensions in the networked, relational and scalar formations through which social justice is 
pursued. These tensions are especially pronounced in the case of gentrification, the 
complexities of which seem to require the creation of broad regional, state and national 
alliances and strategies, as well as intensive, neighborhood-based political organizing, 
particularly in the context of the hyper-entrepreneurial governance arrangements in 
Miami that I discuss below. 
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Figure 1.2: Map of Wynwood, Major Inner City Neighborhoods, the City of Miami 
and Miami-Dade County 
 
 
 
Research Methods 
 In this research I use a mix of qualitative research methods and approach my 
subject as a “history of the present,” in the Foucauldian sense of drawing analytically on 
history to explain a contemporary phenomenon. The notion of a “history of the present” 
emphasizes the difference between “a past” that is “merely that which precedes the 
present” as opposed to historical layers that are productive, interacting with and shaping 
the present and future (Keith 2009, p. 77). Historical study of urban politics typically uses 
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narrative analysis, with its focus on “the organization of contemporaneous actions and 
happenings in a chronological, sequential order ‘that gives meaning to and explains each 
of its elements and is, at the same time, constituted by them’” (Griffin 1993, p. 1097; 
quoted in Gotham and Staples 1996, p. 483). In these ways, narrative analysis seeks to be 
“temporal” and “conjunctural,” establishing the relations between events and social 
forces over time, but also “holistic,” accounting for the various inter-related contexts 
shaping events – economic, political, cultural (see Schutt 1999, p. 334-5).  
 Between 2006 and 2008, when I lived in Wynwood, and thereafter as I returned to 
do field research through 2011, I conducted participant observation in a variety of 
settings. Most of the time, two basic guiding themes directed me to appropriate sites and 
events in Wynwood, and led to informants and interview respondents: (1) processes of 
gentrification and (2) political meetings and events (that is, formal “Politics,” in the sense 
of relations with or through government). These two themes frequently overlapped but 
not always. Moreover, this intentionality of field research was more pronounced after I 
moved out of the neighborhood and particularly during 2010 and 2011, when I followed 
up with individuals I had previously met in order to interview them. At that point, I had a 
deeper understanding of the neighborhood’s history, having read newspaper archives, 
government documents and other sources. I deliberately returned to interviewees who 
were in some way involved in the politics of the neighborhood, either the processes of 
gentrification or the previous eras of political action starting with the 1970s.  
 I should note that it was challenging to talk to residents about the politics of 
gentrification because there had not been much formal, organized political activity in 
relation to gentrification (such as community meetings). Few residents were highly 
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informed about political changes taking place to facilitate gentrification, beyond seeing 
the new buildings, consumers, traffic and other manifestations of the redevelopment. 
Still, people talked about changes in their neighborhood. I observed this perhaps most 
intensely at the place where I lived for two years, an 8-unit apartment building on 32nd 
Street wedged between the Nonprofit Arts Complex (see Chapters 6 and 7) and a low-rise 
pubic housing project that face a middle school named after a Puerto Rican independence 
philosopher. Indeed, I was the landlord’s first “professional” tenant, as he proclaimed, 
and as it turned out, the most stable one. My neighbors came and went. The three who I 
was friendliest with were all evicted at some point, including one of who I later 
interviewed about his experiences in the building. In fact, more residents were evicted 
than moved on their own accord during my time there, though this did not seem to be the 
result of an overly punitive landlord, as several neighbors were allowed to fall three or 
four months behind on rent before being evicted. In these and a myriad of other ways, I 
learned about how people experienced gentrification and the different pressures 
associated with the intensity of urban development taking place in Miami in 2006 and 
2007. By 2008, before I left, I also observed the onset of the recession and rising 
unemployment in the neighborhood, evident not only in evictions but before then, as 
neighbors asked to borrow my electricity or fill up jugs of water to bathe their kids. 
 Beyond the life in my building, I spent time eating, drinking, shopping, doing 
laundry, playing soccer and doing other activities in and around the neighborhood. Partly 
because of problems with my car, I made it a point to use my bicycle both around the 
neighborhood and also from Wynwood to the university where I worked, located almost 
on the extreme opposite end of the county. For one period of about six months, I walked, 
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biked and rode the bus to get everything I needed and to get around the city. Most of 
these personal experiences, including living on 32nd Street and living without a car, are 
beyond the scope of the cases of gentrification and governance I examine in this 
dissertation. But I mention them because I believe they shaped my sense of space and 
time, and made me more sensitive to the way people in Wynwood, especially low-income 
people who depend on public transit, experience the city and how their movements may 
be shaped by the transformation of the built environment. This sense of how residents 
navigate urban space turned out to be quite relevant to my analysis of the physical 
interventions of redevelopment planning in Chapter 4. 
 While I lived in Wynwood I also witnessed the creation of an activist campaign to 
urge the city to reconstruct a community center that had fallen into disrepair. The 
campaign is one of the cases in Chapter 6. The campaign was led by an activist 
organization with which I have had a close relationship for several years, particularly 
those years. Throughout this research was facilitated by my role as a Research Associate 
at the Research Institute on Social and Economic Policy (RISEP), before which I was a 
research intern at the aforementioned activist organization a few years before living in 
Wynwood. During Wynwood’s community center campaign, I assisted as a translator at 
some neighborhood meetings. Since 2004, I have worked with this organization in 
several other ways. While my relationship means that most of the activist or politically 
active residents I spoke with are or were associated with this organization, it also happens 
that this organization has recruited its members from the ranks of the most politically 
active residents in Wynwood. There simply are no other activist organizations in 
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Wynwood; and, as I will explain in Chapter 6, this organization is not really from 
Wynwood. 
 Also, while I lived there and to a lesser extent thereafter, I participated in the 
processes of gentrification as a consumer (of gentrified urban space). I got to know some 
local artists and participated in the social spaces they produced, including art festivals. I 
ate and drank in some of the new, more expensive restaurants that started cropping up. 
Much of this experience speaks for itself as part of the case study of the creation of the 
Art District, also in Chapter 6.  
 By 2011, I had completed more than 60 in-depth interviews with individuals who 
are linked in different ways to the governance arrangements that have shaped 
Wynwood’s gentrification: current and former residents; organizational staff and 
directors; police officers; current and former city officials and neighborhood-level 
administrators; other professionals involved in the neighborhood’s redevelopment 
planning; artists and people involved in the arts businesses; neighborhood merchants and 
property owners; real estate developers; and the most influential of the Puerto Rican 
community leaders and activists who were involved in Wynwood at different times since 
the 1970s. The identities of all research respondents and their organizations, except for 
those speaking in their capacity as public officials, are kept confidential and given 
pseudonyms in this dissertation. I recruited interview respondents through a purposive 
snowball sample that I began to construct in the spring of 2010. My own experience as a 
resident of the neighborhood helped me to recruit informants, including the managers of 
the most popular small businesses. Beyond that, my earliest key informants were the 
directors and staff members of nonprofit service organizations, community organizers 
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with whom I already had working relationships, the former City of Miami Mayor 
Maurice Ferre, and my own relatives who live in Wynwood. This last point merits some 
elaboration, but I am limited by the promise of confidentiality to this person as with the 
vast majority of the human subjects in this research. My family ties in Wynwood 
introduce bias in this research not because of how my relationship to the respondent 
shaped her statements and testimony to be different from what would have been provided 
to an unrelated researcher. Rather, I believe that another researcher simply may not have 
made contact with this person who is not involved in any public aspects of community 
politics. In this way, while the trust facilitated through family ties was important to 
obtaining access to this person’s deeply felt concerns, more important was the ability to 
make this connection in the first place. I ultimately met other residents with similar 
feelings and views. 
 In addition to the qualitative methods describe above, this study employs 
descriptive, statistical and Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis, and draws on 
a variety of secondary, archival sources. For statistical and GIS analysis I relied on: the 
U.S. Census Bureau; the Neighborhood Change Database produced by Geolytics, Inc., 
accessible at the Florida International University (FIU) library; a GIS shape file 
containing property sales and land use records purchased in 2005 from the Miami-Dade 
County Property Appraiser; and other GIS shape files available on the server of the FIU 
GIS laboratory and from the U.S. Census Bureau Web site. I used this information to 
examine basic descriptive statistics of changes in population, housing units, property 
prices, and other shifts that contextualize the transformations that have taken place in 
Wynwood. 
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 The archives I draw on include articles from major national and various local 
newspapers and magazines, transcripts of City of Miami Commission meetings and other 
public records (clerk’s reports, memorandums, discussion items, as well as some Miami-
Dade County records, where relevant), in addition to scholarly and online sources. In 
citations I refer to City of Miami Commission transcripts as MCC and Miami-Dade 
County Commission documents as MDCC.  The Global NewsBank digital database 
contains full text articles from major national and most local Miami newspapers dating 
back to 1982. I researched articles older than 1982 from major local sources, primarily 
The Miami Herald and The Miami Daily News, using the FIU microfilm system. The 
City of Miami’s legislative records are available online since 2003; beyond that, I spend 
several hours a week over a two-month period at the City Clerk’s office, where I was 
provided access to digital, searchable archives of commission minutes dating back to the 
city’s inception in 1896, available only on their office computers. Other important 
records, such as City of Miami plans and research reports, were accessed at the FIU 
reference library or obtained through the personal archives of some of my respondents 
who participated in the preparation of these documents. Although I took photographs of 
all of the settings that I describe below, I sometimes use and cite Google Street View 
images instead of my own because they capture a view that I missed and has since 
changed. 
 I reviewed hundreds of pages of transcripts of the City of Miami commission 
meetings to help construct the narrative history of the politics of community-based 
organization funding, which formed most of the basis of the relationship between 
Wynwood’s Puerto Rican activists and City Hall since the 1970s. Reading this history 
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helped me focus on key moments that are exemplary of the different phases in the 
evolution of Wynwood’s relationship with City Hall, as well as the relationships among 
the various neighborhood organizations and leaders. I also sought to balance the accounts 
in the commission transcripts against the testimony of the former organizational leaders 
and city officials with whom I spoke, as well the newspaper articles. Finally, from my 
review of these records and documents from other sources noted above, I focused on a 
few major redevelopment planning efforts that affected the built environment in 
Wynwood and which were in themselves important episodes in the relation between 
neighborhood organizations and City Hall. I describe some of these cases in turn, as part 
of my description of the organization of the dissertation. 
 Chapter 2 traces some features of the history of Wynwood, including its inception 
as one of Miami’s first middle-class suburbs and industrial districts, subsequent 
suburbanization and deindustrialization, early efforts at urban renewal and slum 
clearance, and related “territorial stigmatization” (Wacquant 2007) which set the stage for 
targeting Wynwood for redevelopment over the course of several decades. Chapter 3 
examines the history of the creation of “Puerto Rican Wynwood,” first by tracing the 
popular narrative of migration to Southeast Florida and to Wynwood and the hardships 
experienced by Puerto Ricans and then through the narratives about the emergence and 
evolution of the ethnic politics of community development funding in which many of the 
still-existing neighborhood nonprofit organizations were founded. In particular, I draw 
from interviews, city commission transcripts and newspaper articles to examine 
narratives of community empowerment, achievement, conflict and bureaucratic 
enfranchisement.  
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 Chapter 4 examines examples of the shift in Wynwood’s community politics in 
the context of entrepreneurial policymaking that sought to effect a “spatial fix” in the 
built environment’s profitability: (1) major redevelopment planning efforts, such as the 
1979 Garment District Redevelopment Plan and the 1990 Wynwood Safe Neighborhoods 
Plan; (2) the emergence of community development corporations (CDCs), and their role 
in a failed attempt to create a Free Trade Zone in the “redeveloped” section of the 
Garment District in the 1990s; (3) the emergence of faith-based activism and its 
participation with and immersion in the entrepreneurial ethos of community 
development.  
 Chapter 5 takes stock of the institutional history and layers of Wynwood’s 
community politics. I examine the rationalities of the different organizational actors with 
respect to urban development politics at this crucial turning point to the 21st Century, in 
the context of a growing real estate bubble in Miami. The analysis, which is grounded in 
a case study of the first “community-based” Master Plan created in 1996 to envision the 
future of the neighborhood, focuses on the discourse and practices of various community 
and organizational leaders involved. This section also reviews the thinking and actions of 
some leaders in relation to the politics of the broader development boom in Miami during 
this period. Specifically, I examine a campaign to reform a proposed, county-wide 
inclusionary zoning policy in Miami in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of 
affordable housing. 
 Chapter 6 focuses on three cases revealing different, inter-related sets of 
governing arrangements that shaped urban development politics in Wynwood between 
2000 and 2010: (1) The creation of the Midtown Miami residential and commercial 
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complex; (2) the creation and growth of the Art District and; (3) the campaign to rebuild 
the community center at Roberto Clemente Park, which was also viewed by activists as a 
way to reclaim community territory from the forces that encroached on it. In each of 
these cases I trace the political narrative, and examine the formation and functioning of 
the governing arrangements, the rationalities of action inherent to different actors 
involved, and residents’ engagement in the formal and informal politics of the production 
of space. I close this chapter with discussion of the relational qualities of social 
movement-building in South Florida and the implications for social justice in the 
gentrifying city. 
 Although my dissertation describes the thinking of action of various individuals 
and organizational actors, my intention is not to critique any single person or 
organization. Instead, I aim to understand gentrification and specifically why and how 
gentrification has advanced so easily in Wynwood. Rather than focusing on any 
individual or organization, in this dissertation I examine the rather diffused, yet effective 
forces that have facilitated gentrification. Moreover, the relevance of the cases analyzed 
in any one chapter to the recent gentrification of Wynwood cannot be understood in 
isolation from the larger history of Wynwood’s community politics presented in the rest 
of the chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Little has been documented on the history of Wynwood. Most old-
time residents say the name was probably chosen by real estate 
investors Josiah Chaille and Hugh Anderson. They took out the 
first plat in Wynwood on January 7, 1917, and chose the name 
Wyndwood Park for their subdivision. Josiah Chaille was a native 
of Tennessee who moved to Miami from Ocala, Florida, in 1896. 
He owned a five-and-dime store on the corner of Flagler Street and 
Miami Avenue until shortly before 1920, when he went into real 
estate. 
- Elliot Rodriguez, The Miami News (1979) 
 The area known as Wynwood became part of the City of Miami in 1913 through 
an annexation vote that expanded the city’s boundaries north and south along the bay 
(City of Miami 1955). Located immediately west of Florida East Coast (FEC) rail yard 
stretching from 29th to 36th streets along N. Miami Avenue, the subdivisions historically 
platted as “Wyndwood Park” and “St. James Park” comprise the residential core of 
present day Wynwood (MCC 3/15/1917).4 By the 1920s, when the Florida (and 
especially South Florida) land boom led to the creation of several cities including Miami 
Beach and Miami Shores, among others, the Wynwood area had developed homes and 
                                                 
4 In the historic meeting minutes of the City of Miami Commission Wyndwood and Wynwood alternated in 
use in reference to the neighborhood, although sources suggest that the neighborhood has always been 
known as Wynwood (see Rodriguez 1979), including several interview respondents who lived or worked in 
the area before 1960. In the 1974 meeting where Wyndwood Park was renamed Roberto Clemente Park, 
residents, elected officials and government staff refer to Wynwood as the neighborhood. Wyndwood 
continued to appear in legal references (e.g., Wyndwood Sewer and Highway Improvement Districts) until 
1991, when the Cuban-American City Mayor paused the meeting to clarify: “It’s Wyndwood Highway 
improvement. Is that the same as Wynwood? [Y]ou might want to take the ‘d’ off. It might confuse 
everything” (MCC 1/10/1991) This was the last time Wyndwood appeared in legal references to the area. 
Several respondents including current and former residents believed that the long-standing Latinization  of 
the neighborhood, particularly after 1960, led to the acceptance of the more Latinized pronunciation, Ween-
wood, and Wyndwood lost the “d”. 
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apartment buildings mostly for middle-class or wealthy families.5 The architectural styles 
that developed in Wynwood as in other historic city neighborhoods (e.g., Riverside) 
during the 1920s and 1930s ranged from functional “two-flat” apartment buildings to 
single-family homes built in the craftsman bungalow and mission styles (WMP 1996). It 
was one of Miami’s earliest suburbs. 
Figure 2.1: Wynwood Districts and Age of Built Structures 
 
                                                 
5 This is at least how “Wynwood Park” was represented in real estate ads and in the “society” section of 
The Miami News during the 1920s. Marriage announcements revealed the occupations of newlyweds who 
built bungalow homes in Wynwood, such as a man who owned a small realty company and another who 
worked as an architect (issues from 5/11/1921, 7/10/1923). The quality of the housing relative to other 
neighborhoods is evident from the real estate ads in The Miami News during this period (e.g., issues from 
10/25/1921, 4/1/1921, 9/1/1927). 
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Wynwood’s Economic and Residential Base 
 Wynwood’s economic base was comprised historically of the emerging 
manufacturing sector mostly south of 29th Street and the residential area to the north 
inhabited by a variety of professionals, technicians and skilled craftsmen, policemen and 
school teachers,  owners of small business supported by the nearby Florida East Coast 
rail workers as well as area residents, and others. South of 29th Street and particularly 25th 
Street, south of the emerging Garment District, were low-cost apartments that housed 
African-Americans being pushed out of the downtown area and later, particularly after 
1940, a growing number of Puerto Rican migrants. 
Rodriguez (1982) wrote that “the 1920s boom years saw the first signs of what 
was to become the Garment District,” noting that in 1926 Coca-Cola built a giant bottling 
plant along 29th Street  and soon after a large orange juice plant was built on NW 27th 
Street and 2nd Avenue. In the post-WWII period the southern section of Wynwood 
developed into a cluster of light industrial warehouses, mostly for garment and shoe 
manufacturing.6 As the industry expanded during the 1930s and 1940s, the largest 
                                                 
6 The garment as well as shoe manufacturing industry in Miami had its origins in the early decades of the 
20th century. The emergence of Southeast Florida’s winter vacation locales such as Palm Beach in the 
1900-1920 period and particularly Miami Beach during the 1910s and 20s made South Florida a key 
consumer market for spotting the latest “summer” fashion trends as styles were experimented during the 
South Florida winters and then released during the northern summers (see Clemente 2007). South Florida’s 
development in this regard led Jewish and other garment manufacturers to build sewing factories or, after 
retiring, lend their expertise to emerging garment manufacturers in Miami. Jews were disproportionately 
represented as owners and managers in the apparel industries of New York City (garment manufacturing 
and retailing) during the first half of the 20th century but still found their opportunities limited because of 
anti-semitism and stiff competition in the nation’s largest garment manufacturing center. South Florida 
represented not only a new and expanding frontier in which to become established, but after the real estate 
bust that underpinned the Great Depression in the late 1920s, restrictive covenants in Miami’s real estate 
market were lifted to allow the economy to recover more easily and Jews gained access to and became 
major players in South Florida’s real estate markets and industries. The Jewish population in Miami Dade 
County grew from 7,000 in 1940 to 47,000 in 1950 to 119,000 in 1960 (Clemente 2007, p. 48). 
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manufacturers (who came to dominate the Miami Manufacturers Guild formed in the 
1940s) consolidated the smaller firms and new, larger factories were built on relatively 
affordable land near the rail lines and storage depots, primarily in Wynwood during the 
1940s but eventually to other  neighborhoods located near the FEC railway and its east-
west extensions (e.g., the Little River Industrial District and in Hialeah) (Clemente 2007; 
Shell-Weiss 2009).7  Sewing and later cutting and design factories were established 
throughout the southern part of the neighborhood between 20th and 29th streets and 
between North Miami and NW 5th avenues (see Figure 2.1 for orientation). The southern 
section became known as the Garment District, and later also the Fashion District when 
retail operations were added particularly in the northwestern section (City of Miami 
1979). Most of the structures in the western half of the Garment District, where a 
majority of the warehouses and a few former manufacturers are still located (albeit 
operating different types of businesses), were built in the 1940s and 1950s, considered 
the height of Miami’s status in the national garment industry (City of Miami 1979; 
Clemente 2007). By 1951, there were more than 251 garment factories in the City of 
                                                 
7 According to Clemente (2007), the rapid growth of the apparel industry in South Florida in the post World 
War II decades is due especially to five factors: (1) Clothing manufacturing was well suited to Miami 
because “with no need for smokestacks or waste dumps, manufacturing facilities could be easily hidden 
from leisure-seeking tourists” (Clemente 2007, p. 45). (2) The mass immigration of Jews and later Latinas 
to South Florida contributed to the abundance of a particular skill sets needed in the garment industry. (3) 
Miami’s role as a fashion trendsetter led to its growth as a manufacturing center. It was more cost efficient 
to manufacture the clothing in the same place they were being sold (at least initially, before Miami’s 
industry went “global”) but it was also convenient that manufacturers and retailers knew each other from 
regional trade associations and came to trust one another, instead of buying clothes made in New York or 
California or elsewhere. (4) As a new site for manufacturing, Miami was not bound by the same traditions 
as northern or even other southern manufacturers whose designers, for example, took off the month of 
August and did not resume to resortwear lines until mid-September, putting them at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to Miami factories. Moreover, as the globalization of consumption expanded after 
World War II, Miami found itself better positioned to sell clothing to Latin American tourists and 
consumers, many of whose summer seasons were the opposite of the United States (Ibid). (5) The success 
of the leisure and sportswear industry in Miami also hinged on the use of technology and the growing 
popularity of synthetic fabrics, such as rayon, embraced and championed by Miami manufacturers. 
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Miami employing more than 5,000 workers (Shell-Weiss 2009), and the largest 
concentration were operating in Wynwood’s Garment District (City of Miami 1979).  
These patterns were affirmed by the testimony of a former manufacturer, Harold, 
whose experiences were typical of the Jewish families that moved from New York to 
Miami to set up garment factories. In 1946 when Harold’s8 father opened his business 
manufacturing children’s clothes in Wynwood—two years after he moved his family 
from New York for health reasons—it was one of the first and largest of a growing 
number of garment factories in the area.9 By 1954 when his father built a 20,000 square 
foot warehouse in the heart of the Garment District and he employed upwards of 200 
workers, Harold estimates there were about 100 garment factories of various sizes in the 
area. 
 
Decline and Disinvestment 
Miami’s garment industry expanded in the 1960s despite the growth of 
international competition facilitated by the accelerating globalization across many sectors 
of the national economy (Feagin and Smith 1987; Grosfoguel 2003; Clemente 2007). The 
arrival of cheap, mostly female labor resulting from the massive influx of Cuban exiles 
                                                 
8 I interviewed Harold in his Wynwood office, November, 2010, with his colleague in real estate, Michael, 
a self-described “Jewban” (Cuban Jew) and also former garment manufacturer in the 1960s. Harold worked 
for and eventually took over the family garment business after 1973 when his father died. In 1987 he sold 
his business and went into real estate and still operates out of his Wynwood office. Michael, along with two 
other realtors who were licensed through Harold’s realty company, closed and sold their garment 
businesses in the 1980s. 
 
9 This is supported by the assertion in the City of Miami’s 1979 Garment Center Redevelopment Plan (p. 5) 
that “by 1940 the majority of the apparel manufacturers in Dade County were located within the area which 
was becoming known as the Garment Center.” Clemente (2007, p. 140) writes that by 1940 the 
Manufacturers Guild in Miami, to which Harold’s family business eventually belonged, “included 20 large 
producers” and an unknown number of smaller, “home-work” producers. 
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allowed Miami’s apparel manufacturing to persist in spite of the pressures of cheap, 
foreign imports (City of Miami 1979).10  Shell-Weiss (2009, p. 179-181) describes how 
in a period of two years (1959-1961) many garment factories in Wynwood closed shop to 
avoid and divide unionization efforts that were intensifying since the mid-1950s, only to 
re-open in Hialeah where they could hire entirely Cuban workforces, reflecting and 
perhaps creating a major difference in the employment prospects and socio-economic 
mobility of Cubans compared to the mostly Puerto Rican and African-American residents 
of the Wynwood Garment District area.11  Cubans increasingly suburbanized while most 
Blacks and Puerto Ricans remained in the deteriorating social and physical environments 
of inner city neighborhoods (Winsberg 1979; see also Figure 2.2, below). 
By the 1970s, recently arrived Cuban women in the garment trades were 
increasingly unionized (albeit by then mostly located in Hialeah) at the same time as the 
garment industry was shrinking (City of Miami 1979; Nissen and Grenier 2001; Shell-
Weiss 2009). Many factories underwent restructuring to speed production and cut costs, 
but such strategies were frequently undermined by direct (labor organizing) or indirect 
(slow-downs) resistance from workers (Grenier and Stepick 2002), and ultimately could 
not prevent the gradual dispersal of many of the manufacturing components of the 
                                                 
10 The number of workers in the needle trades increased from around 1,000 in 1947 to 7,000 by the end of 
the 1950s, and would triple in the 1960s (Clemente 2007; Shell-Weiss 2009), largely due to the 
transformation of the seasonal Cuban  labor migrations into a permanent, year-round workforce after the 
Cuban Revolution of 1959. 
 
11 In the 1960s and 70s recent Cuban immigrants were willing to accept lower wages than existing workers 
(Shell-Weiss 2009, p. 179-181). The perceptions and realities of Cubans’ employment prospects compared 
to non-Cubans in Miami has been written about extensively (Grenier and Stepick 1992; Portes and Stepick 
1993; Dunn 1997; Croucher 1999; Grenier and Castro 2001; Shell-Weiss 2009). Most analysts agree such 
inequalities result from the use by industrialists and policymakers of one vulnerable population to exploit 
several others. Nevertheless, the perception of Cubans “leaping over” other groups has been a point of 
significant tension in Miami’s inter-ethnic relations (Ibid). 
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garment industry to other countries, particularly in the last three decades (1980-2010). In 
Miami-Dade County, the number of apparel manufacturing firms declined from a 
historical high of 702 in 1977 to 634 in 1982, and shrunk an additional 17 percent (down 
to 526) by 1997 (U.S. Census Bureau, County Business Patterns). In the Wynwood 
Garment District there were 99 manufacturing firms in 1974 (down from 112 a year 
earlier) (Polk & Co., 1976), about 60 of which were apparel factories (City of Miami 
1979). In 1997 only 35 apparel manufacturers remained, more than two-thirds of which 
employed fewer than 10 people (U.S. Census Bureau, Zip Code Business Patterns). The 
decline of apparel manufacturing would have a negative impact on inner city residents’ 
economic well-being since, according to City Planning research, “in 1960, 51 percent of 
the city’s apparel industry workers lived in the City of Miami” (City of Miami 1967, p. 
21). Deindustrialization combined with other processes in the formation of inner city 
ghettoes. 
 Following the economic recession of the early 1970s poverty increased in Miami, 
residential and commercial suburbanization accelerated, and low-income, inner city 
neighborhoods became increasingly isolated and segregated by race and income 
(Winsberg 1979, 1983a, 1983b; Aguirre, Schwirian and La Greca 1980; Boswell and 
Cruz-Báez. 1997; Woodlieff 2006; Ganapti and Frank 2008). By the 1980s Wynwood 
was one of the poorest neighborhoods in one of the poorest cities in the country. About 
66 percent of the neighborhood’s residents had incomes below 150 percent of the federal 
poverty level (U.S. Census 1980) and 16 to 20 percent of eligible workers were 
unemployed (Balmaseda 1982). Rising class and racial/ethnic inequality in Miami 
combined with policy brutality contributed to violent inner city protests in the 1980s that 
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accelerated the exodus of people and businesses from Wynwood. Two major “race riots” 
shook inner city neighborhoods and a smaller riot took place in Wynwood in 1990 
(Feldstein-Soto 1990). In less than two decades the Garment District lost almost 60 
percent of its clothing manufacturers (Hernandez 1984; McCarthy 1985a) while its 
warehouses were converted to mostly Korean-owned wholesale businesses catering to 
Latin American buyers (Proscio 1992). Puerto Rican residents with the financial means 
left the neighborhood, moving to other parts of Miami-Dade County, to Broward County 
or abandoned South Florida altogether (Ovalle 2004b). Wynwood’s population base 
diversified even further, drawing new immigrants from Central America, Haiti and other 
islands in the West Indies, and became home to a growing number of African-Americans. 
The accelerated economic decline and disinvestment that characterized the late 
1970s and 1980s in Wynwood was also when policymakers and “place entrepreneurs” 
began to envision the revitalization of inner city neighborhoods through a variety of 
“cultural policy” techniques in which the decline of urban space as a locus for economic 
production would give way to the use and creation of urban place as a consumable 
product  (see Harvey 1989; Gottdiener 1994). Historic preservation emerged as a 
mechanism for renovating and gentrifying districts in the 1980s, particularly in South 
Beach and Coconut Grove (Kranish 1982; Sala and Easton 1987; Mesa 1990), where 
entrepreneurial strategies were also under way to create and promote arts and heritage 
districts. In Little Havana, Calle Ocho was increasingly envisioned as a site where ethnic 
tourism and Latin cultural events would bring people “back to the city” (Menendez 
1994a, 1994b; Feldman and Jolivet, forthcoming). But before entrepreneurial strategies 
blossomed for revitalizing inner city neighborhoods (which I will discuss in subsequent 
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chapters), the federal and local state intervened with slum clearance and highway 
construction to clear the land so that new possibilities could emerge.  
However, such clearance and redevelopment required first what Wacquant (2007) 
calls “territorial stigmatization” of inner city neighborhoods. These are the “discourses of 
vilification [which] proliferate and agglomerate about [poor neighborhoods], ‘from 
below’, in the ordinary interactions of daily life, as well as ‘from above’, in the 
journalistic, political and bureaucratic (and even scientific) fields” (p. 67). Moreover, 
such discourses are not mere expressions or representations, but legitimize public and 
private remedial interventions. Once a place is stigmatized, “it is easy for the authorities 
to justify special measures, deviating from both law and custom, which can have the 
effect – if not the intention – of destabilizing and further marginalizing their occupants, 
subjecting them to the dictates of the deregulated labour [and land] market, and rendering 
them invisible or driving them out of a coveted space” (Ibid, p. 69). As I explore below, 
stigmatization and even self-stigmatization cast a particular shadow over the 
neighborhood and provided the justification and basis for unequal redevelopment in the 
future. 
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Figure 2.2: Map of Concentrations of Puerto Rican, Non-Hispanic Black and 
Foreign-Born Residents, Miami-Dade County, 197012 
 
 
                                                 
12 Miami has always had foreign born residents but their high concentration in certain Census Tracts by 
1970 reflects the rapid influx and spatial segregation of Cubans (Winsberg 1979, 1983). Although the 
greatest number of Puerto Ricans in the County resided in and around Wynwood, the map depicts four 
other clusters of Puerto Rican residents in 1970. The southwestern area of Miami-Dade County is where 
Puerto Rican migrant farm workers originally settled in the decades following World War II. The other 
clusters are in the north-central corridor of Miami-Dade County, inhabited mostly by African-Americans 
and also containing large concentrations of public housing. As U.S. citizens, many low-income Puerto 
Ricans were immediately eligible for housing assistance and came to live in these areas. Still others were 
steered to these neighborhoods through the racist processes of redlining that limited Puerto Ricans 
affordable housing options (see Shell-Weiss [2009] and news articles cited below). 
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Territorial Stigmatization in Miami’s Cold War Context 
Through the networks of Puerto Ricans (discussed in Chapter 3), Wynwood 
became known to both islanders and Miamians as a Puerto Rican place, albeit often in 
negative terms. Although residents had a more positive perception of the neighborhood 
prior to the 1980s, negative stigmas were created and perpetuated by government 
officials (often parroted and disseminated by the media) since the advent of slum 
clearance and renewal policies in the 1950s and 60s. In 1952, a Miami Daily News cover 
page article (reprinted in Puerto Rico’s El Mundo) referred to the southern section of 
Wynwood as “a Puerto Rican Slum in Miami,” featuring a picture of an apartment house 
on 25th Street and N. Miami Avenue where 50 migrant workers lived and which the 
reporter described as “worse than in the central district for blacks.” Throughout the 
1950s, newspapers drew attention not only to housing conditions in Puerto Rican 
Wynwood but also to crimes committed by Puerto Ricans (mostly outside of Miami) and 
their involvement and militancy in unionization campaigns in Miami and elsewhere 
(notably in Puerto Rico).13 During this period the neighborhood came under increasing 
police scrutiny, with Miami’s police chief referring to the area as “one of the greatest 
crime threats” in the city, claiming that “crimes of violence recorded for Puerto Ricans 
are greatly out of proportion to their numbers,” despite evidence to the contrary (Shell-
Weiss 2009, p. 154). There were no major newspaper reports of gangs or any other kind 
of violence in Wynwood during the 1950s and 60s. Instead, the chief’s concerns were 
                                                 
13 In addition to Shell-Weiss’ (2009, Chapters 5 and 6) review of articles, see articles in the St. Petersburg 
Times (May 13, 1952), Sarasota-Herald Tribune (March 4, 1955), Daytona Beach Morning Journal 
(August 8, 1958) and the Miami Daily News (Roberts 1954a, 1954b, 1954c, 1954d, 1954e; December 1, 
1956; Colbert 1957a, 1957b, 1957c, 1957d). 
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with Puerto Ricans’ alleged tendency to “congregate in groups,” “make obscene remarks 
at women,” and claim not to understand English (Ibid). 
 
Figure 2.3: Image from a 1957 Miami Daily News cover story on the “Puerto Rican 
Problem” 
 
 
Image caption: “Colony extending north: Much of this area is a slum.” 
Source: Colbert, Haines. 1957. Puerto Ricans in Miami: A Debatable 
Issue. Miami Daily News, April 22, Cover. 
 
 
Despite the negative perception of Wynwood by outsiders (e.g. the police, 
reporters), my Puerto Rican interview respondents remember the 1950s through the 
1970s in Wynwood as good and “tranquil” times, particularly compared to their 
assessment of the 1980s and 1990s, considered the area’s worst years. Those who lived in 
Wynwood in the 1950s noted the potential for violence, evident from the presence of 
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“Latino, Anglo and Italian gangs” in a neighborhood of “mostly Rednecks—the old 
Anglo-Saxon southerners,” according to Felipe, although he couldn’t recall any major 
conflicts. There were also Black gangs as Larry pointed out, “[NW] Second Avenue was 
the differentiation point of the black American at the time… so we needed not to go over 
west, because that was their territory and they didn’t come into our territory.”  Most 
respondents agreed that the 1980s marked a turning point. As Marta put it, “in 1980 it 
already got bad here. You know a lot people came from different places14 and it got 
pretty bad. There were a lot of delinquents, many things that we still have, lots of drugs 
too.” Like Miami’s representation in the media more generally, satirical hyperbole is not 
uncommon in Wynwood, such as Carlos’ exclamation that “the neighborhood was wild. 
That was a Vietnam there. They would steal your socks without taking your shoes off!”  
Yet, Carlos’ son pointed out that “Wynwood, for all its vices… still had that quality of a 
real neighborhood,” where Puerto Rican social networks functioned as a “village” for 
watching over children and neighbors.  
The concentration of Puerto Ricans throughout low-income and particularly near 
African-American neighborhoods in the post-war decades, and the stigmatization of these 
areas by a variety of sources, set the stage for future policy interventions that would play 
an important role in shaping the built environment of these neighborhoods as well as 
residents’ capacity to engage these interventions and shape their own neighborhood. As 
Mohl (1995, 2001a), Shell-Weiss (2009), Connolly (2006, 2009) have analyzed 
elsewhere, in post-war Miami highway construction, zoning and building code 
                                                 
14 She was referring to the Cuban “Marielitos” and Haitian “boat people” in 1980 (see Portes and Stepick 
1985). 
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enforcement, and other legal and discursive mechanisms were created and used to 
disperse and control African-Americans to the extent they interfered with industrialists’ 
profits or business plans. Downtown expansion compelled “urban renewal” and “slum 
clearance” but these plans were also complicated by a combination of political and 
economic forces throughout the Cold War climate. Fiscal conservatism wrapped in anti-
communism limited the extent and quality of replacement housing15 while slumlords 
lobbied to protect their (dis)investments.16 Finally, as the civil rights movement grew 
nationally and locally and was gradually absorbed into policy and planning mechanisms, 
a particular science of government emerged to justify slum clearance in increasingly 
humane and economic (or “progressive”) terms that concealed the racist and classist 
foundations of urban planning and redevelopment.17 Refashioned into a progressive 
discourse of economic prosperity for all, suburbanization and expressway construction 
                                                 
15 During the 1950s, police, civic and political leaders at state and local levels repeatedly sought to 
associate communism with ethnic groups, “progressive” policies and even “tolerant” attitudes toward 
poverty (as I demonstrate in the case of Puerto Ricans’ living and working spaces). Slum clearance itself 
was not challenged, but conservatives opposed providing relocation assistance to displaced Black residents. 
“One of the best ways to get rid of communism,” argued senate challenger George Smathers during the 
1950 Florida Democratic Party, “is by getting rid of our slums.” Meanwhile, in Miami, protesters took to 
the streets with signs that read “Can you afford to pay somebody else’s rent?” and “Are the Communists 
for public housing? You bet they are!” (Shell-Weiss 2009, p. 136-137). The result was that slum clearance 
remained unfinished (to the dismay of White, Black and Hispanic urban renewal advocates) until the 
federal highway construction plans were rerouted through Miami’s low-income and predominantly Black 
neighborhoods (Mohl 1995). 
 
16 Indeed, the debate over Black housing was essentially one had between different segments of White real 
estate interests (Mohl 1995, 2001a; Shell-Weiss 2009). While slum clearance and renewal was promoted by 
downtown elites, those who most forcefully resisted slum clearance in Coconut Grove and Overtown were 
the White owners of slum housing, evident from their “the unhappy jeers of the landlords” at various public 
hearings (The Miami News, 1961, p. 10A). As I discus below, the coalition to protect Black homeowners 
was heavily dependent on the advocacy and lobbying of Elizabeth Virrick, a White activist from Coconut 
Grove (Mohl 1995, 2001b; Shell-Weiss 2009). 
 
17 Analysts have noted the lack of militant Black leadership in Miami (Mohl 1990, 2001b) and suggested 
that the potential radicalization of the civil rights movement and coalition building between different ethnic 
groups (e.g., Blacks, Jews, Puerto Ricans and other Latinos) was interrupted or short-circuited by Cuban 
immigration in the 1960s (Mohl 1999; Shell-Weiss 2009). 
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destroyed the resource base of inner city neighborhoods while urban renewal and slum 
clearance served the downtown-based, White civic and business elite who were virtually 
unopposed (Mohl 2001a 2001b, 2004).  
Shell-Weiss (2009) documents how as the number of Puerto Ricans grew in 
Miami and became increasingly involved in garment industry unionization campaigns, 
“the initially positive attitude18 about this community shifted dramatically” (p. 144-145). 
In a 1949 article entitled, “Miami Chosen Center of Latin Red Network” and a series of 
articles in subsequent years, the Miami Daily News highlighted the role of union 
organizing among the city’s Latino garment workers—heavily Puerto Rican—in shifting 
the “center of subversion in the United States… from California to Miami” (Crouch 
1949, p. 1A). Thanks in part to union organizing which sought to build class alliances 
across racial lines, Wynwood became known (accurately or not) for its heterogeneous 
racial composition—in particular, the perceived propensity of low-income Latinos, 
mostly Puerto Ricans in the 1950s (but later other Hispanics), to live near and among 
African-Americans.19 Although expressed in terms of fears of “mixed racial stock”20 and 
the potential for inter-racial alliances that could challenge the black-white segregation 
system, Shell-Weiss (2009) reveals how the actual threat was the potential for class-based 
                                                 
18 Shell-Weiss is referring to positive attitudes about the wealthy Puerto Rican families that settled in South 
in the early 1940s. 
 
19 Researchers in New York have noted the propensity of Puerto Ricans, compared to Whites, Hispanics 
and most other immigrant groups, to live spatially closer to African-Americans (Massey and Bitterman 
1985; Galster and Santiago 1994; Freeman 1999), without explaining how the concentration of Puerto 
Ricans in inner city “ghettoes” was largely a result of racial discrimination in housing markets (Grosfoguel 
2003; Davila 2004). 
 
20 These fears were expressed, on the one hand, by the Police and “pro-segregationists” in Miami during the 
1950s. But resentment was also expressed by African-Americans who perceived that Spanish language 
allowed darker-skinned Latinos to “pass” as non-Black and were therefore accorded better treatment (Shell-
Weiss 2009, p. 155). 
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alliances and conflict that challenged industrialists’ capacity to exploit workers by 
dividing them along ethnic lines. For example, during a major International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) campaign in 1955, the union distributed fliers with a 
photo of a factory owner’s Miami Beach home shown above a photo of Wynwood 
apartment houses, “emphasizing shared living conditions among workers and locating the 
labor dispute in Miami's neighborhoods” (Ibid, p. 166). Beyond the assessment that such 
tactics temporarily but “effectively united workers across ethnic lines,”21 they also 
reflected the reality of an urban space (a location) occupied by marginalized U.S. 
citizens, from which some form of resistant, alternative urban as well as workplace 
politics might emerge. 
The 1950s was a period of incipient stigmatization of a neighborhood constructed 
as one of Miami’s first middle-class suburbs. As will become increasingly clear from 
subsequent analyses of city politics and planning processes, Wynwood’s relatively 
heterogeneous socio-spatial composition made it the target of a variety of remedial 
interventions and governance techniques during the latter half of the 20th century. 
Although there has been no explicit policy objective or political discourse to “break up” 
the mixing, so to speak, there is a clear drive in subsequent decades toward a social and 
physical homogenization—“disciplinary normalization” (Foucault 1977, 2009)—of the 
area in the name of security and social control; to harden the edges at which difference 
and contact occur, and “segregate uses” (in typical urban planning parlance). As the 
economic base of the neighborhood declined and civil rights activism made official race 
                                                 
21 In Shell-Weiss’ account  (e.g., p. 165-168)  industrialists ultimately prevailed by either relocating their 
operations or, in a few notorious cases, “by bringing in all Puerto Rican ‘scabs’.” This led many Anglo- and 
African-American workers to “worry that Puerto Ricans would ‘take away’ their jobs ,” and to claims that 
“Latinos were ‘bad union people’ or were ‘clanninsh’.” 
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domination increasingly untenable, a “scientific basis for slum clearance” emerged with 
increasing legitimacy. A variety of governance techniques were implemented until 
Wynwood could be considered a “clean canvas” for redevelopment—processes which 
took several decades. 
  
The “Science” of Slum Clearance 
As U.S. cities suburbanized in the post-war period, urban renewal planning and 
implementation were set in motion by the 1949 and 1954 U.S. Housing Acts, through 
which the federal government required and helped to finance slum clearance, including 
the planning research needed to legitimize such interventions. The primary aim of urban 
renewal in the 1950s was demolition and clearance of central city “slum” housing to 
enhance the downtown business environment while linking it more efficiently with the 
suburban professional classes; but an equally important outcome (particularly in the view 
of local elites) was the displacement and dispersal of “problem” populations surrounding 
downtowns, particularly poor Black residents (Harvey 1973; Mollenkopf 1975; Molotch 
1976; Fainstein and Fainstein 1978; Castells 1983). But since this task was complicated 
by increasing resistance and militancy from community organizations in the 1960s, a 
variety of services and programs to “manage” urban renewal were also devised and 
implemented (Ibid). Funding and institutional support for such programs “suffered from 
an unusual degree of temporal inconsistency” and thus “public housing, urban renewal, 
below-market-interest-rate subsidies, Model Cities-each has come and gone, leaving 
unfunded plans and half-finished projects in its wake” (Fainstein and Fainstein 1978, p. 
135). Nevertheless, through these programs a science of urban governance was born and 
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gave rise to a wide variety of implementation techniques22 that sought to make urban 
space, and its resident populations, more governable in order to “secure” the inner city for 
higher investment returns (Harvey 1975, 1989; Gottdiener 1994). Research was important 
for legitimizing these interventions. The production of scientific knowledge about the 
inner city not only lent geo-statistical precision to renewal activities but also presented a 
veil of accountability. 
By the 1960s Wynwood, like other inner city “slums,” came under increased 
scrutiny by public planning boards, government research agencies, zoning and building 
departments, and policy-makers. Whereas Miami-Dade County’s (1949) first research 
report serving as “the scientific basis for slum clearance” focused on the “two principal 
blighted areas” of Overtown and Coconut Grove, in the 1960s the newly created Dade 
County Welfare Planning Council carried out a series of research reports (1963-1967) 
resulting in a “complete inventory” of the City of Miami’s “social and physical problem 
areas” (Sterne 1965, p. 2) – which included Wynwood. Deemed the basis of “a long-
range program for elimination of the City’s blighted areas,” the series of five reports 
marked the initiation of the County’s Community Renewal Program (CRP) which 
identified not only priority areas for clearance but also the corresponding social and 
economic “needs” of residents (City of Miami 1967). The University of Miami 
sociologist, Sterne (1965), made the case for the integration and management of 
residents. Given the complex factors causing extreme poverty, for urban renewal to be 
successful: 
                                                 
22 This includes not only governing by force but also production and facilitation of self-management 
through “public-private partnerships” that integrate “citizen participation” (see e.g., Foucault 1979a, 1982; 
Rabinow and Rose 2003; Jessop 2007).  
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[C]onsideration… must be given not only to buildings and other physical 
elements, but also to the underlying cultural and social matrix. The urban dweller 
himself… needs attention. If the urban dweller is economically productive and 
socially well adjusted, he is an asset to the city. If he is poor, or a problem to 
himself and to others, he makes his neighborhood less desirable. The 
maladjustments of this type of person are called ‘social problems.’ (Ibid, p. 4)23 
 
Another section of the analysis brought the urban dweller into closer focus by asking:  
Are problems concentrated in certain minority groups? For example, are the 
Negroes or the Cubans special problems? It was deemed desirable to determine to 
what extent these groups required specific social assistance and to what extent 
they located in the City’s slum areas. The same question might be asked about the 
Puerto Ricans; however, their number is relatively small and, also, they are mixed 
with native whites in certain areas. These factors make it very difficult to validly 
separate the Puerto Ricans. (Ibid, pp. 37-38) 
 
Sterne’s research targeted the geographic areas in which different ethnic groups 
lived, particularly “the Negroes who had the highest problem scores” compared to “the 
Cuban population [which] had few social problems.” Puerto Ricans could not be singled 
out statistically for social problems, though their spatial mixing with Whites in certain 
neighborhoods was carefully noted. Stern’s research served as the basis for city officials 
to “target areas”24 for remedial intervention, determined by a formula which counted the 
number and measured the correlation of a variety “social problem” cases25 within sub-
sections of Census Tracts, deemed Analysis Districts. Of hundreds of districts identified 
                                                 
23 The footnote to this section of the introduction reveals that “the statement just made reflects—with the 
substitution of ‘Miami’ for Liverpool—the wording in a report printed in England. Miami shares problems 
with metropolitan areas the world over.” 
 
24 In the city’s renewal plan the term Target Area is used as a noun, not as a verb the way I do here. 
 
25 The following “problems” were included: Illegitimate births (a proxy for “Fatherless Families”), Aid to 
Dependent Children (Federal Welfare), Aid to the Disabled, County Welfare Cases, Syphilis, Old Age 
Assistance, Tuberculosis, Aid to the Blind, Infant Mortalities, Adult Arrests, Juvenile Arrests, School Drop 
Outs. 
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as having some extent of “problems,” the study designated 13 as Target Areas in need of 
further study and specialized planning, two of which were within the southern sections of 
Wynwood (p. 64). The Wynwood Target Areas were given “problem scores” of “middle” 
and “low to high,” due to the “mix” of “low level of social problems” with “high level of 
physical problems.” The report further described the neighborhood’s problem areas: 
 
[Wynwood Area 1:] Residential uses [mixed] with institutional and commercial. 
Housing is largely deteriorated. Definite transitional area with regard to hospital-
complex expansion.  
 
[Wynwood Area 2:] Older Latin area. Has many diverse uses ranging from single 
family dwellings to light manufacturing and a railroad yard. Area is bordered and 
bisected by heavily traveled streets and the North-South Expressway cuts through 
the Western end. Considerable deterioration of both residential and non-
residential uses. 
  
 “As with other parts of the total Community Renewal Program,” concluded Sterne 
(p. 68), the 1965 Social Problem Areas study “will actually mark only the beginning of a 
concerted effort to meet needs and problems of people and their City.” Indeed, the series 
of reports marked the beginning of the construction of a “scientific” rationality of 
government for implementing physical redevelopment of the inner city. In the context of 
increasing tensions between industrialists and workers, natives and immigrants, white and 
non-white residents, this emerging “spatial governmentality” (see Merry 2001; Huxley 
2007) claimed “to develop greater depth and understanding of social conditions and 
needs of people and their neighborhoods, so that urban renewal action projects can be 
more sensitively applied to particular areas” (Sterne 1965, p. 67).  
However, the mandate for research, planning and “sensitivity” came from the 
federal government, which was facing growing challenges to urban renewal from 
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residents in cities such as San Francisco and New York. No such sensitivity was needed 
or actually applied in Miami, since there was no organized, mass opposition to slum 
cleraance or expressway construction during the 1950s or 1960s (Mohl 2001b, 2004; 
Shell-Weiss 2009).26  Leaders of Black communities, which were the most affected by 
urban renewal, were sharply divided on questions of slum clearance and public housing 
(Shell-Weiss 2009, 135-138),27 and this helped the White business and civic elite to 
opreate relatively uncontested well into the 1970s (see Mohl 2001b, 2004). Since 
Miami’s expressways were built relatively early (1964-69), without delays, and because 
amendments to urban renewal reequiring greater local participation and oversight kicked 
in after inner city homes had been demolished, most affected residents (especially Black 
residents) received little more than 24 hours notice to clear out and received no relocation 
                                                 
26 During the 1950s, the Coconut Grove “housing reformers” Elizabeth Virrick and Rev. Theodore Gibson 
advocacy of slum clearance and public housing, supported crucially by a coalition of “progressive” Whites 
among the civic elite (including major newspaper editors), was opposed only by slumlords and the 
politicians they supported (a majority on the Miami City Commission), which likened such government 
intervention to communism (Mohl 1995, 2001b; Shell-Weiss 2009). But by the 1960s real estate interests 
realized they stood to gain from subsidized redevelopment and instead focused on using the occasion to 
build new Black housing and “blockbust” White neighborhoods in outlying areas. Local control of urban 
renewal by real estate entrepreneurs ensured that replacement public housing and social services were 
limited so as to allow the private sector a virtual monopoly on displaced families’ housing needs (Ibid). 
This situation was exacerbated when expressway construction began in 1965. Virrick was forced to reverse 
her advocacy of slum clearance, realizing it had been manipulated by slumlords, and “throughout the 
expressway-building era [she] was a lonely... voice speaking out on the necessity of linking highway 
construction with public housing and  relocation programs” (Mohl 2001b, p. 31). 
 
27 According to Shell-Weiss (2009, p. 135-138),  the Grove’s Black Bahamians had higher rates of 
homeownership and therefore tended to prefer slum clearance policies, while Overtown leaders more often 
opposed demolition but were resigned to accepting the status quo of downtown expansion and Black 
dispersal. Miami’s civil rights movement was relatively small and peaceful compared to other parts of the 
country (see e.g., Piven and Cloward 1979; Castells 1983; Fainstein and Fainstein 1985). While some local 
stakeholders and analysts argue it was marginalized and deflated by its coincidence with the mass in-
migration of Cuban political refugees after 1959 (Portes and Stepick 1993; Shell-Weiss 2009), others have  
noted limitations inherent to civil rights leadership in Miami and attempts to build an interracial alliance 
between Jews and Black prior to 1959 (Mohl 1999). 
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assistance other than a redirection to what Mohl (1995) termed “the second ghetto” 
(Ibid).28 
There is evidence that urban renewal and expressway construction negatively 
impacted several inner city neighborhood in addition to Overtown, which is typically 
cited as the neighborhood that was “destroyed” by the routing of Interstate 95 (see Dluhy, 
Reveall and Wong 2002; Connolly 2006). Mostly white, working-class neighborhoods 
such as Allapattah, Buena Vista and Wynwood lost hundreds of homes and important 
commercial corridors and neighbrohood institutions during the 1960s.  
Respondents described NW 7th Avenue, between 20th and 36th streets, as 
Wynwood and Allapattah’s “downtown” area, home to one of Miami’s oldest movie 
houses (the Strand Theater), a roller rink and a variety of successful stores and 
restaurants.29  A recent Miami Herald retrospective wrote that “Seventh Avenue once 
brimmed with civic importance” (De Vise 2004, p. 1B).  A respondent who was born and 
raised in Wynwood during the 1950s recalled that “the highway just changed 
everything… we had NW 5th and 6th avenues and [I-95] went right down through the 
                                                 
28 By the time the south extention of Interstate-95 had broken ground, meetings were just taking place to 
plan for how to provide social services to displaced families (Blanchard 1966). “What has taken years and a 
complexity of social conditions to build up,” said the Housing Agency director about the needs of displaced 
families, “will take years and a coordination of social effort to begin to rectify” (Ibid, p. 4A, emphasis 
added). Three years later the same Housing Agency director was criticizing the County Commissions’ 
delay tactics (Robertson 1969). Indeed, by 1970, the Model City program, which was the largest of the 
local urban renewal “social programs” meant to help displaced families, was so mired in delays by 
bureacratic gatekeepers at County Hall that the Chair of the Model City Governing Board (also City of 
Miami Vice Mayor), Athalie Range, along with several other members resigned in protest (Blanchard 
1970). Not until community development funding in the 1970s would more effective service programs be 
implemented , nearly a decade after more than  10,000 Black families were displaced by  urban renewal 
and expressway construction (City of Miami 1967). 
 
29 Interviews with three male respondents who grew up in Wynwood during the 1950s and early 1960s: a 
half-Cuban/half-Puerto Rican-American born in New York, a Cuban-American who moved with his family 
when he was less than a year old, and an Anglo-American who was born and raised there (whose wife also 
contributed to the interview but had only lived in the neighborhood for 2 years). 
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middle and took 7th Avenue with them. [They] took housing, of course, for the right-of-
way, and people that we had known for years… moved out when they built 95.” Another 
respondent noted that, in retrospect, he can understand why his parents moved out of the 
area in the early 1960s: “I-95 and [Expressway] 836 were in the process of completion. It 
seems that once 95 was completed, things began to decline in Wynwood.” A 1964 Miami 
News article about a long-time neighborhood bakery deemed “a notable institution which 
elected to stay,” lamented that “when the expressway intruded, several commercial 
landmarks disappeared” (Ash 1964, p. 15). The owners of the bakery estimated that 
expressways’ construction “cost close to 800 customers” (Ibid).  In an interview with 
Fernando, the priest of a Catholic Church based in Wynwood and Allapattah—one of the 
Miami’s largest and an neighborhood important institution—he used the design of the 
parish system to illustrate how the expressway “killed the parish and the neighborhood”: 
 
 
Consider how… the parish faces the expressway. It doesn’t make sense. It was 
built in 1959… when the [expressway] was not the in the middle of the 
neighborhood. Inserting the expressway, well, then the neighborhood of 
Wynwood was separated from the parish. Wynwood was left constrained between 
the expressway and the railroad tracks. If you notice, there is no connection 
between Wynwood and Edgewater [the eastern bayfront neighborhood], only 
through 36 or 29th streets. In short, [Wynwood] was converted into a ghetto. 
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Figure 2.4: Aerial View of Wynwood Catholic Parish Bisected by Interstate 95 
 
 
Source: Authors’ photo of the priests’ aerial images of a 
portion of the Wynwood Catholic Parish, taken during our 
interview. The yellow pushpin is the main church facing the 
expressway which divides the parish base, outlined in red. 
 
 As the expressways were built,30 the Dade County Welfare Planning Council was 
completing the series of research reports that would initiate and serve as the empirical 
                                                 
30 The Airport Expressway that cut from the northwest corner of Wynwood across Allapattah and west to 
the Airport was completed in 1964 (Ash 1964), while the southern extension of Interstate 95 into the City 
of Miami began construction in the Lemon City area (now Liberty City  and Little Haiti) in the latter half of 
1964 (Nellius 1964). By January, 1965, all of the housing demolition required for the segment of Interstate 
95 routed through Overtown, Wynwood and Allapattah was complete and some sections of the expressway 
were under construction in these areas (Hale 1965). Among the last segments of the Interstate system built 
in the City of Miami, the Midtown Interchange (between the north-south and east-west expressways) and 
the southernmost sections routed through Overtown were built between 1966 and 1968 and occupied a six 
block section of the northwest corner of Wynwood (The Miami News, 1967; Williams 1967; Dluhy, Revell 
and Wong 2002; Mohl 2004). 
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basis for the City of Miami Community Renewal Program, described above. Using data 
from Sterne’s (1965) survey, the Planning Council’s final research report (City of Miami 
1967) compared neighborhood-level statistics from 1960 and 1965. In Census Tract 26, 
the northern and wealthiest section of Wynwood, single family home values decreased 
between 11 and 20 percent, one of the highest rates in the City (Map 35, p. 48). The 
population decreased in only five City of Miami Census Tracts (Map 1, p. 3), three of 
which comprised Overtown and southeastern corner of Allapattah, through which 
Interstate 95 was built. During the same period (1960-1965), the population-per-
household increased in only four inner city Census Tracts: three (19.01, 19.03, 19.04) in 
southeast Liberty City, where most displaced Overtown residents were relocated; and 
Census Tract 28 which comprises the southern and (at the time) Puerto Rican half of 
Wynwood, bordering Overtown. Since urban renewal only funded the construction of 
“about one low-rent unit for every six displaced families” and most new units were more 
expensive than those demolished (Hartman 1964, 1971; Columbia Law Review, 1966), 
clearing slums to make way for the expressways may have led to increasing population 
densities in nearby and already crowded, low-income districts such as Wynwood (Sterne 
1965). However, it is not clear whether these data reveal the initial impacts of highway 
construction or whether highway construction merely coincided with these patterns, 
possibly but not necessarily contributing to them. 
Nevertheless, research on the impact of highway construction has argued that 
urban renewal destroyed inner city neighborhoods (see Hirsch and Mohl 1993; Mohl 
1995). In their research on Overtown business patterns during the period when the 
highway was built through the neighborhood, Dluhy, Revell and Wong (2002) found that 
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the number of businesses dropped by 23 percent from 1966 to 1967, the largest single-
year decline in the neighborhood’s history. Other research focused on the displacement of 
residents and the lack of relocation assistance and replacement housing provided (e.g., 
Hartman 1964, 1971; Downs 1970).  “Given the realities of the low-income housing 
market,” wrote Hartman (1964, p. 278), “for many families, relocation [means] no more 
than keeping one step ahead of the bulldozer.”  
In many parts of the country, urban renewal also led to the construction of high-
rise public housing projects that would later be condemned for their “concentrating” 
effects on poverty, crime, and the resulting socio-economic isolation of poor 
communities (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1996).  However, in Miami public 
housing construction was both more limited and designed for lower-density occupancy, 
thanks largely to elected officials’ “commitment” to “free enterprise” (Mohl 1995, 2001a) 
or, put differently, to conserving local real estate investors’ monopoly on slum housing. 
While the concentration and isolation of poverty in Miami’s inner city neighborhoods 
nonetheless increased (Boswell and Cruz-Baez 1997; Dluhy, Revell and Wong 2002), 
poverty and low-income housing also became more dispersed (City of Miami 1967; 
Winsberg 1983) owing in large part to the availability of outlying tracts of land controlled 
by blockbusting real estate investors (George and Petersen 1988; Mohl 1995, 2001a, 
2004).31 The somewhat unique historical combination of both high poverty and dispersed 
                                                 
31 A crucial result of these historic processes is that while a large share of low-income neighborhoods (land 
acreage) is covered by public housing, the overall number of units are fewer, leading Miami to have a 
comparably smaller share of subsidized units within its overall housing stock and comparably higher rates 
of housing cost-burden, overcrowding and other hardship (on cost-burden see e.g., Feldman 2007). 
According to data from the Universoty of Florida’s Shimberg Center for Affordable Housing (Shimberg 
2007), public housing (project-based Section 8) and units subsidized by rental vouchers, not including 
housing financed by local municipalities, represent only 6.2 percent of Miami-Dade’s rental housing 
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poverty32 reflects the region’s economic dependence on tourism and real estate—that is, 
many low-wage workers are needed to service the economy but should be housed as far 
from the view of investors and consumers as possible (Nijman 2011). 
Viewed over a longer time frame, urban renewal and expressway construction in 
Wynwood may be interpreted as the primary mechanisms for creating the “spatial fix” 
needed by investors to eventually revitalize the area (Harvey 1985, 1989; Smith 1996; 
Weber et al. 2006). Although typically conceptualized in terms of its economic function 
(Ibid), the spatial fix is also social and political as the removal of residents reduces the 
possibility of neighborhood opposition to future redevelopment proposals and projects 
(Gibbs-Knotts and Haspel 2006; Martin 2007). Incipient stigmatization, uncontested 
urban renewal and the lack (or insignificance) of poor people’s social movements 
exacerbated the socio-spatial dispersion of Miami’s low-income communities (see Maps 
below), further weakening the possibility of collective action for social change. To the 
extent that by the 1970s, at the height of urban activism elsewhere in the country, 
attempts were being made at interracial urban social movements (Castells 1983; Mantler 
2008),33 in Miami limited interacial efforts either within unions (as noted above in Shell-
Weiss 2009, pp. 165-168) or within the frame of civil rights activism (Mohl 1999) did not 
                                                                                                                                                 
market. Although there is no database that provides directly comparable statistics, the figures in a recent 
UCLA research report (Kucheva 2011) reveal that in cities such as New York, Chicago and Los Angeles 
(the report does not include Miami), project-based public housing and rental vouchers comprise between 14 
and 17 percent of those cities rental markets. 
 
32 This was unique during the immediate postwar period, perhaps making Miami a forerunner to later 
federal policy developments (discussed below). 
 
33 These and other analysts (Fainstein and Fainstein 1985; Fainstein and Hirst 1994) nevertheless found that 
interracial urban social movements were largely unsuccessful in their aims and fragmented by the late 
1970s and especially the 1980s, in relation to their increasing “enfranchisement” under community 
development programs. Nevertheless, some have argued that they left an institutional legacy for future 
interracial organizing (Castells 1983; Mantler 2008). 
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survive into the 1960s. Urban renewal policies were not soley responsible for this 
outcome, since the diseprsion of African-American and Afro-Caribbean communities in 
Miami had begun during the 1930s (Mohl 1995; Dluhy, Revell and Wong 2002) and 
because pockets of poverty had to some extent always been dispersed throughout the 
region (George 1978). (Cuban migration, as I will discuss later, also affected the 
possibility of social movement-building among Miami’s poorest residents.)  But during 
the 1960s and 1970s, urban renewal accelerated low income residents’ displacement from 
the urban core, thus initating a decades-long process of removing them as physical and 
potentially political obstacles to redevelopment. The resulting spatial and political 
fragmentation facilitated the downtown business elites’ control of urban redevelopment 
in the postwar period. Ironically, the only constituent group that has been effective in 
stopping redevelopment projects has been activists in the Overtown neighborhood who 
sued on numerous occasions to halt public plans and projects on the basis of the historical 
injustices sufferred without the payment of any reparations (Dluhy, Revell and Wong 
2002). 
Urban renewal and public housing “met their effective demise in the 1970s” 
because of “the inability of either to significantly counter the decay of the nation’s older 
urban areas” (Judd 1988, p. 275), which is putting it midly. However, local real estate 
interests and downtown elites manipulated postwar urban renewal and highway 
construction in such a way that these programs destroyed inner city neighbrohoods and 
made poverty worse in nearby neighborhoods that were not “cleared.”  Indeed, such 
neighbrohoods became the target of future strategies referred to as the “second wave” of 
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subsidized redevelopment and refashioned as “community development” (Stoecker 1997; 
Hackworth 2001; Smith 2002; Gotham 2005). 
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Figure 2.5: Map of the Percent of Persons with Incomes below the Federal Poverty 
Line, Selected Race/Ethnic Groups, Miami-Dade County, 1970
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Figure 2.6: Map of Poverty Rate in 1970 for Selected Race/Ethnic Groups and 
Poverty Rate Change, 1970-1980, Miami-Dade County 
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III. THE MAKING OF PUERTO RICAN WYNWOOD 
Urban renewal, the interstate highway system and suburbanization in conjunction 
with the deindustrialization of U.S. cities cemented the economic decline of many inner 
city neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993; Mohl 1995; Wilson 1996). As the federal 
government intervened by underwriting these processes, inner city residents organized to 
demand political representation, basic services and greater control over their 
neighborhoods (Castells 1983; Fainstein, Fainstein and Armistead 1983). Some of the 
community organizations that emerged to challenge the existing urban political system 
made advances in terms of social services and limited political representation for the 
poorest residents, but their “bureaucratic enfranchisement” (Fainstein, Fainstein and 
Armistead 1983) also fragmented their leadership and constituencies by co-opting 
moderate activists toward narrower objectives and excluding the most radical (Piven and 
Cloward 1979; Castells 1983). In many cases, as neighborhood decline later turned to 
gentrification and “community development” took an increasingly entrepreneurial turn, 
co-opted organizations evolved into Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and 
worked to revitalize their neighborhoods in the absence of “community control,” paving 
the way for unequal redevelopment and investment by larger, wealthier companies 
(Logan and Molotch 1987; Bockmeyer 2003; DeFilippis 2004; Newman 2004; 
Kirkpatrick 2007). 
The following describes the emergence of community organizations in Wynwood 
through the activism of Puerto Rican leaders in the 1970s. As with ethnic- and race-based 
civil-rights era movements in other U.S. cities (Mollenkopf 1975; Castells 1983), as well 
as the mobilization of Puerto Ricans in places like Chicago and New York (Padilla 1987; 
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Melendez 2003), racism and segregation, extreme poverty and political exclusion (despite 
their U.S. citizenship) were the basis for Puerto Rican mobilization in Wynwood in the 
late 1960s.  
As Castells (1983) pointed out in the case of Chicanos in San Francisco’s Mission 
District, the crucial catalyst to community organization in the late 1960s was service 
funding – especially, but not exclusively, from the government. The organization of 
Puerto Rican activists in Wynwood was at first made possible by neighborhood 
organizing supported by religious institutions. In the climate of the civil rights era, the 
neighborhood’s Puerto Rican leaders demanded government funding for services on the 
basis of ethnic and racial discrimination. The program funding that was conceded led to 
the formation of Puerto Rican service agencies and by the mid-1970s, Puerto Rican 
mobilization had been channeled into these programs, funding for which was controlled 
by Miami City Hall. As happened across the U.S. (Fainstein, Fainstein and Armistead 
1982), “bureaucratic enfranchisement” redirected conflict inward, among the residents 
and leaders. What started as a somewhat united cadre of activists – Puertorriqueños 
Unidos – over time revealed fissures, as leaders shed their militancy and narrowed their 
objectives; one leader became a wealthy real estate investor, while some newcomers with 
Puerto Rican credentials sought power at the helm of service programs.  
As subsequent chapters will make clear, the organizations established by these 
activists would eventually help to facilitate gentrification – not only because they were 
powerless and even reluctant to oppose it or implement alternatives; but also because 
toward the turn of the 21st Century the decentralized and privatized governance of 
gentrification incorporated the Puerto Rican leadership as junior partners. 
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What follows is not an exhaustive history but draws on a few key examples 
involving the most influential leaders and organizations. In discussing the conflict 
between different individuals or groups, my objective is not to uncover the reasons for 
conflict, as the impact of organizational enfranchisement on poor people’s movement has 
been dealt with in greater detail elsewhere (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1979; Castells 1983). 
Instead, I aim to lay the foundation for understanding the legacy of political engagement 
left by key leaders and organizations during the 1970s, while the longer-term impacts of 
this legacy will be examined in subsequent chatpers. Before turning to the rise and 
evolution of the Puerto Rican community organizations, I describe how Puerto Ricans 
came to live in Wynwood and provide a social and geographic profile of the 
neighborhood. 
 
Puerto Rican Migration 
While the number of Puerto Ricans has increased rapidly in the last three 
decades throughout the State of Florida, particularly in Central and South Florida, in 
the City of Miami their presence peaked around 1980, representing 4 percent of the 
city’s population (Table 3.1). Although in the table below I rely on U.S. Census 
Tract enumerations compiled in the Neighborhood Change Database (NCBD), it is 
well-known that the Census underestimates the Puerto Rican population (Duany 
1992, 2000; Rodriguez and Monserrat 2000).34 
                                                 
34 The extent of the undercount was greatest in 1970 due to incompetence and insensitivity on the part 
of the Census Bureau (U.S. Civil Rights Commission 1974) as well as the socio-cultural context 
shaping Puerto Ricans’ responsiveness to the census questionnaires (Duany 1992, 2000; Rodriguez 
and Monserrat 2000).  Duany’s (1992) review of and own ethnographic research among Puerto Ricans 
in the U.S. and on the island found that among Puerto Ricans who do not respond or respond partially 
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The experiences of Puerto Ricans in Miami have differed somewhat from that 
of their counterparts in the major northeastern cities.35  Florida has the second-largest 
concentration of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. outside of New York, mostly concentrated 
in three major metropolitan areas: Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, Miami-Ft. 
Lauderdale, and Tampa-St. Petersburg (Duany and Matos-Rodriguez 2006). Miami-
Dade County has the second largest number of Puerto Ricans in Florida behind 
Orlando, but like the rest of Florida’s Puerto Ricans, those in Miami tend to have 
higher levels of education and income compared to elsewhere in the U.S. (Duany and 
Matos-Rodriguez 2006). Long before Orlando’s emergence as a major Puerto Rican 
destination in the 1990s, Miami’s urban, suburban and rural areas were where many 
Puerto Ricans settled. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
or “inaccurately” to Census surveys, the main reasons have to do with distrust and self-protection: In 
subsequent research (Duany 2000) he also emphasized how resistance to U.S. ethnic and racial 
categories caused some Puerto Ricans to classify themselves as “other” and/or “American,” in order 
to emphasize their U.S. citizenship. In Miami, awareness of the undercount led to complaints that 
Puerto Ricans were “invisible” (Colbert 1957a) and “the forgotten minority” (Cruz 1974). Cited in 
newspaper articles, estimates of the number of Puerto Ricans by government agencies and community 
activists ranged from 20,000 county-wide in the 1950’s (Colbert 1957a) to 30,000 in 1970 (Cruz 
1974) to between 60,000 and 100,000 in 1980 (Roberts 1981). In 1974, a neighborhood social worker 
surmised that Puerto Ricans “just tell census workers they are American citizens and do not identify 
themselves further, any more than an American would feel he has to say he is from Massachusetts” 
(Cruz 1974, p. 1A). 
 
35 Puerto Rican labor migration flows to the U.S. mainland were created by federal trade, immigration and 
national security policies in order to both help industrialize the island and to fill labor shortages in 
manufacturing and agricultural areas across the country (Caban 1994; Grosfoguel 2003). By the 1960s, 
Puerto Rican men also worked as unskilled factory operatives and menial help in hotels and restaurants 
while women were employed as domestics and as seamstresses in the garment industry (Maldonado 1979; 
Bonilla and Campos 1981). Puerto Ricans low position in the U.S. division of labor was facilitated by their 
legal migrant status and reinforced by the absence of federal aid and lack of attention given to their poor 
living and working conditions (Bonilla and Campos 1981; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). 
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Table 3.1: Number and Percent of Persons of Puerto Rican Origin 
Geography 1970 1980 1990 2000 
City of Miami  6,589  (2%) 
12,181  
(4%) 
11,154  
(3%) 
10,280  
(3%) 
Miami-Dade County 17,429 (1%) 
45,808  
(3%) 
68,634  
(4%) 
80,305  
(4%) 
Florida 31,600 (1%) 
98,780  
(1%) 
241,563  
(2%) 
478,698 
(3%) 
Source: Geolytics, Inc., Neighborhood Change Database, 1970-2000, 
U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Origin Tables 
 
 Florida’s earliest Puerto Ricans were wealthy families and agricultural business 
owners who settled in Miami in the 1940s (Duany and Matos 2006; Shell-Weiss 2009), 
including the family of former City of Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre. The first mass 
migration of Puerto Ricans to Florida was part of the contract farm worker program 
sponsored by the Migration Division of Puerto Rico’s Department of Labor in the 1950s, 
and supported by the U.S. Federal government (Maldonado 1979). During the 1950s, 
Miami formed part of the national agricultural labor circuit, which, particularly during the 
winters, brought thousands of Puerto Rican as well as other Latin American and 
Caribbean migrant workers to Southern Dade County to harvest vegetables during the 
Winter (Duany and Matos 2006; Shell-Weiss 2009). Puerto Ricans’ citizenship facilitated 
their shift into other job sectors in the region, including the growing retail service and 
apparel manufacturing sectors in the cities of Miami and Miami Beach. According to my 
interview respondents, affordable rents and proximity to these jobs drew workers to 
Wynwood. Growth in this small community during the 1950s and 60s was also fueled by 
Puerto Ricans migrating from the northeastern U.S. and from the island looking for work 
in Miami’s growing service sectors. The growing concentration of Puerto Ricans in 
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Wynwood led to the area becoming known as Little San Juan, and in 1973 Wyndwood 
Park in the heart of the neighborhood was renamed Roberto Clemente Park, after a 
famous Puerto Rican baseball player. 
Although my interview respondents and a few newspaper articles indicate that 
there were many Puerto Ricans in Wynwood by the 1950s, there is no neighborhood level 
Census data to confirm precisely how many were living there prior to 1970. Remaining 
mindful of the undercount problems noted above, I examine Census Tract enumerations 
for Hispanics of Puerto Rican Origin since the year 1970. Table 3.2 below reports the 
number and share of Puerto Ricans in the central city tracts where they were most 
concentrated from 1970 to 2000. Table 3.3 examines their concentration in these central 
tracts as compared to Puerto Ricans in the rest of the City of Miami and Miami-Dade 
County. Figure 3.1 depicts the distribution of Puerto Ricans throughout the county in 
1970 and Figure 3.2 reveals the change in this distribution between 1970 and 2000.  
Two basic patterns are clear. (1) Puerto Ricans’ share of the population of these 
central city tracts, particularly the single tract comprising the northern half of Wynwood, 
peaked in 1980. (2) While these central city tracts had the highest concentration of Puerto 
Ricans in 1970, the Puerto Rican population was and has increasingly become dispersed 
throughout the Central City and the County. In the two tracts that comprise Wynwood 
there were 1,236 Puerto Ricans, only one-fifth of the Central City’s Puerto Rican 
population in 1970. The height of Puerto Ricans’ concentration in Wynwood was in 
1980, when Census counts reported that almost one-third of the residents in census tract 
26 (Wynwood’s northern half) were of Puerto Rican origin (Table 3.2). This single tract 
is the area now considered “Little San Juan.” There were 2,577 Puerto Ricans in the six 
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central city tracts where they were most concentrated in 1970 (Table 3.2), comprising the 
contemporary boundaries of Wynwood, Allapattah, Edgewater and Buena Vista (also 
known as the Design District and southern edge of Little Haiti). These six tracts 
accounted for about 39 percent of the Puerto Rican population in the City of Miami and 
about 15 percent of the county-wide total (Table 3.3). Moreover, these tracts’ share of the 
central city- and county-wide Puerto Rican population has progressively declined since 
1970.  
There is no neighborhood level data on the socio-economic characteristics of 
Puerto Ricans in Wynwood. My field research experiences revealed that many of 
Wynwood’s Puerto Ricans worked in the retail service sector or as agricultural laborers 
when they migrated to Miami in the 1950 through 70s. Less clear is the extent to which 
neighborhood residents and specifically Puerto Ricans found jobs in the nearby Garment 
District before the industry declined in the 1980s. Shell-Weiss (2009, p. 144) estimates 
that similar to New York and New Jersey, where most of Miami’s manufacturers had 
relocated from (and brought their ethnic hiring practices), at least one-third of the 
garment manufacturing workforce in Miami around 1950 must have been comprised of 
Puerto Ricans; Cuban-Americans,36 African-American and Black West Indians made up 
the rest.37 Despite the lack of statistical information, it seems likely that during the 1950s 
                                                 
36 Shell-Weiss’ used the term “Cuban-Americans” to identify those Cubans who had lived and worked in 
the U.S. for several years as opposed to seasonal Cuban workers or those who arrived after the 1959 
revolution and considered their stay temporary. 
 
37 Discussed below, Shell-Weiss’s (2009, pp. 158-165) analysis of the International Ladies Garment 
Workers’ Union (ILGWU) records reveals organizing and protest activity that involved Puerto Ricans, 
Cuban-Americans and African-Americans. 
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some of the Puerto Ricans in Wynwood, where most of Miami’s Puerto Ricans were 
concentrated, were working in the apparel factories nearby. 
I interviewed38 two former garment manufacturers who recalled that their 
workforce during the 1960s and 1970s was mostly “Cubans and Blacks.” Of another 
eight interview respondents who lived in Wynwood during or since the 1950’s (6 Puerto 
Ricans, 1 Cuban-American and 1 born in the U.S. to Cuban and Puerto Rican parents),39 
two Puerto Ricans were career seamstresses. The other four Puerto Rican respondents40 
(one of whom is married to one of the seamstresses) could not identify or recall any other 
Puerto Ricans working in the garment industry during the 1950 or 1960s,  although most 
opined that some Puerto Ricans held these occupations. These respondents offered the 
explanation that the Wynwood garment factories had closed and relocated so long ago 
(citing the 1970s at the latest) that they either could not recall or that this job sector had 
largely disappeared from the neighborhood by the time they arrived. 
Instead, my interview respondents (including other more recent Puerto Rican 
migrants and Wynwood residents) and other evidence41 suggest that most of the Puerto 
Ricans who moved to South Florida before 1970 were former farm workers who found 
work in the service sector as dishwashers, janitors, cooks, bakers, laundry workers, 
construction laborers or gardeners. Many of the Puerto Ricans who migrated to the South 
Florida during the 1950s and 60s initially worked as agricultural laborers—either in 
                                                 
38 Both Jewish—one from Cuba and the other from New York and who, respectively, operated in Miami 
since the early 1950’s and mid-1960’s. 
 
39 Among the Puerto Rican respondents were two married couples. 
 
40 The U.S.-born respondent of Puerto Rican and Cuban parentage self-identified as a “half Puerto Rican 
American”.  
 
41 See Maldonado (1979), Grosfoguel (2003), Duany and Matos-Rodriguez (2006). 
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southern Dade County (Homestead) or in the northeastern U.S. (e.g., Pennsylvania, New 
York) before moving to Miami. Many others worked in manufacturing and service 
industries of the northeast before migrating south. A history of labor recruitment dating 
back to at least World War I and intensifying in the post World War II era established 
formal and informal migration networks that led to the creation of places like New 
York’s Spanish Harlem (Maldonado 1979; Portes and Grosfoguel 1994) as well as 
Wynwood. For many of Miami’s Puerto Ricans, harsh conditions in the agricultural 
“labor camps”42 and their status as US citizens prompted them to seek work in the 
growing service economies of the cities of Miami and Miami Beach in the 1950 and 60s. 
 
                                                 
42 A series of newspaper articles exposed the illegal recruitment and exploitation of Puerto Rican farm 
workers in Miami and Florida during the 1950s (Roberts 1954a, 1954b, 1954d, 1954e). In 1974, at the 
request of local community leaders concerned about ongoing abuses, the Miami Regional Office of the 
Migration Division of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor was created to study the living and working 
conditions of Puerto Ricans (OGPRUS 2006). The Miami office existed until 1984 and documented abuses 
dating back to 1961. 
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Table 3.2: Puerto Ricans as a Share of the Total Population of Selected Census Tracts, Miami-Dade County and 
Central City, 1970-2000 
 
Neighborhood 
Census  
Tract 
1970 1980 1990   2000   
PR Total % PR Total % PR Total % PR Total % 
Buena Vista E. 2201 298 4,198 7% 265 5,461 5% 177 5,688 3% 106 4641 2% 
Buena Vista W. 2202 404 6,511 6% 492 7,641 6% 405 6,497 6% 369 5,880 6% 
Allapattah N. 2500 301 8,134 4% 1,318 8,707 15% 738 8,564 9% 780 11,542 7% 
Edgewater 2702 338 4,012 8% 410 2,816 15% 198 1,894 10% 92 1,453 6% 
Wynwood N. 2600 837 5,173 16% 1,513 4,862 31% 1,214 4,530 27% 779 4,175 19%
Wynwood S. 2800 399 3,156 13% 256 2,265 11% 346 1,767 20% 164 1,293 13%
6 Central City Tracts: 2,577 31,184* 8% 4,254 31,752* 13% 3,078 28,940* 11% 2,290 28,984* 8% 
* Total for six census tracts 
Note: Selected Census Tracts with the largest concentrations (more than 250) of Puerto Rican residents in 1970. 
Source: Geolytics, Inc. ,Neighborhood Change Database, 1970-2000, U.S. Census Bureau
 
 
Table 3.3: Puerto Ricans in Selected Central City Census Tracts as a Share of Total Puerto Ricans, City of Miami and 
Miami-Dade County, 1970-2000 
 
  1970 1980 1990 2000 
  No. 
Pct. of 
City 
Pct. of 
County No. 
Pct. of 
City 
Pct. of 
County No. 
Pct. of 
City 
Pct. of 
County No. 
Pct. of 
City 
Pct. of 
County 
6 Central  
City Tracts 2577 39% 15% 4254 35% 9% 3078 28% 4% 2290 22% 3% 
Rest of  
Central City 4,012 61% 23% 7,927 65% 17% 8,076 72% 12% 7,990 78% 10% 
Rest of  
County 10,840  62% 33,627  73% 57,480  84% 70,025  87% 
Note: Selected Central City Tracts are those with the largest concentrations (more than 250) of Puerto Rican residents in 1970. 
Source: Geolytics, Inc. ,Neighborhood Change Database, 1970-2000, U.S. Census Bureau.
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Figure 3.1: Map of Persons of Puerto Rican Origin, Miami-Dade County, 1970 
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Figure 3.2: Map of the Change in Persons of Puerto Rican Origin, Miami-Dade 
County, 1970-2000 
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Migrant Profiles 
Wilfredo43 migrated to Homestead in Southern Miami-Dade County from his 
rural town near Arecibo, Puerto Rico in 1962, where he grew up among sugar cane 
cutters. When he was 26 he joined one of the “va y viene” (come and go) circuits that 
have characterized the lives of many Puerto Ricans (Duany 2002). After three years of 
working in fields in Homestead he moved to the City of Miami to look for work in 
restaurants which he heard about from other Puerto Ricans living in the vicinity of 
Wynwood. He recalled that this work was “better” because it offered “more money, 
[was] cleaner, and not as sad as working in the fields.”  He moved to the eastern edge of 
Wynwood (the boundaries of which were then thought to extend east to the Biscayne Bay 
shoreline), found work as a busboy in a small restaurant on Biscayne Boulevard, and 
enjoyed living and working in an area where Puerto Ricans socialized in cafes, on the 
street and in their front yards and porches. Within a couple of years he was training as a 
baker at a different restaurant closer to his apartment in Wynwood, where he remained 
for 12 years and became the head baker. It was working in the bakery where he met his 
next landlord and future wife, Serena, who was from the central mountainous region of 
Atuado, Puerto Rico, and who also migrated to Miami in 1962. By the 1970s when the 
two met in the bakery, Serena was a sewing machine operator (producing wigs) in a 
Jewish-owned factory in Wynwood’s Garment District. She eventually supervised other 
garment workers, mostly Cubans, Haitians and African-Americans, while Wilfredo 
shifted into construction work in the 1980s and, after Hurricane Andrew in 1992, opened 
a roofing business. 
                                                 
43 Interview in Spanish with Wilfredo and Serena in their Wynwood home, January 14, 2011. 
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Carlos and Maria,44 who both grew up in the same small village near Camuy, 
Puerto Rico, settled together in Wynwood in 1960. Carlos first migrated to the U.S. in 
1956, recruited by his uncle to work on Pennsylvania farms picking cabbage, tomato, 
parsley and other crops. When the harvest ended he returned to Puerto Rico and the 
following year decided to follow a different uncle to Miami, where he moved in with a 
Puerto Rican family living on 11th Street near NE 2nd Avenue, in the uncertain edges 
between Wynwood and Overtown, a historic African-American neighborhood. Through 
his uncle, he immediately found a job at the Algiers hotel on Miami Beach “grabando 
discos,” a Puerto Rican “Spanglish” term for washing dishes (see Miller 1978). 
Throughout the late 1950s Carlos moved between Miami and Camuy, brought his brother 
to live with him and married and brought Maria to live together with his aunt and uncle, 
only for her to return to Puerto Rico the next year when she became pregnant. In 1960, 
after their first daughter was born, Maria returned to Miami and they settled in a two 
bedroom apartment on 25th Street for $50 in monthly rent. The va y viene continued as 
each of their children was born and spent their first 4-6 months on Puerto Rican soil. As 
the 1960s advanced and their children were born, the couple also brought Maria’s 
grandmother to live with them as well as several of their younger siblings who settled in 
Wynwood apartments. Carlos took several of his brothers to work with him in Miami 
Beach hotels. After all her children were in school, in the late 1960s Maria took her first 
job at a large laundry service a block from home and eventually worked as an assistant in 
the offices and cafeteria at Buena Vista Elementary, the neighborhood school. Their 
                                                 
44 Interview in Spanish with Carlos and Maria at their home, December 8, 2010, and phone interview in 
English with their son, Carlos Jr., who lives in Washington D.C., December 27, 2010. 
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youngest children attended Buena Vista briefly during the early 1960s before racial 
integration caused them to transfer to formerly all-black schools near Overtown. In the 
1970s they participated in a religious after-school program affiliated with the nearby 
Wynwood Catholic Church (Cantero 1976; Rodriguez 1979). Like Carlos and Maria, 
their three children grew to become leaders in Wynwood, particularly their only son, 
Carlitos. 
 Born in Utuado, Puerto Rico, Felipe arrived in Miami in 1953 when he was 7 
years old. His father’s first experience in the U.S. had been as a migrant worker in 1948, 
when he spent the northern sowing and harvest seasons on farms in Connecticut and 
Massachusetts and during the winter moved south to work the fields in Homestead in 
southern Miami-Dade County. After spending the next season back home in Puerto Rico, 
his father returned to South Florida in the summer of 1949 and worked as a busboy in a 
Miami Beach hotel and the following year as a waiter. He worked this way until he saved 
enough to move his large family to Miami in 1953, a few children at a time. The family’s 
first apartment was on 23rd Street in Wynwood, in the heart of the Garment District, and 
later on 36th Street, near where intersecting interstate highways (I-95 and I-195) were 
built. In the 1960s Felipe’s father became a City of Miami groundskeeper at Wyndwood 
Park. Like Carlos and Maria’s children, Felipe attended neighborhood schools before 
they integrated. Before he graduated from college, in 1969, he bought his first business in 
Wynwood, a Puerto Rican restaurant and bar. After college he opened several additional 
businesses in the neighborhood and eventually became one of the neighborhood’s largest 
property owners. As I will discuss in greater detail later, despite moving in 1969 from 
71 
 
Wynwood to a north Miami suburb, his status as a successful entrepreneur made him an 
important community leader and neighborhood representative in public affairs.  
Of an older generation, Elsa45 was born in Puerto Rico in 1909 but lived briefly in 
Santiago, Cuba, as a child before migrating with her mother after World War I to 
Brooklyn, New York . There she finished high school and gained her first work 
experience. By the 1930s she was a seamstress in a Manhattan garment factory, a job she 
held for nearly 20 years and during which time she married and divorced an Italian man 
before remarrying a Puerto Rican taxi driver. In 1951, Elsa sold her Brooklyn apartment 
and relocated with her husband to Miami. After a series of moves between different 
apartment houses in the vicinity of Wynwood, in 1957 they bought a small house on 34th 
Street where they lived out the remainder of their lives. Her husband worked as a 
mechanic in Miami before his health deteriorated in the 1980s, while she transitioned 
from her first job in a senior center lunchroom to a better paying job developing 
photographs in a nearby laboratory, which she held for more than 20 years. However, 
Elsa was best known for her community service and activism, which I will discuss later. 
Thinking back to her first years in Wynwood, Elsa recalled how the neighborhood was 
“mostly Americans” and a few Cubans, and listed the occupations of her closest 
neighbors: a lawyer, a water heater mechanic, the principal of Buena Vista Elementary, 
the owner of a hardware and paint store, the neighborhood pharmacist—“all Americans 
around here, there were no Puerto Ricans. We were the first that invaded this [area].” 
Although Elsa was joking, many local authorities and residents came to view the Puerto 
Rican influx as an invasion (see chapter 2).  
                                                 
45 Interview with Elsa in her home, November 19, 2010, in English and Spanish. 
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Puerto Ricans were stigmatized by newspaper coverage in the 1950s but received 
little attention in the 1960s, in the midst of the Cuban influx and the dramatic 
transformation of inner city neighborhoods through urban renewal discussed in Chapter 
2. By the 1970s, Puerto Ricans had become the largest “minority” group in Wynwood, 
replacing the out-moving middle-class families of Anglo-Americans and Cuban exiles. 
Wynwood also became home to many other low-income immigrants, including 
Dominicans, Cubans, Haitians and Central Americans, and continued to serve as a 
“springboard” for many on their way to other neighborhoods. But as a small, inner city 
neighborhood with high rates of poverty and no single ethnic or racial group as a super 
majority, Wynwood was relatively ignored in the urban political arena until the 
“awakening” of the Puerto Ricans (Inclan 1972a). Their entry into local politics was 
shaped by U.S urban policy and specifically the emerging and evolving “community 
development” system. 
 
The Ethnic Politics of U.S. Community Development 
Unlike most Western European countries, urban renewal policy in the United 
States has always emphasized decenralization and devolution of authority to localities 
and this has led, with few exceptions, to partnership with (if not total control by) non-
governmental organizations and private companies in the delivery of social services and 
affordable housing (Fainstein and Fainstein 1978, 1985). As noted above and has been 
well documented elsewhere (e.g., Judd 1988), partnerships with the private sector led the 
original urban renewal programs to emphasize demolition and clearance, at the expense 
of low-income housing construction, relocation assistance and comprehensive social 
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services. These failures and the political pressures created by grassroots mobilization 
across the country gave rise to “Federal Activism,” evident most notably in civil rights 
legislation and anti-poverty programs, particularly the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964 enacted as part of the broader “War on Poverty.”   
The 1960s federal “War on Poverty” created the Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO) and a new vehicle for community planning and activism in localities, the 
Community Action Agency (CAA). The mission of the CAA was resident empowerment 
to improve local conditions, shaped by the central principle of the Community Action 
Program (responsible for oversight of the CAAs) of “maximum feasible participation” of 
community members in local politics (Judd 1988, p. 317). Community Action Agencies 
distributed funds to local community-based organizations (CBOs), although the first 
rounds of this funding (1965-66) supported relatively few organizations because the 
federal program’s initial focus on maximum participation was implemented as a 
“demonstration project” (Fainstein 1987; Judd 1988). The War on Poverty programs were 
as much a response to the pressures of the civil rights movement as reflective of the need 
of the Democratic Party to increase voter turnout in low-income, black communities 
(Judd 1988; DeFilippis 2004). These programs were also a key shift in the political 
opportunity structure of federalism, which, by introducing new resources and mobilizing 
structures, affected the “collective action repertoire” of community-based activists and 
organizations (McAdam 1999; Bockmeyer 2003).  
While the impact of CAAs on political mobilization varied greatly across cities, 
by 1967, their explicitly political agenda (in several major cities, CAAs had become 
vehicles for militant, community-based activism) was “sufficiently threatening or 
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persuasive to precipitate [another] change in national urban policy” (Fainstein 1987, p. 
328). New federal legislation changed the nature of government-funded community 
organizations from political organizing (reinterpreting the “maximum feasible 
participation” clause) to social service and economic development activities, facilitating 
the program’s rapid expansion into the 1970s (Judd 1988, pp. 316-321).46 Under Nixon’s 
“New Federalism” in the 1970s, the OEO was terminated and the CAA program shifted 
into the newly created Community Services Administration. This shift marked the 
beginning of a “new urban policy” created through a series of initiatives during the Nixon 
administration (Stoecker 1997; Reed Jr. 1999; Defilippis 2004; Newman and Lake 2006), 
including the transformation of federal grant programs into general revenue sharing and 
block grants for states and cities. This gave local policymakers control of the funds, 
rapidly eroding the direct link between the federal government and urban CBO 
stakeholders (Defilippis 2004; Newman and Lake 2006).  
Federal Revenue Sharing (FRS) granted local officials considerable spending 
discretion and, in most large cities, the majority of funds went to essential services (e.g., 
fire, police), and basic infrastructure maintenance, while typically less than one-third of 
funds were devoted to social services for low-income residents (Judd 1988, pp. 340-344). 
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (CDA) blended the Republican 
Party’s interest in decentralizing urban policy with Democrats’ efforts to increase funding 
                                                 
46 The number of CBO’s nearly doubled from 650 funded in 1965 to 1,100 in 1967 (Ibid, p. 317).  The shift 
in priorities began through the passage of the Special Impact Program amendment to the OEO in 1966 and 
was furthered by the supplemental Federal Community Self-Determination Act in 1969 (note the “self-
help” language). The other component of the shift towards entrepreneurial community development 
occurred through the Model Cities Program, designed “to place the control over antipoverty [and] 
neighborhood development policies back into the hands of city governments—and explicitly away from the 
hands of communities” (DeFilippis 2004, p. 42). 
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for social services and, especially, subsidized housing. The resulting CDA also 
consolidated numerous categorical grant programs into a single block grant to local 
governments. Like FRS, Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) could be spent 
on a variety of basic urban needs and services, but the CDA funding was targeted to low-
income neighborhoods (“Target Areas”), defined through planning research also funded 
by the program. A final piece of legislation worth mentioning because of its relevance to 
Wynwood during the 1970s was the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA), 
which expanded the payrolls of local government in part to administer CDBG and FRS 
funded programs.  
During the 1970s, funding for CBOs—especially FRS, CDBG, and CETA—
shaped the political environment in which Wynwood was constituted as a Puerto Rican 
place. These programs created a political constituency in the community development 
sector which would structure neighborhood residents’ engagement with the broader urban 
political arena for years to come. By the 1980s, national urban policy would change 
again, intensifying the entrepreneurial turn in community development practice, 
introducing new political opportunities, resources and mobilizing structures and further 
shaping activists ways of thinking and acting. Bockmeyer (2003, p. 177) summarizes the 
cumulative impact of federal policy shifts and specifically CDBG funding for both 
service and, later, housing development organizations in the community-based sector:  
Decentralization together with a lack of administrative coordination—as found in 
the United States—can be expected to multiply the points of access for citizens. 
At the same time, fragmentation discourages protest movement activism—which 
would be more symptomatic of centralized and repressive regimes—and instead 
produces cooperative or assimilative behavior (Kriesi, 1995). As a result, 
American devolution produces a centrifugal effect on organizers, in a 
fragmenting, “let a thousand flowers bloom approach” (Dreier, 1998, p. 115). The 
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emergent repertoire includes the expansion of service delivery groups, while 
lacking social movement mobilization. Community activists are challenged to 
make use of dispersed access points in a collective effort. Both dispersed policy 
making and grant distribution shape the collective action frame... As non-profit 
groups increasingly implement programs, federalism becomes a complex web... in 
which to affect policy and its implementation, advocates must access multiple 
points, influence public and private sector actors, and stay ahead of the ever 
changing relationships between sectors. 
 
 Along with African-Americans in Overtown and Liberty City (Mohl 1999), 
Puerto Ricans in Wynwood were the first to respond to and benefit from the shift in 
federalism encouraging maximum participation and empowerment of residents in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Yet, this political opportunity closed quickly and Wynwood’s 
leaders were integrated to the funding systems of nonprofit service provision, resulting in 
the “lacking social movement mobilization” noted by Bockmeyer (2003, p. 177). The 
following section describes the development and change of these structural influences on 
collective action in Wynwood as well as the internal conditions of the Puerto Rican 
community in Miami that contributed to its fragmentation and weakened potential for 
social movement activism. 
  
Wynwood’s Puerto Rican “Awakening” 
The 1970s in Wynwood were defined by Puerto Rican leaders’ “awakening” 
(Inclan 1972a) to political opportunities to obtain social services for the neighborhood’s 
“forgotten” residents (Ousley 1993a). Through the politics of CBO funding, these 
individuals created lasting organizations through which future generations of Puerto 
Rican leaders would be employed and that engaged residents in local politics. In the 
following decades the leadership would become less Puerto Rican, reflecting the growing 
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diversity of the neighborhood’s residents. But the 1970s generation of Puerto Rican 
leaders made possible the symbolic constitution of the neighborhood as a Puerto Rican 
place. Morevoer, the rise of this Puerto Rican leadership and its evolution over time also 
reflected the impact of federal urban policymaking and local implementation. By the 
1980s, when the urban agenda of the federal government was nearly eliminated, space 
was created (out of need and/or opportunity) for non-government funded organizations to 
help fill the void of shrinking social services and to mobilize residents politically. 
 
Puerto Ricans United 
Prior to 1968, in Wynwood there were no social service agencies based in the 
neighborhood and virtually no grassroots efforts to obtain political representation or 
social services for neighbrohood residents.47 In 1968 an office of the Christian 
Community Service Agency (CCSA), an interdenominational organization funded 
through a network of local and national churches,48 was established in Wynwood with an 
open-ended mission to help residents (Inclan 1972a). Although the CCSA was founded in 
1965 to serve residents throughout Miami-Dade County, the organization was 
immediately overwhelmed by the needs of Cuban exiles arriving on the “Freedom 
Flights” and refugee resettlement became its primary function (Glass 1967; Johnson-King 
1969). By the late 1960s, however, CCSA shifted away from this work and “back to” its 
mission of helping local “minority” groups, according to its director (Johnson-King 1969, 
                                                 
47 Sporadic interventions by state and local prosecutors on behalf of Puerto Rican migrant workers occurred 
in response to complaints and newspaper coverage of the poor condition of their housing, but there were no 
systematic or sustained organizing efforts these or other injustices in Wynwood. 
 
48 Although the CCSA received federal anti-poverty funding for its county-wide services (particularly 
Cuban refugee resettlement), it is not clear whether any federal funding supported the work in Wynwood.  
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p.10A). The faith-based organization opened branches in different neighborhoods, 
including Liberty City and Wynwood, where its work evolved into organizing the poorest 
residents to address different injustices they faced.49  
In Wynwood, the CCSA’s work began as a one-man operation under Jose Molina, 
a priest and former radio talk show host from Honduras (Inclan 1972a; Brownstein 1980; 
Hancock 1992). Molina rented a cheap apartment in Wynwood but practically lived out 
of his car during his first year of knocking on residents’ doors, getting to know their 
troubles and needs, and helping them obtain different kinds of services on a case by case 
basis (Ibid). Activists and leaders from the 1970s as well as newspaper accounts (Inclan 
1972a; Brownstein 1980; Hancock 1992) credit Molina with catalyzing organizational 
and political action in the neighborhood.50 He trained some vocal residents and service 
workers on how to organize inside the community and in relation to local government. 
Molina and other CCSA staff were able to sustain their initial organizing efforts well into 
the 1970s through the Wynwood Community Project, funded by the United Methodist 
Church from 1972 to 1974 (The Voice 1971; Cruz 1974; Brownstein 1980).51 From 1968 
to 1969, the Honduran was instrumental in organizing 12 neighborhood leaders into a 
group that became known as Puertorriqueños Unidos [Puerto Ricans United, PRU], also 
dubbed the “12 apostles” by some neighborhood residents. 
                                                 
49 In Liberty City, for example, CCSA “social workers” helped to organize a tenant union and initiate a rent 
strike against slumlords (Ash 1967). 
 
50 The neighborhoods primary spokesperson in the 1970s, Rodrigo, described below, credited Molina with 
advancing his political and professional development as well as that of other Puerto Ricans in Wynwood. 
“He was my mentor. He was the cause of it all. Many people give me credit for the things that happened, 
but he was the one behind [everything we achieved].” 
 
51 Archives of the United Methodist Church, Race and Religion Commission, Minority Self-Determination 
Grants: Wynwood Community Project, 1972-1974. 
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Under the guidance of Molina, by 1972 the PRU led by its main spokesperson and 
President, Rodrigo, began routinely mobilizing hundreds of Wynwood residents, mostly 
Puerto Ricans, and campaigning at City and County Hall and through the local newspaper 
for more attention, services and control over resources (Inclan 1972a, 1973a, 1973b; 
Handros 1973; Cruz 1974). Although Wynwoods’ Puerto Rican leaders spoke out on a 
number of issues—the deterioration of Wyndwood Park, the need for bilingual education 
(an issue ultimately addressed by Cubans), the unintended hazards of school 
desegregation (e.g., children having to cross different neighborhoods to get to school), the 
lack of Puerto Rican representation in government agencies, the need for small business 
loans (Inclan 1972a, 1973a, 1973b; Handros 1973; Cruz 1974)— they were confronted 
with a local City and County government which had total control over the kinds of 
programs that could be funded and the fact that the Puerto Rican vote within the City of 
Miami was numerically insignificant. On the one hand, their inability to challenge 
funding decisions politically meant that by the mid-1970s the PRU leaders’ actions were 
shaped by the “citizen participation” processes through which funding priorities were 
effectively manipulated by city officials.  On the other hand, realizing this, they also 
increasingly focused on mobilizing Puerto Rican voters through the Organizacion 
Democratica Puertorriqueña (or Puerto Rican Democrats, ODP). 
As the story goes, Rodrigo grew up so poor in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, that he had 
to stuff newspapers in his shoes to cover the holes. Before moving to Miami in 1963, 
Rodrigo spent the 1950s in between New York, Puerto Rico and serving in the U.S. 
Marines, during which time he also took some college courses. In Miami, as he recalled, 
“I dedicated myself to study and fight.”  For a few years, he worked in retail stores and 
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later as an officer in a juvenile justice center, before returning to college and ultimately 
earned a masters degree in guidance counseling, in addition to various certifications in 
medical services. His involvement in Wynwood began not as a resident but as a 
counselor in a neighborhood school, Buena Vista Elementary, in the late 1960s. “I found 
so much need, I started to take kids from school in my car to Jackson Memorial Hospital 
and to the different places where they needed services, and that’s [how] I started to get 
recognized by the community.” Recognition by community members led to Rodrigo’s 
designation as President of the PRU. He also became the primary (but not the only) 
spokesperson for the neighborhood in governmental affairs. 
In 1972 Miami-Dade County’s Community Relations Board (CRB, comprised 
mostly of public officials and civic and business leaders) held a series of public meetings 
to gather resident input on priorities for spending money from different federal and local 
programs (Inclan 1972b). One of the programs for which proposals were solicited was the 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s (HEW) Public Service Grants, 
which went directly to community organizations but were vetted through local 
authorities. The timing of the solicitation was crucial.  Under President Nixon, federal 
urban funding was shifting from categorical social purpose grants to federal revenue 
sharing and eventually, consolidated block grants. The last year that local organizations 
could be funded directly was 1973,52 although by then Nixon had given local mayors “a 
coveted veto power” over federal grant applications (Judd 1988, p. 344).  
                                                 
52 Some of this direct funding was transformed into special categorical programs, such as funding for non-
profit health clinics. But after 1972, local authorities would always have some role to play in the 
relationship between community organizations and federal funding programs. 
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An outcome of the first meeting (held at The Miami Herald building), where 
Wynwood was represented by the PRU leaders and another “30 or 40 Puerto Ricans” 
from the neighborhood,53 was the formation of a loose-knit network of Latino leaders, 
including Cubans in Little Havana, Mexicans in Homestead and the PRU leadership 
(Inclan 1973b).54 Rodrigo recalled that at the meeting “all the local universities and 
everybody else was there, and they wanted the money to do research. I stood up and said, 
‘No, you’re not going to do that. We’re tired of being studied. What we really need is 
action!’”  In an attempt to structure the process, federal HEW officials at the meeting 
asked the cohort of Latinos to organize their respective national groups – Cubans, Puerto 
Ricans and Mexicans – into a 15-member coalition with even ethnic representation and to 
make a specific proposal from each group after consulting with neighborhood residents. 
The United Way of Miami, which served as fiscal agent for some federal programs, 
hosted subsequent CRB meetings to help evaluate and recommend one specific proposal 
from each group, as well as sponsor their travel to Atlanta to present their proposal to the 
HEW. 
In Wynwood, meetings took place in the living rooms of PRU leaders, 
particularly Carlos,55 who organized the neighborhood’s Puerto Rican Little League and 
                                                 
53 According to Rodrigo, not all of the PRU leaders or their supporters lived in Wynwood. Several low-
income, politically active Puerto Ricans lived in Homstead as well as the Larchmont Gardens public 
housing project in what is now known as the northern edge of the Little Haiti neighborhood. Larchmont 
Gardens was in notoriously bad condition (Florida Grand Jury 1985; Miami Herald 1998) and was 
eventually privatized and redeveloped into condominiums (Miami-Dade County 2006). 
 
54 According to former PRU leaders, the link between the Puerto Ricans and other Hispanic groups in 
political work was the ODP, which worked with Cubans in local and state electoral campaigns and had 
been involved in efforts to help Mexican and Puerto Rican farm workers in Homestead. 
 
55 Carlos Jr. recalled how during his this period of his childhood, “our house was a hotbed of social 
[activism]… it was always very active. Folks coming in and out of it all the time, the Rodrigo’s of the 
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was heavily involved in the ODP. A consensus was reached to request funds to start a 
community-based Health Clinic. The United Way sent the “Dade Delegation” to Atlanta 
where a two-page proposal and oral presentation by the Puerto Rican Group of Five56 
won approval for $145,000 for the first year of the clinic’s operation. But the funds 
would not be disbursed without a more detailed plan and the group would have to return 
to Atlanta within a few months to make a final presentation. After consulting with Puerto 
Rican associates in New York “since they’re so advanced in [Puerto Rican] community 
issues,” Rodrigo decided it was too expensive to rely on outsiders and instead “a group of 
four at my house,” including a Puerto Rican architect who worked for free, “ended up 
writing the project without knowing anything about clinics.” The second trip to Atlanta 
was supported by a neighborhood fundraiser, “a pesetita y a peso” (a penny here, a dollar 
there), so that neighborhood residents could join the Group of Five. The project’s final 
approval not only founded a Puerto Rican-named health clinic and resulted in “the 
biggest celebtation you can imagine in Wynwood,” but by “beginning to do what we did, 
then we became recognized as the Puerto Rican neighborhood.” 
More precisely, what they did led to a shift in perception both within and from 
outside the neighborhood. The naming of a major Puerto Rican institution in Wynwood 
represented a shift from the negative stigmas perpetuated in local newspapers about the 
neighborhood and Puerto Ricans during previous decades (e.g., El Mundo 1952, 1957; 
Reynolds 1953; Colbert 1957a). Wynwood was still known for poverty and slum 
                                                                                                                                                 
world or Felipe’s, and the [founding] directors of the ODP. You know, they came because my father was a 
community organizer.” 
 
56 The Puerto Rican Group of Five was more socio-economically diverse than the PRU’s leadership, 
according to Rodrigo, reflecting the need to incorporate Puerto Ricans with professional skills to assist with 
the presentation.  
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housing, but the area’s problems were framed in increasingly sympathetic terms (Cruz 
1974). Newspaper coverage of Puerto Rican symbols and cultural events in the 1970s 
added a positive and prideful association (The Miami News 1970; Inclan 1972a, 1976) 
and the neighborhood’s problems were framed as “improving” through the help of social 
service agencies (Handros 1973; Inclan 1973a, 1973b; Rodriguez 1979). 
Between 1973 and 1977, several non-profit organizations and government 
agencies were created in Wynwood, most of which continue to exist as the symbolic and 
institutional representations of Puerto Ricans’ accomplishments in the neighborhood. 
Wyndwood Park was renovated with funds from the 1972 issue of the City’s “Parks for 
People” Bonds and renamed Roberto Clemente Park after the famous Puerto Rican 
baseball player. Its inaugeration was a major event attended by the governor of Puerto 
Rico, Clemente’s widow and son, state and local politicians and hundreds of residents. 
The Holy Cross Episcopal Church hosted several of Wynwood’s first social service 
agencies. A non-profit day care center was created and housed there until it became an 
independent agency, Puerto Rican Child Care, Inc. (PRCC) and grew into one of the 
largest in the County. A lunchroom for the elderly was also established in the church. The 
lunchroom grew into a center for recreation and other services known as Ancianos del 
Encanto (“Charming” or “Enchanting” Elderly). Other agencies established during this 
period included a legal services branch, a “Puerto Rican mental health unit” for drug 
abuse counseling, and a “Puerto Rican Opportunity Center” for job training and 
placement services. Approved in 1975 and developed in multiple phases, in 1979 a City- 
and County-funded “neighborhood service center” was inaugurated in the heart of the 
neighborhood to house social services for youth and elderly, and serve as a recreational 
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and meeting hall for other organizations. It was named the Eugenio Maria De Hostos 
Center, after the Puerto Rican philosopher and independence advocate. Neighborhood 
seniors continue to congregate there daily to play dominos and eat lunch. 
Although not “activist” in their orientation, privately-funded, faith-based 
organizations serving Wynwood’s Puerto Ricans also emerged during this period. In 
1964, just as the exodus of Anglo-American residents from the Wynwood-Allapattah area 
was accelerating due to expressway construction and deteriorating conditions, the 
Wynwood Catholic parish located there instituted the practice of neighborhood missions 
not only to serve the area’s growing number of “Spanish-speaking” residents who “find 
themselves separated from their duties as Catholics” but also to reverse the decline in 
attendance at parish churches (The Voice 1964, p. 21). The mission system created 
satellite centers of religious practice throughout the neighborhood, closer to residents. 
The first mission, attended by 250 new Spanish-speaking57 parishoners—likely to be a 
mix of Cubans, Puerto Ricans and some Dominicans—took place on an empty lot in the 
Allapattah area. As the initial influx of Cubans increasingly moved to Miami’s suburbs, 
mission activities and other church services were located in the Puerto Rican sections of 
Wynwood. In 1970 the Centro Catolico San Juan de Puerto Rico (The Centro) was 
founded by Miami Archbishop Coleman Carroll “as a recognition of the specific cultural 
and spiritual needs of Puerto Ricans living in Miami, especially in the Wynwood 
community [of the] Catholic parish” (The Voice 1975, p. 2). A group of Ecuadorian nuns 
known as Las Hermanas Marianitas lived above a floor abve the Centro and ran an after-
                                                 
57 In the Miami Archdiocese’ Spanish-language monthly newspaper (titled, The Voice En Español, and 
later, La Voz Catolica), the national origin of the Spanish-speaking parishioners is not identified in issues 
published in the 1960s. They are referred to as Spanish-speaking or Latin.  
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school recreation center in addition to providing religious and cultural education, and 
vocational training such as sewing classes (Pena 1974, p. 2). Of the 200 Hispanic 
children attending the Center in 1975, about 130 were Puerto Ricans and most of the rest 
were Cuban (The Voice 1975, p. 2). The Centro helped cultivate “cultural pride” among 
the neighborhood’s Puerto Ricans during the 1970s (Ibid). Particularly before the creation 
of the De Hostos community center, the Centro San Juan hosted festivities such as the the 
patriotic celebrations (known as the fiestas patronales) of St. John the Apostle, the patron 
saint of Puerto Rico, attended by thousands of neighborhood families as well as the PRU 
leaders (some of whose children attended the Centro). As I will delve into later, the 
Centro’s closure58 in the 1980s amidst increasing violence and declining attendance 
became cause for the revival of the parish mission work under new leadership, with a 
clear focus on political action to “take back” the neighborhood. 
Aside from faith-based initiatives and the Puerto Rican health clinic, which were 
funded mostly by private sources (e.g., the Archdiocese and the Wynwood Catholic 
Church) and federal agencies, respectively, the rest of Wynwood’s service organizations 
were created and maintained by lobbying at City Hall for community devleopment 
funding.59 Rodrigo’s leadership in the creation of the Puerto Rican Health Clinic made 
him an important spokesperson for the neighborhood at City Hall. 
 
                                                 
58 It re-opened in Opa-Locka, an African-American controlled municipality in the northwest of Miami-
Dade County, where it still operates and serves that city’s growing Latin-American population, including 
Puerto Ricans. 
 
59 The largest sources of funding for most of these organizations was Federal Revenue Sharing (1972-1987) 
and Community Development Block Grants (created in 1974). Elected officials voted on the funding 
recommendations of Community Development staff at the City Manager’s office, who received input from 
Community Action Agency (CAA) Advisory Boards comprised of neighborhood residents. 
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After we started to accuse the whole world of discrimination [against Puerto 
Ricans], then [the City and County] started to bring the government programs 
with greater emphasis to Wynwood… at the beginning of the 1970s. [And later 
there were other] programs which they gave to me but since I didn’t want to be a 
“poverty pimp”… I passed the programs to Christian Community Service 
[Agency] and they established them. So from a neighborhood that didn’t have a 
single program, in the year after the Health Clinic [1975] we got like six or seven 
other programs, to help the neighborhood. 
 
Other PRU leaders were important in early initiatives such as renovating and 
renaming the park and obtaining funding for the senior center. In addition to Carlos 
(profiled earlier), who was active in the ODP and managed youth athletic programs in the 
neighborhood, Benny and Felipe were influential not only as volunteer lobbyists for 
social service funding but also in electoral mobilization and economic development 
initiatives. Benny arrived from New York in 1970 as an AFL-CIO60 representative and 
became known as one of the most aggressive of Wynwood’s activists, along with 
Rodrigo. Unlike Rodrigo, however, Benny lived in the neighborhood and through his 
daily presence was involved in development issues affecting the built environment. He 
was a member of the Community Action Agency’s (CAA) Advisory Board in 1972-73 
and eventually became board chairman for the Target Area containing Wynwood. Having 
helped to establish many of the neighobrhood’s service organizations, Benny served on 
several of their advisory boards. In the 1980s, as urban policy took an entrepreneurial 
turn, Benny helped found the Wynwood Chamber of Commerce and was until his death 
in 1983, the founding director of a Wynwood-specific Community Development 
Corporation, created to support physical redevelopment initiatives in the area.  
                                                 
60 American Federal of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations is the largest federation of unions in 
the United States. 
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A product of Wynwood, by the 1970s Felipe was an accomplished businessman 
(accountant and realtor, among other interests), gradually accumulating investment 
ventures and properties in the area as well as becoming a campaign manager for city, 
county and state politicians. Felipe was a founding director or board member of several 
of the neighborhood’s organizations: the Puerto Rican health clinic, Puerto Rican Lions 
Club, the Roberto Clemente baseball league, the Puerto Rican Opportunity Center, and 
later in the 1980s, the Wynwood Community Economic Development Corporation. After 
the creation of the health clinic, Rodrigo and Felipe were appointed to the Advisory 
Board of the City of Miami’s Parks for People Bond program (in 1973 Felipe was Chair 
for the Park district containing Wynwood), which allocated almost $150,000 for the 
renovation of Wyndwood Park and $1.8 million for parks in surrounding neighborhoods 
(mainly Overtown and Edgewater).61  
Felipe later served on the City of Miami’s Audit Advisory Board and the Police 
Crime Prevention Council. Through his involvement in the ODP, he eventually became 
an independent campaign consultant who helped local, state and national political 
candidates mobilize the Puerto Rican vote. Throughout the 1970s he was a campaign 
coordinator for City Mayor Maurice Ferre and in 1984 he founded the Puerto Rican 
Democrats for Reagan. By also participating and leading in political initiatives that were 
broader than Wynwood, Felipe and Rodrigo became well-known throughout the City and 
County. This enabled them, at least during a few occassions in the 1970s, to collaborate 
                                                 
61 Two years later Rodrigo, acting as chairman of the Parks Advisory Board for the central district, 
including Wynwood and Overtown, actually rescinded $25,000 from Wynwood’s allocations to help a 
struggling park in Overtown (MCC 3/12/75). 
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with other Latinos, which at the time seemed an effective strategy for increasing the 
political clout of Hispanics.62  
Felipe described his involvement in Wynwood and his role in the PRU in the 
following ways, starting with a description of the business he established in the early 
1970s in the neighborhood’s main commercial corridor: 
 
Not [only] accounting, a service agency where you could go to if you had a 
problem… We used to solve the community’s problems. That’s how I got 
involved; I used to be a social service agency for profit. I mean, I would charge 
nominal fees, but I would charge something. 
 
The relationships forged through the service agency not only contributed to Felipe’s 
ability to support political action but also served him as a real estate investor since 1975, 
when he began steadily acquiring properties throughout the neighborhood. By learning 
about and helping his clients63 through their personal and financial difficulties, “they 
offered me the first opportunity of buying.”  
 
I had money. I knew the community. I know people with money. Politicians need 
money and support to get elected. So Rodrigo initiated with the idea— ‘Who do 
we go to? Let’s go to City of Miami Commission and talk to commissioner so-
and-so,’ who I helped get elected because I ran his campaign for Wynwood. I 
                                                 
62 In the 1970s, Cubans in Miami claimed to be facing discrimination from the Anglo-American power 
structure and were not yet solidly Republican (an eventual turn which alienated Puerto Ricans and some 
other Hispanics). In these ways they had more in common with other Latino leaders in the 1970s. While it 
is not clear whether the coalitional strategy of Latinos worked, Black Miamians’ frustration over their 
declining share of City resources relative to Latinos was cited by community leaders as a cause of the 1980 
riots (Porter and Dunn 1984; Portes and Stepick1993). 
 
63 It is interesting to note that diverse sectors of the neighborhood were linked, albeit loosely and 
informally, to the PRU network through Felipe. On the one hand, he gave legal advice and sold houses to 
neighborhood drug dealers who had money to invest. “[Then] on the other line, the City Mayor: ‘Freddie, I 
need your support, let’s go to lunch.’ I played both sides.” As Felipe’s son recalled not only from growing 
up in the area but also working for and eventually managing his fathers’ business: “These guys [drug 
dealers] were philanthropists, too. You’d be surprised. Those guys would come and give out turkeys and all 
kinds of crazy things… they’d be part of the community because they were [there] from the beginning.” 
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knew the politicians… I had one thing – that I was working on my own, for 
myself, I was not working for the government agency. So I had a little more 
leeway and a little more pull than most people, because politicians needed 
somebody that can get the votes out and somebody that can get money to organize 
the campaign.  
 
By 1980 Felipe was a wealthy man and built a home in an expensive bayfront 
suburb -- on a lot purchased from his friend, Rodrigo. Indeed, as each separately 
explained to me, the two formed a close friendship and crucial partnership during the 
1970s —Felipe as an accomplished businessman trusted by city officials to keep an eye 
on different neighborhood agencies’ finances; and Rodrigo as the more militant activist.  
Rodrigo, Felipe, and Benny were not the only Puerto Ricans who comprised the 
PRU but they were the most influential.64 Each took on leadership roles through 
governing boards and advisory committees, as organizational directors or through 
grassroots organizing to rally support for specific initiatives. Less-known Puerto Ricans 
within the PRU (recall there were 12 at the onset) were also brought onto some boards 
and advisory committees by the leaders but their roles were mostly limited to linking the 
main leaders to grassroots support as well as personifying the needs of low-income 
residents in strategic ways.65 
                                                 
64 Carlos led voter registration and turnout drives and was well-known through his networks in the 
neighborhood, at church and the baseball league. But aside from his involvement in the ODP and as an 
initial member of the Health Clinic’s board, he was not involved in the administrative affairs of non-profit 
or government agencies and did not speak at public meetings. Later I will describe how his son became 
active in public affairs. 
 
65 Other founding PRU members include Braulio, Maritza and Tony. Rodrigo recalled that Braulio was a 
neighborhood resident and founding PRU member. He was also a patient at the Puerto Rican Health Clinic 
and a clinic board member loyal to Rodrigo during bouts of infighting on the governing board. As he said 
to a reporter in 1991, “[Rodrigo] was picked as director from the start because he was the most capable. He 
was the loudmouth, the one who fought to get things done. I would give my head for him if I had to” 
(Viglucci 1991, p. 1A). Maritza was involved because her son was the victim of alleged police brutality 
(The Miami News, 1973, January 18). Tony, who lived in the area since the 1950’s and also served on the 
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Bureaucratic Enfranchisement and Internal Fissures 
The creation and growth of the new Puerto Rican service organizations also led to 
conflict, some of which I will describe in this section. It is not possible to reconstruct the 
entire history of the dissolution of the Puerto Rican leadership network in Wynwood over 
the years from my small sample of respondents. But I will focus on the tensions that 
surrounded the group’s leader, Rodrigo, and the Puerto Rican health clinic, which grew 
rapidly66 and was prized as the first and foremost Puerto Rican community organization. 
Less than a year after the clinic opened, during the winter of 1973-74, it was 
gripped in a power struggle between its board of directors and the executive director, 
Rodrigo, who was forced to resign (Inclan 1974a). Funding for the introduction of dental 
and X-ray services led to disagreements about hiring new personnel. Board members told 
reporters that Rodrigo was unresponsive to the board and was not attending budget 
meetings (Inclan 1974b), while Rodrigo claimed they were interfering with his work by 
pressuring him to hire their friends and relatives as administrative assistants.67  After a 
portion of Rodrigo’s base of support in the neighborhood picketed the clinic for nearly 
two weeks, there was an intervention by federal funding authorities68 and a local civil 
court ruled Rodrigo’s dismissal to be a breach of the board’s by-laws. He was reinstated 
and his most outspoken critic, the chairman of the board, resigned.  
                                                                                                                                                 
founding health clinic board, continues to serve as a board member on the neighborhoods’ Community 
Action Agency. 
 
66 From a budget of less than $200,000 in 1973, it grew to $500,000 by 1983 and $2.7 million in 1987, 
when it served more than 60,000 patients a year. 
 
67 Interview with Rodrigo. 
 
68 They called for new elections. 
91 
 
While this was only one of many similar power struggles at the clinic, Rodrigo 
noted it was the first time that Wynwood’s Puerto Rican community had experienced 
such internal tension. “Some people, when they realized they weren’t going to be elected 
[to the board again], some of them retired. In one case, it was people from the 
neighborhood and the others [who left] were professionals.” Similar episodes were 
repeated over the years at the clinic, sometimes pitting former PRU members or other 
Puerto Ricans against each other, and other times sparking conflict with other groups, 
such as Haitians. 
In the late 1970s, a federal grant funded the crowded Clinic’s expansion into a 
building a half-mile north of Wynwood, in the heart of Miami’s Little Haiti 
neighborhood. Within two years, the clinic was again overwhelmed as its patient caseload 
nearly doubled, mostly from an increase in Haitian patients (Vaughan 1983). But the 
increasingly Haitian clients were treated by mostly Latino and Spanish-speaking health 
workers, especially among clerical staff, leading to misunderstandings in the stressed 
waiting room. Haitian community leaders protested their countrymen’s 
underrepresentation in the clinic, as only one one of the 12 board members and three out 
of eight staff doctors were Haitian. But Rodrigo responded that they were “asking for too 
much, too soon,” and argued that the real problem was the burgeoning caseload and 
resulting stress that affected all patients. After years of “accusing the whole world of 
discrimination” against Puerto Ricans, Rodrigo was in the position of defending himself 
against the same, and not only from Haitian critics. As he told The Miami Herald 
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(Vaughan 1983, p. 20), “right now, the Puerto Rican community is accusing me of 
running a Haitian clinic.”69 
Not surprisingly, conflict was associated with stress. Each time the clinic 
underwent a major expansion in physical infrastructure or services, some form of power 
struggle ensued. “The biggest fight” erupted in the midst of the Clinic’s celebrated but 
protracted move back to Wynwood from Little Haiti in the 1990s. Rodrigo took 
advantage of the opportunity to purchase a vacant and foreclosed six-story office building 
in 1987 but it took eight years and additional millions to overcome the the damage caused 
by internal discord, vandals and Hurricane Andrew (Roman 1988a; Viglucci 1991; Davis 
1992; Maass 1993; Ojito 1995a, 1995b). The “melodrama” was exposed in the local 
newspapers (Viglucci 1991, p. 1A), including “two lengthy interviews salted with 
expletives and emotional outbursts” by Rodrigo, warring factions among the staff that 
resulted in the resignation of 10 admministrative and medical personnel, and allegations 
of bribery and embezzlement, among other things. The crux of the conflict was over 
control of the Clinic’s expansion and specifically the selection of contractors, but tension 
had been building for years as a result of what critics called Rodrigo’s dictatorial style. 
These allegations and conflicts notwithstanding, in 1995 the Clinic was inaugurated to a 
crowd of more than 300 and neighborhood residents wearing Puerto Rican T-shirts and 
waving flags. 
                                                 
69 During my interview of Rodrigo, he asserted that he would never allow ethnic or racial discrimination in 
the clinic precisely because “we accused everyone of discrimination and so I made sure in the clinic there 
would not be discrimination. As with the employees, I brought people from all nationalities and we did 
something where, what we had said was happening to us, that nobody would accuse us of that.” Moreover, 
Rodrigo reasoned that as Puerto Ricans were never a majority in the Wynwood, “It was always very mixed 
and we worked together. Whatever we [Puerto Ricans] achieved, we shared it with everyone else. And 
when the Haitians arrived in Miami and nobody served them, we were the first to open our doors and give 
services. The same when the Cuban balseros came. We opened our doors to everyone.” 
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Reflecting on these episodes, Rodrigo felt that “the biggest mistake I made was 
becoming director of the Health Clinic.” 
 
The person that’s involved [in the community] and becomes leader, and then 
becomes director of the programs, loses part of that leadership because then the 
whole world wants to take away the reigns of what he’s doing. That’s when the 
fights started in the Puerto Rican community. People that I had placed [on the 
board] went against me! 
 
Although such power struggles surely affect the relationships between former friends and 
the Puerto Rican leadership network,70 their significance is in that they reveal the 
transformation and absorption of activism into much narrower initiatives, reorienting the 
struggle inward, within the community, instead of against the government or other 
“outside” threats. The fundamental complaint of the PRU and Rodrigo, in particular, 
during the 1970s was that “the community” did not have control over what happened in 
the neighborhood. They were never able to substantially influence land-use decisions, 
particularly in the 1980s and 1990s as the scale of planned redevelopment grew larger 
(which I will examine in subsequent chatpers). As they grew older, more disillusioned 
and increasingly went their separate ways, they left behind organizations which continued 
to be useful, albeit to politicians and developers more than neighborhood residents, as I 
will show later in the context of gentrification. 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 By 1979, Rodrigo admitted that the PRU had “gone by the wayside” (Rodriguez 1979, p. 2B). During the 
last major struglge that embroiled the clinic, some of the dissenters were part of the Puerto Rican leadership 
network from the 1970s. The most outspoken of Rodrigo’s critics who resigned was married to the Puerto 
Rican woman who founded the Wynwood Day Care center in the local Church in the 1970s. 
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The Broader Puerto Rican “Community” 
Since the 1970s, both PRU leaders and other Puerto Ricans have tried to promote 
the sense of a Puerto Rican community in Miami, albeit in fragmented ways. Despite the 
significant concentration of low-income Puerto Ricans in Wynwood, even in the 1970s 
they made up at most one-third of the total Puerto Ricans spread throughout Miami-Dade 
County (and many in Broward and Palm Beach counties). Today Puerto Rican cultural 
events and activities are similarly spread throughout Southeast Florida and Wynwoods’ 
leaders have no monopoly on the cultural symbols and practices of Puerto Rican-ness. 
This reflects the fact that, compared to large Puerto Rican populations in other parts of 
the country (e.g., New York, Chicago, even Orlando), Puerto Ricans in Miami and even 
those who grew up in Wynwood are more diverse socio-economically and more divided 
along class lines. 
The PRU President, Rodrigo, asserted plainly that “since it was a poor 
neighborhood, the other middle-class Boricuas that lived outside of Wynwood felt 
offended that the neighborhood was identified as the Puerto Rican neighborhood.”  The 
head priest of the Wynwood Catholic Church expressed a similar observation, recalling 
the controversy over the area’s symbolic designation as “Old San Juan” (see also Roman 
1987, 1988b). 
 
When I arrived [in the early 1980s], they had declared the neighborhood “Old San 
Juan” and many Puerto Ricans were insulted because they wanted it to be called 
“little Vietnam” since it was full of drugs, violence; it was a neighborhood that 
gave a bad image to the Puerto Rican. The educated Puerto Rican, the wealthy 
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Puerto Rican, didn’t like to be associated, at least at that moment, with 
Wynwood.71 
 
While there are many Wynwood residents who chose to stay, there are also those 
who are “not coming back.” Larry (whose mother was Puerto Rican), for example, is a 
successful businessman who grew up in Wynwood in the 1950s but moved out before its 
“worst years” and before the activism of the 1970s. He explained why he felt no 
solidarity with the neighborhood or its leaders, despite some fond childhood memories: 
 
There’s a distance [between me and the Puerto Rican leaders]72 and it was a 
different era. This was the slums. You made it out, right? You’re not coming 
back! You know? Let me out of here, man! I can remember the City of Miami, 
Miami News at the time, doing an article on this area and showing my street, 24th 
Street, as the slums, the Wynwood slums, and it was so fucking embarrassing that 
they’re showing my street for Christ’s sake! In the papers: The Puerto Rican 
Sluuums! [said in a higher pitch, imitating a newspaper boy announcing a 
headline]  So I took that personally.  
  
Many Wynwood residents who were part of the mobilization and activism of the 
1970s also sensed that they were looked down on from “outside” of the neighborhood. 
Carlos remembers how “back then,” before the neighborhood began to gentrify as an Arts 
District, “people didn’t like to come to Wynwood… because it wasn’t exactly—the area 
                                                 
71 Although the priest was referring to middle-class Puerto Ricans outside of the neighborhood, there were 
apparently some neighborhood residents who also felt Wynwood would be more appropriately titled, 
“Little Vietnam,” or at least they said so jokingly. According to a 1988 newspaper article (Roman 1988b, p. 
1D): “First Angela DeLeon did a double take, then she laughed when she heard that her Wynwood 
neighborhood has been renamed Old San Juan. ‘Old San Juan? It's better to call this Vietnam because this 
is so bad here,’ said DeLeon, who has lived in Wynwood for 29 years.” That residents as well as wealthier, 
non-residents of Wynwood should suggest that their neighborhood is really “a Vietnam” is evidently 
consistent with the internal and external stigmatization of other neighborhoods, such as Little Havana 
(Lowe and Saldivar 1983; Balsameda 1989). This is also consistent with scholarly research that finds that 
stigmatization by outsiders is eventually adopted by insiders (e.g., Wacquant 2007). 
 
72 Here he is also referring to a political distance. In his half-Cuban, half-Puerto Rican family there is many 
Republican voters, including Larry. This contrasts the typically Democratic voting patterns of Puerto 
Ricans. 
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was mostly Puerto Rican, you understand? Like as we say, we came to be the Jibaros73 
here [he laughs], as some have named us. But it’s prideful for us, throughout all the years 
and how we’ve grown in Wynwood.”  The first Hispanic Mayor of Miami (1973-1985), a 
wealthy Puerto Rican, also emphasized the class divide among Puerto Ricans which, in 
his view, ensured that lower-income Puerto Ricans such as those in Wynwood would not 
receive a greater share of government or private sector resources. 
 
All of these, mostly Puerto Rican and subsequently Cubans that were involved [in 
Wynwood], they had nothing to do with Wynwood or the [lower-income] Puerto 
Rican community or, you know, there was no social conscience of the wealthy, 
middle class, professional, Latino community in poor neighborhoods. It just 
didn’t exist. Either here or in Puerto Rico. The [Puerto Rican] doctors that worked 
in Mercy Hospital and the people who owned the Pan American Bank74 and the 
other businesses didn’t go to Wynwood. In other words, I was the only exception 
to that [laughing].75 But there was a very large wealthy Puerto Rican community 
in Miami in the 50s. It was much larger than the Cuban community. 
 
The institutions and governing arrangements established by these Puerto Rican 
activists would leave their mark on the community politics of Wynwood. They created 
community service organizations that became many residents’ link to the political 
processes of the city. As Castells (1983) put it, issues of “collective consumption” 
dominated inner city politics in the 1970s. As in other parts of the U.S. (Mollenkopf 
1975; Castells 1983; Fainstein 1987; Judd 1988), the “ethnic politics” of collective 
                                                 
73 Jibaro refers to the traditional Puerto Rican “hill people” or highland farm workers who lived in the 
interior of the island, but is also used pejoratively in a similar sense to the North American term, Hillbilly 
or Redneck. Carlos uses the term to indicate both feeling stigmatized and proud. 
 
74 Although there was no mention of the connection by long-time activists, in newspaper articles or other 
sources I reviewed, the Puerto Rican owners of Pan American bank may have donated to the Catholic 
Parish and other service agencies in Wynwood. 
 
75 The former Mayor later admitted that he actually did very little to help Puerto Ricans in Wynwood, for 
reasons I will discuss below. 
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consumption helped build up political constituencies and elect ethnic representatives; that 
is, community organizations were at least partners, perhaps no more than junior partners, 
in the larger governing arrangements of the city. While mobilization in Wynwood may 
have been initially effective, at least in obtaining funds, it was never strong enough to 
“elect its own” as Cubans and African-Americans did and, over time, even this initial 
ability to support the growth of service organizations weakened. 
The creation of the Puerto Rican Health Clinic was a remarkable achievement and 
in addition to federal funding it received, in the first two years of the CDBG funding 
(1975, 1976), Wynwood’s share of the total city’s grant was 10 and 11 percent, 
respectively (Table 3.4). The relative increase in 1981 was largely the result of funding 
for the Garment District expansion in accordance with the 1979 Redevelopment Plan 
(discussed in Chapter 4). But by the 1980s, Wynwood settled into the role it would 
occupy thereafter within the city’s collective consumption politics – that of being the 
neighborhood with the smallest share of CDBG funding. Having the smallest population 
of the CDBG Target Areas, this may not be surprising. However, for at least two years, 
Puerto Rican activists helped Wynwood to a larger slice of the pie. 
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Table 3.4: Community Development Block Grant Funding Allocation to Wynwood 
and City of Miami Overall, 1975-1982 
 
Year Wynwood Share City Total 
1975 $217,951 10% $2,270,852 
1976 $527,182 11% $4,911,559 
1977 $355,851 4% $8,763,410 
1978 $518,691 5% $9,628,937 
1979 $114,784 1% $9,271,297 
1980 $533,386 6% $9,106,258 
1981 $757,800 12% $6,210,954 
1982 $293,050 4% $7,181,000 
Total $3,318,695 6% $57,344,267 
Source: City of Miami Commission Records, City Clerk Archives 
 
Figure 3.3: Share of Community Development Block Grant Funding by City of 
Miami Target Areas, 1975-1982 
 
 
Note: City-wide is a category for funds spread across various sites, not the total 
for the city. Source: City of Miami Commission Records, City Clerk Archives 
 
 
As will become clearer in the next chapter, the “ethnic politics” on which 
Wynwood’s mobilization was based – and on which Rodrigo in particular insisted – was 
not effective in fostering the Wynwood’s inclusion in Miami city politics, beyond 
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receiving its prescribed share of government-funded services. The Puerto Rican 
community in Miami was dispersed spatially and struggled to overcome internal class 
divisions. This political isolation was exacerbated by the internal divisions among the 
Wynwood Puerto Rican leadership, which endured well into the 1980s. Lacking an 
effective power base, the neighborhood continued to experience disinvestment and 
stigmatization, setting the stage for the “spatial fix” of slum clearance and policing 
interventions that would eventually make way for redevelopment and gentrification. As I 
will explore in the next chapter, in the 1980s and 1990s Wynwood’s Puerto Rican 
organizations and leadership sought to develop the autonomous capacity to shape the 
economic development of the neighborhood. Although these efforts failed, by the 2000s 
the neighborhood’s organizations would become useful partners within the unfolding 
governing arrangements of gentrification. 
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IV. THE “SPATIAL FIX” OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 
As national CDBG funding increased to its 1978 peak, urban policy shifted from 
resident participation to service provision, drawing many activists in this direction as 
well. Activists were more likely to pursue service funding opportunities if their 
conceptualization and demands for “civil rights” and/or “welfare rights” were relatively 
narrow, focused on political inclusion and service provision, for example, instead of the 
broader objectives of “community control” which shaped the political agenda of some 
community organizations during the 1960s (Cloward and Piven 1975; Castells 1983; 
Cummings and Glaser 1985). Organizations that focused on community control had 
never developed in Wynwood.76 By the time Wynwood’s organizations had developed in 
the late 1960s, battles had already been won in other parts of the country resulting in the 
creation of social service programs that local government agencies could offer activists as 
rewards. The more militant the activist, the more important the program they were given. 
By 1974, City and County Hall controlled the federal funding, further weakening 
neighborhood organizational autonomy and locking activists and public officials in 
ritualized, annual negotiations over funding terms and amounts. There is little evidence 
that activists in Wynwood sought anything more than basic services for poor residents, 
despite Rodrigo’s regret: 
 
                                                 
76 Nor did “community control” organizations – some of which eventually become Community 
Development Corporations (CDCs) – develop anywhere else in Miami until the 1980s (Von Hoffman 2001; 
Lowe 2004). Most of the early (1960s-70s) CDCs to develop did so in cities with strong, ideologically-
driven, social movement activism; whereas in Miami (as discussed in Chapter 2), the civil rights movement 
was, at its peak, a reform-oriented coalition of Blacks, Jews and other Whites focused on pragmatic 
objectives such as urban renewal relocation assistance and, ultimately, was largely ignored by elites 
preoccupied with the Cuban influx. 
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I see that the programs that came to Wynwood and community development and 
all those programs from the government – they usually come with the intention 
[or stated purpose] of involving the community. And really they never allowed 
the community to develop what the community wanted, instead what they [the 
government] already had thought of beforehand. It’s one of the things that I, in 
retrospect, can say - that those programs were controlled by the people that work 
in the city or the county [government], and they are the ones that decide. What the 
community says is really not taken into consideration.  
 
As examples, Rodrigo pointed to the numerous occasions over the years in which 
Wynwood’s organizational leaders advised city officials of their preferences for how to 
develop the FEC Railway property (the ultimate development of which I discuss in the 
next chapter). 
 
We wanted to do other things there but it was not until the big money 
[developers] got to the neighborhood that the county and the city allowed it to be 
developed and to create multiple buildings [of high-rise condos] and that type of 
thing. In the 80s, we wanted to develop something else there, [we tried] through 
the city and through the county. We prepared ideas and presented them to the 
different community development groups that came [to the neighborhood]. We 
met every month… they [the advisory boards] would be assigned one or two or 
three million dollars, whatever, and we would tell them what we wanted to 
develop. But those often fell on deaf ears. 
 
Some of the proposals that Rodrigo recalled sounded bizarre, such as the time “a Cuban 
man came with a proposal to build a tower like the one in Atlanta, very tall, like a tourist 
attraction… which many of the people [in Wynwood] were in favor of.”77 But he also 
cited more practical ideas, such as “lower scale apartments than what they have there 
now, but to be for the people of the community, the neighborhood, to move there.” 
                                                 
77 The 12-story steel tower topped with a golden flame – known as the Torch Tower – was built by an 
Atlanta real estate developer to memorialize the city’s Olympic Games (Cress 1996). 
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As I will examine in the next chapter, none of Wynwood’s community-based 
development proposals – practical or otherwise – were taken into account when the FEC 
railway site was ultimately developed into expensive, high-rise condos and a commercial 
complex filled with upscale restaurants and national chain stores. Wynwood 
organizations never developed the capacity to implement physical development, despite 
the creation of Community Development Corporations (CDCs) to provide business 
services and to rehabilitate and build housing. Wynwood CDCs incapacity to build 
affected the thinking and practice of their leaders, shaping their roles as organizational 
intermediaries between neighborhood residents and the politics of urban development. In 
the case of Wynwood, CDCs would help facilitate gentrification not only because of their 
particular political rationalities but also because their lack of productivity contributed to 
the neighborhood’s deterioration, helping to widen the “rent gap” and intensify the 
“spatial fix” of physical redevelopment needed to “revitalize” the area.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine the main manifestations of both the 
“spatial fix” and the “entrepreneurial turn” of community development that eventually 
helped facilitate the area’s gentrification: the 1979 Garment District Redevelopment Plan 
and the 1990 Safe Neighborhoods Plan for Wynwood; the formation of CDCs; and the 
emergence of faith-based activism to advocate for physical redevelopment initiatives. 
 
The 1979 Garment District and 1990 Safe Neighborhood Plans 
The City of Miami’s 1979 Redevelopment Plan for “Garment/Fashion District” 
was the first major physical redevelopment initiative in Wynwood since the urban 
renewal and highway construction processes of the 1960s. This Wynwood-specific plan 
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was set in motion by the city-wide research of real estate consultants Hunter Moss and 
Company (City of Miami 1976a), the basis for the City’s Comprehensive Neighborhood 
Plan for 1976-86.78 The premise of the Redevelopment Plan was established by the real 
estate research findings for Census Tract 28, which delineates the district (City of Miami 
1976a, p. 26): “This tract will continue to follow a commercial direction which will work 
against any upgrading in the housing.”79 Although passed by the Miami City Commission 
in July 1979, implementation of the plan required a series of approvals by Miami-Dade 
County, which partnered in the redevelopment project. 
The “primary objective” of the Redevelopment Plan was to demolish deteriorated 
housing in the section of the Warehouse District that overlapped with the Overtown 
Redevelopment Area (see Figure 4.1) in order to retain and expand industrial 
employment in this part of the city (City of Miami 1979, p. 8). The target area was 
described as having “developed during the 1920s, at which time a larger number of the 
wood frame structures were constructed. The area changed racially in the 1950s as a 
                                                 
78 The research and city-wide planning was mandated by the Florida Community Redevelopment Act of 
1976, which enabled local governments to use community development funding for the purposes of 
extensive slum clearance and redevelopment. Incidentally, in the Florida International University library 
system, the City of Miami 1976-1986 Comprehensive Neighborhood Plan is available under the subject 
headings, “Neighborhood – Neighborhood planning – Gentrification” (see City of Miami 1976b, 1982). 
 
79 According to the city commissioned research (Ibid), “Census Tract 28 is predominantly made up of 
warehousing, wholesaling and light manufacturing with the residential in the form of Black walk-up 
apartments in poor condition and also deteriorating single-family and duplex dwellings. The occupants are 
primarily Blacks, Cubans and Puerto Ricans. There has been some upgrading in the appearance of the 
commercial structures with better than average warehouses and showrooms located along 5th Avenue. This 
tract will continue to follow a commercial direction which will work against any upgrading in the housing.”  
Census Tract 26, which encompasses the northern, predominantly residential section of Wynwood, was 
also described (Ibid, p. 24): “This tract has many diverse uses ranging from single-family dwellings to light 
manufacturing. It contains that large former freight yard of the F.E.C. Railroad containing 50 acres. It is 
little used today. The railroad has set a valuation on this of… just under $9,000,000. As presently 
constituted this tract is as dismal as No. 25 to the west since its western boundary is bisected by I-95 and is 
bordered by heavily travelled streets. However, a major redevelopment on the 50 acre FEC [rail]yards 
could represent a major thrust in doing something for this area that could have a ripple effect south into 
Census Tract 28 and 31.” 
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result of the expansion of the ‘Central Negro District’ at which time a number of large 
apartment structures were built (concrete monsters).”80 More than 47 percent of the land 
uses in this area were residential even though a substantial number of housing units had 
been demolished by the time the plan was published (p. 8, 10): “Expansion of the 
Garment Center/Fashion District required the acquisition and demolition of 
approximately 280 occupied housing units (323 total units) south of NW 23rd [and] 9 
marginal business establishments on 14 acres of land for re-use as industrial property. 
Some 97 percent of these units,” noted the plan, switching oddly into the present tense, 
“are in substandard condition [and] the vacancy rates are high, averaging over 10 
percent.” 
Although later sections in the plan account for the exact location of the acquired 
and demolished units, the shifts in tense are confusing – how can demolished units be in 
substandard condition and vacant? The next paragraph, continuing in the more 
appropriate present tense, reported that “there are 45 single-family or duplex housing 
units in the Garment District north 23rd Street, about 75 percent of which considered to be 
in substandard condition.”81 Moreover, more than $1.8 million or about 18 percent of the 
total budget for the redevelopment plan was set aside to provide relocation assistance to 
displaced residents (up to $4,000 per family). None of the 10 area residents interviewed 
by a reporter a month before the redevelopment plan was approved and published had 
heard of the plan, although a community meeting had been scheduled for a week before 
                                                 
80 Elizabeth Virrick, the housing reformer from the 1950s, was thought to have popularized the term 
“concrete monsters” through her advocacy of slum clearance (Mohl 2001b). 
 
81 Other than the 1979 plan, I found no public records (e.g., demolition permits, city commission records) to 
confirm the timing of the demolitions. 
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its approval at City Hall to help residents obtain relocation assistance (Veciana 1979). 
Although there were no organized protests at City Hall or elsewhere,82 a debate took 
place in newspaper articles prior to the plan’s approval. In response to the head city 
planner’s assurances that “we don’t want to tear down any viable businesses in the area – 
only marginal ones,” the African-American owner of an auto repair shop retorted, 
“What’s a marginal business? They promise one thing and then they do another” (Sidlo 
1979, p. 2b). When Rodrigo was asked about the plan, he complained that the majority of 
the garment manufacturers did not hire residents from the neighborhood and the 
manufacturers needed to participate more in job training and referral systems (such as the 
one run out of Rodrigo’s Health Clinic) (Ibid).83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 When the plan was approved, two spokespersons from Overtown appeared to advocate that this 
neighborhoods’ African-American residents be given the first right of refusal in purchasing some of the 
new homes that were planned to be built (although not for several years) in the vicinity as well as training 
for jobs in the garment industry (MCC 7/23/79).  
 
83 However, it was well-known that the mostly female labor force in the Miami garment factories earned 
very low wages (e.g., sewing machine operators), exacerbated by the irregular work schedule (Silva 1976a, 
1976b; Moore 1981; Konicki 1982). A Puerto Rican nonprofit agency manager explained to me that he was 
not able to sustain a branch of a national jobs training program linked to Wynwood’s garment industry in 
the late 1970s because “the garment industry was only minimum wage. We couldn't use those employers to 
satisfy the requirements [established by the national organization].” His wife, who worked at a welfare 
assistance agency in Wynwood, added that even though the pay was low and work unsteady, women might 
lose their welfare benefits by being employed.  Moreover, “some of these women had to pay for baby 
sitters,” which “even in the 70s, they paid around $50 a week and that would take such a big chunk out 
whatever they earned that wasn't worth it for them to go to work [in the apparel factories].” 
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Figure 4.1: Map of the Wynwood Garment District surrounded by Inner City Areas 
 
 
Source: 1979 Garment District Redevelopment Plan, City of Miami Planning 
Department (p. 6). The “Proposed Expansion Area” and “Future Redevelopment 
Area” are contained in the overlap between the Overtown and Garment District 
Redevelopment Areas. 
 
 
The plan also outlined objectives to solve a variety of other problems: insufficient 
parking, inadequate loading facilities, poor access to the regional transportation system, 
inadequate street system, crime, and difficulty recruiting labor for manufacturing. Later I 
will discuss the job training and placement programs created in Wynwood, which became 
another source of conflict among Wynwood’s Puerto Rican leadership. To address 
concerns about crime, vehicular access and inadequate street infrastructure, the plan 
called for a series of physical interventions, including not only housing demolition but 
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also the installation of lighting and signage, and the construction of street closures and 
“landscape buffers.” When combined with the creation of “vehicular access restrictions” 
(curbs, sidewalks and metal partitions to close streets) that largely comprised the 1990 
Wynwood Safe Neighborhood Improvement District Plan, these interventions effectively 
enclosed and walled off the section south of 23rd Street (the proposed expansion area) 
from the warehouse district to the north. The 1979 plan called for the closure of five 
north-south avenues and courts along 22nd Street and the east-west 22nd Terrace (see 
Figure 4.2). The following images depict these plans and a few examples of their 
implementation. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Map of Proposed “Street Improvements” in the Garment District 
Redevelopment Plan 
 
 
Source: 1979 Garment District Redevelopment Plan, City of Miami Planning Department (p. 17). 
Note that the northern solid black line marks the northern edge of the proposed expansion area. 
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Figure 4.3: Map of Proposed Vehicular Access Restrictions in the Wynwood Safe 
Neighborhood Plan 
 
 
Source: 1990 Wynwood Safe Neighborhood Improvement District Plan, City of 
Miami Planning Department. 
 
 
The only street closure actually built was at the southern tip of the Garment 
District along NW 22nd Avenue, completely closing off a low-income housing complex 
from the area to the north except for NW 6th Avenue, next to the highway. Not shown 
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here nor contained in any city planning documents, NW 3rd Court that connects with 22nd 
Lane was eventually closed as well (see 3rd image, below). These may seem minor 
details. But the micro-geographies of segregation and enclosure created by the techniques 
of “crime prevention through environmental design”84 shape the circulation of people in 
accordance with the security concerns of government and business elites and exacerbate 
the isolation of the poorest inner city residents (Davis 1992; Low 1997; Herbert and 
Brown 2006; Wacquant 2007). At the City Commission meeting where the 1990 Safe 
Neighborhood Plan was approved, district commissioner Miller Dawkins urged the city 
manager to complete the street closures regardless of delays in implementing other 
aspects of the plan, some of which required county and state approval (MCC 6/7/90). 
 
I want you to give directions to close off that [avenue into a] cul-de-sac. We 
allowed the Design District to move [away] because we did not do enough to 
encourage them to stay. We got almost every business along 5th Avenue [in the 
Garment District] rented [now] and if we do not work to make this area secure, 
where the people who are there with their businesses and their citizens85 who 
come there feel safe, they’re going to move also. So now, let them [other city 
staff] go on and play with whatever they’re playing with [county and state 
approval processes], that’s fine. But I want you to come back at the next meeting 
and tell me how we – I don’t care if it means closing off every entrance from 5th 
[Avenue] and putting a cul-de-sac. So people, when they go in there, if you snatch 
a pocketbook you got to run back out and come by our police up at the corner. 
(emphasis added) But we have to do something to ensure the merchants… more 
than just moving parking meters so that the people can park free. 
 
                                                 
84 This is how the resolution that approved the 1990 Safe Neighborhood Plan was worded: “to promote the 
concepts of crime prevention through environmental design” (City of Miami 1990; MCC 6/7/1990). 
 
85 This was an interesting word choice considering that the client base of the wholesale fashion district he is 
referring to were and still are mostly Latin American business owners who fly to Miami for a few days to 
buy merchandise in bulk. Very few stores in the district sell at retail prices or even open on the weekends, 
when Miami residents are more likely to shop (as they do in Allapattah’s Fashion District nearby). The 
other reason why Dawkins word choice was interesting is because of how he (intentionally or not) links 
citizenship with shopping. 
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By 1990, city officials spoke with a certain anxiety about the importance of the 
architecture of surveillance and security to the retention of business. Dawkins’ unease 
was an ominous message just a few months before the Wynwood riots of December 
1990. At the time of the 1979 Redevelopment Plan, however, City of Miami planners and 
their consultants were more optimistic; they expected the fashion apparel industry “to 
grow by 24 percent from 1976-1990 County-Wide and 15 percent within the City of 
Miami” (City of Miami 1979, p. 11). But by the early 1980s, the apparel industry began 
to decline, accelerated by the 1980 and 1982 riots in nearby neighborhoods. “That’s 
really when we saw that we’re going to have trouble bringing people back,” said one 
linen store owner and former president of the district’s merchants association (Hernandez 
1984, p. 24). According to a City of Miami report, between 1976 and 1986 the number of 
garment factories within the City of Miami shrunk by 60 percent, representing about 
2,000 jobs (Cosco 1986).86  United States Census data reveal that while the number of 
residents employed in manufacturing, transportation or public administration (the closest 
industrial category available) increased county-wide by nearly 9,000 between 1980 and 
1990, within the City of Miami this category declined by more than 9,840 and in Census 
Tract 28 (encompassing the Garment District) by 244 (Geolytics NCDB).87  According to 
the Sun-Sentinel (Cosco 1986, p. 15B), “By the time the city had devised a 
redevelopment plan and acquired 13 acres in the area, the domestic garment industry was 
                                                 
86 The former manufacturer I interviewed, Harold, recalled that in 1968 was the first time he walked into a 
Miami Department store “and saw a garment from Japan, which was the China of that time – had knocked 
off one of our garments at half the price. I said at the time, I told my Dad, that eventually the industry 
would disappear… By like 1980, 81, imports became more and more important, and then China got in the 
picture.” 
 
87 The number of employed persons decreased by 891 during the decade in Census Tract 28, which is 
especially remarkable considering that the total population was 2,265 in 1980 and 1,767 in 1990. 
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hit hard by cheaper imports.” Although apparel manufacturers were partially replaced by 
the growth in retail and wholesale clothing companies, these concentrated in the 
northwest section of the neighborhood around 5th Avenue and were eventually controlled 
by small-scale, Korean merchants as many of the Jewish, Cuban and other Miami-based 
entrepreneurs moved out (Proscio 1992). The industrial decline seemed to further cement 
the area “becoming more and more like a ghetto,” as the city’s assistant director of 
community development described in 1986 (Cosco 1986, p. 15B). 
 
Figure 4.4: Views of Street Closures Along NW 22 Street 
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Source: The first and last are from Google Street View (2010) while the middle photo was taken 
by the author in December, 2010. In the last image, newly built artist lofts are visible in the 
distance, beyond the edge of what used to be NE 3rd Court, now used as a parking lot for renters. 
 
 
 
Although information on the actual number of homes demolished as a result of 
the 1979 Redevelopment Plan is not available (beyond the confusing past and present 
tense description in the plan), census tract data reveals that the total number of housing 
units in the Garment District (Census Tract 28) decreased by 189 between 1980 and 1990 
(Table 4.1), eliminating more than one-fifth of the housing stock. Between 1970 and 
2000, the number of housing units decreased by about 550 in the southern part of 
Wynwood containing the Garment District. During these decades, the Garment District 
area lost more than four times as many units than did Wynwood’s northern, more 
residential half (-130). The largest decrease in housing units throughout all of Wynwood 
occurred in the 1980s, owing not only to redevelopment planning and implementation but 
also to the emergence of faith-based activists who protested the condition of abandoned 
housing, as I will discuss below. 
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Table 4.1: Change in Total Housing Units in Wynwood Census Tracts, 1970-2000 
 
Wynwood 
Area 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Change 
1970-2000 
South  
CT 28 
(Change) 
1,028 850 661 479 
-549 
 -178 -189 -182 
North  
CT 26 
(Change) 
1634 1677 1545 1504 
-130 
 43 -132 -41 
Wynwood 
Overall 
(Change) 
2662 2527 2206 1983 
-679 
 -135 -321 -223 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Geolytics, Inc. Neighborhood 
Change Database 1970-2000. 
 
 
 
Land clearance and spatial controls were the main physical interventions planned 
and implemented in Wynwood in the 1980s and 1990s to achieve the “spatial fix” needed 
for future redevelopment. Beyond merely clearing land, these initiatives were concerned 
with controlling population flows, evident not only in the street closures but also because 
the majority of the buildings demolished had been occupied. Thus, the number of 
residents also declined (Table 4.2). In the southern part of Wynwood, the population 
declined by 891 in the 1970s, 494 in the 1980s and 474 in the 1990s. Over four decades, 
the entire neighborhood (south and north tracts combined) lost more than 34 percent of its 
population or almost 2,900 residents. 
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Table 4.2: Change in Total Population in Wynwood Census Tracts, 1970-2000 
 
Wynwood 
Area 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1970- 
2000 
South  
CT 28 
(Change) 
3156 2265 1767 1293 
-998 
 -891 -498 -474 
North  
CT 26 
(Change) 
5173 4862 4530 4175 
-1863 
 -311 -332 -355 
Wynwood 
Overall 
(Change) 
8329 7127 6297 5468 
-2861 
 -1202 -830 -829 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Geolytics, Inc. 
Neighborhood Change Database 1970-2000. 
 
 
 
The Emergence of Community Development Corporations 
The period when housing was being demolished and jobs and people were leaving 
Wynwood was also when the Community Development Corporation (CDC) movement 
was blossoming nationally and locally. Designed as vehicles for the construction and 
rehabilitation of permanently affordable housing, CDCs were envisioned as a way to not 
only help “stabilize” a neighborhood’s property market but, in some cities where 
gentrification had already begun in the 1970s and early 1980s, as a way to protect 
residents from displacement due to rising housing costs (e.g., Gaston and Kennedy 1987; 
Turner 1999; Levy, Comey and Padilla 2006). Some residents were protected from 
displacement in Miami Beach in the late 1980s and 1990s, where the Miami Beach CDC 
became an effective and nationally renowned developer of nonprofit-owned, affordable 
rental buildings (Donnelly 2005; Viegas 2005).88 Such a CDC never developed in 
                                                 
88 I say partially because the gentrification of South Beach nevertheless displaced a large share of its’ low-
income population (Ibid). CDC housing development is only part of a broader strategy needed to prevent 
gentrification-driven displacement. 
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Wynwood even though faith-based activism, which at its peak was quite powerful within 
the City of Miami, supported the cause of affordable housing rehabilitation and 
development. CDCs in Wynwood were affected by the fragmentation of Wynwood’s 
Puerto Rican leadership and the broader national and local political move toward private 
rather than public mechanisms for economic development. 
The “entrepreneurial turn” of community development – part of the broader 
national shift toward “supply-side” economics since the 1970s (Eisinger 1988; DeFilippis 
1999) – took shape in different ways across different local political contexts. Starting 
under Jimmy Carter in 1978, in the fourth year of the federal CDBG program and 
following the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act, community development funding was 
made available for community-based, physical development. By the 1980s “the rise of 
the entrepreneurial state” (Eisinger 1988) spawned a network of national foundations and 
state and regional intermediary organizations to support the work of local CDCs. 
Nationally, CDCs mostly focused on housing rehabilitation and construction. Although a 
few prominent CDCs existed throughout the U.S. in the 1970s, Miami’s first three CDCs 
were established in 1980 in Liberty City, following the civil unrest in the historic 
African-American neighborhood (Von Hoffman 2001; Lowe 2006).89 Indeed, the 
emergence of CDCs revealed the salience of interethnic conflict in Miami’s political 
climate. The state legislation and local policies and corporate alliances that funneled 
money to CDCs – particularly to the new African-American controlled CDCs – were 
responses intended to smooth interethnic relations in Miami (see Portes and Stepick 
                                                 
89 The uprising that led to more than 1,000 arrests, $200 million in property damage and 18 deaths, was 
catalyzed by the acquittal in 1980 of four white police officers for the fatal beating of an unarmed, black 
insurance agent (see Porter and Dunn 1984). 
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1993, Chapter 8; Von Hoffman 2001, pp. 63-64). The Miami CDC movement of the 
1980s and 90s exhibits extreme tendencies not only in terms of the politicization of CDC 
funding in the context of interethnic conflict, but is also extremely entrepreneurial in its 
ideology and practice. 
The “highly politicized” nature of CDC funding in the context of interethnic 
competition meant that “in the course of transferring [some degree of] control of the city 
government from African-American to Cuban Americans” in the 1980s and particularly 
the 1990s, “deals were made by which CDCs that had not demonstrated an ability to 
carry out programs received long-term support” (Von Hoffman 2001, p. 66). Although 
this was generally consistent with national trends whereby the cultivation of “powerful 
political sponsors” (Ibid) meant that CDCs emerged “as practitioners of a new machine 
politics” (Marwell 2004, p. 278),90 Miami CDCs seem to have been especially 
unproductive.91 It is no coincidence that several of the City of Miami’s current and past 
City Commissioners are or were leaders of the city’s largest CDCs.92 
                                                 
90 Although CDCs cannot engage directly in electoral politics, they generate neighborhood support bases 
through service provision and jobs, and in some cases directly through a “community organizing” branch of 
their work (e.g., Stoecker 1997; Marwell 2004). 
 
91 It is worth repeating the evidence that Von Hoffman (2001, p. 66) cites: “Surveying the landscape in 
1993, Bratt and her colleagues found that few of the more than 20 nonprofit housing organizations in 
Miami had developed multifamily rental housing for more than four years, and these were primarily for the 
elderly (Bratt et al. 1995). By the late 1990s, 43 CDCs existed in the Miami-Dade County area, but only 
about a quarter of them were productive and at most 3 to 5 of them were in the top tier of CDCs across the 
country (Burnham 1999; Jones 1999; Martin 1999).” Also see the discussion in Stepick et al. (2003, pp. 66-
73) about the politics surrounding Miami’s African-American business development organizations. 
 
92 Current commissioner Willy Gort (who also had a spell during the 1990s) is president of the East Little 
Havana CDC. Former commissioner Angel Gonzalez directed the Allapattah Business Development 
Authority (ABDA, also a CDC). The latter commissioner was indicted on ethics charges for steering city 
contracts to his organization (Cenziper, Corral and Lebowitz 2007) and in the 1990s ABDA was found to 
have engaged illegally in electoral mobilization in support of former City Mayor Suarez and Commissioner 
Humberto Hernandez, both of whom were implicated in major corruption scandals (Hernandez was 
eventually convicted and imprisoned) (Garcia 1998; Viglucci 1998). 
117 
 
A key finding of Von Hoffman’s (2001) case study of community development in 
Miami was that CDC projects struggled because they followed an entrepreneurial 
approach instead of relying on foundation and government grants to the extent that is 
typical in other parts of the country. This was partly the result of a young CDC system: 
“Unlike other cities, Miami had never developed the proto-CDCs—neighborhood 
organizations that were formed to fight urban renewal and poverty and that then became 
interested in real estate development” (Von Hoffman 2001, p. 80). But in the 1980s when 
Miami’s CDC support system was established in the form of technical assistance 
agencies and community foundations, it struggled for prominence because of competition 
from an alternative, entrepreneurial method of doing community development.93 The 
state of Florida’s community development policies created in the 1980s emphasized 
small businesses loans with restrictive underwriting (making it difficult for CDCs to get 
loans) and established rules governing low-income housing tax credits which favor large 
development companies (Ibid, p. 65). Miami-Dade County’s administration of 
community development funding also followed the entrepreneurial approach, for 
example, by typically distributing almost three-fourths of available grant monies to for-
profit businesses and leaving more than 40 CDCs to compete for the rest (Ibid, p. 66). In 
one case, a CDC in Liberty City failed because it consistently partnered with private-
sector real estate developers, as “it adopted a strategy in keeping with the entrepreneurial 
                                                 
93 The “traditional” CDC ideology differs from entrepreneurialism because according to the former, certain 
principles cannot be compromised to the profit motive, such as the location of development projects (in the 
neighborhood) and the permanent affordability of housing. 
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ethos.”94 Albeit “weak,” other CDCs made do within the existing community 
development support system in Miami by relying on stronger political connections, 
scaling back their operations within the limited support system, and/or by virtue of 
operating in a smaller municipality where the political environment is more malleable 
and open (Von Hoffman 2001; see also Lowe 2004).95 
 
Community Development Corporations in Wynwood 
The problem that I had politically was that the Puerto Rican community in 
Wynwood expected from me to give preferential treatment to Wynwood. And 
there was no social, economic or any justification for them getting it other than 
their fair share. What was their fair share? It was never enough… They always 
wanted more. It’s different [than other neighborhoods] because the fact is that 
they didn’t get more. And the fact is that the Puerto Rican community never had 
any political clout. Never! [The Wynwood Puerto Rican leadership] was a very 
small, kind of, very ineffective, very insignificant... I mean, I went there because I 
felt an obligation to go there. Not because I had to go there. I didn’t get elected 
there. My votes came from the Hispanic community [read: mostly Cuban-
Americans]… Then I got challenged from a Cuban-American in 1981 [and] at 
that point, I was [re]elected by the Black community. 
- Former Miami City Mayor Maurice Ferre (1973-1985) 
 
In Wynwood, although neither the service agencies nor the more development-
oriented CDCs managed by Puerto Ricans ever developed significant electoral clout, their 
                                                 
94 Although the “weak” community development system and pro-entrepreneurial climate in Miami 
encouraged the CDC to operate like a for-profit business or at least partner with private companies, trained 
as a CDC executive, its’ leaders made business mistakes that led to failed operations. 
 
95 The East Little Havana CDC, unlike the Liberty City case, was managed by a Cuban-American city 
commissioner and has had other influential Cuban-Americans on its Board of Directors. ELHCDC also 
focused on smaller-scale buildings intended for homeownership in addition to supporting small businesses, 
fitting with the entrepreneurial orientation of local policymaking and the prevailing housing development 
practice (as in the case of the Inclusionary Zoning policy I examine in Chapter 5, large-scale rental 
properties are the exclusive terrain of for-profit builders). The Opa Locka CDC has been effective along 
more “traditional” lines partly because it operates in the City of Opa Locka, where the political system was 
more malleable and public officials more supportive (indeed, the current OLCDC director is a former Opa 
Locka mayor), in addition to gaining some support from Miami-Dade County. 
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leaders nevertheless behaved as if they were also political organizations, owing to the 
nature of the game in which all CDCs seemed to operate. While the first CDCs created in 
1980-81 were Black organizations based in Liberty City and Overtown, by 1983 and 
1984 Latino neighborhood leaders were funded to create similar organizations.96 The first 
CDC in Wynwood focused on business development and job training, and was born out 
of the complex and highly politicized series of events between 1980 and 1983 that 
included divisions among the neighborhood’s Puerto Rican leadership, conflict between 
Puerto Ricans and Cubans from Little Havana, and the typical (for Miami) discursive 
conflicts between capitalist and socialist ideologies. This episode of ethnic and 
ideological friction was exemplary of the general pattern of internal and inter-ethnic 
conflict that characterized community development work in Wynwood throughout the 
1980s and 90s. 
 The first public fissures between Puerto Rican organizational leaders became 
evident in 1980 when a Cuban-controlled nonprofit agency, the Small Business 
Opportunity Center (SBOC) based in Little Havana and housed in the offices of the Latin 
Chamber of Commerce (CAMACOL), was awarded monies from Wynwood’s share of 
CDBG to implement a job training program there. The SBOC was selected because the 
Wynwood CDBG Advisory Board, chaired by Rodrigo, did not establish a quorum in its 
annual meeting to vote on a funding recommendation for 1981. Rodrigo appeared before 
the City Commission when the funding was awarded to SBOC to protest the decision but 
to no avail. Speaking in support of the SBOC was Benny, a Wynwood resident and 
                                                 
96 In many cases, existing service agencies were funded to expand or shift their operations toward economic 
development. 
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activist, who had apparently broken ranks with Rodrigo (MCC 6/26/80). Later, the SBOC 
hired and subsequently fired Manuel, one of Rodrigo’s Puerto Rican associates from the 
Health Clinic, to help implement the new jobs program in Wynwood. After he was fired, 
Manuel, together with Rodrigo and another associate, Jorge, filed complaints with the 
city’s legal department against the SBOC. They made a variety of allegations during the 
October 1980 deposition hearing (MCC 10/9/1980), but two are most relevant. Manuel 
claimed that he was hired as “a token” and that SBOC was being used as a cover for the 
Cuban-controlled CAMACOL to “infiltrate the Wynwood area.” Second, Manuel 
testified that he was told “to back Benny for Chairman of the CD[BG] Advisory Board 
[instead of Rodrigo].”97 As I discuss below, the Mayor eventually terminated the SBOC’s 
program in Wynwood citing its lack of neighborhood support. The program funding was 
turned over to a new organization founded by Benny, who by then had been elected to the 
neighborhood’s CDBG advisory board. For these reasons, explained Rodrigo, he 
regarded Benny as an “opportunist.” Rodrigo lamented that by taking over the Puerto 
Rican Health Clinic he “lost the leadership factor” in the neighborhood.98 
 The other major split in Wynwood’s Puerto Rican leadership occurred in the 
electoral arena. The leaders of the Organización Democrática Puertorriqueña (Puerto 
Rican Democrats or ODP), including Felipe, stopped working with Rodrigo to organize a 
Puerto Rican voting bloc in 1981 after Rodrigo decided not to support the incumbent 
                                                 
97 The rest of the allegations had to do with the fact that the city-funded CAMACOL staff and board 
members were also employed by the city-funded SBOC, although the city attorney could not find any 
evidence that the Cubans had used their “position at one place to benefit the other,” which would have 
constituted a conflict of interest. 
 
98 Felipe also regarded Benny as an opportunist, despite their temporary collaboration, and he was 
characterized as an aggressive, self-serving activist in newspaper articles (Feldstein-Soto 1983a, 1983b; 
Miami Herald 1983). 
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Puerto Rican Mayor Ferre in his 1981 re-election campaign against Cuban Manolo 
Reyboso. The split between the ODP and Rodrigo not only divided the Puerto Rican vote 
in general but specifically within Wynwood, as one faction, including Benny and Felipe, 
followed the ODP and others were loyal to Rodrigo.99  Yet, by 1984, even Felipe 
abandoned the ODP to form a new organization, the Puerto Rican Democrats for Reagan, 
thus leaving the Democratic Party to support the President’s re-election campaign in 
Florida. 
Another notable case reveals the salience of both inter- and intra-group conflict in 
the politics of community-based organizations. Although the Puerto Rican Opportunity 
Center (PROC) established in 1976 was an “information and job referral” service (MCC 
11/10/77), critics doubted whether it actually conducted job training or assisted 
neighborhood small businesses. Moreover, as it was housed in, and effectively managed 
by the leaders of the Puerto Rican Health Clinic (PROC was initially named after the 
clinic), it was seen as an extension of Rodrigo’s role as a neighborhood representative. In 
the late 1970s, as Federal Revenue Sharing gave way to CDBG funding and local 
politicians had more discretion over community development monies, PROC funds were 
terminated and given to a national organization, Puerto Rican Education Services 
(PRES), which established itself in Wynwood in 1981. The Mayor explained his 
resolution singling out PROC for defunding during an October 1981 City Commission 
meeting (MCC 10/7/81): 
 
As you know, we are funding the Puerto Rican [Health] Clinic $40,000 a year. 
There are two things involved in this. One is, I think, substantive and the other is 
                                                 
99 Interview with Rodrigo. 
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something that is personal that I want to explain. The substantive issue is that the 
City of Miami has never dealt with funding of medical clinics. We were funding 
PROC, the Puerto Rican Organization for Community whatever it is, and they 
were involved in job training. Now all of a sudden PROC was a failure so it was 
faded out and absorbed [by the Health Clinic]. But instead of continuing to use 
that money for job training we ended up just because we wanted to placate the 
Puerto Rican community in Wynwood giving that money to the Puerto Rican 
[Health] Clinic. We are not in the business to do that. [Now] there is an 
organization called PRES… a national organization now in the Miami area [that] 
have been funded [by] the Federal government specifically for job training… As 
we go about cutting monies… the number one priority, after giving people hot 
meals, is job training. 
 
 
After the Mayor’s resolution was passed 4-1, with the dissenting African-American 
commissioner arguing that PROC should be given more time to reestablish job training or 
otherwise adjust,100 the Mayor went on to explain his more “personal” reason for 
defunding the agency (MCC 10/7/81). 
 
I would like to now on the record, even though I didn’t say it before because I 
didn’t think it was germane to the vote and I didn’t want to get into an emotional 
issue – that one of the of the members and evidently the political ideologue of the 
Puerto Rican Health Clinic, a gentlemen by the name of Font, F-O-N-T, Jorge 
Font, is the representative of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party in this community, 
and that the Puerto Rican Socialist Party is directly affiliated to Fidel Castro in 
Havana, Cuba, and is a bonafide member of the Communist International. And I 
would like for Mr. Font to clarify for this community how the Puerto Rican 
Socialist Party is functioning in Wynwood and in the rest of the Puerto Rican 
community.101  
                                                 
100 Although the Mayor’s surprise pocket item did not allow Rodrigo a chance to appear and defend his 
agencies’ use of the funds, at the next city commission meeting Rodrigo argued that the reason he 
terminated the job training program was because another agency was established in the De Hostos 
Neighborhood Center (not PRES) to implement job training. Yet, he insisted on receiving the funding on 
the basis that the Mayors’ actions were retaliatory against him for withdrawing political support during the 
last election. As it turns out, the Mayor’s reasons may have been somewhat politically motivated, although 
not for lack of electoral support. 
 
101 Rodrigo explained to me that Jorge was indeed a socialist and one of the grandsons of Jorge Font 
Saldaña, a writer and politician close to former Puerto Rican Governor Luis Muñoz Marín (González 
2008). The junior Font eventually moved back to island but never got involved in politics. He is not to be 
confused with the other grandson name Jorge (De Castro Font), who eventually became a Puerto Rican 
Senator, supporter of the island’s commonwealth status and George Bush ally. 
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Two months later, when Rodrigo appeared before the City Commission to protest the 
defunding of PROC, the Puerto Rican Mayor reiterated (MCC 12/10/81): 
 
The PROC… started as a job opportunity and a job training [center] and in my 
opinion we have been derelict in the past couple of years when they got away 
from that because, in my personal opinion, [they] failed. And I think they failed 
because of the people that were involved and there is no question that some of the 
people involved that were being paid out of this were paying more attention to 
politics, both the politics of Miami and the politics of the Socialist Party of Puerto 
Rico which espouses independence of Puerto Rican, and I don’t think it had 
anything to do with the well-being of the Puerto Rican and other community here 
and job training. PRES is a non-political, nationally recognized outfit. 
 
He went on to argue that “poor people who need job training, they don’t need politics and 
as far as I’m concerned that was an appropriate move [to defund PROC].”102 Speaking in 
support of funding for PRES was Benny, one of the original and key Puerto Rican leaders 
from Wynwood, who was by 1981 also on the governing board of PRES. Although 
Rodrigo later reflected that the Mayor employed “divide and conquer” tactics to avoid 
dealing with him, it seems more likely the Ferre was seeking to impress Cuban voters in 
an election year. 
 As noted above, the following year – in fact, only two months after Ferre was 
reelected – the Mayor terminated funding for the Wynwood-expansion of the Cuban-
controlled SBOC and gave it to the new Wynwood Economic Development Corporation 
                                                 
102 This time, the motion was introduced as part of a broader community development funding package by 
Cuban-American Commissioner (and Vice-Mayor) Carollo and seconded by Cuban-American 
Commissioner Perez, and passed by a 3-2 margin – the dissenting votes cast by African-American 
Commissioner Dawkins and Anglo-American Commissioner Plummer, the latter of which objected to other 
aspects of the package. Although Dawkins never explained his dissent, it was by his request that Rodrigo 
was invited to speak to the resolution, to no avail. 
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(WEDC) formed by Benny, who thereafter served as Board Chairman (MCC 1/14/82).103 
Later that year, Benny’s first major undertaking with the WEDC was to obtain a $25,000 
city grant for the first annual Wynwood Community Festival (MCC 7/29/82) but the 
city’s annual review of CDC contractors ranked the WEDC as the third-least productive 
organization (out of 10 studied), receiving a score of 54/100 (MCC 1/28/1983) that put it 
at risk of being defunded. To satisfy these concerns, in the following year Benny’s 
WEDC joined forces with Felipe and a cohort from the wealthier Edgewater 
neighborhood to the east, including a Reverend and a merchants association, to form the 
Biscayne-Wynwood Chamber of Commerce (BWCC). They proposed to implement an 
emergency shelter and job training program with the support of many local businesses, 
which impressed the Mayor enough to initially recommend allocating $275,000 (MCC 
6/9/1983).104  Two months later, however, when faced with a competing proposal from 
the PROC (affiliated with Rodrigo and the Puerto Rican Health Clinic), the Mayor 
decided to amend the previous resolution and instead split the funding evenly between 
the two organizations (MCC 9/29/83). Felipe protested the decision, arguing that “we 
should have never been misled into believing that the Chamber of Commerce was 
granted this proposal,” leading them to spend three months organizing the project under 
the presumption of a $275,000 budget. Despite the obvious competition between the two 
                                                 
103 Benny explained: “As you recall, about a year and a half ago I came before this Commission requesting 
that the monies allocated for the Wynwood Economic Development Program be given to the SBOC set up 
in Little Havana… One of the conditions that was [sic] set up at that time was that… I asked the 
Commissioners that until we come with a community organization, that there would be the agency to 
administer the funds. Now… that we have organized a community organization… we are asking for the 
transition from one organization to the other.” 
 
104 The Mayor claims it was “one of the very first times that I have seen a business group… become 
involved in a serious community problem [training young men to help reduce crime],” and thereby there 
was “no way that I, as Mayor can turn my back on the attempt that is being made here” (MCC 9/29/1983). 
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groups for funding, the Mayor voted for the split allocation on the condition “that both 
groups must work in tandem – I do not want separate, rival organizations… competing 
with each other for government funds on something that is essential for the well-being of 
the community” (Ibid).  
 Not surprisingly, a September 1983 Miami Herald article was titled, “Wynwood 
Needs United Leadership” (Morris 1983). While PROC and the WEDC-BWCC 
partnership competed for economic development funding, smaller groups also emerged to 
complicate and, ultimately, undermine the neighborhood’s power. Also in 1983, a new 
activist to the neighborhood, Roxanne Rexach, founded Puerto Rican Charities, Inc. to 
train women on sewing machines, among other trades (Foote Jr. 1983). But within a year 
the Bronx-native, whose city funding proposal was not approved, disappeared with 
thousands of dollars in donations and down payments from neighborhood residents 
impressed by her “street skills” (Soto 1984). In December, 1983, Benny died of a heart 
attack during one of his “typical” heated discussions with the Mayor and Rodrigo over 
the distribution of funding for Wynwood groups (Miami Herald 1983; Gilbert 1984).105 
The shelter project he wanted to build through the WEDC eventually became a public 
housing project for the elderly that was named after him. 
Wynwood was left with a thoroughly fragmented leadership. The WEDC’s 
replacement director resigned after only four months. The city soon defunded the agency 
(Colon 1984a), which remained inactive for almost four years until it was taken over by a 
new leader supported by Felipe (Roman 1987). Felipe and Rodrigo regrouped in order to 
reconstitute the WEDC as a stronger agency focused on Wynwood, and recruited its new 
                                                 
105 Rodrigo’s account is confirmed by newspaper articles. 
126 
 
director, Bill, an educated Puerto Rican professional from New York.106 Still in 1987, 
newspaper reporters wrote that “residents speak of a fragmented Puerto Rican leadership 
and of too many small organizations that don’t get together” (Roman 1987, p. 10). By 
1989, the prior alliance between the Edgewater merchants and Wyndood leaders had also 
dissolved, as the WEDC and the new Edgewater Area Association competed for city 
funds (Roman 1989). This division was also important because it marked the redrawing 
of neigborhood lines between Wynwood and Edgewater, the latter of which had been 
considered part of Wynwood for decades (see CDBG map, Figure 4.5).107  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 According to the accounts of Rodrigo and Felipe. 
107 As Edgewater gentrified, its’ neighborohod associations and economic development organizations 
sought to implement different programs than those of Wynwood’s Puerto Rican leaders. By 1993, for 
example, about $200,000 of the Wynwood Target Area’s $2.1 million allocation was spent on Edgewater-
based programs (City of Miami 1996). Albeit small, such funding reflected the encroachment of new 
stakeholders in Wynwood’s political terrain. 
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Figure 4.5: Map of Wynwood Community Development Target Area and 
Neighborhoods 
 
 
Source: From City of Miami’s 1994-1996 Community Development 
Target Area report. In the legend, “Wynwood Neighborhoods” are 
numbered as following: (1) Wynwood, (2) Boulevard, (3) Egdewater, (4) 
Omni/Island. Note how the mostly Black low-income housing in the 
southwest corner of Wynwood – the Proposed Expansion Area in the 1979 
Redevelopment Plan – is cropped out of the Wynwood’s CD Target Area 
even though CD funds were used for some of the clearance. 
 
 
 
By 1990 the thrust of the neighborhood’s economic development intiatives was to 
directly address the conditions that limited real estate investment. Community initiatives 
became closely aligned to the political agenda for Wynwood established by government 
and business elites in the form of the 1979 Redevelopment Plan the 1990 Safe 
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Neighborhood Plan, described earlier. Although the WEDC was tilting in this direction 
under Benny to the extent that he increasingly partnered with local businessmen, he was 
mainly interested in employment training for residents and low-income housing. His 
successor at the WEDC in 1984, although short-lived, already hinted at the potential shift 
in orientation, as his only undertaking was to publicly support the creation of the Non-
Profit Arts Complex, arguing that “besides giving prestige to the area, it will upgrade the 
neighborhood [and] you'll see traffic of new people (emphasis added) on the weekends” 
(Colon 1984b, p. 6).108 But it was only under new management in 1988, with one of 
Rodrigo’s associates as board chairman and Felipe also in support, that the WEDC 
became a real estate development organization. Such an orientation was, after all, what 
CDCs were intended to adopt, even if in the Miami context they became extremely 
entrepreneurial. In this respect, compared to other Miami CDCs, the WEDC was 
somewhat late in its shift toward an explicitly entrepreneurial strategy. After briefly 
examining the WEDC’s project in the 1990s, I will discuss how its failure made room for 
yet another group of new organizational leaders who formed CDCs in the mid-1990s. 
Prior to 1990, the WEDC re-organized the wholesale clothing firms in the 
Garment District into a merchants association and sought a marketing strategy to change 
the perception of the area. The WEDC director successfully lobbied the City of Miami to 
provide visible signage to help direct tourists and shoppers from highway exists to the 
wholesale clothing district and to approve symbolic namesakes – for example, Fifth 
                                                 
108 The establishment of the Arts Complex was funded in part by $200,000 from Wynwood’s CDBG 
allocation. 
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Avenue became Fashion Avenue and the northern half of Wynwood became “Old San 
Juan.” 
The centerpiece of the new WEDC’s work was an ambitious plan to establish a 
Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in the southwest corner of Wynwood, the city-owned site where 
housing had been cleared as part of the Garment District Redevelopment Plan. The 
Wynwood FTZ was also approved as part of the 1990 Wynwood Safe Neighborhoods 
Plan since, as the city manager put it, “that trade zone being a federal facility is required 
to have security, [then] that security will enhance the safety that [is] centered around that 
particular district” (MCC 6/7/1990). The FTZ was an extraordinarily large and protracted 
project initiated in 1990 that became mired in several legal disputes that were finally 
settled in 2005, by which time the property was in foreclosure and surrounded by a 
burgeoning Art District (next chapter). Examining the details of the plan and the politics 
surrounding its failure are beyond the scope of my analysis; still, some key observations 
about the project reveal its consistency with the prevailing market ideology that had 
transformed community (re)development practices and fit into the plans of government 
and business elites (despite disagreements over the distribution of the profits).109 
With approval and administrative support from the City of Miami and Miami-
Dade County, the WEDC applied for and received a Foreign Trade Zone designation 
from the federal government. The city then granted the WEDC the property title to the 
13-acre site that had been cleared as part of the 1979 Garment District Redevelopment 
Plan, so that the WEDC could recruit private firms to develop a distribution facility at the 
                                                 
109 In addition to sources cited, the following summary is based upon the authors review of a City 
Commission special hearing where attorneys explained the complexities of the pending litigation over the 
FTZ to commissioners (MCC 2/9/95) as well as newspaper articles (e.g., Ousley 1993b; Wilner 1999; 
Bussey 1996, 2003; Viglucci 2007), albeit with some simplification. 
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site. The WEDC said it would require developers, contractors and tenants to train and 
hire local residents and charge them fees for use of the facility (where the import-export 
business would be tax free). These fees were expected to generate substantial proceeds 
for the WEDC, which planned to reinvest in community development initiatives. Both the 
city and the WEDC expected that the revenues from managing the free trade facility 
would be sufficient to allow the WEDC to operate independent of government funding. 
The WEDC established a private subsidiary corporation, Old San Juan Management, Inc. 
(OSJ), to act as its fiscal agent because the nonprofit entity was legally prohibited from 
managing the amount of money involved in the FTZ project. Old San Juan Management 
had the same board of directors and was to function only as a vehicle to funnel proceeds 
from the FTZ to specific WEDC community development initiatives. 
The creation of this private entity alarmed city officials who in 1993 demanded 
the power to choose five of the WEDC’s 12 board members. The remaining board 
members would be determined through neighborhood-based elections. Still, the FTZ and 
the WEDC’s accountability to the neighorhood was called into question because the 
project’s scale went far beyond the neighborhood, drawing on state and federal funding 
sources that did not permit Wynwood-specific training and hiring preferences, even 
though the WEDC had promised to use its leverage as project manager and relationships 
with contractors to provide exclusive opportunities to area residents. However, the 
protracted conflict and litigation apparently kept the board structure from developing. 
Records indicate that the only active board was comprised of three members: Chairman 
Gamaliel, an administrator at the Puerto Rican Health Clinic; Bill from WEDC; and 
Soraya of the Puerto Rican Child Care Center. Dozens of leaders and members of the 
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Wynwood Catholic parish protested this at a City Commission hearing where their priest 
requested the following (10/14/1993): 
 
There has to be some accountability with the [WECD] agency and they should 
answer to a higher authority, that being the City of Miami, since the Commission 
is elected by the people and to serve the people, that is to say, Wynwood. I would 
like to see the foreign trade zone serve the community and, in a special way, those 
who live in that area; and that all of the people who live in that area be assured 
some voice in the board of the Wynwood FTZ.110 
 
 
Meanwhile, the Wynwood Puerto Rican leaders (Rodrigo, Felipe and Bill) 
involved in the project accused the City Commission of trying to sabotage the FTZ, once 
they realized how lucrative it would be, by withdrawing funding and support for the 
WEDC to seek state and federal funding. The WEDC eventually sued the city for not 
“reasonably” cooperating as stipulated in earlier agreements to amend the property deed 
to repeal restrictions on private development. City officials, on the other hand, accused 
the WEDC of trying to enrich itself through a “sweetheart deal” without sharing the 
proceeds with the City. One commissioner in particular repeatedly lamented that the city 
had given away such a valuable piece of land without guaranteeing itself a greater share 
of the spoils. However, the WEDC prevailed in 2005 when a circuit court ruled that the 
city had unreasonably restrained the project’s development by reneging on its 
commitments to amend the property deed and support the agency in seeking special 
federal and state loans (Jeffers 2005a). But by then the WEDC was bankrupt and its 
                                                 
110 Rodrigo, who supported the WEDC FTZ project, later reflected that the Cuban priest was always distant 
from the pre-existing Puerto Rican organization leaders, seemingly uninterested in collaborating. Without 
pinpointing any specific groups, the priest noted during our interview that when he first arrived in 
Wynwood he found a variety of groups that he referred to as each made up of cuatro gatos, four cats, 
asking rhetorically: “but who is behind those four cats?” He contrasted other leadership to his own, noting 
that when his church fought for a cause they were supported by hundreds if not thousands. I will discuss 
this faith-based activism later in this chapter and the next. 
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director had become a licensed realtor who had vanished from Wynwood’s political 
scene.  
Before the project was indefinitely caught up in litigation, the WEDC hired a 
developer to build the FTZ distribution facility (Figure 4.6), a major physical 
redevelopment project in itself. The resulting three-story building shell now divides the 
low-income housing complexes along NW 22nd Street (previously segregated by street 
closures and landscapre buffers) from the warehouse district to the north. The FTZ was 
included as part of the 1990 Safe Neighborhood Plan as a rationale for the location and 
organization of the street closures. 
 
Figure 4.6: Image of the Failed Wynwood Free Trade Zone Site, 2010 
 
 
Source: Photo taken by author, September, 2010. In 2011 the site was purchased by an investment 
company that cleaned and leased it out as a film production site while plans are finalized to 
redevelop it into some kind of an artistic venue (Musibay 2011). 
 
 The project was unusually large for an organization like the WEDC and for a 
neighborhood with little political clout. From the outset, it seemed far beyond the scale at 
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which Wywnood residents might be directly engaged. The lack of resident engagement 
led to questions from other neighborhood leaders and city officials about the project’s 
accountability to Wynwood residents and city taxpayers. However, from the perspective 
of the WEDC director, “the problem” with the FTZ project “was [that] everyone wanted 
a piece of it” (Viglucci 2007, p. 1A). Ultimately, a county circuit judge found that “no 
justification for the city’s action [to withrdaw support and funding] was reflected in the 
record,” concluding that city officials were largely to blame for the FTZ’s collapse (Ibid). 
The former city manager explained in an interview that the city erred in giving away the 
13-acre site with so few strings attached (a point that was repeatedly brought up during 
City Commssion meetings in the 1990s). 
The hyper-politicized nature of the project discouraged other organizational 
leaders who wanted to carry out community-based economic development from straying 
from the politically correct approach. Although many felt that that the FTZ was a 
promising project (Andrews 1991; Charles 1995a), the WEDC’s struggle over the project 
was an example of how not to work with the City of Miami. Moreover, the project’s 
failure further divided Wynwood’s organizational leaders. The remaining, long-time 
Puerto Rican leaders, Rodrigo and Felipe, supported the WEDC. By 2000, these leaders 
retired and became disconnected from the community politics of Wynwood. During the 
1990s a new crop of leaders including the Cuban priest of Wynwood’s Catholic parish as 
well as Puerto Rican professionals who moved from New York and from the island, 
created new community organizations and became recognized by city officials and the 
news media as Wynwood’s representatives. I will discuss some of the work of these new 
organizations below and in the next chapter. One of these organizations was the Puerto 
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Rican Chamber of Commerce, formed in 1991. Another, the Puerto Rican CDC, was 
formed in Wynwood two years later under the direction of another Puerto Rican 
professional from New York. By 1999, when a new director took over the Puerto Rican 
CDC, she noted that as she started her work in the neighborhood and did not understand 
why the FTZ project had become “a real mess,” she was clear that “it’s something that 
everybody just shies away from.” 
 
Faith-Based Activism against Disinvestment and “Blight” 
Noted earlier, in the 1980s the Catholic parish in Wynwood established satellite 
missions throughout the neighborhood to better reach residents and to increase its 
membership. By the late 1980s, the church became an important member of the county-
wide Faith-Based Activist Coalition (FBAC). In the next chapter I examine some aspects 
of the FBAC’s broader, city- and county-wide work but here I focus on the emergence of 
the Wynwood Catholic Church and its Cuban head priest as a powerful force in the 
neighborhood. 
 As one reporter wrote in the late 1980s, “the inner city parish has turned political 
action into a tool of evangelization. That tool is the FBAC” (Rodriguez-Soto 1989, p. 7). 
It was described this way because in the late 1980s FBAC organizers canvassed the 
neighborhood in what they called a “listening process” to understand what problems 
Wynwood residents faced and which issues they would most likely support as social 
justice causes. With the Cuban priest as a key ally, the FBAC campaigned to increase 
building code enforcement and demolish abandoned houses in Wynwood. In March 
1989, the FBAC held its first “accountability meeting” with city officials and more than 
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350 residents at the Catholic parish in Wynwood. At the meeting, Wynwood leaders 
presented a list with images of 360 properties in the area that were vacant and littered 
with trash, abandoned buildings that had become “crack houses,” or were otherwise in 
need of building code enforcement (Ibid). 
 Although it is not clear how many buildings were demolished as a result of the 
church’s pressure, these actions contributed to the decrease in housing units noted earlier. 
By emphasizing the role of these demolitions in reducing the housing stock I do not mean 
to imply that “crack houses” are important assets to the neighborhood that should be 
preserved. But as a former FBAC organizer explained, knocking them down was one 
thing, monitoring the management of those properties was another challenge altogether. 
 
It was easier to control a vacant lot [so that it] was kept clean than be dealing with 
a lot of the drugs, and a lot of the problems [in an abandoned building], especially 
for kids that have to walk distance from home to school. [But] it’s very difficult 
[to monitor] because it costs a lot of money and resources to keep this type of 
campaign going on. 
 
Of course, the FBAC’s concern was ensuring that the properties were kept clean and 
drug-free. When in 1992 city officials devised a more rigorous code enforcement plan, 
the Cuban priest urged them to also include mechanisms for transferring properties to city 
or nonprofit ownership so that the outcome of their efforts is not just to produce vacant 
land. 
 
It will be good… [for] the City Manager to bring us some kind of things that he 
can do with those empty properties… Because we are in favor of the strongest 
measure [of code enforcement] but we want also those empty lots to have 
something for them. We don’t want empty lots in our city. We are willing to 
accept any… suggestions to make those affordable houses or whatever, you now, 
that can pay taxes. 
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Ultimately, city officials passed stricter codes that streamlined their ability to place liens 
and foreclose on properties, but it was left up to Wynwood’s CDCs to figure out how to 
develop affordable housing or propose alternatives on city-owned vacant lots. Although 
the FBAC organizers were aware of the potential threat of gentrification (as I discuss in 
the next chapter), it was not clear to them in the late 1980s and 1990s that by helping to 
clear land of abandoned buildings, the cost of redeveloping these properties was reduced 
(the “rent gap” enlarged). For this reason, the  Alinsky tradition of neighborhood 
organizing that focused on short-term, practical objectives has been criticized for its lack 
of ideological vision and political analysis (e.g., DeFilippis 2004). 
 Another key initiative of the Catholic Church in Wynwood was to build a small 
chapel in the heart of the neighborhood, concretizing the envagelizing work of its roving 
missions. Regardless of whether residents believed it, the origin of the chapel was staged 
as a “miraculous” conception. One night in 1990 after parishioners expressed skepticism 
at the head priest’s announcement of the project, a sheep appeared on the vacant, future 
site of the proposed church. As the Lamb of God is the central symbol on the shield of 
the Puerto Rican coat of arms, the Cuban priest announced it was a sign from God that 
the new chapel would be named for Puerto Rico. “And that lamb was there, nobody dared 
touch it,” recalled Carlos Jr., who at the time worked at the PRES offices just down the 
block. “This [was] in a neighborhood where, you know, people would steal your tires 
while you’re waiting at a red light.” 
 The Puerto Rican Chapel was completed in 1994, after piecing together 
architectural designs, building materials and money from private donors. The designs 
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were donated by renowned architects from the University of Miami and a small cohort of 
wealthy donors (most of whose identities were never revealed). The chapel project made 
the Catholic Church in Wynwood under the leadership of the Cuban priest a popular 
charity. A profile of a 1993 church fundraiser revealed a long list of powerful Cuban-
Americans, including the then-mayor and city manager (whose sister was treasurer of the 
church’s fundraising department) (Landers 1993). The chancellor of the Archidiocese of 
Miami explained that the Wynwood Catholic Church “was the center point for Cubans at 
the beginning of exile. Most of the families [which] are the friends of [the church] went 
to school there, then moved on to other areas. Now they are coming back to help the 
people and the parish that helped them” (Landers 1993, p. 1J).111 
 Thanks in part to these relationships, the 1989 campaign to demolish “crack 
houses” and enforce building codes developed into a closer collaboration between the 
Wynwood Catholic Church and the city government. The Cuban priest was instrumental 
in the development of a new Community-Based Policing (CBP) system in Miami in 
1992, modeled on the government participation efforts he led in Wynwood. At the March 
1991, city meeting where the CBP system was approved, the City Manager credited the 
FBAC and its Wynwood support base as they “showed me that the only way we could 
deal with the problems of the community was out there in the neighborhoods,” quoting 
the Cuban priest’s approval of the new program when he said, “you have given a face to 
bureacracy. I can look at that guy and go and complain and maybe something will 
happen.” The CBP system created what the city manager referred to as “mini city halls” 
                                                 
111 The Mayor added, “my wife and I and many of our close friends, including a few doctors, find [the 
church’s inner-city projects] to be one of the most important efforts in the city, in both the spiritual and 
community sense.” 
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inside of the neighborhoods to directly engage residents in issues of building code 
enforcement and permits, among other city services.  
Ironically, the Cuban leaders who advocated for the CBP system also warned 
against the excesses of government. The Cuban city manager closed his March 1992 
presentation of the new administrative infrastructure by reminding the commission that 
“President Eisenhower said that the best government is the government closest to the 
people, and that’s simply what we’re trying to do here.” Moments later, the Cuban-
American Mayor interrupted the public comments to distinguish the CBP system from 
the communist neighborhood watch groups in Cuba:112  
 
Let me just put in the record [that] the exchange has to with the characterization 
of the program as a committee of barrios which is something very, very 
distasteful to people in the Cuban community because it’s something that was 
initiated by Castro to exert surveillance and to co-opt and otherwise oppress the 
people of Cuba and Mr. Urra has responded that he fought against that and that 
[the CBO] has nothing to do with that. There is no oppression here but there is 
order. 
 
Even the Cuban priest from Wynwood was known for railing against the “imperialistic” 
schemes of heavy-handed government (Landers 1993), albeit in reference to City of 
Miami garbage dumps imposed on poor people’s neighborhoods.  
In some ways, the cautions against government “close to the people” were 
warranted. The creation of the CBP, while helping to make local government more 
responsive to poor neighborhoods in the 1990s, also became a form of closer social 
control at the neighborhood level. As I will examine in the next chapter, at the turn of the 
                                                 
112 The Comité de Defensa de la Revolución or CDR created by Castro’s government in 1960 are 
neighborhood watch groups often described as the “eyes and ears of the Revolution” in Cuba.   
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21st Century gentrification processes began to change the form and function of the 
neighborhood-based CBP offices, making them more responsive to speculative investors 
than long-time residents. Moreover, the rationalities and practices forged during the 
entrepreneurial turn of community-based organizations also shaped the way these 
organizations would engage with the unfolding gentrification processes. 
 
The Creation of the City of Miami Voting Districts 
At the height of the mobilization generated through the priest’s leadership, a 
major change in the City of Miami political system undermined the potential power of the 
residential base of Wynwood. The fiscal crisis of the mid-1990s113 provoked a 
referendum to disincorporate the City of Miami and this, in turn, prompted sitting 
commissioners to propose a city commission district plan to replace the existing at-large 
voting system (see Branch 1997a, 1997b; Steinacker 2001). The referendum failed but 
voters approved a “five-seat plan” in September 1997 (Branch and Keating 1997; 
Viglucci 1997). The resulting district system split Wynwood virtually in half, as Figure 
4.7 below reveals. The political logic behind the boundaries that cross Wynwood – as 
expressed during several city commission meetings in July 1997 – was to unite the 
African-American strongholds of Liberty City and Overtown (District 5) and the largest 
Anglo-American voting blocs along the Upper East Side, Brickell and Coconut Grove 
(District 2). 
                                                 
113 In 1996, a federal investigation of political corruption discovered that Miami had a $68 million budget 
deficit, 25 percent of the overall city budget, causing rating agencies to immediately downgrade Miami’s 
bonds, eventually to junk bond status (Garcia 1996; Dluhy and Frank 2002). 
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 The district plan was approved despite some initial concern and negotiation over 
the division of Wynwood. Notably, this concern did not come from community activists, 
organization leaders or any residents from Wynwood. The only two residents to criticize 
the impacts of the district plan on Wynwood lived in neighboring Allapattah and both 
commentators raised concerns in ethnic group terms, in line with the rhetoric that 
surrounded the larger debate over the future of the City of Miami (Steinaker 2001). At the 
city commission meeting on July 10, 1997, one Puerto Rican resident of Allapattah, a 
neighborhood known for its large Dominican population, was critical of both his fellow 
Puerto Ricans and commissioners for not being “fair” to all of the Hispanic “subgroups” 
in the creation of a plan that reinforced the tripartite (Black, White, Cuban) racial/ethnic 
structure of the city. 
 
I have always attacked this commission, generally. But now I am going to attack 
my own people from the Puerto Ricans… Where are the Puerto Ricans? Why 
don’t we have a district in companionship with the Dominicans? The Hispanics 
are… there are subgroups. So, if we are going to make this, we have to be fair to 
all the subgroups.114 
 
Quoted below, the Cuban-American commissioner Hernandez was critical of a previous 
version of the plan that kept Wynwood intact by routing the boundary further east, along 
the FEC railway. 
 
There is no way that you could connect Overtown to the African-American 
district on top without encompassing the Wynwood-Edgewater area. And I have 
to agree with Commissioner Plummer that the problem I have with that is that you 
are obviously not living up to the integrity of the Wynwood Edgewater area by 
                                                 
114 Transcript of City of Miami Commission meeting, July 10, 1997. 
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putting it into the African-American district. You are splitting it and I think you 
are kind of messing up with the actual integrity of that community.115 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Boundaries of the City of Miami Commission Districts and Wynwood 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 Transcript of City of Miami Commission meeting, July 4, 1997. 
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The decision to move the boundary further west into Wynwood did nothing to 
consolidate the Hispanic vote in the central corridor of the city. It is not entirely clear 
why the boundary between districts 2 and 5 was specifically routed along NW 2nd 
Avenue, the central commercial corridor of Wynwood. Part of it likely had to do with the 
formula for allocating votes. If the boundary were moved east to keep Wynwood intact it 
would have added too many voters to the African-American corridor and, the resulting 
district would have been reduced along a different boundary. It is likely that African-
American leaders preferred to consolidate a black voting bloc instead of the mostly 
Hispanic area of Wynwood. Caught between majority white and majority black voting 
precincts, Wynwood’s Hispanic vote was divided and apportioned almost evenly to each. 
Wynwood had not shown any substantial electoral power since the early 1970s, 
when Puerto Rican mobilization contributed to the Puerto Rican Democrats organization. 
In the mid 1990s, the Catholic Church seemed a potentially formidable force when it 
could mobilize hundreds and sometimes more than 1,000 Wynwood residents to 
“accountability meetings” with politicians. Yet neither the Wynwood Church nor the 
Faith-Based Activist Coalition spoke out against the districting plan, possibly because the 
growing number of recent Central American arrivals in Wynwood and the out-migration 
of upwardly mobile Puerto Ricans, Cubans and others, meant that fewer residents or 
parishoners were eligible to vote. Nevertheless, the head priest acknowledged that the 
new voting districts “sacrificed Wynwood” and made it the “rat’s tail” in the city’s 
electoral politics. Since then, he exaggerated, district commissioners “have never in their 
life stepped foot in Wynwood.” 
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V. RATIONALITIES OF COMMUNITY-BASED ACTION 
By the early 2000s, as the City of Miami recovered from the 1990s recession116 
and real estate markets were beginning to rebound , Wynwood emerged for the first time 
in its postwar history as a prime development interest and experienced rapid 
gentrification. In this chapter, I examine examples of the thinking and practice of 
community-based development in Wynwood during the 1990s and through the first 
decade of the 2000s. Of particular interest are two aspects of community politics: (1) the 
factors shaping the thinking and action of community-based organizational leaders and 
(2) the implications for how these organizations function as vehicles through which 
residents may engage in the politics that shape the built environment of the 
neighborhood. My interest here is not merely that community organizations in Wynwood 
were produced to be co-opted vestiges of previous generations of activism or ineffective 
in challenging the status quo or implementing some alternative development. The 
question is how this came to be: Why were these Wynwood organizations passive in the 
face of gentrification and even active in facilitating it? 
These organizations shape resident participation in urban development by 
standing in as neighborhood representatives in political processes and by helping to 
inculcate residents (the constituents or “clients” of organizations) in ways of thinking and 
acting with respect to the politics of urban development. In this way, organizations help 
                                                 
116 Noted earlier, in 1996 the City of Miami received a junk bond rating. The reduced bond rating increased 
the cost of financing redevelopment projects, resulting in increased austerity in subsequent city budgets, 
which encouraged the city to make greater use of alternative mechanisms such as Tax Increment Financing 
and tourist and parking taxes to finance inner city redevelopment (Garcia 1996; Miami Herald 1996; AP 
1997; Cordle 2000; Rabin 2000; Dorschner and Corral 2001; Olkon 2001). As I will show in the case of the 
Midtown complex, the use of these financing schemes helped political and business elites circumvent or 
weaken public participation. 
144 
 
to produce political subjectivies akin to what some have labeled the “new pragmatism” 
(Eick 2007, p. 270), a rationality that supports business initiatives and the local 
governments’ growth agenda in neighborhood-level economic development projects. 
The first section of this chapter focuses on the discourses and rationalities of 
action revealed in the development of the 1996 Wynwood Master Plan, which was a 
community-based planning exercise conducted as a partnership between the Catholic 
Church, the Puerto Rican Community Development Corporation and the University of 
Miami School of Architecture, and supported by a local bank and the City of Miami. This 
plan developed in the context of the neighborhood’s leaders shift from demolishing to 
developing housing; from protesting disinvestment to proposing some alternative, a 
process which apparently led them to acknowledge and accept the political “realities” of 
urban development. The second section of this chapter seeks to further examine these 
leaders’ thinking and action in the broader context of political activism and social justice 
advocacy in Miami during the mid-2000s, in some of which I was personally involved. I 
highlight the case of an initiative to create a more equitable Inclusionary Zoning 
(housing) policy in Miami-Dade County and I draw on other examples of how activists 
felt overwhelmed by the power of the wealth generated at the height of the 2003-2006 
real estate bubble. In the subsequent chapter, I focus on three cases that exemplify the 
gentrification unfolding in Wynwood to explore how the ways of thinking and acting 
examined below shaped residents’ and organizations’ engagement with gentrification 
processes. 
Recall that by the 1990s in Wynwood, non-Puerto Rican (or at least more diverse) 
leadership emerged through the local church campaigns to protest government neglect of 
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the area and to demand services. Following the construction of the new Puerto Rican 
chapel, Fernando, the Cuban head priest of the Catholic Church, helped organize the 
formation of a new, Puerto Rican-led community development corporation (CDC) to 
provide assistance to small businesses and build affordable housing. The dissolving 
bonds of the neighborhood’s decades-old Puerto Rican leadership and the previous 
Wynwood CDC’s involvement in a protracted legal dispute (see Chapter 4) gave way to 
fresh crop of Puerto Rican professionals imported from the island and New York to 
manage existing agencies, found new organizations or otherwise inject fresh energy into 
the neighborhood’s political relationships with government and the private sector. The 
new transition was not free of conflict as the Wynwood CDC claimed it was being 
sabotaged by the City of Miami’s support of the new, competing CDC in the 
neighborhood. The new CDCs leaders sought to distance themselves from the Wynwood 
CDC and the negativity surrounding the Wynwood Free Trade Zone project. They were 
therefore much more likely to negotiate and partner with government officials and private 
developers. Indeed, from the 1990s onward, the neighborhood’s new leadership, Puerto 
Ricans and otherwise, were decisively pro-development. Similar to the previous 
generation of leadership forged in the 1970s, which were enfranchised as service 
providers after rounds of protest, in the 1990s the neighborhood’s leaders initiated the 
turn from protest activism to development implementation. An important and 
representative moment in this turn was the 1996 Wynwood Master Plan. 
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Community-Based Planning for the “Reality” of Gentrification 
 Throughout the process of funding and building the Puerto Rican Chapel in 
Wynwood (Chapter 4), Fernando insisted that the group “do something more” for the 
neighborhood to enhance residents’ sense of ownership. The general desire led to two 
specific initiatives – the formation of a new Puerto Rican CDC to assist small businesses, 
promote affordable housing development, and the initiation a neighborhood planning 
process in consultation with the University of Miami’s Community Urban Design 
program. The CDC has provided homeowner counseling to low-income residents and 
sporadically implemented the City of Miami’s commercial façade rehabilitation program, 
a source of financing to paint storefronts and fix awnings. As I will discuss below, it has 
been less effective in building affordable housing. 
The Master Plan process, initiated in 1996 at the request of Fernando in 
collaboration with the Puerto Rican CDC, was supported by the City of Miami and 
Greater Western Bank (persuaded by the head priest to fulfill its Community 
Reinvestment Act obligations).117 It involved a week-long “charrette” including public 
meetings and private sessions for “neighborhood stakeholders” (residents, local business 
people, government officials, educators and civic and religious leaders).118 In the mid-
1990s gentrification was not evident but its potential was clear to the charrette leaders 
                                                 
117 As part of his effort to pressure banks to invest in the neighborhoods of Wynwood and Allapattah, the 
Cuban priest organized a consortium of banks who supported the creation of low-income homebuyer 
workshops in 1994 (Ousely 1994). 
 
118 All meetings were held at the community center at Roberto Clemente Park. 
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and some recently arrived art collectors and gallery owners. As the supervising architect 
explained, the charrette included a tour of one of world’s largest private art collections.119 
 
We actually all took a tour of the Rubell Collection… because we could 
understand that this was the first inroad of a future economy… And we 
understood that the potential game changers were the Nonprofit Arts Complex,120 
revival of the 5th Avenue [wholesale fashion district] area which was already a 
destination [where] people shopped and then, you know, the Rubell Collection. So 
[we chose these sites] in terms of economic activity or benefit for the whole area. 
 
The resulting Master Plan document (WMP 1996) established a number of guidelines and 
objectives for Wynwood’s redevelopment. In addition to design enhancements for the 
neighborhood’s streets and edges,121 the Master Plan called for the preservation of 
historic structures, the creation of a public plaza (“Placita San Juan,” see Figure 5.1 
below) in the center of the residential area associated with Puerto Rican heritage, and the 
redevelopment of the FEC Rail yard (discussed in Chapter 4) into either a residential 
extension of Wynwood or an “arena alternative” designed as a civic and commercial 
space. The Master Plan also called for basic maintenance and preservation, particularly in 
terms of public space and affordable housing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 According to its curator and several New York-based art journals and critics, the Rubells are among the 
200 largest art collections in the world (Wallach 2001; Mason 2003). 
 
120 The Nonprofit Arts Complex [NAC] is funded through government grants, private donations, and 
mostly by renting studio space to artists at affordable rates. 
 
121 Such environmental designs differentiate between districts, which are thought to protect the identity of 
an area and help legitimize a group’s claim to the place, according to architects. 
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Figure 5.1: Proposed San Juan Plaza and Actual Development of the Site as a 
Parking Lot in 2008 
 
 
 
 
Source: The top image is of “Placita San Juan” from the 1996 Wynwood Master Plan (WMP, p. 
19). It was envisioned along NW 2nd Avenue across from the Puerto Rican chapel “to provide a 
civic space for informal activities and to serve as the symbolic center of the neighborhood.” The 
bottom image is the author’s photo of a parking lot built on the proposed plaza site in 2008. The 
black street lamp to the left is a part of the Master Plan explained by Carlos Jr., quoted below. 
 
 
The 1996 Master Plan expresses the entrepreneurial policy orientation of the 
community-based organizations involved. In addition to suggesting conventional 
strategies to “combat the forces of deterioration,” such as through building code 
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enforcement and strategies to increase homeownership, the plan recommended that 
stakeholders “encourage controlled gentrification while protecting the rights of existing 
residents and businesses to thrive in place” (WMP 1996, p. 6). Although it cannot be 
known exactly what the plan’s proponents were thinking in 1996, their reflections reveal 
a “practical” rationality in which gentrification and displacement were deemed acceptable 
as an outcome of “progress,” or at least a preferable alternative to what they perceived as 
neighborhood disinvestment and decline.122 Moreover, the lack of implementation of 
those aspects of the plan which would have most benefited residents (as I will 
demonstrate below), such as the development of the central plaza or preservation and 
development of affordable housing (which inspired the creation of the Puerto Rican 
CDC), further shaped the leader’s pragmatism.123 
Carlos Jr., the son of a founding PRU member (Chapter 3), was chairman of the 
board of the Puerto Rican CDC when the Master Plan was conceived and emphasized the 
importance of symbolic preservation given the eventuality of change. 
                                                 
122 As I will discuss below, such views were also shared by residents who opposed the claims of anti-
gentrification activists working in Wynwood after 2005. 
 
123 Although not included in the Wynwood Master Plan, an example of the Cuban priest and the Puerto 
Rican CDC’s struggle to implement community-based economic development was a case in which they 
asked the City of Miami for support to redevelop the aging minor league, Bobby Maduro stadium into 
affordable housing (MCC 4/25/1996). The project was ultimately released to an existing affordable housing 
developer from Hialeah (a working-class city in northwest Miami-Dade County controlled by Cubans) 
because the Puerto Rican CDC was thought to not have the capacity to construct the rental apartment 
complex (Skolnick 2001). This was a significant disappointment for the Cuban priest because he had been 
helping to coordinate various activities since 1993. He organized a consortium of banks who might be 
interested in financing the construction through the Puerto Rican CDC and coordinated a series of 
architectural charrettes. But the priest and the CDC needed support and approval from the City of Miami. 
Bobby Maduro stadium held sentimental value for Miami Cubans, not only because it was named for a 
Cuban ballplayer but also because it served as a camp for Cuban refugees. City commissioners, particularly 
the two Cuban politicians, Carollo and Hernandez, pushed for an “open” and competitive bidding process. 
This resulted in a second series of architectural drawings by a well-known Cuban architect at the University 
of Miami who proposed to preserve the symbolic stadium and develop a commercial complex surrounding 
it. Ultimately, commissioners ignored these plans too and chose the Hialeah company to build the “Stadium 
Apartments” while the stadium itself was demolished. 
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We wanted up and down the neighborhood, that the lighting in Wynwood would 
be what we call in Puerto Rico guacaras, the old style street lamps… We 
envisioned a lot of the new development to look like Old San Juan where, you 
know, it would have courtyards [and] we were also encouraging the [historic] 
architecture… We knew that in the FEC railroad track area, where Midtown 
Miami is now, that was going to happen [eventually] [emphasis added]. But if it 
could happen in an organized way, then we wanted it to happen. And you know, 
we always were fighting for better services from the city and everything, but 
knowing in the back of our minds, hey, just like every other major city where 
huge development happens, gentrification comes along… So part of it was 
making sure, if that happens, that Wynwood in itself wouldn’t lose its identity and 
wouldn’t lose, you know, its heart. 
 
His views reflect the thinking of the stakeholders in the 1996 planning process 
who led the main community organizations, which the City of Miami and private sector 
investors typically consulted about urban development projects in the neighborhood.124  
However, the most influential figure in the neighborhood’s organized political 
action throughout the 1990s was Fernando, the Cuban priest, particularly through his 
involvement in the Faith-Based Activist Coalition (FBAC), discussed in Chapter 4. He 
wields the kind of “pastoral power” that Foucault (1979b, p. 227) referred to as the 
“individualizing power,” the power to shape the subjectivity of the individual through the 
“production of truths” that help people achieve not only eternal salvation but well-being 
                                                 
124 In addition, as Carlos Jr. grew up in one of Wynwood’s well-known Puerto Rican families and led 
several of the advocacy campaigns that preceded and coincided with the Master Plan process (such as the 
Save Our Schools campaign, discussed below), his views may have been influential among other 
neighborhood residents. 
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on earth (Foucault 1982, p. 783).125 Or in the more reticent terms of Carlos Jr., “he comes 
in with the moral authority of the Catholic Church.”126 
 While Fernando supported revitalization via gentrification, he recognized that 
renters could be displaced. He hoped to insulate these residents from gentrification by 
increasing homeownership levels through founding a new Wynwood Puerto Rican CDC. 
However, the CDC proved incapable of protecting renters from gentrification.127 The 
only subsequent development project that fit into some of the Master Plan’s guidelines is 
the new “Midtown Miami.” While it had an integrated street grid, one of the plan’s 
recommendations, Midtown lacked affordable housing for renters and homeowners. 
Other objectives in the Master Plan that failed to materialize include the preservation of 
historic bungalow homes used by low-income homeowners and renters and the 
development of public spaces to serve area residents.128 
 
                                                 
125 The pastoral metaphor is particularly appropriate here. But that is not to say that Foucault’s sense of 
“pastoral power” does not also apply to the leadership and work of other neighborhood organizations, for 
through the inter-personal relations of leadership and governance they are involved in the production and 
dissemination of truths and in organizational practice that reflects and applies those truths. 
 
126 Recall from Chapter 4 that one of the truths produced through the “miraculous” conception of the Puerto 
Rican chapel was that it was a sign of change and progress coming to the neighborhood and its poor 
residents who, “more than anyone, need beautiful churches” (Fernando the priest). It was his extraordinary 
influence in the lives of church members—rooted in trust—that led the Wynwood-based parish to become 
the most powerful organization within the county-wide FBAC in the 1990s. Indeed, when the Miami 
Catholic Archdiocese recently proposed to relocate the Cuban priest to another parish, hundreds of 
members protested and the proposal was scrapped. 
 
127 As I note below, the Puerto Rican CDC built a few lower-priced units for homebuyers but never 
developed or rehabilitated any rental properties. As with most CDCs elsewhere in Miami (recall from 
Chapter 4), CDCs in Wynwood have focused exclusively on promoting homeownership for low-income 
buyers instead of permanently affordable rental properties. This is also in keeping with Miami’s history of 
urban renewal politics in which private home builders maintained a monopoly on rental housing 
development (see Chapter 2 and Mohl 1995, 2001a, 2001b). 
 
128 Another example is the Central “San Juan” Plaza, planned for a site occupied by an unused school 
playground and recently converted into a parking lot to serve a new school. 
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Figure 5.2: Diagram of Wynwood’s Historic Buildings 
 
Source: Diagram from the 1996 Wynwood Master Plan (p. 
9) that “shows the lots with historically significant and 
contributing buildings” which revealed that “much of the 
original Wynwood village is still standing.” 
 
 
The ongoing deterioration of historic buildings used and occupied by Wynwood’s 
low-income residents is a clear example of the Master Plan’s failings. The plan called for 
neighborhood leaders to “raise community consciousness about the value of historic 
buildings” (WMP 1996, p. 6), which to some extent was already evident in the preceding 
Save Our Schools campaign.129 The Master Plan made significant mention of several 
                                                 
129 According to several respondents who were involved, the Save Our School campaign incorporated 
historic preservation as a tactic within the broader strategy to ensure that public schools remained in 
Wynwood. In 1988 the Save Our School committee was formed by a group of parents and staff from area 
service agencies (including Carlos Jr.) to press for an alternative to the County School Board’s plans to 
close and demolish Robert E. Lee middle school because of its physical deterioration (Fisher 1988, 1989). 
The historic character of the school was cited among the reasons to save it but the $1 million-priced 
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dozen “craftsman bungalow” and mission-style homes built in the 1920s as well as two 
historic schools. Robert E. Lee School, “the single most important historical landmark in 
Wynwood” (Ibid, p. 21), was deemed too expensive to renovate by the Miami-Dade 
County School Board and demolished in 1995. Authorities did finance repairs to the 
façade of the Buena Vista Elementary School.130 However, there have been no efforts to 
preserve any of the other historic structures highlighted by the Master Plan’s architects.131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
renovation was deemed too expensive by the County School Board. It was eventually replaced with a new, 
Puerto Rican-named school in the same location but in the interim the school was closed for nearly a 
decade, angering families whose children were relocated to schools outside of the neighborhood (Ousley 
1993a). 
 
130 The façade was preserved when the school was redeveloped in the mid-2000s into an all-boys prep 
school attended mostly by children from other parts of the county (Valdemoro 2007; Goodman 2008; 
McGrory 2010). While residents and long-time social workers in the area praised its preservation, it was 
County officials that independently made the decision to restore the facade. 
 
131 Although all of the neighborhood leaders I spoke to, including those Puerto Ricans who were active in 
the 1970s but not so much in subsequent decades, agreed that the old buildings should be preserved, they 
were divided over what names to give them. These divisions were usually along ideological lines. The 
more liberal leaders, for example, felt buildings should be named for Puerto Rican independence fighters 
(their views ultimately prevailed) while the more conservative valued U.S. historical figures such as Robert 
E. Lee. Although there is no evidence of outright conflict among Puerto Ricans or other neighborhood 
leaders over historic preservation, some of the older generation leaders did not participate because of these 
differences.  
154 
 
Figure 5.3: Images of Historic Bungalow Homes in Wynwood 
 
 
Source: Taken by author in December, 2010. Top image is of a boarded-up coral rock bungalow 
house purchased by an investment company in the early 2000s, located near the western edge of 
the Art District. Bottom image is of an inhabited bungalow in good condition in the heart of the 
residential section north of 29th Street. Preservation of these buildings is left up to individual 
property owners, as there have been no government programs or organized efforts of community-
based organizations to systematically rehabilitate and preserve the old housing. 
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The director of the Puerto Rican CDC,132 which developed merely 10 affordable, 
single-family homes (for ownership) between its inception in 1993 and 2010, admitted 
that developing housing that is affordable to Wynwood residents became virtually 
impossible after major investment in the neighborhood drove up property prices.133 
(Figure 5.4 below depicts the growth of single family home prices between 2000 and 
2005.) This was especially true for the historic “craftsman bungalow” homes in the 
neighborhood, the rehabilitation of which would price out existing residents. 
 
We have tried to preserve the bungalow style, which is unique to Wynwood or to 
this area but they haven’t been declared historic and really, honestly, we don’t 
want it to be declared historic because historic becomes a whole different issue 
and it’s very, very expensive to repair or replace historic. 
 
Recent corruption scandals at the Miami-Dade County Housing Authority (Cenziper 
2006; Pinzur 2007)134 combined with the collapse of housing market forced the Puerto 
                                                 
132 The director since 1999, she was preceded by two directors. 
 
133 During the early 2000s, the Puerto Rican CDC partnered with Wind and Rain, Inc., a more experienced 
CDC based in Coconut Grove, to build five single-family homes scattered throughout Wynwood for sale to 
low-income families. The CDC used public subsidies to help families with incomes in the $20,000’s buy 
the homes priced between $120,000 and $150,000, “when those were available.” At the height of the boom 
the definition of “affordable” housing “[went] up to $210-220,000, which is the number that the county 
[sets].” 
 
134 Investigative reporting by the Miami Herald (Cenziper 2006, 2007; Pinzur 2007) revealed routine and 
widespread fraud at the Miami-Dade County Housing Agency in the use of subsidized housing funds 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s. More than $20 million in assisted housing funds were stolen or 
squandered by housing agency administrators and well-connected contractors before the agency was placed 
under federal control. More corruption was found at the Miami-Dade County Empowerment Trust (Hiaasen 
and Grotto 2007), although not in the case of the five single-family homes built by the Puerto Rican CDC. 
The dubious investments approved by the EZ governing board, such as subsidizing parties and travel for 
celebrities during the MTV Music Video awards, took place during or after 2004. Until 2003 the 
chairperson of the Wynwood Neighborhood Assembly and Wynwood representative on the county-wide 
Empowerment Trust board was Rodrigo. The Wynwood member that replaced Rodrigo in 2004, Veldrin 
Freemon, never disclosed that she owned an employment agency that was funded by the EZ board to 
supply itself with office workers. Subsidized housing funding was frozen in the immediate aftermath of the 
scandal (2007-2008), as alluded to by the Puerto Rican CDC director. A new source of affordable housing 
finance arrived in the form of the Federal Neighborhood Stabilization (stimulus) program, but this money, 
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Rican CDC out of the affordable housing business, at least temporarily.135 Moreover, the 
CDC’s director revealed the way “the market” dictated her work. As investment flowed 
into Wynwood during the early 2000s, “affordable” took on a different meaning.  
 
When we started we were very active in housing. But over time what has 
happened in Wynwood is, with all of the new investment in housing and all the 
talk with Midtown coming in, people started to invest in the area. The city was 
providing funds to build housing but there was, we didn’t have the jobs, the 
infrastructure here wasn’t what it should be for housing and to attract people back 
into the city. 
 
 Implicit in this statement is that the CDC did not have the power “to attract people 
back” to the area, unlike wealthier investors. The “people” she referred to are from lower-
income households that qualify for housing subsidies, as opposed to the wealthier 
consumers drawn to upscale developments.  The CDC Director’s statements affirm the 
pattern noted in Chapters 3 and 5 in which the policies of housing finance in Florida and 
Miami do not support affordable housing preservation and development nearly as much 
as they encourage private, market-rate housing development. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
as with Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (Olorunnipa 2011a, 2011b), flowed to the largest CDCs in the 
county. As I discuss below, by 2010 and 2011 a tiny share of it was used by local governments’ to cover 
budget deficits and was allocated to smaller CDCs for work such as façade rehabilitation and 
weatherization of old homes. 
 
135 “We stopped building… because we were dependent on the housing authority and the housing authority 
underwent a lot of issues at the county, between the Feds getting involved and, you know, kind of cleaning 
up housing and stuff [for example, firing administrators indicted on fraud charges], a couple of years went 
by. On the tail end of that, there were other issues… with the banks with all the foreclosures and stuff. It 
just seemed housing is not the way to go right now.” 
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Figure 5.4: Map of the Change in the Median Price of Single Family Homes in 
Census Block Groups, Wynwood and Vicinity, 2000-2005 
 
 
Note: Block groups colored white have too few data points for mapping, such as in the area of the 
Midtown complex, which was still under construction in 2005. Data from Miami-Dade Property 
Appraiser. 
 
 
Between 2002 and 2006, the Puerto Rican CDC became increasingly involved in 
developing “live/work” loft apartments in order to remain productive in the context of the 
changing constituency of housing consumers and also out of a concern to protect recently 
arrived artists from future displacement. The Puerto Rican CDC never succeeded in 
building any live/work housing itself, but it did contribute to these developments in other 
ways. Its designation as a Community Based Organization  by city and county 
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government makes the Puerto Rican CDC eligible to receive not only community 
development funding and other subsidies, it has also been granted government property 
to develop affordable housing.136 Although the property was never developed, the CDC-
commissioned market research and architectural designs for a live/work building inspired 
a private developer to build a variation of the concept on adjacent land, setting a 
precedent in the neighborhood.137 In addition, the Puerto Rican CDC extended its 
prospective homebuyer counseling and financial assistance to the new artists who were 
moving into the neighborhood. 
 
…Because with regard to the artists, some of them are magnificent and extremely 
talented but they’re terrible managers of money. We have to work with them in 
the same exact way we would work with a family that’s low-income trying to buy 
their first apartment or house. We needed to provide the same type of services and 
get them prepared to own, so what we figured was, OK, there has to be some kind 
of a product that we could offer them. And we worked with the Nonprofit Arts 
Complex and we did some studies throughout the community and we found out 
that if we created live/work environments we would be able to help them. And we 
worked with the County. This particular project we were working with the 
Empowerment Trust and we believed that if… we provided them the financial 
package they would be able to become stakeholders in what’s going on. 
 
 The Puerto Rican CDC’s shift toward artists leaves long-time residents with an 
even less effective vehicle for addressing their needs. The shift is also remarkable 
considering that one of the key findings of their market research on live/work lofts, as 
                                                 
136 After the project was aborted, in 2008 the land – which includes 4 parcels next to the failed Wynwood 
Free Trade Zone (see Chapter 4) – was re-assigned by the county to the Puerto Rican Chamber of 
Commerce along with $2.5 million in General Obligation Bond funding to develop “a multi-purpose 
facility to include rental gallery space, conference rooms, classrooms for neighborhood residents and 
students of two neighboring public schools, and office space for a community business enterprise program 
to assist with job creation” (MDCC 12/2/2008). In 2010, the Puerto Rican Chamber had received the 
support of the City Mayor addition to the area County Commissioner, and described the project as Casa 
Puerto Rico, a “cultural center and small business incubator” (PRCC 2010). 
 
137 Although this was the first newly built live/work loft building, this developer previously converted an 
existing manufacturing loft building into live/work studios. 
159 
 
written by the Puerto Rican CDC’s research consultants, was that area residents were 
concerned about the threat of gentrification (Urbana 2002). Although the bulk of the 
consultant’s report focused on the strengths and limitations of building live/work loft 
buildings from a market-based perspective, it also included results from interviews, 
surveys and focus groups with more than 30 realtors, artists, developers, residents, 
community organization leaders and government officials. “The most pressing issue,” 
stated the report, “was gentrification of existing businesses and residents” (Urbana 2002, 
p. 98). The report included the following quotes from a focus group held at the Wynwood 
Empowerment Zone (EZ) Neighborhood Assembly, the group that advises the Miami-
Dade Empowerment Trust on how to allocate federal EZ funding. 
 
 
I think lofts may be a good idea but I have some reservations. I don’t want people 
who already own property here to be driven out like they did in Overtown. I 
would like our community to stay intact. […] Will residents be bought out? Will 
they have to move so that other people can benefit? Just be careful of 
gentrification. Many people don’t have enough skills to take advantage of 
live/work lofts. This project will bring people from the outside. Will they be 
hiring people from the neighborhood? The concept is OK, just don’t push the 
people here out. 
- 35-year resident of Wynwood resident 
 
What we need are multiple rooms for families. We need to help keep families 
here in the community. Lofts are nice, but they aren’t practical. We have fixed 
space in this community. Lofts would cut the availability of housing. Is the first 
priority for artists? No, our families are the priority. These live/work lofts for 
artists don’t meet our [Wynwood EZ Neighborhood Assembly] mission. 
- Community organization leader138 
                                                 
138 Despite the sentiment of this person that serving artists does not meet the EZ mission, the focus group 
that he or she participated in was part of research that was listed among the Empowerment Zone’s 
“milestones” (U.S. HUD 2009). The research was likely to have been funded by the Empowerment Trust as 
well, since that was the source of the Puerto Rican CDC’s administrative and project funding during the 
2002-2003 period. Although I found no Empowerment Zone records indicating that funds had been 
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I would be interested in knowing what kind of mixed use? Housing for artist is 
fine, but we don’t have enough scattered [subsidized] housing. What kind of 
development will this be? We need to take care of the families. Artists are just one 
person. […] I want to know the funding source of this project. Is it public money? 
[…] Don’t limit it to ownership. We just want to build pride in our community, 
whether they own the property or not. 
- “Participant 2” 
 
These residents’ statements included in the Puerto Rican CDC’s market research 
report highlight the contradiction of the agency’s (and the Empowerment Trust’s) 
strategy of supporting artists. During our interview, the CDC director did not mention 
gentrification and when I asked about it the conversation shifted to the expensive condos 
built at the Midtown complex. Her statements above suggest that she views artists as 
legitimate residents of the Empowerment Zone or at least as constituents of her 
organization.  
The CDC director explained that her interest was not only in helping to prevent 
the eventual displacement of the artists – “we didn’t want to lose them” – but it was also 
a way for her organization to capitalize on an opportunity.  As she pointed out, the 
creation of the Art District “has helped Wynwood because that’s when the local 
government started to pay attention to Wynwood.” It is well-known that the vast majority 
of CDCs in the country operate within an organizational culture oriented toward 
“programmatic efficiency and organizational survival” (Newman and Lake 2006, p. 58; 
see also Gittell 1980; Stoecker 1997). Indeed, the current director had been invited to 
                                                                                                                                                 
specifically allocated for the Urbana Inc. research, a 2009 EZ annual report lists among its’ “milestones” 
completed between April 2002 and December 2003: “Puerto Rican CDC to perform analysis of local 
demand for live/work residential units.” In a separate section of the report, it states that the CDC was 
allocated $23,280, which is listed apart from funding for the directors’ administrative salary ($35,000) and 
project expenses to partner with the Coconut Grove-based firm to build five homes ($400,000). Moreover, 
this funding was provided with the stated purpose to help CDC “look for solutions to allow EZ residents of 
[Wynwood] to become homeowners.” 
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Miami from New York by her friend, Luis, director of the Puerto Rican Chamber of 
Commerce, to take over the Puerto Rican CDC in 1999 “when it was struggling” so that 
she could help “wind it down.”  But in doing so, “I realized, why are you closing this 
company? There’s a lot of potential and you’re owed money, not that you owe money.” 
She was able to transform the agency’s finances into “the green rather than in the red,” 
after which she was told by Luis, “now that you saved it, you have to continue.” The 
point is not that she is uncommitted to the purpose of community-based economic 
development but quite the contrary; within the entrepreneurial orientation of this field of 
work, recognizing the potential “that Wynwood could be the next SoHo of the eastern 
coast” is a key part of the job description. In this context, being a Puerto Rican 
professional is merely a part of one’s employment qualifications; no longer the vital link 
to place- and ethnicity-based collective action. 
The entrepreneurial orientation of community development is further illustrated 
by the most recent phase of Puerto Rican CDC’s work. In 2011, the district commissioner 
funded the CDC to rehabilitate the homes of low-income, elderly residents in the 
neighborhood, a strategy supported by local and national policy shifts emphasizing 
“weatherization” of old homes. But again the Puerto Rican CDC’s capacity is too limited 
to address the enormous need for rehabilitation that exists. The CDC director admitted 
that the most run-down homes are better left alone, so “we’re not triggering a whole lot 
of other issues that really the program doesn’t have [resources] to do.” 
 
Some of the houses are really bad. It’s really tricky… None of us are in the 
business of putting anybody [out]. If you go into a home of that caliber… we’d 
have to condemn the property which then would [make] that family homeless. We 
just can’t do that. So what happens is what we’re initially going to start [with]… I 
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would say it’s modest but… focusing on making [homes] safe, like with decent, 
proper roof, proper windows, shutters, repair on the outside of the house to keep 
rats [out] and termite tenting. Things of that nature to kind of help. And all of 
them are going to have paint. We’re going to include paint and all, because paint 
is like the cheapest fix and it really has an impact when you clean something up. 
So we’re going to start with that and see, when we go into these houses, what can 
we really do inside. 
   
She went on to explain that to “maximize the impact,” the strategy would be 
deployed in a small cluster of homes surrounding Roberto Clemente Park. While these 
interventions are important, they are also crucially limited in that Wynwood has a great 
number of homes with severe structural problems in their walls and baseboards, electrical 
wiring and plumbing, problems far beyond the scope (in cost and effort) of the issues 
addressed by the CDC’s rehab program. Therefore, the neediest homes (occupied by the 
poorest residents) will receive no attention, as the director makes clear, for revealing the 
extent of those deeper problems may cause their demolition. 
Beyond the resource constraints of the CDC and the significant hardship faced by 
residents, these examples also reveal the market ideology that pervades “community 
development,” something which has been noted throughout the country (e.g., DeFilippis 
2004; Newman and Lake 2006; Thibault 2007). Most CDCs and especially Wynwood’s 
Puerto Rican CDC work to achieve the “cheapest fix” not only because they operate with 
limited resources; but crucially because the concept of “neighborhood stabilization” 
inherent to the CDC movement (and its federal funding) is based on exchange value in 
the real estate market, not the use values to the occupant. As the logic goes, painting a 
building may marginally enhance the use value of a home but more importantly, it 
enhances the appearance of the street and the area, making Wynwood a more marketable 
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neighborhood and thus improving the exchange value of the home. Thus, “maximize the 
impact” refers to area-wide property values, in which case it is important to paint homes 
in a cluster instead of scattered throughout the neighborhood. Existing homeowners in the 
particular area that comes to look “improved” may benefit financially if they sell their 
homes. But for renters and homeowners whose houses need more than a coat of paint, 
there is little if any benefit. Moreover, the preoccupation with individual houses 
reinforces the ideology of individual-level cost-benefit calculations. The larger point is 
that these cosmetic enhancements do nothing to help low-income renters remain in the 
area. 
 It is not surprising, then, that most of the hopes expressed in the 1996 Wynwood 
Master Plan and embodied by the formation of the Puerto Rican CDC remain unfulfilled. 
National and local politics as well as the funding for and rationality of community 
development practice ensure that gentrification and displacement cannot be “controlled.” 
Nor is it remarkable that the Master Plan garnered little attention from public officials or 
developers, given that it was a small initiative carried out as a community service by the 
university’s design team.139  Yet it proved a frustrating experience for the Catholic priest 
                                                 
139 The architect in charge of this project, co-director of a renowned Urban Design firm and professor at a 
major private university in Miami, offered this explanation: “I think when we do [plans] here [at the 
university’s community design department] it’s different. [In contrast,] when [the firm] does it, somebody’s 
investing a lot of money and asking us to make a plan that has economic sustainability. In other words, you 
can get started on it right away…. When we do stuff at the university… we don’t expect that anybody’s 
going to say, ‘follow this plan,’ because after all, we’re not professionals here.” The last reference is to the 
fact that the university architecture programs’ community service typically involves students in surveying 
the site and making drawings. The Master Plan did not result in a final presentation to any public 
authorities. This architect nevertheless asserted that community design projects such as the Wynwood 
Master Plan may be implemented over a longer time period can be effective in other ways. “Sometimes you 
have to do things [many] times for people to really act on it… Many of us understood that plans are like 
guerilla warfare, you do it whether or not it’s going to be official. It’s out there [as] information and 
knowledge for people to use and if you’ve done a public process like a charrette, you’ve educated some 
people along the way.” 
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who catalyzed the initiative, leading him to wonder if he was involved in “charrettes or 
charades?”140  To the extent that his frustration shaped the evolution of his thinking about 
what is possible, the impacts of unfulfilled hopes and plans take on additional 
significance. If national and local politics adopted a fundamentally different approach, for 
example, devoting far greater resources to repairing homes or ensuring that rental and 
housing prices remained affordable to current residents, then gentrification could be 
controlled to a greater extent. But, to the long-term Puerto Rican and other residents of 
Wynwood, the Cuban priest and the Puerto Rican CDC, changing policy this dramatically 
is inconceivable and they can justifiably perceive gentrification as inevitable. 
Since arriving in Wynwood, Fernando has been clear in his desire and efforts to 
physically revitalize the neighborhood for its existing residents, starting with the 
construction of the Puerto Rican chapel.141 But he has also “accepted the reality” that, 
given the aforementioned limitations to preserve affordable housing, neighborhood 
revitalization required an influx of wealthier people. After explaining that during the 
charrette process he advocated for the promotion of an art district to help “transform 
Wynwood,”142 he addressed the more recent consequences of such a transformation. 
“Remember something: whether we like it or not, we have to accept the reality that the 
                                                 
140 Although the head priest would not elaborate on the critique implicit in the humorous question, others 
involved in the charrette recalled that the priest expected the plan to be published somewhere and hoped a 
developer would implement one or more specific parts of it. Moreover, recall that this was not the first time 
he helped organize architectural charrettes. In the case of Maduro stadium, noted earlier, his efforts led to 
nothing. 
 
141 Despite its name, the chapels’ membership is now mostly Central American. 
 
142 “Wynwood has a gigantic potential. I would tell people [during the charrette] – we were talking about an 
arts district – why don’t we convert [5th avenue] into a boulevard and put modern sculptures all over it? We 
could do a cultural exposition, that is, [as a] suggestion for the art world, and transform Wynwood.” 
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redevelopment is displacement.”143  Moreover, he concluded that it was not possible to 
prevent the displacement of residents (especially of tenants) through neighborhood 
political action given the nature of “this capitalist world we live in” and especially the 
transient and speculative patterns of property ownership in Wynwood.144 But beyond 
accepting the reality of a capitalist mode of change, the priest revealed how his 
perspective was shaped by specific ideas and experiences, including the territorial 
structure of the church’s mission system, and the training he received during the FBAC’s 
advocacy campaigns.145  
 
Of course, I’m affected by the people who live here, that is, the affective 
attachments. [For example,] I’m screaming for this immigration reform because it 
would give [many of my members] representation. But while I want the best for 
my community, I also have to realize that I’m not Don Quijote, fighting against 
the windmills. The reality is that property owners are going to do [what they 
want]. This church, over time… the person that moves [to Wynwood] – I imagine 
that some of them will be Catholics and those I will have here [in my church]. 
The only thing that changes is the occupant of that house… they may or may not 
be of a higher level economically, but others will come… You have to respond to 
the problems of the territory. (emphasis added)  Therefore, now my problem 
might be how to take care of the artists... [which is not] the Wynwood that I found 
[when I arrived in the 1980s]. And for that reason I think the best would be that 
someday I were not the pastor of this parish… [to] give way for another point of 
view. 
 
                                                 
143 He said these emphasized words in English. 
 
144 “I’ll tell you why. In this capitalist world… if you’re a homeowner, you want the maximum 
[investment] return. What would you do? ‘No, out of my social solidarity I want to stay in Wynwood.’ No! 
Because in addition [to the fact that] you’re renting the place, maybe tomorrow [the opportunity to sell] 
gets away. In other words, one thing is theory and another is fact (he said this in English). If 80% of the 
neighborhood [residents are] not from the neighborhood and they [treat it] as an investment, then [the 
neighborhood’s fate] is going to depend and fluctuate with the economic situation. As the neighborhood 
rises and suddenly the owners of these homes have to pay higher taxes… what do you do?” 
 
145 The territorial conception of the mission structure and the FBAC’s campaigns were discussed in Chapter 
4; here I explore the implications for the priests' thinking and action. 
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Although on several occasions Fernando was critical of development projects that 
in his estimation offered few benefits to existing neighborhood residents, the above quote 
and other exchanges revealed that his political action was shaped by a “realistic” outlook 
rooted, in part, in the territorial mission structure he conceived146 and has implemented 
since the 1980s. His thinking was also shaped by his immersion in the FBAC. There he 
received training in a Congregation-Based Community Organizing (CBCO) model 
adapted from Saul Alinsky’s brand of neighborhood organizing that emphasized fighting 
for what is winnable and immediately visible to residents (Chambers and Cowan 2003). 
As explained by Fernando, as well as the former director and the former lead organizer of 
the FBAC,147 advocacy campaigns are chosen on the basis of what residents say is 
affecting them combined with an analysis of what is “winnable, controversial and 
widespread.” The first criterion has to do with perceived political opportunities and 
constraints. Controversial refers to whether the issue will generate sufficient interest from 
members, potential allies and the broader public. Widespread involves a measure of how 
many residents are affected by the issue and therefore have self-interest in addressing it. 
The former FBAC activists agreed that gentrification, while a controversial and 
widespread issue at the height of the housing boom (according to what their members’ 
told them), was challenging to confront because it was a highly complex issue with 
ambiguous solutions. That is, it was seen as unwinnable. Yet, as I will discuss in greater 
detail below, they differed in their analyses of the implications of this challenge; some 
                                                 
146 Although the priest’s interpretation was unique to Wynwood, the concept of mission churches used for 
evangelization dates at least as far back as Spanish colonization of the Americas. As he reminded me, “after 
all, the Catholic Church has always been territorial – it is responsible for a territory.” 
 
147 Interviews with Adam, former director and Edwin, former lead organizer of the FBAC during 1996-
2006. 
167 
 
felt that gentrification must be addressed in smaller, perhaps indirect ways, while others 
felt the issue should be avoided altogether. As the leader of one of the most powerful 
components of the FBAC organization, Fernando felt it should be avoided altogether. His 
views may have been different, perhaps less conclusive, in the early 1990s, when he 
spearheaded efforts to increase homeownership levels and, he hoped, put residents in a 
better position to remain in the neighborhood as it gentrified. But the priest’s attempted 
foray into housing issues in the 1990s and other experiences with city and county politics 
(that were not Wynwood-specific) taught him that it was difficult to mobilize residents 
around long-term and complex issues.148 The following is representative of various, 
similar reflections: 
 
We have to be realistic. In other words, we have to choose things – and this is one 
of the things I learned. FBAC was a strong organization while it did things that 
were immediately visible. You cannot get into campaigns about things which [the 
results] are not visible. The best campaign we did was when we asked the City to 
knock down crack houses, that is, the abandoned houses. And people [could] see 
what the city did. Now the problem that was in the neighborhood is gone… When 
FBAC started to get involved in the education issue, where people no longer see 
what was being done and instead it was, ‘go and work’ and four people could see 
it but the majority of people did not see anything immediate, then it was a failure. 
These people cannot afford to wait. So this is what happens: they are discouraged. 
‘Why go to another meeting if we didn’t get anything [last time]?’ All those 
organizations,149 if they do [things with visible, immediate impacts], good. But if 
what they want is to prevent what is inevitable, which is the change in the 
neighborhood, then as the scripture says, you’re struggling in vain.150 
 
                                                 
148 He would not elaborate on his frustration with the kind of housing and urban development that he 
envisioned and led him to help create the Puerto Rican CDC. But others’ accounts and his own avoidance 
of the subject suggest that his observation of neighborhood organization’s inability to affect housing policy 
was disillusioning. 
 
149 Here he refers to more recent activists in the neighborhood, described below. 
 
150 He said, dando coces contra el aguijón, which literally means kicking yourself against the pricks. 
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The FBAC took up education reform in the winter of 1995-1996, by asking the 
Miami-Dade County school system to adopt the “direct instruction” teaching method for 
reading, to improve reading levels in low-income schools (Mailander 1995, 1996).151 
Although within a year the teaching method had been adopted in 12 schools on an 
experimental basis, the FBAC spent the next three years lobbying for the implementation 
of the program in the rest of the county’s D- and F-graded schools, which led the group to 
also lobby the state legislature for increased funding for Miami-Dade County (Yee 2000). 
As a result, the legislature provided $2.3 million of the $10 million requested to boost the 
school system’s implementation of the direct instruction system in 2001 (Lehman 2003). 
However, since individual schools had discretion over the whether to use the method in 
combination with or instead of other methods (such as the “whole language” model), the 
FBAC had to continually monitor individual schools while maintaining some pressure on 
the school board and superintendant (Rodriguez 2003; Santana 2003). 
The former director of the FBAC (1996-2006), recalled that the priest’s “personal 
involvement and how much time he spent on FBAC and FBAC issues was in continuous 
decline over the 10 years that I was there.” The lead organizer of the FBAC between 
1996 and 2008, who worked closely with inner city congregations and especially the 
Catholic Church in Wynwood, noted that Fernando “started to lose interest when they 
took on educational reform.” According to the former FBAC organizer, the prolonged 
duration of the education reform campaign, and the diverse political targets involved 
(individual school principals, county school system officials, and state legislators), wore 
out and led to the Cuban priest “cooling off” from the FBAC’s work. By 1999 the head 
                                                 
151 Interviews with Adam and Edwin. 
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priest assigned another priest to take the lead in the church’s involvement in the issue 
campaigns. However, the former FBAC activists attribute his declining involvement not 
only to the “cooling off” effect of protracted campaigns but also to the priest’s increasing 
workload within the parish. He spent several years planning and financing the 
construction of two new inner city churches152 to serve a growing parish, such that by the 
2000s he was in charge of six churches in three neighborhoods. “To tell you the truth,” 
the priest admitted, reflecting on his involvement in the FBAC, “it’s been years that I’m 
not involved in the political questions of Wynwood. Now I have such a large parish and 
fewer people to help me… My problem is time.” He also attributed tiring as he got older, 
since “at the beginning, you’re capable of throwing yourself to the fire.” 
Although Fernando delegated another priest to work with the coalition, the former 
FBAC activists noticed that his steadily declining personal involvement was associated 
with the steadily decreasing mobilization of Wynwood residents for the campaigns. 
Adam, who directed the FBAC from 1997 to 2007, recalled that while Fernando was 
“personally involved and really wanted to, we… turned out 1,000 people just from the 
Catholic Parish alone. But without his active involvement, we might get 150, 200. That 
still made them one of the strongest congregations in our membership, but we always 
knew that if his heart were really in it, it could have been much larger.”  
                                                 
152 The first of these was the Puerto Rican chapel in Wynwood, which took nearly seven years to complete 
(see Chapter 4). The second has been a work-in-progress throughout most of the 2000s, costing almost $1.5 
million in construction and nearing completion as of this writing (Shoer-Roth 2010). 
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The alternate priest assigned to work with the FBAC was simply not as effective 
at mobilizing residents,153 and by the turn of the 21st Century the Catholic Parish was no 
longer the most powerful congregation within the FBAC. A Haitian church had become 
the largest inner city membership base and the growing influence of Haitians154 within 
the FBAC was reflected in the type of issues taken up in the annual campaigns, starting 
with issues that included the interests of both Latinos and Haitians. For example, in 1999 
the FBAC sought improved treatment and services from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), including INS information disseminated in Spanish and 
Kreyol (Lynch 1999). While immigration reform and the Dream Act remained at the 
forefront of FBAC activism in the early 2000s (issues primarily oriented toward Hispanic 
constituents), other campaigns sought to increase the number of Kreyol-speaking police 
officers and continued to demand improved treatment of Haitian asylum-seekers at the 
County’s Krome Detention Center (Casimir 1998; Santana 2003). 
                                                 
153 Edwin, the former lead organizer, suggested that the alternate priest, as a subordinate within the parish 
hierarchy, was simply not powerful enough to mobilize as many members as the Cuban priest did. 
“Because remember that I can tell you, ‘take this other [priest] to work with you,’ but I’m delegating him. 
He has many other things to do. So the other priest could work with us a limited time, but he wasn’t going 
to be the person in charge with the power to decide and delegate others.” It is also likely that the alternate 
priest, a Dominican who had only begun working at Corpus Christi a short time before he was assigned to 
work with the FBAC, did not command the same respect, admiration and trust among members as the 
Cuban priest. Having worked in Wynwood since the 1980’s, the head Catholic priest was admired by 
multiple generations and different Latino nationalities within the neighborhood. 
 
154 For example, one of the various ways in which the former organizer, Edwin, explained this to me was 
when he pointed out that the growing disengagement of the Cuban priest “did not affect [our overall 
turnout] because I still mobilized plenty of people from the Catholic Parish and other Churches, but there 
was a moment when the Haitian members started to become more numerous than members from Latino 
Churches.” Adam, the former FBAC director, was clear: “Notre Dame d’Haiti became our biggest base in 
the city [by] 1999… They had some very similar issues, lots of synergy [with Latino Churches], but [also] 
some different ones. For example, we did a big campaign to get the City of Miami Police Department to 
hire more Kreyol speaking officers. Clearly, that was because Notre Dame wanted it. And we were 
intentionally trying to build our base in the Haitian community.” 
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The increased attention to injustices of special concern to Haitians does not mean 
that Hispanic issues were displaced. The FBAC’s three annual campaign choices have 
almost always included a mix of “bread and butter” neighborhood issues (e.g., crime 
fighting, public services) and broad-based issues (e.g., education, transit, housing), along 
with a group- or neighborhood-specific issue (e.g., the struggle against the Port storage 
expansion in Wynwood). Rather, the tendency to take on larger-scale campaigns which 
appears to have demobilized the Catholic parish membership to some extent, both gave 
way to and coincided with the growth of Haitian influence within the FBAC. In many 
ways the experiences of the FBAC follow in the footsteps of classic examples of how the 
shift from mobilization through protest toward organizational advocacy and negotiation 
are demobilizing experiences (Piven and Cloward 1979), albeit played out in the context 
of contemporary issues and organizing models. 
The contemporary context of organizing, combined with the Cuban priest’s 
ideological dispositions noted above, helps to explain how and why by the time 
gentrification had emerged in Wynwood at the turn of the 21st Century, the priest and 
thereby the Catholic Parish were resigned to those “broader changes.”  
 
That was a point of tension and conflict between the priest and me and the other 
organizers at FBAC. He was much more resigned to those broader changes and 
not as interested in fighting them. I remember he really wanted us to just focus on 
the simpler, winnable, things in the neighborhood and didn’t want us taking on 
these bigger fights.155 
 
Furthermore, the FBAC organizers expressed frustration not only with the internal 
challenge (in terms of FBAC organizing capacity) of taking on the increasingly complex 
                                                 
155 Adam, former FBAC director. 
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issues of education, mass transit, and housing policy issues (including gentrification). But 
they also lamented the disillusionment and reluctance of some of their congregation 
leaders to take on urban development issues in the face of the growing intransigence of 
public officials at the height of the housing bubble’s wealth. The next section examines 
the political climate affecting social justice campaigns on issues broader than Wynwood 
in order to understand how perceptions about Miami’s “exceptional” and extremely 
“entrepreneurial” climate shapes how organizations and leaders think about what is 
possible, and thereby their choices of action. 
 
The Broader Political Climate of “Irresistible” Development 
The “bigger fights” referred to by Adam above included the education reform and 
mass transit campaigns that took place between 1998 and 2002, and also a housing policy 
campaign in 2006 which was a rare example of FBAC involvement in a county-wide 
urban development issue (as opposed to, for example, focusing on eliminating “crack 
houses” from the neighborhood). Although Fernando and the Catholic Parish were not 
involved, this last campaign is an especially illustrative example of the power of 
development interests in Miami during this period and the seeming inability of activists 
to impact the status quo. Although played out by actors at a political scale beyond 
Wynwood, a brief examination of the case helps understand why activists struggled to 
impact development processes at any scale, especially in Wynwood. 
At the height of the housing boom in the mid-2000s, FBAC organizers were 
confronted by a paradox that forced them to make difficult choices. Many congregation 
members complained about gentrification pressures in their neighborhood, expressed in 
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terms of rising rents, evictions and unequal public services (e.g., police protection 
favoring wealthier newcomers instead of existing, low-income residents). But activists 
struggled with how to wage an effective campaign against these issues, particularly how 
to balance the need to “win” with the importance of achieving something broad enough to 
benefit the diverse components of the FBAC’s base (i.e., something worth winning). Its 
ultimate choice to take on a Miami-Dade County housing and development policy, 
deemed the Workforce Housing Ordinance in 2006, was shaped by its own capacity (or 
incapacity to do anything else) and a political opportunity that emerged in the wake of a 
corruption scandal at the Miami-Dade County Housing Authority (Cenziper 2006, 2007). 
Several other social justice organizations had also been prompted to act on this Ordinance 
because of this political opportunity (which they arguably helped create through 
neighborhood organizing that exposed the impacts of some the corruption) (McGrory 
2006). Therefore, before briefly reviewing the experience of this collaborative effort and 
its implications for FBAC leaders, it is necessary to locate it within the context of the 
network of social justice organizations that was created during this period. 
Nissen (2009) has termed this broader network of organizations as South 
Florida’s “social justice infrastructure.” 156 A sub-section of the loose-knit network began 
meeting on a regular basis in 2005 (prior to the corruption scandal) to discuss how to 
                                                 
156 See Nissen (2009) and Nissen and Russo (2006) for more of the history of these organizations prior to 
2005. This author was a research assistant for one of the organizations during 2004 when some sporadic 
and informal meetings took place between the organizations that would later form the CBC. My field notes 
from 2004 documented the membership and contents of some of those meetings, including planning to 
obtain funds for future coalitional work. 
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utilize the emerging political opportunities157 in order to address unequal urban 
development in Miami. Along with Nissen, this author served as a research consultant to 
the groups that were meeting, which eventually called themselves the Community 
Benefits Coalition (CBC).158 Although no formal, coalitional campaign emerged, meeting 
monthly for almost two years facilitated the maintenance of a mutually supportive 
network which, on key occasions, collaborated to mobilize specific protest activities or 
advocacy.159 One of those advocacy efforts was to intervene in Miami-Dade County’s 
attempt to pass a so-called Workforce Housing Ordinance, which I will now examine to 
glean how this effort both shaped and reflected the FBAC leadership’s thinking about 
how to address housing and urban development issues at the height of the boom. 
                                                 
157 When the “Community Benefits Coalition” (CBC) started meeting, several factors coincided to expose 
social injustice in Miami and propel the group to collaboratively address inequalities: hurricanes Katrina 
and Wilma had wreaked damage and exposed decades of inner city disinvestment; many of the coalitions’ 
activists were aware and/or had collaborated with Miami Herald reporters on the Housing Agency 
corruption scandal; many of the organizations observed that the growing real estate wealth coincided with 
growing neglect and punitive treatment (e.g., by police and welfare agencies) of low-income 
neighborhoods. But perhaps the most immediate catalyst that brought the groups together was money. As I 
will discuss later, not only were individual organizations being funded in 2005 at higher levels than ever 
before, but a common funder invested in the collaborative space that was eventually constituted as the 
CBC. 
 
158 Despite the eventual name, some members of the CBC disagreed over whether it was an actual coalition, 
preferring instead to call it a “network” or even a “table” (see also Nissen 2009). Yet, with increased 
funding in 2007, the CBC hired a coordinator (instead of a group member volunteering to coordinate 
meetings) and established a website, giving the “Coalition” a public identity with which to take positions 
on different policy issues. 
 
159 The most cohesive collaboration that emerged from this network was the Emergency Housing Task 
Force. Made up mostly of the CBC’s “base-building” organizations, the Task Force mobilized several 
protests at County Hall to demand criminal prosecutions and reparations for the public housing funds 
mismanaged and in some cases, embezzled by various corporations, non-profit organizations and 
government officials. Some CBC groups also worked together to challenge the County’s Workforce 
Housing Ordinance, described here; to commission and publicize the finding of a study conducted by this 
author’s research institute which contradicted the status quo of urban development in Miami; and to some 
extent, to coordinate and support each others’ individual campaigns. The CBC initially hoped to collaborate 
on a central, unifying campaign that would use a referendum to pass a county ordinance requiring a variety 
of “extractions” or “community benefits” from large-scale development projects. But this effort never 
materialized and by 2008 the CBC meetings had ceased. 
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In response to a Florida House Bill that required local governments to create land-
use and zoning mechanisms to increase the supply of affordable housing, in 2001 Miami-
Dade County created a task force comprised of public officials and private developers to 
study inclusionary zoning policies and recommend an action plan to the County 
Commission (MDCC 7/24/2001). Inclusionary zoning (IZ) is a land-use regulation that 
requires development projects of a given size (typically the largest) to set aside a share of 
the project’s total housing units for sale or rent to lower-income households, or to pay 
into an affordable housing trust fund instead. So as not to reduce developers’ profit 
margins, IZ typically subsidizes the affordable housing set-aside by providing “bonus 
density,” effectively allowing for the construction of a greater number of units to offset 
the reduction in profits from building smaller and cheaper units to satisfy the IZ 
regulation. Notwithstanding the challenges of defining (and ensuring) “affordability,” the 
land use concept aims to link market forces to social needs. Although by 2002 Miami-
Dade’s “Plan for an Enhanced Affordable Housing Program” was complete and the task 
force set about studying how to create IZ legislation (MDCC 1/29/2002; SFLCDC 2002), 
no legislation was proposed for another three years. In 2005, nearing the peak of the real 
estate bubble, the county created a new task force to re-examine IZ and propose 
legislation. 
I was involved in several aspects of this renewed policy process.160 Along with 
representatives of some community-based organizations, I attended (as a university 
representative) a meeting at the County’s Planning and Zoning Department where County 
                                                 
160 In addition the examples of my involvement cited below, I participated in numerous public hearings and 
meetings and other correspondence of the activist coalition between September 2005 and December 2006 
to determine strategy and actions for how to address the proposed IZ policy. 
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officials and development industry representatives, including members of the Latin 
Builders Association, worked out key components of the proposed IZ policy. The 
policy’s intent was to provide enough bonus density so that developers could, without 
sacrificing any profit margin, set aside a small fraction (5 to 15 percent) of a project’s 
total housing units for families with incomes ranging between 65 and 140 percent of the 
county-wide median family income (County staff used the 2005 statistic, which was 
$46,350). The “upper tier” of the affordability range was chosen as the initial target 
around which to structure the proposed policy since the highest potential sales price was 
considered the easiest starting point for the development industry to create a “housing 
product.” On the basis of advice from mortgage lenders, county researchers determined 
that a family with income at 140 percent of the median ($75,700) could afford to 
purchase a home for as much as $225,000 or pay monthly rent up to $1,497. Thus, during 
the meeting, the concern of planners and industry analysts was how much subsidy (bonus 
density) and which designs would produce housing that could be sold or rented for the 
aforementioned amounts. Industry representatives acknowledged that a “product type had 
not yet been developed” that might sell for less than $225,000, or be affordable to 
families with incomes less than 140 percent of the median. In other words, at least 
initially, it seemed that implementation would focus on the most expensive possible 
“workforce housing” allowed under the IZ ordinance. 
Following this meeting, I was involved in advocacy efforts to modify or defeat the 
proposed legislation, as analysts (including myself) and activists agreed that it would 
produce neither enough units nor housing at prices affordable to those who most needed 
it (Feldman and Nissen 2006; Haggman 2006). Affordable housing advocates were 
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concerned that the passage of this ordinance, touted as an affordable housing policy, 
would preempt a potentially more progressive policy in the future. The FBAC invited me 
to present the findings of a policy paper critiquing the IZ policy to their membership 
during a church meeting in February 2006. The FBAC activists sought to inform 
members about the policy and request their attendance at an upcoming public workshop 
on a preliminary version of the ordinance where they could demand changes to the 
ordinance. Several dozen FBAC representatives attended the subsequent workshop in 
March of 2006 and spoke against the proposal, seeking specific changes. The following is 
representative of the discourse of the activist organizations that attended the workshop 
(MDCC 3/15/2006). 
 
This is not affordable housing, workforce housing, inclusionary zoning... not 
middle-class housing. We can only afford to build a few hundred units for 
struggling professionals making $80,000 a year? This shouldn’t be so hard... 
There is a housing boom, there is abundance all around us and this is the best we 
can do for people’s housing needs? 
 
Instead of the wide range defined as between 65 percent and 140 percent of the 
median family income, opponents of the proposed IZ policy called for it to target 
multiple income tiers (e.g., to set aside a fraction of units for families with incomes at 65-
80 percent of the median) to ensure that some of the housing produced would be 
affordable to families at the lower end of the target income range. While affordable 
housing advocates opposed the potentially unaffordable outcomes, the IZ proposal was 
also opposed by major developers who felt it should not be mandatory.  
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Social justice activists’ pleas were ignored; developers’ requests were 
incorporated.161 Ultimately, a voluntary IZ policy was passed that enacted the provision 
of bonus density as a way to subsidize “moderately-priced” housing (MDCC 2007a). 
Arguing that federal and state housing programs already existed to provide housing 
affordable to families with incomes up to 80 percent of the median income,162 the 
proponents of a voluntary IZ policy (including the sponsoring county commissioner) 
acknowledged the policy was not intended to produce housing for low-income people but 
rather represent “one of many tools” to diversify the cost and location of housing 
products (MDCC 1/25/2007b). What began in 2001 as a search for “an enhanced 
affordable housing program that promotes equitable distribution through inclusionary 
zoning” (MDCC 1/29/2002) ended as a subsidy for integrating $200,000 apartments into 
developments with more expensive housing. Whatever its merits, IZ in Miami will not 
produce housing for poor people as it has elsewhere in the U.S., notably in some 
California cities where set-asides are mandatory (e.g. Mukhija et al. 2010). 
The outcome of the IZ policy process in Miami was shaped by the timing of the 
legislation at the height of the real estate boom and by the extremely entrepreneurial 
orientation of policymaking in South Florida (as throughout Florida), where real estate 
                                                 
161 For example, the IZ policy exempted developments over 200 units (high-rise projects), thus focusing 
mostly on lower- and medium-density projects which were the specialty of the builders who worked most 
closely with the County in crafting the legislation. This also made sense since the County opted not to 
pressure munipalities to implement similar IZ legislation, which is where the highest-density development 
tends to occur (such as in the City of Miami). 
 
162 Despite the apparent mismanagement in many of these housing subsidy programs (Cenziper 2006, 
2007), public officials insisted that there was no need to enact additional policies since the existing 
affordable housing systems were adequate. Representative of this discourse was a 2007 Miami Herald 
editorial by the City of Miami Mayor, Manny Diaz, in which he said, “There is no crisis in housing… 
Mistakes were made and will be made, but we learn from and fix them. Does this amount to a crisis? 
Absolutely not.” 
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developers have historically overpowered neighborhood organizations and advocates of 
regulation.163 In 2005, a Florida State University policy brief opined the IZ was unlikely 
to flourish in the state (West 2005, p. 2). 
 
Inclusionary zoning succeeds where it is supported by organized groups, as it 
requires longstanding attention and focus to affect the distribution of housing. 
Local politics in Florida are fluid, reflecting the rapid population changes that 
occur in the state, making it difficult to sustain long-term organizations as are 
needed to maintain pressure for inclusionary zoning. By contrast, forces opposing 
the policy are well established and able to mobilize. In addition, the policy is most 
successful where growth rates are mild, as the market pressures that exist in areas 
with rapid growth, along with attendant pressures on local and state governments, 
render the policy difficult to enforce. 
   
This logic may be especially applicable to Miami. As discussed in Chapter 4, Community 
Development Corporation projects in Miami struggled because they followed an 
entrepreneurial approach instead of relying on foundation and government grants to the 
extent that is typical in other parts of the country (see Von Hoffman 2001; Lowe 2006). 
Moreover, the perception that Miami is not only exceptionally entrepreneurial but 
also a highly insular political climate, thereby resisting governance advice from outside, 
is frequently criticized by activists and reformers who work here. At one point during the 
IZ policy process, an e-mail discussion ensued within the activist coalition about an 
exchange between IZ opponents and the Cuban-American vice-chairman of the County 
Commission, in which a member of the former deemed the commissioner’s views, 
“Miami exceptionalism.” A part of the exchange, which took place in May of 2006, is 
illustrative of the perception of policymakers’ intransigence and is worth quoting at 
                                                 
163 However, later I will discuss how during the last housing boom a new coalition of middle-class 
neighborhood organizations partially and occasionally denied the advance of large-scale development 
through their neighborhoods. 
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length. Here, an FBAC representative from a Jewish Temple tells of his experience with 
the commissioner. The response is from a public interest lawyer who supports several of 
the activist organizations and has practiced in Miami since 1992, longer than most of the 
activists have been in the city. 
 
Jerry’s message:  
Yesterday, as Adam, Leticia, Father Mike and I164 were leaving the 
County [Hall], Pepe Diaz approached us. He showed his appreciation for our 
efforts on the workforce housing issue. He reminded us that he’s a co-sponsor of 
the ordinance and gave me the impression that he wouldn’t budge. When I asked 
about the fact that inclusionary housing ordinances had income tiers everywhere 
else, Diaz looked at me, an Anglo with a Kipah, and said that “it’s that you don’t 
understand Miami – we’re different.” When I insisted, he returned to this idea that 
I wasn’t from Miami, (being Anglo and Jewish?) so I don’t get it. 
I think we need to present the question of how successfully tiers are used 
for a really just and inclusive housing policy and that it has nothing to do with the 
fact that Miami is different except perhaps that it is poorer than most. Diaz seems 
to think that Miami’s ethnic or some other populational/statistical quirk makes the 
difference significant. Would you or Marcos or anyone else have a thought on 
how to refute this type of argument? Personally, I think his remarks were a kind 
of reverse discrimination. 
Fred’s response:  
I have attached to this email a letter I sent to the Commissioners which has 
attached to it spreadsheets listing some of the many other jurisdictions who have 
inclusionary zoning. The Commissioners have been bombarded with this 
information. I think you have hit the nail on the head with this “Miami 
exceptionalism” argument. While other major cities and counties look to 
progressive ideas, Miami (both City and County) are incredibly insular refusing to 
look outside for ideas. There are many people that would love to help both the 
City and the County solve their housing problems but they continually hear that 
Miami does not need outside help. I have asked many to help with this and other 
issues and they continually say that while they are working with Cities and 
Counties throughout the state, Miami (city and county) just don’t want help. What 
you heard was another voicing of that same idea. I don’t think it can be combated 
solely by more information because it is deeper than information. It needs to be 
                                                 
164 Adam was director of the FBAC; Leticia was an FBAC organizer; and Father Mike was the leader of a 
congregation in the inner city neighborhood of Overtown. Although Jerry’s Temple was a member of the 
FBAC, his primary affiliation was as director of another inter-faith network that focused on worker justice. 
I witnessed the exchange described in the message. According to my field notes, the Cuban-American 
commissioner also said, “my opinion is that Miami is like no other place; our diversity if what makes us 
great, but that's also our Achilles heel.” 
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confronted as a problem in its own right – exactly as you stated it, a problem of 
insularity - Miami simply does not want ideas from outside. If we can confront 
and break through that wall, we open up the City and the County to a whole world 
of ideas that are just waiting to be utilized. (One initial opportunity might be the 
hiring of a new Housing Department Director – a progressive director with new 
ideas and open to working outside the bureaucracy could work wonders.) 
 
 Notwithstanding the identity- and place- politics implicit in the exchange (e.g., 
who are the real locals in Miami), many Miami activists (most of whom grew up outside 
of Miami), perceive the region to suffer from insularity in its governing regime (see also 
Steinacker 2002) in addition to being exceptionally entrepreneurial. In a separate 
conversation at the height of the housing boom and Miami’s coalitional activism, Jerry 
hoped that activists and reformers would win something significant. Otherwise, he 
warned with some angst, “it’s hard to not let this fatalism that envelops our community 
take hold again.” His concern seemed well-founded as many within “our [social justice 
advocacy] community” became frustrated and discouraged by the extent to which 
unequal development seemed to rapidly outpace tangible “victories” or “extractions”165 
from development to benefit poor people. 
The FBAC, which had in the past been able to change or resist policies that 
negatively impacted Wynwood,166 found that their power was much more limited during 
the 2000s and the height of the housing boom. Inside the neighborhood, as my analysis of 
major development projects will show, key community leaders and neighborhood 
organizations chose for practical or ideological reasons not to invest substantial time and 
                                                 
165 Whereas activists often speak in terms of “victories,” some community lawyers refer to the concessions 
provided by developers or public officials to low-income residents, racial minority groups or other social 
justice constituencies as “extractions.” 
 
166 Such as shaping community-based policing systems and decisions about school construction, or 
rebuffing plans to expand the Port Authority’s storage facilities in Wynwood. 
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energy in opposing gentrification. In broader policy processes, such as the Workforce 
Housing Ordinance, their opposition and advocacy was ineffective. The former FBAC 
director, Adam, also noted how the organizations’ typically impressive “people power” 
for affecting smaller, neighborhood issues seemed less effective. 
  
I have this sense that in the great real estate bubble that occurred in the early and 
mid-2000s, you know, 2003 to 2007, my last several years there, that we, no 
matter how many people turned out, it didn’t matter. That the economic power, 
the driving, the gentrification of Wynwood was more than we were able to 
compete with. That’s how I felt in those years… that we were up against 
economically powerful forces that were more significant than the people power 
that we could muster… So as we tried to confront even simple issues, our 
members in Wynwood had the feeling that [government officials] don’t want to 
fix any of the problems in the community because they want to drive people out 
so that the properties could be acquired dirt cheap and then demolished, 
redeveloped, you know, transformed, gentrified, etc. So we had this sense that, 
you know, whereas trash issues and crime and other neighborhood problems – it 
felt as though they were intentionally ignoring those things in order to force 
people out of their… [keep] property values low and force people out of the 
community. 
 
Edwin noted that as he saw more and more conventional neighborhood 
organizations in Wynwood—CDCs, homeowner associations, and others—signing off as 
supporters of major gentrification projects, he became discouraged. “They were bought 
off; they let themselves be seduced [by financial concessions from developers].167 As an 
organizer, there came a moment in which I felt frustrated because I saw these things, and 
when I took the decision not to recommend the topic of gentrification to the board of 
directors, I knew that FBAC did not assemble the conditions [necessary to win] and, in 
addition, the issue was not clear.”  Therefore, reasoned Edwin, “when you analyze 
gentrification, and you analyze the criteria for taking on a campaign, you realize that it’s 
                                                 
167 I will discuss these processes in subsequent sections. 
183 
 
not winnable. That is why FBAC decided, for now, [that] we’re not going to take any 
action.” 
The conditions that were necessary to take on gentrification included a clear 
definition of the specific issue that could be addressed by a social justice campaign, the 
support of the leadership of the FBAC’s largest member organizations in gentrifying 
areas in order to mobilize member support, and an exploitable political opportunity 
(recall these criteria from earlier). Although some FBAC activists such as Edwin may 
have struggled to identify a clear issue, this problem was exacerbated by lack of support 
for the variety of options available to address gentrification. Indeed, in several U.S. cities 
“gentrification mitigation strategies” include a long list of specific media strategies, legal 
mechanisms, and other tactics for addressing specific aspects of gentrification, such as 
rising rents and evictions or large-scale gentrification projects subsidized by the property 
taxes of nearby low-income residents. But defined in such specific terms, campaigning 
against the gentrification “issue” was not likely to gain support from FBAC’s institutional 
leaders who were reluctant to “oppose development,” resigned to the “inevitable” 
neighborhood changes or in some cases, wholeheartedly supportive of progress even if it 
displaced some residents. The leadership in Wynwood, both among the FBAC’s religious 
institutions as well as most conventional community organizations, was for practical or 
ideological reasons unopposed to gentrification. These conditions and especially the 
aforementioned “feelings” shaped the thinking and action of many activists in Miami at 
the height of the housing boom. 
On the other hand, activists were not the only ones with a sense of powerlessness 
in the face of politics and business as usual. The sense that the forces of development 
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overwhelmed community-based interests seemingly pervaded most settings of 
community-based, organizational action and politics, not just that of social justice 
activists. Over the winter of 2006-2007, the research institute where I worked conducted 
a series of focus groups with randomly selected “active voters” from a cross-section of 
Miami neighborhoods (Stepick and Feldman 2007). Among the participants were the 
leaders of some neighborhood organizations as well as unaffiliated, ordinary residents. 
We found that although people differed in their opinions about what to do, a broad array 
of residents – middle-class and poor, native and immigrant – believed that development 
was “out of control” and hurting their neighborhoods, and also that neighborhood-based 
interests had little to no influence in development policymaking and practice.  
Residents clearly felt ignored and found public officials unresponsive, a sentiment 
which eventually made itself known at the polls with the election of a “neighborhood-
friendly” city mayor in 2009 in a campaign characterized by anti-incumbent voting 
(Rabin and Vasquez 2009). A notable community-based political development that was 
instrumental to the electoral shift was Miami Neighborhoods United (MNU), a coalition 
of homeowner associations representing several upper-middle class neighborhoods of 
mostly single-family homes. Although some of its member associations had previously 
been effective in resisting or weakening the advance of large-scale development, the 
coalition emerged largely in response to a city-wide rezoning policy known as Miami 21 
which threatened to impose higher density zoning in or near MNU neighborhoods. 
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According to the City planning director who helped design Miami 21 and is now in 
charge of its evolution as it is implemented:168  
 
I think [through] Miami 21… all of these neighborhood activists [or] civic 
participants, to use a more neutral term, began to… cross-pollinate, inform one 
another of what their respective interests were, began to develop a fairly 
sophisticated view of what Miami as a city was, and began to find points in 
common and points of difference. And MNU has evolved into a very, 
sophisticated – I mean, I think that’s the interesting paper to write, right? How 
MNU in a period of six years through the Miami 21 process became a coalition of 
neighborhood groups who garnered this very sophisticated understanding of how 
the city works and how they can influence government processes to further their 
interests. 
 
Because of their substantial resources, including money, human capital (e.g., legal 
expertise) and social/political capital (e.g., comprised of current and former city 
officials), MNU garnered plenty of attention from policymakers and news media, 
including mention in more than 175 news stories between 2005 and 2011 (see e.g., 
Vasquez 2004; Leon 2007; Cave 2009). MNU was not only instrumental to the election 
of the new City mayor, noted above, but also introduced key amendments to the Miami 
21 zoning plan, most of which have been accepted or are under consideration. 
Two years later, in 2011, voters recalled the Miami-Dade County mayor and one 
commissioner in a historic referendum after these supported an increase in property taxes 
as well as major subsidies for private developers (Haggman and Brannigan 2011; Mazzei 
2011). Though financed by a wealthy Anglo-American businessman, it was mostly 
Cuban-American voters who expelled the Cuban-American politicians they had 
previously elected (Mazzei 2011). 
                                                 
168 It is worth noting that the City of Miami Planning Director, who in 2004 as zoning administrator 
resigned in protest because of an outsized development next to single-family homes, has the changed 
political environment to thank for his return to the city. 
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In these ways, development politics and the housing boom and bust cycle 
provided a political window of opportunity, one which was partially exploited by the 
County recall advocates and neighborhood associations in the City of Miami. Other parts 
of the referendum, such as Miami-Dade County Charter reforms to enhance elected 
officials accountability to voters, were not as effective, as politicians were able to choose 
which reforms to put on the ballot (Brannigan and Haggman 2011). In any case, the 
charter reforms would have done virtually nothing to transform the inequalities inherent 
to the urban development system. 
To the extent that corruption scandals and Housing Agency mismanagement at 
the height of the housing boom provided an opportunity to win reforms that might help 
low-income residents mitigate the impacts of unbridled and unequal development, social 
justice organizations mobilized individually and sometimes collectively win relatively 
minor reparations. Perhaps the most substantial concession won was in the case of the 
Liberty City-based Social Justice Center, which obtained one-for-one replacement of 850 
public housing units demolished in a scandal-plagued HOPE VI redevelopment project 
after the original plan called for only a small fraction to be replaced. The collaborative 
efforts of the Emergency Housing Task Force described above, which coalesced in 
response to the widespread mismanagement, obtained $18 million in budgetary 
commitments to low-income housing to partially make up for the more than $40 million 
that were diverted. While such victories may make a real difference in poor people’s lives 
if and when the funding is properly applied, the urban development systems remained 
basically unchanged and many of the victorious social justice organizations remain 
embattled with county and city government and private developers who as of this writing 
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wish to carry out subsidized development projects without conceding to the 
organizations’ demands. In other words, while small victories are important, development 
as usual continues. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188 
 
VI. CASE STUDIES OF ‘UNSTOPPABLE’ GENTRIFICATION 
To the extent that gentrification involves the constitution of a transformed living 
environment and a “new middle class” (Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008), the 2000s marked 
the consolidation of gentrification in Wynwood. Two key processes of urban 
development marked the onset and advance of gentrification of Wynwood. One is the 
Midtown Miami residential and commercial complex, which was shaped by two 
preceding planning processes, including the 1996 Wynwood Master Plan and the 2001-
2003 FEC Corridor Plan, and was built between 2005 and 2007. The other is the creation 
and growth of the Wynwood Art District, formally established through a series of policies 
and institutions after 2006 but catalyzed and informally organized since the first art 
galleries arrived in the neighborhood in the 1990s. In addition to these processes, I 
examine the case of an activist campaign to address the deterioration and eventual 
reconstruction of the Community Center in Roberto Clemente Park. The first two cases 
are clear examples of gentrification while the community centers’ deterioration and 
reconstruction reflected and symbolized the shifting balance of power in the 
neighborhood toward wealthier newcomers. Some community organizations supported 
some or all of the unequal redevelopment projects in Wynwood, readily admitting that 
inequality is an unchangeable “reality,” while others lamented the unequal outcomes and 
criticized examples of gentrification but chose not to address them in action. While 
accepting gentrification as inevitable was not the case for every organization all of the 
time, these are nonetheless the predominant trajectories that emerged since the 1990s. 
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Case 1: The Midtown Miami Project 
By the end of 2007 the Midtown Miami complex was complete and its’ corporate 
anchor tenants, such as Circuit City, Target, and Marshalls, among others, were setting up 
shop. The complex of 34-story residential towers and 4-story shopping centers mixed 
with ground-level retail outlets appears like a “new city” to many of the nearby, existing 
residents of Wynwood. A before-and-after birds-eye view of the complex, shown in 
Figure 6.1 below, reveals the emergence of a new street grid through the two-by-eight 
block district, contributing to the sense that urbanism was created from scratch. The 
following account of the creation of Midtown traces the role of neighborhood 
organizations in the process and the implications for neighborhood residents. The account 
also reveals how an array of legal techniques were invented to minimize accountability to 
both taxpayers and low-income residents, both of whom are the alleged beneficiaries of 
the public subsidies provided to Midtown. 
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Figure 6.1: Aerial View of Midtown Miami Site, Before and After Redevelopment 
 
 
Source: Image of the empty Buena Vista rail yard from the City of Miami legislative package 
creating the Midtown Community Development District (City of Miami 2005); on the right, a 
Google Earth satellite image, 2010. 
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A variety of specific legal, technical and political processes contributed to the 
public-private partnerships through which the Midtown complex was built. The most 
important of these processes included the Florida East Coast Railway (FEC) Corridor 
Redevelopment Plan, the creation of the Midtown Community Redevelopment Agency 
that enabled Tax Increment Financing (TIF district), and exemptions from key land use 
regulations within the process of obtaining a Major Use Special Building Permit 
(MUSP).169 These processes involved university researchers who conducted planning 
studies, corporate attorneys who lobbied for exemptions from zoning and other land use 
regulations, government officials who maneuvered complex regulatory techniques, 
selected neighborhood representatives who provided political support and, developers, 
architects and contractors who were responsible for executing the construction project 
within the frameworks established through the aforementioned processes. The costs of 
such processes as well as the redevelopment project itself totaled about $600 million for 
the first phase built by 2007, including upwards of $170 million in direct and indirect 
subsidies from City and County taxpayers to two New York-based developers who 
partnered to build Midtown.170 
Many people were able to claim some contribution to the projects’ success, 
including people who were not involved in the specific processes mentioned above. The 
Catholic priest claimed that the emergence of the Midtown Miami complex, as an 
alternative to the abandoned Buena Vista rail yard, was made possible by his 
parishioners’ activism in the 1990s to prevent the creation of a storage facility in the rail 
                                                 
169 I will also describe below how County and City government agencies applied for specific federal and 
state subsidies, some of which were unrelated to the FEC Planning, TIF district and MUSP processes. 
170 Total construction costs, including additional phases not yet built, were estimated at $1.2 billion.  
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yard (Glasgow 1994; Charles 1995b; Lynch 1996). Indeed, the expansion of port 
container storage at the rail yard would have most likely expanded the “dust storms” 
generated by truck traffic that residents complained about for years. Even if temporary, 
the Port’s continued use of the site would have prolonged the environmental remediation 
needed to redevelop it, as it was designated an environmentally polluted “brownfield” 
after years of industrial use. Carlos Jr., who by the time of the FEC planning process was 
working as a policy advisor for the County Commissioner of the district containing 
Wynwood, also touted his role in “fighting the dust bowl” and noted that “all of this stuff 
that you see now [Midtown complex] happened after I left but… there were a lot of us 
that put the groundwork in for a long, long time, for stuff to happen.”171 
 
Planning for the Florida East Coast Railway Corridor  
Nevertheless, a series of complex legal and quasi-scientific techniques, and 
specific political and planning processes initiated in the year 2000 made possible the 
conceptualization and development of Midtown. The city commission assembled a task 
force made up of government officials, business leaders, non-profit neighborhood 
organizations, and private developers to study and create a new master plan for the 
Florida East Coast (FEC) Railway corridor, which extends along the railroad tracks from 
the northern edge of Downtown to the northern boundary of the City of Miami (see 
Figure 6.2 below). Because it occupied such a large tract of undeveloped, inner city land, 
the Buena Vista rail yard on the eastern edge of Wynwood was a crucial component of 
                                                 
171 The lead architect of the Wynwood Master Plan in which Carlos Jr. and the Catholic priest participated, 
said: “Our influence on Midtown, if any at all, was that we said, make a grid and make it part of the city… 
Eventually that happened in a different way than what we were suggesting but I think just the fact that 
some people started thinking about it in those terms early on was useful.” 
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the corridor and its’ incipient redevelopment planning. The task force and its’ subsequent 
research and planning (as with the research and plans of prior decades, e.g., see Chapter 
4) was justified politically as a way to preserve and expand the light industrial uses along 
the corridor and thereby create jobs for city residents (MCC 2/10/2000). But the resulting 
plans’ implementation, at least as of this writing, has consisted largely of upscale housing 
and retail consumption (especially in the case of the Midtown site), while industrial 
activity along the corridor continues to decline. 
 The City of Miami commissioned Florida International University (FIU) to lead 
and coordinate the research and planning efforts, which produced the first of several 
different redevelopment plans in 2002. Community participation was considered integral 
to the FIU-led planning research, which included a series of “community conversations” 
held across the three major neighborhoods comprising the FEC corridor, Wynwood, 
Edgewater and Little Haiti, in which residents and commercial stakeholders participated 
in the creation of redevelopment objectives and a vision statement for each area. To this 
end, two meetings and community mapping exercises were conducted and after drafting a 
plan, another meeting and follow-up correspondence was used to get more feedback. 
Indeed, as discuss below, much was made of the procedural aspects of the plan.  
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Figure 6.2: Boundaries of the FEC Corridor Study Area 
 
Source: City of Miami FEC Corridor Community GIS, from FIU GIS lab website 
(http://gislab.fiu.edu/gisrsal/frames/fec/home.html). 
  
 
A wide and diverse representation from within and beyond the neighborhood 
attended these meetings– Felipe, the Puerto Rican leader from the 1970’s who owned 
several properties in the area; more recent Puerto Rican leadership in community 
organizations; neighborhood residents; business owners ranging from art galleries to 
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manufacturers and wholesale distributors; realtors and real estate developers; city and 
county politicians’ advisors; the owner of an apartment building; and even the Governor 
of Puerto Rico. The concerns voiced at the Wynwood meetings related to the 
neighborhoods’ physical deterioration and perceived lack of security; the need to create 
jobs and revitalize the real estate market; the extent of homeless persons attracted to the 
area’s cluster of social service agencies; and the perceived lack of neighborhood 
participation among residents and businesses (FIU-MC 2001). 
Although within a few years some residents voiced their opposition to ongoing 
redevelopment, especially the Midtown complex (Menendez 2005; Sohn 2005), the FIU 
project leader noted that during the 2001 community meetings the negative impact of 
gentrification “was something we were more concerned about than the people,” an 
observation similar to that made by the lead architect of the Wynwood Master Plan in the 
mid-1990’s.172 Similar to the 1996 plan, the apparent absence of concern over 
gentrification may have been a function of the mixed composition of the meetings, which 
apparently included a greater number of non-resident stakeholders compared to 
residents.173 Nevertheless, the lead researcher of the FEC plan explained his concern that 
                                                 
172 Having done community design charrettes in Coconut Grove on several occasions, the lead architect of 
the 1996 Wynwood Master Plan reflected on her experiences to draw comparisons. “I think the main 
difference is that the West Grove [a historically Black neighborhood] has been conscious for more than a 
generation that it has to stave off gentrification. It’s in a location and surrounded by people who would love 
to take over the real estate and so for a long time they’ve been very defensive about it… Now, up in 
Wynwood, there was no, there was nobody there or maybe there were, but very few people from six 
generations. It was a recent immigrant community. It was largely rental. There wasn’t a lot of stakeholding, 
in a sense, in the community, the way there has been in the West Grove. So there wasn’t same sense of 
either belonging, territory, or defensiveness that there was in West Coconut Grove.” However, recall that 
the research commissioned by the Puerto Rican CDC (Urbana 2002) found a few members of the 
Wynwood Empowerment Zone Neighborhood Assembly who were opposed to the idea of artist lofts for 
fear of gentrification. 
 
173 Although only three neighborhood residents are identified in the list of 26 participants, there are three 
other names for whom no affiliation is provided, who may be residents. Anywhere from 3 to 6 out of 26 
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speculative investment (some of the meeting participants were, in fact, such investors) 
would not benefit existing residents: 
 
We were only there six months, driving and walking around, hearing [people] 
saying, you know, ‘the horse may be already out of the barn here.’ Just because 
you don’t see [gentrification] doesn’t mean that this is not already happening. 
And sure enough, it was already happening. People were buying up stuff. 
Changes were starting to occur, not visible, but… so we tried to introduce some of 
this [concern], but it was also something that we obviously also took into 
consideration in the plan itself because we knew [that] economic opportunity has 
to come from within, not just people coming in, you know, outside developers, 
and taking advantage of the situation. 
 
To enhance area residents’ and merchants’ sense of their stakes in the 
neighborhood, care was taken to help participants develop a deeper understanding of the 
imminent changes in Wynwood and the other neighborhoods where “community 
conversations” were held. Thus, much was made of participatory principles within the 
FEC Plan that laid the foundation for the eventual development of the Midtown Miami 
complex. Even the architect, Zyscovich, chosen as part of the planning team and later to 
design most of the Midtown Miami complex, was a proponent of “Real Urbanism,” 
which, in contrast to the “New Urbanism” paradigm, argues that buildings must be 
designed “organically,” according to the qualities and stakeholder preferences rooted in 
local context.174 “So our process,” as the FEC project leader explained,  
                                                                                                                                                 
participants may have been residents. One of the resident-participants is someone I interviewed, who was a 
strong supporter of the eventual Midtown project in which he found employment as a security guard and 
was contracted personally by the developers to do odd-jobs. It should also be noted that, according to the 
project lead, many other residents participated outside of the meetings by joining along on the 
neighborhood walk and calling or writing letters to the research team after hearing about the project from 
others. 
 
174 According to Zyscovich (cited in Ottolenghi 2002), “I call it Real Urbanism because when someone 
does planning within a city, they need to take into account not only what it looks like, but how it came to 
be. The premise is simple: What we all want as human beings is to have an ever-increasing quality of life, 
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was fairly nuanced and I made it very clear that we needed to develop a 
relationship with people in these communities… We knew going in there was a 
lot of cynicism and distrust based on past government efforts… So the thinking, 
even before we went in, [was that] we need to just have a conversation with 
people… to kind of figure out where they’re at. You know, not just come in there 
with the flipcharts and the powerpoints… [but]… continually engage them, come 
back to them [with drafts], did we get it right? Show them, engage them in 
community mapping. Walking the neighborhoods with them, having them point 
out things. You know, really developing an understanding, but a mutual kind of 
understanding of building trust. 
 
 The approach taken to participation was a response to the project leaders’ 
perception that city officials (in Miami and elsewhere) typically aim to satisfy the 
minimum criteria of “the statutory language relative to citizen participation – ‘we get the 
folks input, now we move on,’ which is really contrary to what community development 
is all about in terms of building capacity within communities and neighborhoods.”175  
Such “capacity building” discourse is rooted in the project leaders’ background and 
expertise in Community Development practice, in which existing residents are supposed 
to be the focus and beneficiaries of investments. In this regard, the views of the FIU 
researcher were not closely matched to the city’s interest176 as the task he was given was 
to draft a plan that was fundamentally about real estate development, however “organic,” 
                                                                                                                                                 
whatever that means at whatever state in life you are. If you are a poor person, for example, you want to 
own your own house one day and to have a more secure life. Urban life has the potential for that if it’s done 
properly. ‘Properly’ means knowing where you are at and designing a way of life that corresponds to the 
characteristics of that place and is not artificial. It needs to be real, and "real" is diversity and things to do 
and places to go and creating strong neighborhood ties and community. I don’t believe that those things are 
limited to small towns,” in reference to the neo-conservatism of the “New Urbanism” design school which 
emphasized the traditional qualities of small towns.  
 
175 FEC project leader. 
 
176 On the other hand, he is employed by a university research institute that frequently gets local 
government contracts to do planning and other kinds of research, and was therefore a convenient choice for 
the FEC project. 
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“authentic” or “sustainable” the physical design. The pairing of a community 
development specialist to lead an economic redevelopment planning process apparently 
led to some “tension,” according to the project leader, as he was pressured by city 
officials to shorten the community participation process. The city commissioner who 
sponsored the plan assigned oversight responsibilities to the Economic Development 
Department, instead of the Planning Department, which likely contributed to the tension 
between planning principles and the imperatives of real estate development. 
Nevertheless, the project leader persisted in his approach to ensure that participants were 
“engaged from the beginning all through the process, then hopefully even when we’re 
gone, they continue on, kind of the self-help kind of thinking.”  
Ironically (but not surprising, as I will explain below), the subsequent processes 
that led to the construction of the Midtown complex empowered a select group of 
neighborhood “stakeholders” to act in the name of Wynwood residents and, whatever 
their original intentions, ultimately “self-helped” themselves to lucrative relationships 
with the developers in exchange for the political manufacture of neighborhood support. 
This highly inequitable outcome was made possible, in part, by the claim the FEC Plan 
“was a huge public process,” according to the deputy city manager, that “served to inform 
the city about what the residents wanted in that area… residential and retail on the 
property” (Sohn 2006a). 
Although the FEC plan made a genuine effort to take residents concerns into 
account, it generated no enforceable commitments to residents which opened the way for 
development to proceed without implementing any of the industrial employment training 
and affordable housing strategies recommended both in the FEC plan and in subsequent 
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plans integral to the creation of public-private partnership to build Midtown. (I will return 
to the political construction of “accountability” later.) For example, with regard to 
housing,177 the FIU researchers recommended “using proposed zoning changes as a 
‘planning tool’ for housing choice” (suggesting an inclusionary zoning type of policy), 
“creating new housing financing mechanisms” to support affordable housing construction 
and rehabilitation, and “sponsoring an affordable urban housing design competition” 
(FIU-MC 2002). None of these were implemented.178 The FIU project leader noted that 
the Plan’s implementation “accomplished a lot” in terms of urban design and 
redevelopment guidelines,179 but “in the end, from my perspective, the thing that we 
didn’t accomplish was affordable housing.” 
 
The Governing Partnerships to Build Midtown 
The FEC process was the foundation of the planning that led to the construction 
of the Midtown Mall. The subsequent discussion will examine how the processes that led 
directly to the construction of Midtown evaded public and specifically neighborhood 
resident accountability as much as possible, partly by manufacturing “community 
participation” in specific ways and partly by devising innovative zoning designations that 
allowed the project to avoid key regulatory hurdles. My analysis of these processes draws 
                                                 
177 They also recommended specific strategies for the retention and expansion of niche industries within the 
manufacturing sector and the creation of specialized job training programs to help local residents get jobs 
in these industries. As of this writing, these recommendations have not been implemented. 
 
178 Instead, as I noted earlier, existing community development funding was provided to the Puerto Rican 
CDC to build five single-family homes sold to low-income families. This small output represented a 
continuation of the status quo of affordable housing provision during the 2000 to 2008 period. Indeed, it 
allowed the CDC to meet objectives that had been established since the 1990’s. 
 
179 The accomplishment most frequently cited by proponents of the FEC sites’ redevelopment, including 
those who worked on the 1996 Wynwood Master Plan, was the creation of an integrated street grid. 
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on interviews with a few neighborhood stakeholders, on my review of County and City 
commission meeting minutes and other government records and a study of these 
processes written by a public interest lawyer for a social justice organization considering 
a campaign against the Midtown project (Midtown Study 2006). 
 By the turn of the 21st Century, the Puerto Rican organizations and the local 
Catholic parish were largely disengaged from the political processes shaping Wynwood. 
At the crucial moment during the winter of 2003-2004 when, after decades of 
disinvestment, one of Miami’s “flagship” redevelopment projects was set to transform the 
neighborhood, the only people to publicly ask about affordable housing and jobs for 
neighborhood residents was an African-American city commissioner and community-
based police officer who worked closely with area residents. Privately, others were 
critical of the public-private partnership that produced Midtown, and by 2006 different 
groups of residents spoke out against it.  
 Following the completion of the FEC Plan, in 2002 a New York-based investment 
partnership purchased the rail yard property for $35 million and in 2004 sub-divided and 
re-sold the east and west partitions for $25 and $38.5 million, respectively, to the also 
New York-based developers. The original investment partnership retained control of the 
eastern portion under a new name, supported by additional investors once the 
development plans were in place. In other words, the original owners flipped the eastern 
half of the property to themselves as part of a new investment partnership. To carry out 
the more than $1 billion in planned projects, the developers asked the City of Miami for 
assistance in the development of the street infrastructure, parking garages and a public 
plaza, totaling more than $170 million. Specific planning and zoning processes were 
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instrumental in facilitating the Midtown development receipt of subsidies with minimal 
public oversight and involvement. 
 According to the aforementioned legal analysis (Midtown Study 2006), “the 
Midtown Miami project has been able to proceed in its current form thanks to the 
elaborate and creative land use, zoning and permitting process underpinning it.”180 Most 
important was the designation in 2003 by the City Commission of the site as a Regional 
Activity Center (RAC), a state-level land use designation, creating what the legal analyst 
termed a “sort-of hybrid building permitting process,” of which only a select few exist 
throughout South Florida. What is crucial about the RAC is that it raises the threshold at 
which additional planning processes are triggered from 400,000 to 800,000 square feet of 
development (residential or commercial). Without this enhanced threshold, the scale of 
the combined projects on the single site by a single developer would have qualified as a 
Development of Regional Impact (DRI), required a Major Use Special Permit (MUSP) 
and a costly series of environment impact studies typically taking up to a year to 
complete. The DRI studies include an evaluation of the projects’ impact on the existing 
supply of affordable housing and depending on the extent of the impact (see footnote 
below) developers may have to fund “affordable housing mitigation” efforts. In practice, 
because of the peculiar methodology used in these studies, no DRI study has ever found 
an affordable housing deficit, despite City and County planning studies that routinely 
                                                 
180 This began in 2003 when the City of Miami created special zoning overlays, known as special districts 
SD-27.1 and SD-27.2, in order to amend the city land use ordinance and comprehensive plan and rezone 
the site from industrial and “general commercial” to higher-density residential and commercial uses. 
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note such a deficit.181 Nevertheless, by avoiding the DRI studies that involve public 
hearings, the Midtown project avoided not only a costly and lengthy set of studies, but 
also one of the only mechanisms through which opponents could potentially intervene 
legally and/or politically (Midtown Study 2006).182 
 Furthermore, since the specific type of subsidy involved in the Midtown project 
“provide[s] little in the way of ‘legal hooks’ to get us into court” (Midtown Study 2006), 
                                                 
181 Since 1972 the state legislature has enacted a series of laws to implement a “coordinated system of state, 
regional and local planning” (Bennett 2004). The current version of the state’s growth management system 
was established through regulatory measures passed in 1985, including a policy initiative that is especially 
relevant to the impacts of large-scale redevelopment projects in inner cities such as Miami: namely, 
Developments of Regional Impact (DRI). The DRI legislation requires state and regional review of 
development projects that are considered to impact more than one municipality, and established funding for 
Regional Planning Offices to conduct such reviews. Part of the review includes an analysis of whether the 
development “will favorably or adversely affect the ability of people to find adequate housing reasonably 
accessible to their places of employment” (Ibid, p. 5). The DRI review process includes, in addition to 
environmental and economic impact analyses, an affordable housing impact study with corresponding 
recommendations for local, regional and state planning advisory boards. However, DRI-related regulations 
pertaining to “urban infill” areas were recently weakened. Following the recommendations of the state’s 
2000 Growth Management Study Commission, the Florida legislature amended the 1985 Act to allow 
“concurrency requirements, except for transportation, to be waived in urban infill and redevelopment areas” 
(Bennett 2004, p. 2). The effect of this change is such that the DRI system is now only a review process, 
not strictly enforceable since local politicians can waive concurrency requirements such as the need to set 
aside affordable housing units if it is demonstrated that there is insufficient affordable housing to support 
demand. In Miami, for example, the Downtown DRI was modified to allow affordable housing that was 
required by DRI concurrency regulations to be built outside of the boundaries of the downtown DRI, 
defeating the purpose of “inclusionary” housing requirements. The downtown DRI was amended because 
developers argued that it had become too expensive or not profitable to build affordable housing near 
downtown. One part of the purpose of the DRI’s affordable housing concurrency requirement is to offset 
the impact that major redevelopment projects have on surrounding property prices and the displacement of 
lower-income households. The other part is to make sure there is enough affordable housing for the 
incremental population that will be generated by the project itself. The broader purpose of “inclusionary” 
housing mandates is to reduce the segregation of city residents by income, a filtering process that happens 
primarily through the housing market. If affordable housing can be built anywhere within the city, instead 
of within the “impact zone” of major redevelopment projects, then the effect of the redevelopment projects 
is the same: displacement of lower-income households to areas where poverty is already concentrated. Like 
the Midtown case, these modifications could not be challenged since the state’s concurrency requirements 
were weakened. 
 
182 Even if the methodology used by politically connected consultants to conduct DRI studies is faulty, the 
DRI processes prolong the development timeline, introduce more public hearings and allow for an appeal 
process for “aggrieved” members of the public to make their case against the provision of a MUSP. In 
Overtown, a DRI project was stopped by activists largely because of their lawsuit against the City of Miami 
in which they appealed the findings of an outdated environmental impact study (Sommereyns 2006; 
Viglucci 2006). 
203 
 
the public interest lawyer referred his activist clients’ to “potential points of leverage for 
the affected people of Wynwood in the political arena.” Specifically, the infrastructure 
(streets, sewers, a massive parking garage) constructed to support the complex was 
financed through the sale of bonds backed by Tax Increment Financing (TIF) revenues 
(discussed below)—funding that is controlled by the board of the Midtown Community 
Redevelopment Agency (CRA, or TIF district), comprised of City of Miami 
Commissioners and did not require public hearings or approval.183  Had the project made 
use of federal or state subsidies, the public would have had greater opportunities to 
participate and intervene in the use of such funds. However, the developers specifically 
avoided the use of a federal Section 108 loan worth $20.5 million, for example, because it 
would have required set-asides for low-income housing, guarantees and monitoring of 
local hiring, and additional public hearings and participation which may have delayed the 
project and potentially mobilized activists’ or others to demand costly concessions 
(Midtown Study 2006).184 The exclusive reliance on bond proceeds backed by TIF 
revenues meant there were few legal mechanisms for public intervention. 
                                                 
183 Indeed, a review of Midtown CRA board meetings (Midtown CRA 2005-2008) reveals typically one or 
two agenda items, no discussion, and an up-or-down vote approving the ongoing allocation of bond 
proceeds to the same projects. Below I will discuss the only purpose for which the Midtown CRA 
governing body exists, thereby clarifying the peculiar nature of this district. 
 
184 The aforementioned legal analysis described the Section 108 Loan (Midtown Study 2006, p. 8), issued 
by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the implications of its avoidance 
by the developers: “HUD's Section 108 Loan Guarantee Program provides federally guaranteed loans to 
CDBG recipients for large scale economic development projects. Recipients pledge their current and future 
CDBG grants as collateral and may borrow up to five times their CDBG yearly allocation (minus 
outstanding balance on previously funded 108 loans). The projects must further the objectives of the CDBG 
program. Based on the HUD eligibility category, the national objective, and the public benefit standard 
under which the County applied for the Section 108 loan, it would be required to ‘document that at least 51 
percent of the jobs will be held by, or will be available to, low- and moderate-income persons.’ 24 CFR § 
570.208(a)(4)(i)… In the spring of 2005, however, [the developers and the County] decided not to go ahead 
with the application. This is explicitly because it would have triggered an Environmental Impact Study, a 
process that could have taken a year to complete, which involves studying traffic, noise, historic 
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These types of subsidies were made possible by the most inventive aspect of the 
projects’ arrangements – the Midtown Miami Community Development District 
(MMCD) initiated and controlled by private developers as the only stakeholders in the 
district. The MMCD was created in 2003 and the Midtown Community Redevelopment 
Agency, a Tax Increment Financing (TIF) district, was created in 2005.185 The MMCD 
differs from a TIF district in that TIF district funds usually represent the potential 
property tax revenue from existing property owners that will be diverted toward private 
development (instead of public services). Tax Increment Financing districts are governed 
by public officials (whether existing elected officials or other appointed community 
leaders). But the MMCD’s boundaries were drawn to encompass only the undeveloped 
Buena Vista rail yard, thus, involving only the set of Midtown developers. The site went 
from generating zero property tax revenue (as a publicly owned rail yard) to millions 
within a few years because of the redevelopment activity.186 The City of Miami therefore 
agreed with the developers’ petition that they should be appointed, initially, to govern the 
                                                                                                                                                 
buildings… Because HUD Sec. 108 funds would have been the second most significant source of public 
funds provided to Midtown after [TIF], and because it would have been the only source of funds with 
relatively strong statutory/regulatory strings attached, the fact that Midtown Miami is not receiving such 
funds deprives us of what would have been a more straight-forward point of attack. (Most significantly, 
HUD money would have triggered a lengthy environmental review procedures under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, see 24 CFR 58 and 24 CFR 570.604, and would have required prevailing wage 
rates requirements under the Davis Bacon Act for construction financed in part by federal funds, see 42 
USC 5310(a).)” 
 
185 TIF districts are created so that local governments can use future (projected) incremental property tax 
revenues to borrow money to fund the immediate costs of infrastructure and other projects within the TIF 
district. In other words, the rise in property taxes after the district is created is diverted from traditional 
authorities (e.g., schools, fire, police) to redevelopment activity. 
 
186 The TIF revenue increased to $300,000 in 2006 and $3.9 million by 2010 (CRA 2010). 
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MCDD board,187 as they were the only property owner within the boundaries of the TIF 
district. Once projects were complete and condominiums purchased (or rented, as it 
turned out), these buyers and/or occupants would be eligible to form part of the MMCD 
board.188 Its sole purpose to was to establish an independent entity that could issue 
redevelopment bonds to the City and County, which then recycled the bond proceeds 
back into the TIF districts’ redevelopment. The reinvestment process could not be 
initiated until the site was privately owned and acquired taxable value; thus, in 2005 the 
inter-local agreement between the MMCD, County and City established the Midtown 
Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA), that is, the TIF district governed by city 
commissioners. The TIF district has only one purpose – to pay the debt service on the 
bonds issued by the MMCD that existed within the same boundaries.189 In short – and 
this was a much celebrated point among city officials – the redevelopment district was 
self-financing through this circular shell-game of newly created taxing authorities 
(MDCC 1/27/2004, 2/8/2005; MCC 4/22/2004, 4/29/2004). The Midtown TIF district, 
unlike other CRA’s in Miami and nationwide, was never intended to directly address 
poverty or affordable housing since its’ boundaries and plans were drafted to exclude 
both of these “problems.”190  As a former CRA administrator put it, this makes the 
                                                 
187 The MMCD’s legal existence accomplished its’ purpose. Thus, there was no need for board meetings 
and the creation of a board was merely a formality in accordance with Florida’s special district regulations. 
 
188 This is not what happened, however. According to state of Florida audits, the MMCD’s five-member 
Board of Supervisors continues to be made up entirely of the employees of the two developers. 
 
189 Until 2011, almost $100,000 out of millions in TIF revenues was spent on the Midtown CRA’s 
administration. 
 
190 Instead, the scientific justification for the TIF districts’ creation (written by the same FIU researchers 
who conducted the FEC Plan) was the rail yards’ dilapitaded and undeveloped conditions, referred as urban 
“blight.” 
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Midtown CRA “an aberration from what a CRA is supposed to be (enrich developers vs. 
improve blighted neighborhoods)” (Rollason 2007, p. 20).191 
 As there were no “legal hooks” for public intervention, the “political arena” was 
the only recourse for those who sought community input. At the April 2004 City 
Commission meeting in which the inter-agreement between the MMCD, City and County 
was approved, thereby establishing the financing plan for the project, proponents claimed 
that the Midtown developers were committed to a variety of specific investments to 
directly benefit Wynwood. These commitments were published in a series of memos 
between city officials (e.g., City of Miami 2004a), in a powerpoint presentation used to 
explain the project to City and County Commissioners in April of 2004 (City of Miami 
2004b; MDCC 4/22/2004, 4/29/2004), and repeated verbally into the public record by 
different proponents throughout a series of public hearings (City of Miami 2004a, 2004b; 
MDCC 2004). Proponents of the project, including the city manager, deputy city 
manager, the sponsoring city commissioner and a community-based police officer, 
claimed that the developers had committed specifically to “minority participation” during 
construction, community outreach activities to ensure the participation of Wynwood 
residents during and after construction, and an “affordable housing program” described in 
significant detail (City of Miami 2004b). The housing program involved “making 
available” to the City of Miami 80 housing units from the eight condominium towers that 
the City could purchase using available housing subsidy programs; the claim that HSBC 
Bank had committed to provide mortgage financing for eligible (City of Miami-
                                                 
191 Rollason (the former CRA director who later became a columnist in a local newspaper) implied that the 
Midtown CRA, more than any other, was focused on enriching developers as it did nothing to directly 
“improve blight” in the surrounding Wynwood neighborhood. The least cynical interpretation would be 
that its’ purpose was to finance the construction of the Midtown complex. 
207 
 
approved) low-income homebuyers; developers’ contribution of $5,000 in closing costs 
for each of these units (for a total of $400,000) as well as a $1 million revolving line of 
credit to a local non-profit housing agency to acquire vacant parcels, condemned housing 
or other units to rehabilitate or build affordable housing within Wynwood or the 
surrounding neighborhoods. 
 The commitments were linked to the potential application for a U.S. HUD Section 
108 loan. The complex financing plan described above was devised in less than two 
months and pushed through quickly at the city commission during the week of April 22nd, 
2004, when a city commissioner complained that he had only one week to study the “the 
largest subsidy that we have ever given any developer.” To which the sponsoring 
commissioner could only respond, “there’s been a lot of changes in the way this 
structure’s working, up to today… so this financing package, as you’re looking at it, 
couldn’t have come here a week ago.” It was unanimously approved on April 29th by the 
City and the County Commission and, as I will discuss below, even garnered an 
impressive but controversial showing of support from neighborhood residents who filled 
City Hall. During that final week the developers decided not to pursue the federal Section 
108 loan, absolving them from the commitments that were nonetheless promised 
politically.192 
                                                 
192 This was disappointing to the director of the Puerto Rican CDC, which stood to potentially benefit from 
the implementation of the proposed affordable housing program. Although she never made any public 
statements to this effect, during our conversation she argued that Midtown did not do enough for the 
community. “During the time that it was being developed, it was directly impacting the community in 
negative ways… I believe that when a big developer comes into town he has, the entity has to realize that 
these are side-effects of their investments. And they can’t just say, oh well, that’s their problem, not ours. 
I’m not saying that they were that casual with it but I don’t think that they were as responsible about it as 
they could have been. And then, there was a lot of commitment to provide housing opportunities for local 
residents and that didn’t happen. Well, it didn’t have to be in the towers but there were so many lots around 
that they could have invested in building out some lots and helping out whether it was with loans or grants 
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Thus, despite the detailed housing program proposed in 2004, since construction 
began the only benefits subsequently mentioned by proponents and other observers were 
jobs. All else was largely forgotten. The Miami Herald reported on developers’ donation 
of thousands of dollars to charities and non-profit organizations in the area (Nahed 
2004b; Swartz 2004), “positive interest in this community” and efforts to “inform 
Wynwood residents about job opportunities” (Ovalle 2004a), Wywnood Puerto Ricans’ 
“first priority in getting jobs at Midtown Miami stores” (Ovalle 2004b), and so on (Ranta 
2004). With one exception that I will return to below—that of an investigative series in 
the typically NIMBY-oriented,193 Biscayne Boulevard Times (Sohn 2005, 2006a, 
2006b)—press coverage either ignored the commitments made in public hearings by the 
projects’ proponents or highlighted the aforementioned “job opportunities.” 
On the other hand, once construction began, news coverage increased of 
residents’ and community organizations’ complaints about the projects’ unaffordable 
condos, its impacts on property taxes and rents, and speculative investment in the area 
surrounding the complex (Menendez 2005; Nahed 2005; Vasquez 2005; Viglucci and 
Haggman 2005; Sohn 2006a, 2006b; Morales 2008a). Such complaints have been 
dismissed by both political authorities and a small, select group of neighborhood 
stakeholders as “negativity” and anti-development ideology – responses recorded in some 
news coverage (e.g., Sohn 2005, 2006a, 2006b) and which I routinely discovered during 
                                                                                                                                                 
or something, but they got away with just doing like baseball team uniforms, plaques for this event, you 
know, little ‘tsotchke’ (a Yiddish term for small, insignificant item) stuff that in the size and magnitude of 
the project, I think they could have been a little more fiscally interested in the immediate area. They hired a 
security company [that employed local workers] that was part of the initial group and as soon as pretty 
much the job was done, they were fired and somebody else came in and, you know, just stuff that you say, I 
don’t get it. Things like that disappointed me.” 
 
193 NIMBY refers to “Not in my backyard” politics. 
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my field research. But before I delve into my experience and analysis of the conflict that 
ensued between some residents, organizational leaders, activists and authorities, I will 
explain the context which shaped such conflict – the controversial process that led to an 
apparent upsurge of neighborhood support for Midtown in the spring of 2004. 
 In 2003 the community-based police officer for Wynwood single-handedly 
became the Midtown developer’s community outreach program. Recall from Chapter 4 
that in the 1990s the City of Miami devised an innovative community policing program 
implemented through neighborhood-level administrative units (“mini city halls”) that 
housed a community-based police officer (CBPO) and integrated other city services, such 
as those of the building and solid waste departments. Bobby, of Puerto Rican parents, 
moved from New Jersey to become the CBPO for Wynwood in 1998 “because the Miami 
Police Department, by far, had the best community policing set-up.” Through his award-
winning community policing work between 1998 and 2003,194 Bobby grew close to 
neighborhood residents, developing and sometimes personally sponsoring a variety of 
neighborhood programs and became well-known as Wynwood’s “guardian angel” 
(Nzinga-Ifateyo 1999).  
In 2002, soon after the Midtown developers had purchased the land, they visited 
the community-based policing (CBP) office in Roberto Clemente Park to inquire about 
the processes for obtaining building permits. A conversation ensued in which the 
developers’ told Bobby of some of their plans to build a shopping center and he 
explained that not only was he an expert in “crime prevention through environmental 
                                                 
194 He was named community policing officer of the year in 1999 by the Miami Police Department. 
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design” – something they should consider incorporating in their plans – but he had been 
working with neighborhood residents for years to help them get jobs.195   
 
I had no intention of working for em’. I thought, ‘that’s a good contact.’ And I 
said to them, ‘gentlemen, if you need construction workers, I got a lot of people 
here, good people, that need jobs.’ So the one guy, [Charlie], he’s a really 
community oriented [developer], he was cool. Next thing I know, like 3 days 
later, they asked me out for lunch… I showed him all this [local press coverage]. 
Right there he goes, ‘we’d like to be involved.’ And you know, they just wrote 
out a check. [But] I would never take money. I’ll say, ‘make out a check to 
Athlete’s Foot downtown, and I’ll go pick up the stuff’ [for the kids], you know 
what I mean? I would take the [neighborhood] kids camping and the top kids, I’d 
take them to North Carolina once a year. So [the developers] paid for the camping 
trip, the first fucking week! You know!? I took em’ to [the Neighborhood Center], 
and they wrote out a check, stuff like that. 
 
The developers did much more than that. Although they never entered into 
contractual obligations to hire residents or build affordable housing, they doled out 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. “They were smart,” Bobby later reflected. Observing 
his enthusiasm and realizing the depth of his community connections, “they used me… 
they immediately started being real good to me.” About two months later, as the story 
goes, the developers offered and Bobby accepted a job as chief of security for Midtown. 
According to Bobby, this happened just at the moment when he was feeling “very 
depressed” because he found out that not only was his promotion to sergeant becoming 
an increasingly distant prospect but the city “started reducing the CBP office and I saw 
everything… getting cut back.” Meanwhile, he perceived that the recently hired Police 
Chief was promoting officers who were also new to the police force, adding insult to the 
                                                 
195 He explained why he was excited to hear about more job opportunities coming to the neighborhood: 
“Kids would always come to my CBP office and I would take them to Walgreens, McDonalds, or places, I 
would get kids jobs and I didn’t have enough places to send kids. And I would go with the kid and say, cuz 
I knew the kid was a good kid, you know, and if you’re the manager of Walgreens and the policemen walks 
in with you, yada yada…” 
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injury of a protracted and uncertain promotion, despite earning accolades from within and 
outside the police department (Nzinga-Ifateyo 1998, 1999; Natale-Planas 1999; Muller 
2003). He also explained that his bitterness and frustration was rooted in longer-standing 
disagreements with superiors. Whatever the circumstances, he noted a variety of “life 
pressures” shaping this key moment in his life.196  Noting his apparently extensive 
knowledge and close relations with Wynwood residents, Midtowns’ developers “said to 
me, ‘you know, you’re really good with the community… we need a guy like you. 
Because those people don’t know us.’ So next thing I know, I’m having meetings, and I 
went out and I got them some real positive press” (e.g., Ovalle 2003, 2004a; Swartz 
2004). 
Whatever the case surrounding his exit from the Police Department, once he 
became security director for Midtown, Bobby was able to hire Wynwood residents as 
security guards, such as Hector, whose views and experience I discuss below. For a brief 
time, he was also able to get developers to give priority to neighborhood residents to 
operate a food truck for construction workers. He even tried to negotiate with the hiring 
managers at Target to give priority to neighborhood residents, but this effort was less 
successful since he and the developers’ had little leverage over the retail tenants. He held 
some neighborhood meetings to let people know about job opportunities but he mostly 
relied on a network built over years of experience working closely with residents.197 In 
                                                 
196 Among the dozen of my interview respondents who knew him, most opined that he was sincerely 
committed to community policing and helping Wynwood residents. 
 
197 I met Bobby at the 2010 annual Miami-Dade County Health fair hosted at the Puerto Rican clinic, where 
he was celebrating with other current and former Puerto Rican “leaders” at one time involved in the 
provision of services to Wynwood residents. Later we met for a roving interview that also included a stop 
by the offices of his security company. During our conversation in his security car, riding through the 
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addition to thousands of dollars provided to fund Bobby’s youth programs, Christmas 
celebrations and the continuation of other events he promoted as a CBPO, he negotiated a 
$200,000 donation to the Puerto Rican child care organization (recall from Chapter 3), 
which used the funding to expand into a new facility in Little Haiti (Bobby continues to 
serve on the centers’ advisory board). 
The crucial piece of Bobby’s community outreach – and what seemed to cause the 
indignation of a few neighborhood activists and other residents – was how he rallied 
support from a busload of elderly residents for the crucial City and County votes during 
April, 2004 to approve the financing package for Midtown. The Biscayne Boulevard 
Times’ (Sohn 2005, 2006a, 2006b) series of investigative reports tried to get to the 
bottom of their headline question – “Did Midtown Bait Seniors’ Support with Chicken 
Lunch?” Not surprisingly, there are many versions to the story of what happened on one 
seemingly fateful day (including questions about how fateful that day actually was). The 
basic facts are that Bobby picked up about 40 senior citizens with whom he apparently 
had a long-standing, trusting relationship, took them to the City Commission meeting, 
where they occupied several rows in the back of the room and stood up when asked to 
confirm their support for the project (MCC 4/29/2004). He also coordinated the 
attendance of some senior citizens from the nearby Little Haiti neighborhood as well as a 
smaller group of business owners from Wynwood. After dropping the Wynwood seniors 
back off at the neighborhood center, Bobby brought them all lunch from Kentucky Fried 
                                                                                                                                                 
streets of Wynwood, dozens of neighborhood residents stopped to talk with Bobby – for example, a 
teenager whose brother Bobby helped through drug addiction and an elderly Puerto Rican woman who sold 
him alcapurrias around the holidays. I ran into him again at the funeral of one of the neighborhoods’ well-
known centenarians, accompanied by many other residents and service workers, at the local Catholic 
Parish. 
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Chicken since, as he explained, they had to miss their daily lunch to attend the city 
meeting.198 Despite the variety of interpretations, Bobby’s recollection speaks for itself:  
 
Again, remember, I was in a state of mind that, these [developers] were the best 
thing since sliced bread. They were giving me money for the senior center 
Christmas Show. So I invited the seniors, ‘would you like to go [to the city 
commission meeting]?’ And the seniors do anything for a field trip. Cuz when I 
was a cop, I would take them every other week in the summer to watch a Marlins 
game. We were tight. Seeing, you know, I was taking care of their personal 
problems, they would call me, ‘hey, my son is a junkie, he’s coming to my house 
to steal,’ you know, I would stay there all night with em’ and wait til’ the son 
comes home and put him in rehab. They were like my family, my extended 
family. And they loved me. They would see me, hug me and kiss me all the time. 
And then when I left, they cried. So when I needed, I wanted to take people to 
show that we were still not going to forget the seniors and… who knows, maybe 
the developers did set me up for this, but the bottom line was, truly in my heart, I 
believed we were doing the right thing. 
 
 
Bobby later regretted leaving the police force to get involved with the developers 
not only because he was terminated but also because their generosity for the residents and 
organizations of Wynwood (or at least those referred by Bobby) dried up soon after the 
complex was built in 2007. Bobby argues that his insistence on local hiring, intensive 
community outreach, and “doing things right” caused him to fall out of favor with one of 
the developers who was increasingly concerned with curbing expenses. By then he had 
reached an agreement with his employers to form an independent security company, 
thereby making him their sub-contractor and easier to replace with another company.199 
                                                 
198 Meanwhile, Bobby noted, the developers celebrated their accomplishment over dinner at a fancy 
restaurant. He insisted that they pay for the seniors’ lunch. 
 
199 The private security company is based in Wynwood and provides security services to the Arts District, 
among other contracts. The Wynwood residents who worked at Midtown thus no longer work there. 
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Whatever the exact circumstances and reasons,200 Bobby’s relationship with the 
developers came to an end.  
It was also around this time that opponents of the project began to surface and 
Bobby’s entanglement with the developers became a major point of contention, as 
opponents accused Bobby and complicit city agencies of manipulating neighborhood 
support for private real estate development. What most angered some of the 
neighborhoods’ activists who opposed the Midtown project was, as one reporter put it 
(Sohn 2006b, p. 54), the feeling of being “betrayed, since no one from the city or county 
ever bothered to prepare them for the changes that the Midtown redevelopment would 
bring to their community.”  
 
Discourses of Neighborhood, Community and Development 
One of activists most angered by the affair, the former director of the 
neighborhood’s homeowner association, refused an interview, only telling me over the 
course of several brief encounters that she was pursuing an investigation into the city 
agencies responsible for informing residents about government affairs in the area. The 
homeowners association and its leaders contended that the Puerto Rican Neighborhood 
Center, where seniors gather daily to play dominos and eat lunch and the Community 
Action Agency (CAA) office, located in the same building, were complicit in the 
manipulation of seniors in 2004. A reporter’s analysis of CAA meeting minutes seemed 
to confirm that the only information provided to the elderly residents about what they 
                                                 
200 I leave out the complex details of a story that includes tensions between the different developers and 
between Bobby and his employers over security services provided at different buildings that ostensibly led 
to his termination as security director. 
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were “voting” for was a “watered-down version” of the facts of the Midtown project, and 
a presentation shown after key votes (Sohn 2006). Later I will return to the issue of how 
offices like the CAA and the Neighborhood Center become contested spaces amidst the 
politics of urban development that engulf their participants and service workers. This 
episode involving the elderly was divisive, pitting some of the neighborhood’s few 
homeowners against others and contributing to a mistrustful environment of community 
politics. 
In the course of my field research I found as many area residents who supported 
Midtown as those who opposed it. Those who supported the project may well have been 
influenced directly or indirectly by Bobby’s community outreach, but like the 
neighborhood leaders involved in the 1996 Wynwood Master Plan, many were also 
predisposed to support new development. The words of a Wynwood homeowner who 
was part of the contingent of senior citizens that supported the project at the April 2004 
City Commission meeting are illustrative and representative of others I spoke with.201 
Our exchange, which begins with me probing a previous reference to a group of angry 
homeowners, is worth quoting at length. 
 
Marcos: [The association] was upset about the Midtown project? 
Eliza: Yes because it seems that in the newspaper it was written that that people 
that supported the project were paid to do so and I said, ‘Too bad they didn’t give 
me anything!’ But that I know of, they never gave us anything and we did go the 
[City Commission] meeting because they took us from the Neighborhood Center. 
I even took some people in my car. 
Marcos: Did you know you were going to support the project? 
                                                 
201 In her native Guatemala, she was a registered nurse in the 1970s. Her relatively higher educational level 
and her professional experience having worked as a nursing assistant and therapist in a major Miami 
hospital for almost thirty years shape her views and ways of speaking. 
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Eliza: Yes, they told us at the center that we were going to show support so they 
would build the center, this mall, that was by some people coming from New 
York, because they were going to give jobs to everyone in the neighborhood. That 
the first people that were going to work there were people from the 
neighborhood.202 I've never seen anybody work there – maybe 2, 3 or 4 people 
that got in to work as security, that’s true, but other than that, I’ve never seen any 
employees that are from the neighborhood. 
Marcos: You spend time over there? 
Eliza: I always go to walk around, zapatear. To shop, not so much, but just to 
look… I like the stores. I know everyone over there. I think they already know me 
– I go in one door and out the other, just to pass the time. 
Marcos: So you liked the shopping center idea? 
Eliza: Fantastic. I thought it was very good because, first, it was supposed to give 
jobs to the people here, we knew it would bring good commerce here. We didn’t 
have to spend money on bus fare or gasoline to go to another center and I thought 
also that they should bring a shopping center that has food, restaurants, and all 
that. 
Marcos: After discussion about consumption, I ask: What about the impact on 
living costs? 
Eliza: Well, the impact was bad to a certain extent because they raised property 
taxes because they said that this used to be catalogued not just as a residential area 
but as a zone of people with low incomes. When they started to bring [the 
shopping center], people started to buy and then taxes increased and the value of 
ours homes increased…  
After discussion of her homes value, condition and how her social security 
payments are not enough to pay for needed maintenance, I ask if she thought to 
sell her house. 
Eliza: No. Where am I going to find a place to sit and watch the birds? As my 
husband used to say. But the impact of the mall was substantial. Another impact 
that I’ve noticed also is that the police, I see that they take great care but almost 
always from 1st Avenue toward the mall [one block from 1st Avenue] because 
here on 2nd Avenue I see all those little groups [hanging around] and I’ve known 
about a lot of robberies around here. 
 
 
Eliza’s discourse is representative of many residents and organizational leaders 
who position their views to be independent of anti-development rhetoric or what some 
call “negativity,” and to be “realistic” about the costs and benefits of major real estate 
investment. Another example is that of Carmen, an undocumented Guatemalan 
                                                 
202 Says this in English to emphasize that it was in the words of the projects’ proponents. 
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immigrant and long-time resident who regularly attends mass at the local Catholic parish, 
works as a janitor in an upscale interior design shop and briefly volunteered with a social 
justice organization that opposed Midtown. Noting that the Midtown project could have 
done more for the community, she opined that “it’s too expensive for us but it brings 
cleanliness [to the neighborhood] and,” stretching a big smile, said, “that’s why I’m 
here.” 
Marta is a Cuban woman who has lived in Wynwood since the 1970s, married 
into a Puerto Rican family that owns two homes in the area and in the 1980s ran a small 
cafeteria a few blocks from her house. She has never wanted to participate in any 
organizational action against what she clearly perceives as a threat to the social fabric of 
her neighborhood (even though one of the leaders of the homeowner association does her 
husband’s taxes). Marta noted that she was friendly with the leader of the homeowner 
association but simply dismissed “politics” as “a mess” to be avoided, seemingly 
resigned to the inevitability of things. Although she was not ideologically opposed to 
Midtown’s “nice stores,” its impact on neighborhood small businesses has led to her to 
believe that “then us poor people are relegated over here,” “disappeared” from the section 
of the neighborhood where Midtown was built. Two of her favorite neighborhood hang-
outs, a well-known Puerto Rican grocery store and a cafeteria across the street from 
Midtown (the property belonged to Felipe, one of the long-time Puerto Rican leaders), 
closed because of rising rents and increased code enforcement.  
According to several accounts, once the Midtown complex opened, Felipe raised 
the rent (doubled, according to some), forcing out the long-time Puerto Rican cafeteria 
owner and angering many long-time customers. Before it underwent renovations to 
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accommodate a new arts-oriented business, it was rented by an Indian man who 
attempted to maintain it as a Latin cafeteria (keeping its Puerto Rican name). But he no 
longer allowed residents to hang out, play dominoes, or purchase beer without food, thus 
eliminating many of the practices established under the previous owner. The same 
happened to the Puerto Rican grocery store around the corner from Marta’s house which 
also doubled as a cafeteria. In this case, not only did the rent rise, but building and 
“quality of life” code enforcement increased, such that one afternoon Marta’s husband 
was arrested outside the store for allegedly drinking a beer without food. On a separate 
occasion, during a typical gathering in the improvised front terrace of the cafeteria, “a bus 
[police wagon] came and they took everybody because somebody had their beer hidden 
in a little bag. They took my brother-in-law, all my friends – a bus full of people!” She 
noted that the cafeteria owner subsequently received a “huge ticket” from the 
government. The store was located along the path of a new monthly “art walk” (which I 
will describe in the next section), bringing increased police attention to its patrons. While 
it is not clear exactly why the store closed, residents like Marta believe it is because of 
the extra police attention generated by the arrival of wealthier people, represented by 
Midtown and the Art District. “When the galleries came [to the neighborhood], before the 
[people would show up for art events] the police would come around for days to bother 
everybody and hit them with tickets [if they were caught drinking without food]. Since 
the galleries came, this got bad.” Moreover, she resents that wealthy “tourists,” such as 
those who consume alcohol publicly during the monthly Art Walk, are allowed to do 
what she and her friends are not. “You see the tourists – they carry beer in their hand 
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without any paper [bag] or anything, and they (police) don’t do anything. Why do people 
who are from here (the neighborhood) get locked up?”  
When the Puerto Rican cafeteria closed, Marta, her husband and their friends lost 
their principal social lounge, a place that for years functioned as a neighborhood 
institution (see Sanchez-Jankowski 2008). Such was the importance of the small cafeteria 
and the good times enjoyed there, that a framed picture of its social scene hangs in her 
dining room (Figure 6.3). As Marta put it, “that was our social life. The whole world got 
together and saw each other. Now almost nobody sees each other because there is only 
one [cafeteria] left.” What used to be a daily encounter decreased to only on the 
weekends and sometimes even less frequently, apparently because the only remaining 
cafeteria is farther from her house. 
 
Figure 6.3: Photo of a Gathering of Friends at the Neighborhood Bodega  
 
 
Source: Authors’ photo during interview, December 2010. In Marta’s dining room hangs a 
framed and matted photograph of family and friends at the grocery store and cafeteria around the 
corner from her house. Note how most men are holding beers covered by paper bags. 
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As I will discuss later, she and other residents also resent the crush of art gallery 
patrons who descend on the neighborhood every month for the Wynwood “art walk” and 
once a year for the Art Basel festival,203 generating noise, trash (without additional city 
waste removal services) and crowded street parking. Yet, when pressed, she revealed that 
she was not ideologically opposed to the changes but rather felt they were too much, too 
fast, and thereby overwhelming. Moreover, although she complained about the lack of 
security in the neighborhood, she resented that her own social world had become the 
target of security forces. Since she clearly presented the Art District and her own 
neighborhood life as conflicting, antagonistic forces, I asked whether she thought she had 
to choose between investment and security, and her way of life. “Clearly,” she asserted, 
with a wide-eyed look of surprise at my question, “I would rather have the cafeterias.” 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Image of Homes Belonging to Marta’s Family 
 
 
Source: Authors photo taken September, 2011. Marta’s house (left), and that of her mother-in-law 
(right), carve out a social space where family and friends have gathered for decades. Both houses 
were built in the 1930s.  
                                                 
203 For more information see www.artbaselmiamibeach.com.  
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The few individuals involved in the political processes of the Midtown project 
tend to take more polarized positions. In at least two community meetings organized by 
neighborhood activists who tried to raise consciousness about gentrification, one of the 
neighborhood residents, hired by Bobby’s security company, Hector, loudly insisted that 
not only had he personally benefited from Midtown, but argued that many others had 
benefited, too (although he cited none). One of these meetings was a community forum 
specifically about gentrification and another was a town hall meeting with an elected 
official about finding more funding for a neighborhood park (discussed later). Hector’s 
voice was a rather important one as a long-time Puerto Rican homeowner who is known 
for his intense Puerto Rican pride (his house, inside and out, is practically a museum of 
Puerto Rican cultural memorabilia) and for having left a life of violence and vice in the 
1980s to become the leader of a championship-winning little league baseball team in 
Wynwood.204 His support for Midtown has as much to do with the direct financial 
benefits he has enjoyed as a result of Midtown as his own prideful self-identity as 
someone who endured “the bad times” to experience “the good” in Wynwood. 
 
Hector: You have the [arts] district. Now we got Midtown. I mean, you got 
famous restaurants…. I worked directly for one of the owners of Midtown. I do a 
yacht for him on Saturdays–the details, I wash it, I clean it. My wife do the 
interior. I travel with him. Anytime that he goes out in the boat, I do it… I mean, I 
do many, many things for him. He wants do a … special occasion, I drive with 
him. I got a concealed weapon license. I got, G license, D license, I got chauffer 
license. You know, he uses me for his personal things. And since Midtown’s here, 
Target, Ross, Pet supermarket, restaurants all over…  
                                                 
204 Hectors’ house, located on the northern edge of Roberto Clemente Park, has flagpoles in the front and 
back yard that wave the Puerto Rican and U.S. flags. During our interview, he spoke of his history as a 
former gang-member in the 1980’s, involvement in the torching and looting of several stores during the 
1990 riots, his turn-around as a mentor to troubled youth through the creation of the little league program in 
the 1990’s, his recent relationships with Bobby and the Midtown developers, and conflicts with anti-
Midtown activists and other naysayers. 
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Marcos: Is all this good for the community? 
Hector: Oh, 100 percent yeah!. And whoever say no must be ridiculous. Now, 
you see, one of the things about the… that [anti-Midtown activist] group, I went 
to one meeting. I went real mad! Because they start talking [that] negativity about 
Midtown.  
Marcos: What was the meeting about? 
Hector: About the taxes, about how much the houses gonna raise, about how 
much this community gonna change when they do that… I said, ‘What are you 
guys talking about? Do you want Wynwood to be like in the 80s?’ And they was 
complaining, and this lady [who directs the local homeowner association but who] 
lives I don’t know where in South Miami, that she don’t live in no Wynwood, I 
said, ‘Let me ask you a question, and I got three or four questions for you, in the 
front of these people here. First, do you live in Wynwood?’  ‘No.’ ‘Where you 
live?’ ‘Oh, I live somewhere…,’ ‘So how you gonna say what is good for my 
community?’ 
 
Although Hector’s discourse represents one extreme of the polarized political 
environment surrounding the Midtown project, it reveals how key supporters of the 
project were able stake out positions “inside” the neighborhood as a way to discredit 
“outsiders.” Although many residents critical of the project also live inside the 
neighborhood, most of the leadership of activist organizations does not, opening the way 
for the use of such delegitimizing tactics. Ironically, in one of our brief encounters, the 
woman Hector refers to above told me, “You have to actually be from this community. 
Anybody can come into the community to be the voice of the community,” in reference 
to Bobby, the Midtown developers and others who supported the project and who did not 
live in the neighborhood. This woman lived in Wynwood briefly in the early 1990s, when 
she first moved to Miami from New York. Since then, she has worked a thrift store in the 
neighborhood. It is not clear whether such tactics were effective in limiting the power of 
Midtown’s critics or whether they were simply used as a political justification for 
ignoring them, as such critics may not have been perceived as a threat by policymakers 
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and proponents of redevelopment. Indeed, as Bobby told me (and had said to reporters 
years before), the naysayers were a small, unrepresentative group: “It wasn’t a majority 
nor even the minority. I think at the very end [of the conflict] they had 12 people join. 
I’ve been in Wynwood for seven years, busting my ass. I’ve never even know who you 
are. Now you say you got this big homeowner association?”  Or at least it appeared this 
way because, as I will examine in the next section, the critics were not united. 
Although nothing will change Hector’s mind about Midtown, the majority of the 
project’s supporters, especially those who led neighborhood organizations, became 
disillusioned with the outcome of the Midtown project after Bobby was terminated as 
security chief. Puerto Rican organizational allies such as the Puerto Rican CDC and the 
Puerto Rican Chamber of Commerce were disappointed by how Midtown’s developers 
reneged on their commitments to fund community programs, hire neighborhood residents 
and build affordable housing. The Chamber, which was cited by developers and 
politicians in 2004 as being a key supporter of the project, opined in its Spanish-language 
newspaper, La Opinion Puertorriqueña, in 2009, “The Midtown district benefits today 
from the initial support from the community of Wynwood without any commitment to 
return the support and resources to said community, which was simply used and 
discarded.” It may be viewed as yet another lesson in why developers’ promises must be 
secured by contractual agreements. This was precisely the fear expressed by a City 
Commissioner on April 22, 2004 the first time the financing package was discussed 
publicly. As he put it, “The problem with these gentlemen agreements is, when there’s a 
disagreement, you can’t find the gentlemen.” Yet, by the following week, perhaps 
convinced that the developers would eventually obtain and use a federal funds requiring 
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contractual commitments, the same commissioner said in voting for the project, “This 
stands on the threshold of being one of the greatest developments since Mr. Henry 
Flagler.” 
The Midtown case reveals the vulnerability of the devolution of certain kinds of 
power to neighborhood organizations, typically encouraged as the “self-help” solution to 
poor neighborhoods’ problems (whether crime, addressed by the CBP office; housing, 
addressed by the CDC, etc.). These organizations may step into a void of political 
leadership (even when their functions are to provide services) or otherwise shape the 
environment for political leadership. In this case, their temporary co-optation into the 
arrangements of the governing regime helped ensure that whatever minimal opposition 
presented itself would have to contend with divisions among the neighborhood’s 
stakeholders. Because some of the neighborhood’s “own organizations” were used as part 
of the political strategy to obtain subsidies, the resulting level of mistrust engendered 
among its critics (the homeowner association) was so much that they were viewed as 
cynical naysayers by virtually all other organizations involved. This last point will 
become clearer as I examine the relationships between different stakeholders and 
organizations in relation to other redevelopment projects. 
 
Case 2: The Rise of the Wynwood Art District 
 By the time the FEC Plan was published (City of Miami 2003), an art district had 
taken root in Wynwood. In 2003, a network of more than 30 galleries and arts-related 
spaces formed the Wynwood Art District Association (WADA) in order to pool resources 
and promote the district. They began publishing a map of venues (see below), designed 
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and hung advertising banners throughout the neighborhood and organized promotional 
events. The slogan on their 2003 brochure read simply, “…at the intersection of 
contemporary culture and urban revitalization.” By 2011, the association included more 
than 50 galleries and the map depicted more than 100 arts-related business and venues. 
The district has grown through the conversion of the area’s boxy warehouses into 
galleries and related businesses either by developers or the gallerists.205 Whereas in other 
cities, arts-inspired revitalization movements were led by the artists themselves, 
sometimes as part of a broader social movement, in Wynwood gallerists and real estate 
developers led the movement, which succeeded only after an influx of resident artists.  
In this section I describe the establishment and growth of the arts movement in the 
neighborhood and examine how its leaders increasingly penetrate and claim a place in the 
political territory of the neighborhood. In the first section I describe the uniquely 
entrepreneurial nature of the “Miami Model” of art appreciation at work in the 
transformation of Wynwood. In the remainder I study examples of two sets of processes 
that form a dialectic of “creative destruction” (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Swyngedouw 
2003; Harvey 2007) shaping the neighborhood – the creation of the “social scene” that 
supports the arts economy and the removal of physical and social obstacles to 
neighborhood redevelopment. 
 
 
 
                                                 
205 Gallerist refers to anyone who owns or runs an art gallery. The New York Times claims that the term 
emerged in the early 2000’s (Glueck 2005). Gallerist was apparently in use in Wynwood’s arts district by 
2003 (Chang 2003; Kaplan 2003) and was certainly common parlance by the time I began field research in 
2007. However, a gallerist may or may not also be an “art dealer.” The latter refers to buying and selling 
among other dealers and collectors (the “secondary” market) while the former refers mainly to buying 
directly from artists and selling to gallery patrons (the “primary” art market).  
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Figure 6.5: Image of a Typical Wynwood Warehouse Converted into an Art Gallery 
 
Source: Photo by author, June 2010. “HERE” is the title of painter Gustavo Acosta’s exhibit, a 
series that traced the recent urban transformation of Miami.  
 
 
The first inroads of an artist colony occurred in the 1980s through a single project, 
and this was perhaps the first and last project in Wynwood to be truly led by artists until 
the mid-2000s. In 1986 the Nonprofit Arts Center (NAC), a complex of more than fifty 
artist work studios, was established in a defunct baking factory by an organization of 
artists who were part of a larger group that worked at the former Grove House, a 1960s-
era artist cooperative in Coconut Grove that closed in 1981 (Blanchard 1982). The Grove 
House group divided; some artists established themselves in a gentrifying, more 
commercially-oriented strip of galleries in South Beach (Almashat 1985; Viglucci 1985). 
The other members of the Grove House cohort, because of their experience of 
displacement from Coconut Grove,206 were ideologically predisposed to purchasing and 
controlling their workspace and ended up in Wynwood, where a large complex like the 
                                                 
206 The Grove House made way for a parking lot to serve the growing number of middle-class consumers. It 
was located in what is now the heart of the Grove’s entertainment district along Main Highway. 
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NAC was more affordable compared to sites in other neighborhoods.207 Located in the 
heart of the historically Puerto Rican section of neighborhood (NAC is number 5 on the 
map), even today the complex remains secluded from the burgeoning art scene in the 
warehouse district south of 29th Street and along the edges of Wynwood. The renovation 
of the building was financed by City and County grants and loans, and operating income 
is generated through rents paid by artists.208  
 
Figure 6.6: Map of Galleries, Studios, Private Collections and Venues in the 
Wynwood Art District, 2003 
 
 
Source: From the 2003 brochure of the Wynwood Art District Association. 
                                                 
207 This general account of a split among the artists, with some gravitating towards trendier, gentrifying 
South Beach while others sought a more secluded space that offered longer-term affordability, is confirmed 
by a few newspaper articles (Horn 1984; McCarthy 1985; Dunlop 1987) and my interview with the NAC 
director and staff. 
 
208 Today two-thirds of the NAC’s budget comes from studio rents and the remainder from government 
grants and private donations. 
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 Although several long-time arts stakeholders believe that little-known artists 
probably worked in Wynwood before the NAC was established, the only recorded cases 
are that of the Cuban-born sculptor, Tony Lopez, who worked from 1958 until he died in 
2011 in a studio on 36th Street at the northern edge of Wynwood (Marquis 1987; 
Menendez 1994)209 and Miami born-and-raised artist, Purvis Young, who worked in 
Wynwood from the mid-1980s until his death in 2010 (Santiago and Burch 2010).210 
There is no recorded history of other artists working in Wynwood until the NAC and not 
until the turn of the 21st Century did an artistic enclave take root.  
 Wynwood’s emergence as a site for artist workspaces and showrooms is linked to 
the evolution of real estate markets in other parts of Miami. As the Grove House artists 
were priced out of Coconut Grove, many resettled in South Beach but a sprinkling 
established the NAC. As South Beach gentrified and rents rose rapidly in the 1990s (see 
Table 6.1 below), art collectors and arts-oriented real estate developers began to move to 
the Design District, at the southeastern edge of Little Haiti, just northeast of Wynwood, 
and to Wynwood (Brennan 1993, 1994; Dietsch 1999; Chang 2003; Martin 2004; 
Donnelly 2006).211 
 
 
 
                                                 
209 Lopez created innumerable monuments to Cuban heroes, a statue of the former U.S. congressman 
Claude Pepper, and other well-known pieces located throughout the Miami landscape and beyond (Ibid). 
 
210 Purvis Young, who died in 2010, was born in Liberty City and lived in Overtown, both historic African-
American neighborhoods in Miami. He made artwork from everyday things, including garbage. 
 
211 Art galleries and upscale commercial venues have also expanded along the Calle Ocho tourist district in 
the center of Little Havana, catalyzing the first wave of gentrification in the neighborhood occupied mostly 
by low-income residents (Gonzalez 2001; Shoer-Roth 2005; see also Feldman and Jolivet, forthcoming). 
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Table 6.1: Change in the Median Monthly Gross Rent in the Design District, South 
Beach and Wynwood, 1990-2000 
 
Neighborhood 
1990 Median 
Monthly  
Gross Rent1 
2000 Median 
Monthly  
Gross Rent1 
1900-2000 Change in 
Median Monthly 
Gross Rent 
Design District $444.05 $522.70 $78.65 
Wynwood $337.06 $447.00 $109.94 
South Beach $399.29 $645.41 $246.12 
Source: U.S. Census 1990, 2000. 
Note: Data pertains to the following geographic units: One census tract that 
contains the Design District; two census tracts comprising Wynwood; South 
Beach reported here is five census tracts that make up South Beach’s Flamingo 
Park neighborhood, which contains the Art Deco district. 
1 Includes utilities. 
 
 
The first major collector to arrive in Wynwood was the Rubell family, whose case 
is also exemplary of the role of art collectors in the transformation of the built 
environment. “In six years,” wrote the Miami Herald’s art critic in 1997 (Gonzalez, p. 
1L), “a family best known for their involvement in the New York art world and the 
redevelopment of SoHo, their art collection, and the exploits of Don’s younger, late 
brother, Steve Rubell, co-owner of Studio 54 and successful hotelier, reinvented 
themselves as Miamians.” Like many of the major art collectors and real estate 
developers now involved in Wynwood, in the 1980s and 90s the Rubells increased their 
fortunes by renovating historic Art Deco hotels (Sontang 1986; Kornbluth 1997). They 
were the first to move across the bay into Wynwood, when in 1993-1994 they converted 
a 40,000-square-foot, former Drug Enforcement Agency warehouse to store their 
collection of more than 1,000 pieces of contemporary art.212  In 2004 the Rubells bought 
a single-family home and two vacant lots on the street behind their warehouse to live 
                                                 
212 At the same time, another South Beach development team, Craig and Scott Robins, began redeveloping 
buildings in the Design District, which was historically a center for interior and fashion design (Werne 
1990; Ycaza 1993;  Barry 1996). 
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close to their collection. Given that they own residences throughout Miami, New York 
and elsewhere, it is not clear how much time they spend in Wynwood. But seeming to 
“live” next to their warehouse helps to authenticate their commitment to art and their 
position as “locals” in the neighborhood. Newspaper articles contributed to this 
authentication and the following excerpts from Hoban (2004, p. 1) and Martin (2004, p. 
1A), respectively, are representative.  
 
In addition, they’re building a personal residence connected to the museum by a 
two-story library open to the public, epitomizing the public-meets-private Miami 
phenomenon. “We are simply coming as close to our art as we can,” Mrs. Rubell 
says. “For us the art is our life, and it’s impossible for us to separate the two. We 
have this passion, and we live inside the passion, and our particular paradigm of 
passion includes the public.” 
 
 
As the collection grew, they fantasized about living in a space big enough to 
house it all. Fantasy turns to reality as… the Rubells move into a house attached 
to their warehouse… That the occasional drunk comes around to scavenge scrap 
metal or that many people wouldn’t be caught around there after dark doesn't 
worry the Rubells. “When we were deciding whether or not to buy the warehouse, 
I walked around,” said Mera Rubell, sitting at the edge of the empty lap pool just 
put in behind her new house. “I found working people who took pride in their 
homes. I wasn’t scared off. To the contrary. I’m an immigrant myself.” 
 
The other reason the Rubells need not be afraid– as the image below reveals – is because 
they secluded and fortified their house with concrete walls and steel doors, a sharp 
contrast to the short, chain-link fences draped in flowering bushes that border their 
neighbors’ homes. Nevertheless, other than Brook Dorsch, who I mention below, such 
examples of live-in gallerists are idiosyncratic anomalies and function to authenticate the 
identity of the gallerist, not only as a passionate and “serious” patron of the arts but also, 
as I discuss later, as “pioneers” on the urban “frontier” represented by Wynwood. 
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Figure 6.7: Image of Fortification Surrounding the Rubell Residence next to their 
Wynwood Warehouse 
 
 
 
Source: Authors photo taken September, 2011. 
 
 
Between 1998 and 2002 these pioneers were followed by other well-known New 
York collectors along with Miami-based collectors. Together they converted dozens of 
warehouses into gallery spaces.213 New York-based gallerist Bernice Steinbaum set up 
shop in 1998 on the northeast corner of the neighborhood that would soon face the 
Midtown complex across the street. Then several Miamians arrived. In 1999, Marty 
Margulies, a well-known housing developer from Miami, established his photography 
collection in a 35,000-square-foot, nondescript warehouse he purchased for $1 million, 
and later enlarged by 10,000 square feet (Hoban 2004). In 2001, Brook Dorsch, known 
for his bohemian, risk-taking character and for throwing parties in his studio, moved his 
collection from southwest Miami to a 6,500-square-foot warehouse, which “he 
partitioned off [in] the back… to make himself a cavernous loft apartment, complete with 
                                                 
213 Although I cite newspaper articles, the following was explained by interview respondents involved with 
the creation of the “arts scene” in Wynwood in the early 2000s. 
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a sliding fireproof door” (Corral 2003, p. 1B). Dustin Orlando, another gallerist, 
contributed to the promotion of Wynwood’s art scene by organizing parties (Cordovi 
2002). Seldom mentioned as one of the influential, early stakeholders, the Miami Art 
Space (MAS) was established by Ofer Mizrachi in 2001 by retrofitting and fortifying a 
wooden warehouse built in 1925 in the middle of a residential street (see Figure 6.8 
below). Steven, an acclaimed collector I interviewed who also manages the Miami office 
of a national foundation, set up shop in 2002 in a 9,500-square-foot warehouse shared by 
another well-known gallerist collector and university professor, Snitzer. Damien 
Boisseau, a French gallerist, opened a non-profit gallery to promote young, local artists in 
2002 (Cohen 2002). Around the same time, Rosa de la Cruz, whose private collection, as 
with Steven, Rubell and Margulies, is considered a “de facto museum” (Sokol 2009; 
Austin 2010), moved her collection into a 28,000-square-foot building in the Design 
District in 2004.214 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
214 A portrait of Rosa’s mother-in-law painted by Salvador Dali is part of the collection (Ibid). 
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Figure 6.8: Image of the Colorful Wall Fortifying an Art Gallery Located on a 
Residential Street in Wynwood 
 
 
Source: Photo by author, September 2011. In 2001 Miami Art Space was established by 
retrofitting and fortifying an old warehouse, hidden by the wall topped with security cameras.  
 
 
By the 2000s, real estate developers – whose work I will discuss later –began 
systematically converting warehouses into gallery spaces and redeveloping some of the 
multi-story factories into artist lofts. Concentrations of actual artists did not move to 
Wynwood in substantial numbers until after gallerists and developers had created the 
infrastructure for them (e.g., housing, consumption venues) – precisely the opposite of 
how artist-led gentrification was established nationally as a model of urban revitalization, 
notably in southern Manhattan (Zukin 1989) or in Chicago’s Wicker Park neighborhood 
(Lloyd 2002, 2004). There is no evidence of a colony of artists who lived in Wynwood 
before the redevelopment boom of the 2000s.215   
                                                 
215 According to the NAC director, a staff member, an artist and a former board member, even though 
artists are not allowed to overnight in their work studios, there is little enforcement and it does occur. 
However, no one could pinpoint exactly how often this happened. 
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The illegal loft inhabitants of SoHo, the anti-establishment, “problematic social 
group of arts producers” and the activist organizations they created during the 1960s and 
1970s in defense of artistic space (Zukin 1982, p. 424): none of these ever existed in 
Wynwood.216 In Wicker Park, the creation by artists of a cultural environment conducive 
to “creative work” in artistic fields became linked to economic redevelopment, thus 
leading Lloyd (2002, 2004) to term the environment, “neo-bohemia.”217 While such an 
environment was created in Wynwood during the last 15 years, it was not led by artists 
living in the neighborhood and did not precede efforts to use “arts and culture” as 
vehicles for physical redevelopment. Gallerists’ vision and endeavor to use Wynwood as 
a staging ground for the Arts – the creative moment of the “social scene,” as some 
respondents and reporters called it – was catalyzed by the simultaneous arrival of 
“business people”218 and the growth of a critical mass of collectors and other arts-related 
commercial venues at the turn of the 21st century.  
Nor were there in Wynwood during the 1980s and 90s the stereotypical 
“incumbent upgraders” of numerous gentrification case studies (e.g., Smith and Williams 
1986; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008), characterized by middle-class status, anti-suburban 
ideologies, or individuals otherwise interested in moving into an area to redevelop it 
                                                 
216 It appears that similar groups existed in Coconut Grove in the 1960’s and 70’s, before being displaced 
and partially transplanted to South Beach, where an arts movement contributed to gentrification through 
historic preservation, exhibiting some similarities to what happened in SoHo around the same time 
(McCarthy 1982; Lawrence 1984; Donnelly 2006). 
 
217 His point, beyond describing ethnographically how it happened, was that while such “bohemian” 
environments have historically existed in disinvested, inner city districts, they are now systematically 
linked to physical redevelopment processes, drawing on Chicago as a paradigmatic case. 
 
218 The director of a government agency in Wynwood, whom I introduce below, referred to some real estate 
developers in this way to emphasize their business acumen for creating a social environment that would 
attract consumers. 
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through their “sweat equity” investments (e.g., Smith 1986; Slater 2003). It would be a 
stretch to call the gallerists and collectors in Wynwood “incumbent upgraders,” since at 
the end of the day they go home to another neighborhood, even another city. Observers’ 
claims that it has become “South Florida’s SoHo” (Cohen 2002; Hampton 2010) refer to 
the concentration of “creative industries” and artistic activity but the parallels to SoHo 
end there. Instead, Wynwood represents a newer model of arts-led gentrification, one that 
was already emerging in the 1980s (e.g., in London’s Docklands) to capitalize on “the 
apparent success of a market phenomenon initiated from below” (Zukin 1989, p. 202) 
evidenced in Manhattan, San Francisco, and a few other places. As Zukin asserted in 
1989, “SoHos are now made, not born, in culture-based economic redevelopment 
strategies” (Ibid).  
Wynwood’s claim that its artistic community is “from below” appears 
disingenuous given that the prime movers were outside wealthy arts collectors, real estate 
developers, art dealers and gallery owners. Nevertheless, news reporters and public 
officials parrot the arts and real estate entrepreneurs’ self-identification as grassroots 
activists (e.g., Triff 2004; Iuspa-Abbot 2010), helping to legitimize the presence of a new 
community-based organization in Wynwood. As I will demonstrate in the following 
pages, the arts movement in Wynwood and, in particular, the Wynwood Art District 
Association (WADA) as its public and political representative, has mobilized and 
constructed a variety of operative scales through which to influence land-use policy – 
only one of which is “from below.” It operates simultaneously “from above” and at scales 
in between, working in and through existing city agencies (e.g., those with jurisdiction 
over specific corridors, “the neighborhood,” the electoral district, municipal boundaries, 
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etc.) as well as through vehicles and scales of its own creation. The Wynwood Art 
District Association has not only (re)defined the boundaries of Wynwood but, as I 
explain below, has created a sub-district where special administrative rules apply. The 
arts and real estate entrepreneurs redeveloping Wynwood, then, are both more than and 
distinct from the notion of “grassroots.” 
It is interesting to consider how and why these influential entrepreneurs and 
advocates of the arts movement in Wynwood (and Miami in general) believe their 
“movement” represents a new model of arts entrepreneurship related to the idea of action 
“from below” – what they call the “Miami Model.” 
 
The “Miami Model” of Arts Entrepreneurship 
The Miami Model, as it has been dubbed by collectors and critics (Sokol 2009; 
Austin 2010), refers both to how art is collected and made accessible to the public, 
emphasizing the importance of private collectors as opposed to public museums in 
Miami’s art consumption and appreciation. The Rubells are considered the pioneers of 
the Miami model because they were the first to install a collection of museum size and 
quality in a privately owned warehouse routinely accessible to the art-going public. 
According to one of the most articulate exponents,219 there are two basic, albeit 
interrelated elements of the so-called Miami model of arts-driven revitalization. One is 
historical, related to the young history of the Miami region and its public institutions. The 
other is political and economic, stemming from the power of real estate developers who 
                                                 
219 Steven is the director of the Miami office of a major international philanthropic foundation and is a 
renowned art collector with a warehouse in Wynwood. He grew up in a northwest Miami neighborhood and 
attended the University of Miami. 
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have also amassed acclaimed art collections, many of them quite recently. In Miami, 
many of these newly wealthy collectors made their real estate money in the relatively 
recent political and economic ascendance of Miami and Miami Beach (Sassen and Portes 
1993; Nijman 1996, 1997). As a result, while public museums have yet to amass 
collections, privately owned collections are exhibited to the public in warehouses largely 
clustered in Wynwood, where individual collectors can purchase or rent museum-like 
space. Moreover, such privately-owned, “de facto museums” (Sokol 2009) often focus on 
contemporary art, since the market for “classics” is dominated by the world’s most 
powerful public art institutions in New York, Paris and other major art centers (Zukin 
1982, 1989). Steven, a philanthropic foundation director and major contemporary art 
collector described the Miami model: 
 
It’s a very unique situation here… to have private collections represented and 
available publically en masse. It happened because Miami is an untraditional town 
in terms of city organizations. When I grew up here as a boy, there were no 
museums. So when the group [of art collectors] that I was describing kept hoping 
for public spaces for private collections, began to collect [in the 1960s] – the 
typical model is a person of some wealth decides to collect art, doesn't know 
anything, gets picked up by a museum director and a museum curator, is taken to 
New York, the Vanderbilts, the Whitneys, taken to Europe to where the center of 
Art was. The museum director helped you buy a bunch of things, you became 
cultured, you know, and at the end you said, ‘Thank you so much, I’d like to buy 
something from you, too.’ Or ‘thank you so much, when I die, you get all these 
things.’ That’s the standard – Philadelphia, Boston, New York, Chicago model… 
The Miami model is that there weren’t those people here [to educate us] during 
that time period and so when we began collecting we all did it our own way. We 
ended up learning our own way. That’s why the collections are so diverse and so 
different and so well thought of in the international art world – because these 
collections don't look like any other collections. Because [in Miami] there are not 
the same groups of people, the same group of educators.  
 
238 
 
Moreover, Miami’s unique situation has implications for its recently established 
public art museums. Public museums are typically established and grow through 
acquisitions from collectors, especially local collectors who want to promote arts 
appreciation in their city (the New York case is paradigmatic, e.g., Zukin 1982, 1989). In 
Miami public art museums have struggled, exemplified by doubts over the under-
construction Miami Art Museum to fill its walls with the highest quality art (Kaleem 
2010; Sokol 2010).220 So because art museums succeeded the preeminent private 
collections, the former will have to “earn the trust of collectors,” according to Steven, and 
when that eventually happens, the museums will grow “based upon bequest, upon 
[collectors] making decisions down the road,” adding that “all the collectors are still 
pretty young.”221 Second, in the short run, this has implications for public art 
consumption. As the foundation director put it, while public institutions “have to collect 
for posterity,” to educate future generations,   
 
these private institutions can be more idiosyncratic [and tend to] reflect a personal 
passion – that’s not the same as a public institution. Public institutions have 
objects that become the community’s objects. These [private institutions] are not 
the community’s objects; they’re the objects of the people that hold them. It’s a 
different model. It won’t be this way for ever. It’s not about whether one model is 
good or bad, it’s that there is a disagreement between when those objects will 
become public objects. 
 
 
                                                 
220 Some major private collectors, such as Margulies (see Sokol 2010), have argued against public funding 
for the new Miami art museum. 
 
221 Interview with Steven, the foundation director and art collector. 
239 
 
Depending on who you ask, about four of five private collections in Miami are 
considered to be world-renowned, “de facto” art museums.222 The Rubell collection 
mentioned above is one. The foundation director who I interviewed controls another 
major private collection, also housed in Wynwood. De la Cruz, Margulies, and perhaps a 
few other very wealthy families, all of whom house most of their art collection in 
Wynwood warehouses, round out the powerful players in Miami’s art world and shape 
the highly privatized Miami Model. Although somewhat spatially clustered in Wynwood, 
the Miami Model’s power structure is spread across the small group of private 
collectors,223 as opposed to the “art in the arms of state power” model represented by the 
Ford and Rockefeller families in New York since the 1960s (Zukin 1989). Private 
collectors are powerful in other cities such as New York, London or Paris, but unlike 
those cities, Miami has minimal state patronage for the arts. While state support for the 
arts was critical to artist-led gentrification in New York, for example, in Miami art 
collector-led gentrification is financed mostly by these wealthy collectors, most of whom 
are also developers. Yet, as I will discuss below, Miami’s arts entrepreneurs do draw on 
government support in a different, less visible, more indirect fashion. The Miami Model 
has been advanced by a close alignment of developers and collectors who lobbied for 
                                                 
222 The foundation director was careful to point that “we do not think of them as museums but [rather] 
public spaces for private collections. We have been very careful to name them that way. None of them are 
museums. They all do different things. Sometimes they have educational programs, sometimes they don't.” 
 
223 Through their roles in major local and national Foundations and their close relationships with each 
other, Miami’s top art collectors have worked together to make Miami an global center for contemporary 
art. “When people come to Miami for Art Basel [the annual international art festival, discussed below], 
they come every year to see those collections. It's a very important component of Art Basel. When we 
brought Art Basel here, that's one of the things that we all promised to do… that we [all] help in any way 
we could and one of the ways was to make those collections available during those festivals for people 
come to see. Those [visitors] make up 30,000 people over Art Basel week.” 
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specific “cultural” and urban development policies that facilitated the transformation of 
Wynwood into a privately controlled, but government abetted Art District.  
 
Art in the Arms of Real Estate Power 
If Miami’s art scene is heavily shaped by a loose-knit network of a few very large 
private collectors whose “endgame is art” (Martin 2004, p. 1A), Wynwood’s arts-driven 
real estate market is shaped largely by two developers who, conversely, are interested in 
how “art can make a neighborhood happen” (Ibid). Together these influential early 
stakeholders – collectors and developers – transformed Wynwood. By opening the 
private collections to the public, hosting parties in their warehouses and coordinating 
special monthly events with each other, the early promoters of Wynwood were 
instrumental in drawing a growing number of arts consumers to the neighborhood.  
The developers were crucial not only for their business acumen – marketing, 
event organizing, and so on – but also because they control space and could cluster 
consumption in strategic areas. Between them, developers Goldman and Levine own 
more than 80 properties in Wynwood’s warehouse district (see Figure 6.9 below), making 
them by far the largest property owners in the area.224 Each is considered a “kind of an 
artist [who] approaches real estate as an artist would approach art,” according to the City 
Commissioner who represents the eastern half of the art district. Goldman made his name 
in the 1970s redeveloping SoHo’s cast-iron manufacturing lofts into art galleries and 
“live/work” spaces for “creative types” in SoHo (Lees and Bondi 1995; Bernstein 2005; 
                                                 
224 There is also a third major property owner who owns 20 properties in Wynwood, but he specializes in 
light manufacturing operations. According to my analysis of property records, after these three the next 
largest property owner in Wynwood —either north or south of 29th street (mostly residential vs. mostly 
commercial, respectively)—holds no more than 10 properties. 
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Pristin 2010). He has since been involved in the arts-oriented revival of other urban 
districts such as South Beach225 (Lacker 1986; Sontag 1986), Philadelphia’s Center City 
district (Flanagan 2000), the Fort Point Warehouse district in South Boston (Gregor 
2006) and, most recently, Wynwood. In contrast to “developers [who] are knock ’em 
down, build ’em up guys” (Flanagan 2000, p. 4), Goldman and son claim to take a 
comprehensive approach to creating “an urban pedestrian environment” (Chang and 
Turner 2005, p. 1A), not only restoring and redeveloping buildings but selecting tenants 
to create a diverse consumption infrastructure, including art galleries, restaurants, 
boutiques and other commercial venues, in addition to creating a few of their own. 
However, the basic pieces of the consumption infrastructure were being established 
before the Goldman’s first investment in the area in 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
225 Goldman worked with Craig Robins, mentioned in note X above, in the redevelopment of South Beach. 
“The big story,” said Robins in 2005 (Bernstein, p. 1), “is that the people who made South Beach… have 
now crossed the bridge.” 
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Figure 6.9: Map of Major Art District Property Owners and Selected Organizations 
and Government Agencies  
 
 
 
 
Levine, who also profited from investments in South Beach Art Deco rental 
apartments during the 1990s, started buying properties in Wynwood in 2001 with the idea 
of transforming them into live/work artist lofts, galleries or other supporting commercial 
venues. He also spent time promoting the area, which included giving other prospective 
investors tours of the neighborhood’s “collection of nondescript facades with cherry 
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filling.”226 Part of his tour involved stopping by the Wynwood Community Based 
Policing (CBP) office located at Roberto Clemente Park to introduce prospective 
investors to Melissa, the CBP office administrator since 2000 who had become a key ally 
to Levine and other art district stakeholders. “He would bring them to the CBP office,” 
said Melissa about the tours for “developers and people who were interested in the 
neighborhood,” and “show [them] that there was engaged government and people who 
cared and who could help if you were an artist and, you know, artists aren’t really into all 
this licensing and permitting stuff.”  
But the help provided by Melissa and the neighborhood’s “mini city hall,” as the 
CBP offices were initially nicknamed (see Chapter 4), went beyond basic licensing and 
permitting for new businesses. There were two crucial sets of processes in which the CBP 
office, as a conduit to work with government agencies, supported the budding Art 
District. One was by getting involved in the production of the social environment of arts 
and cultural consumption supporting economic revitalization – Lloyd’s (2002, 2004) 
“neo-bohemia” in the Chicago neighborhood of Wicker Park227 or, as Melissa put it, 
“through the CBP office, I put my grain of sand to the creation of the scene [emphasis 
added].” The other was the close collaboration between the CBP office and Levine (and 
sometimes other developers) in the “quick and dirty work,” as Levine put it, of 
neighborhood redevelopment; that is, to use another of Levine’s phrases, the creation of a 
                                                 
226 This is Levine’s well-known marketing slogan, according to several respondents (including Levine), and 
repeated in brochures and websites. In addition to “talking the talk,” noted Levine, he “walked the walk” by 
relocating his real estate office to a redeveloped Wynwood warehouse to help convince investors. Levine 
needed to lure other investors because, unlike Goldman, he did not have enough of his own capital to 
realize the extent of redevelopment that he wanted throughout the neighborhood. 
 
227 Although again, unlike the case of Wicker Park in Chicago, in Miami the “scene” was created mostly by 
gallerists, collectors and developers, who laid the groundwork for the eventual influx of artists. 
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“clean canvas,” implying processes of cleansing – demolition, homeless removal and 
other displacements. Taken together, these two sides of the coin of urban redevelopment 
– socio-cultural production and the displacement of “disorder” – have been referred to by 
way of Schumpeter’s 1942 phrase, “creative destruction” (Brenner and Theodore 2002; 
Weber 2002; Swyngedouw 2003; Harvey 2007). The remainder of this chapter examines 
key examples of these processes in Wynwood since 2000, paying close attention to how 
they were implemented through collaborations between the Wynwood CBP office as a 
conduit to other city agencies, and the area’s new developers and gallerists, as they 
endeavored to catalyze and grow an Art District. 
 
Creating the Scene: Artist Lofts and Artsy Parties 
 In 2001, after buying nearly 20 properties, Levine’s first loft redevelopment set 
the stage and served as an impetus for the district’s promotion because, as Melissa put it, 
he then found himself “sitting on a lot of land.”  The retrofit of the 1924-built Terminal 
Fabrics228 manufacturing lofts was a public-private partnership of sorts because it 
required the City of Miami to facilitate new “live/work” land uses by, on the one hand, 
creating new county- and state-level zoning categories and, on the other hand, to look the 
other way in the meantime since it took years to establish those new categories. 
 
So in 2001 I built those lofts and the city didn’t know what to make of them but 
they liked what I was doing and Manny Diaz [City Mayor, 2001-2009] said, 
‘Look Levine, here’s Lourdes, she’s the head of zoning. We’re not quite sure how 
to classify you but we’re going to leave you alone.’ The problem was that that 
side of the street was zoned industrial and… they felt they had to re-write an 
                                                 
228 Originally named the Seminole building when it was built, Terminal Fabrics was the name of the 
company that operated the apparel factory during the post-war years. The redeveloped live/work lofts 
became known as the Terminal Lofts. 
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ordinance in order to make it kosher. So she wrote an ordinance that ended up 
never getting passed at the state level because the state wanted to add all of this 
gobbley-gook that she was not pleased with. But they just left me alone and told 
me that, anybody moving in there needed to get an occupational license for their 
space as a business. And if they slept there, so be it.229 They left it alone… 
because they shared the vision. My pitch to them was [that] the industrial 
manufacturing community… is no longer here and the few [remaining] won’t be 
here in three years. [The City] agreed and, you know, manipulated the ordinance 
to facilitate what I wanted to do.  
 
The three-story Terminal Lofts building is what began to draw comparisons between 
Wynwood and SoHo’s manufacturing-turned-artist lofts. But this was one of the only 
multi-story manufacturing loft buildings in Wynwood – not enough to satisfy the 
potential demand for artistic “loft living,” according to Levine. So in 2003, with help 
from a former City of Miami attorney, he started to build another four-story loft building 
from scratch. Wynwood Lofts was intended not only to continue to increase the supply of 
live/work lofts, but also because Levine wanted “the artists to be able to take an 
ownership stake in the neighborhood and not get forced out in gentrification.” Once 
again, “we had to go through a series of hopscotch from an industrial-zoned piece of land 
to get it zoned commercial with a special exception for residential, so we hired Lucia 
Dougherty,” an attorney with Greenberg Traurig (who consulted for the Midtown 
developers) and formerly of the City of Miami and, as “she was the master of that 
universe, she got it rezoned.” In the four months after the project was completed in 
                                                 
229 Artists sleeping in their studios (“illegal studios” as they are known in Wynwood’s art world) was 
widespread during the early 2000s, according to different gallerists, realtors and artists I spoke to. But the 
situation at the Nonprofit Art Complex and that of Levine’s building were different because in the case of 
the NAC, the potential of losing its government funding if anybody was caught increased the risks. Levine 
was assured by city officials that nobody would enforce the zoning regulations as the City of Miami 
sympathized with his live/work vision for Wynwood. Until now, no artist has been caught sleeping in their 
studio at the NAC, at least not by government agency workers (nor is there any evidence of inspections or 
audits that focus on such behavior). But there were disagreements among NAC board members about 
whether the rules against sleeping in studios should be strictly enforced, apparently causing at least one 
board member to resign. 
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November of 2006, rental prices per square foot in Wynwood increased from $200 to 
$300, according to realtors (Elkies 2007). 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Image of the Former “Terminal Fabrics” Factory Converted to 
Residential Lofts 
 
 
Source: Authors photo taken September, 2011. Incidentally, Marta lives on the same block. 
 
 
 
While local government “for the most part has been very supportive over the 10 
years that I’ve been [here],” Levine noted that the city was more helpful and cooperative 
during the early years of the housing boom compared to more recently, during the onset 
of recession, when bureaucratic officials seem to be trying to “justify their existence,” 
suggesting that this is common across many cities. 
 
This is not unlike other areas in the country. When they’re [city agencies] 
desperate for change and new life, new blood to be pumped in, they pat you on 
the back and show you through. They let everything go and [say], “Do you what 
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you gotta do.” Once there’s a certain level of success achieved, like when 
Midtown came in, all of a sudden it was “Levine who?” … Now we’re in a city 
that’s financially crippled and there are inspectors [from] different departments 
that are trying to justify their existence so they’re coming out [and] writing 
violations. I have spent honestly maybe 1/3 of my time in the last 18 months 
[during 2009-2010] doing nothing but fighting the bureaucracy. Violations, 
getting zoning changes, use changes in spaces. 
 
Just as he needed the support of investors and city agencies to create the Terminal 
and Wynwood life/work loft buildings, Levine worked with the CBP office, artists, 
gallerists and other area businesses to help fill them. Although their collaborations were 
actually intended to create a popular social environment in Wynwood (“the scene”), a 
crucial byproduct of this popularity was apartment sales. Melissa and Levine 
(independently) described how the idea emerged to create a series of roving parties – 
eventually known as “Roving Fridays,” a precursor to the existing Second Saturdays Art 
Walk – to promote the warehouse spaces to a broader audience, modeled on “the coolest” 
parties thrown on South Beach before “that scene” became a “place to be seen.”230 
Melissa recalled one of their frequent meetings: 
  
It’s Levine, Dustin Orlando, and me. Dustin Orlando… more of like an urban 
low-brow artist, very cool… was really one of the pioneers in getting cool people 
here. Levine was sitting on all this land, right? And I know about Code [building 
                                                 
230 In addition to her career with the City of Miami – which more recently helped her get a job with a 
prominent consulting firm of former City of Miami Commissioners – Melissa was apparently a frequent 
party-goer on South Beach during the 1990s and, subsequently, in Wynwood when it became the “place to 
be” during the 2000s. “When I spent my 20s on Miami Beach,” recalled Melissa, “the reason we loved it 
was because it was a frontier and it’s where you went to be anonymous. The minute that I stopped really 
wanting to hang out on Miami Beach was when it became the place where you went to be seen. And that 
was a transition in Miami Beach… Now Wynwood is a similar thing,” implying that when she was first 
involved in the roving parties of the early 2000s they were cool because they were largely unknown, 
compared to Wynwood’s more recent acclaim, which was catalyzed by the first Art Basel festival in 2003. 
An indication of the turn in the Wynwood’s [I presume you meant Wynwood and not M. Beach here.] 
broader popularity was when the neighborhood started to be consistently profiled by the New York Times’ 
art and real estate writers in 2004 (Hoban 2004; Robin-Brandt 2004; Bernstein 2005; Tsui 2006; Chaplin 
2008; Pristin 2010). 
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permits and codes]. We were… starting to have a little feeling – you had Bernice 
Steinbaum and you had the NAC and you had Brook Dorsch and, you know, 
Brook Dorsch would throw these great parties and, Damien B, there’s like a little 
something [potential with all these important gallerists in the neighborhood]. And 
Levine’s like, “We need to figure out how to get people here at night.”  
 
Levine considered Brook “a tremendous inspiration. It was an [art] opening in his place 
in 2001 that put the light bulb on for me of what this neighborhood could be.” After 
ruling out the idea of a night club, the group capitalized on Melissa’s expertise. She 
reconstructed her thinking during that meeting. 
 
I remember that the city has something like a temporary use permit that will let 
you do activities in your space that you don’t have a certificate of use for, 
provided there’s no safety issues. [The temporary use would be permitted] twice a 
year, for a period not to exceed two weeks each time. Right? So I said, well, if 
you keep it roving, you can rotate it through your property just one night a month, 
and he would rotate it through his properties. It’s still how a lot of warehouses do 
their permitting for Art Basel [the annual international art festival, discussed 
below] – where a certificate of use doesn’t exist for the activity that they’re 
requesting; they’re operating under a Temporary Use Permit. 
 
The permit is issued twice a year per property, so if one person owns enough properties, 
he can get a permit for each property and rotate special events throughout them on a 
monthly basis. While it is not clear whether such creative permitting had ever been 
implemented in the City of Miami, Melissa’s idea was nevertheless crucial to the creation 
of Roving Fridays. In addition, through her work in the CBP office she had relationships 
with businesses throughout Wynwood and Edgewater, such as the Bacardi Corporation, 
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which began to support the monthly parties. 231And as Levine explained, this was good 
for sales. 
 
The way we sold Wynwood Lofts was through our art parties. [During] Roving 
Fridays, back in 2002-2003, I would take whatever space I had empty [in one of 
my properties] and get 20 or 25 artists to come and hang works with a curator. We 
had a DJ. We had a band. We’d have Bacardi supply free booze for the whole 
night. And we would charge at the door, 5, 10 bucks, [which] would go to the 
artist for their troubles. Anything sold, the artist kept the money. And my whole 
intention was to get people used to coming here at night. To understand what the 
neighborhood could be. And it was very effective. We sold maybe 20-some-odd 
of 36 units in that building just through those art parties, giving out brochures.  
  
Despite their talent for promoting the neighborhood, this initial grouping of 
gallerists, businesses and a growing crop of artists were not effective at creating a 
permanent neighborhood association – the first attempt at the Wynwood Art District 
Association (WADA). “It never really gelled,” opined Levine, because “the early 
galleries were a lot of under-capitalized young people. Nothing against them. They just 
weren’t business people. Thank God for them because they really created the movement 
early on. I needed them to fill space.” By the time I moved to Wynwood in 2006, Roving 
Fridays had evolved into “Second Saturdays” Art Walks and other neighborhood party 
circuits had developed.  Before I describe the Art Walks, it is worth noting that there 
were some lesser-known groupings as part of the larger (and wealthier) social scene 
promoted by gallerists and developers.  
I encountered one such lesser-known “scene” installed in a small storefront space 
known as Cornerstone Experiential Art, which in 2007 described itself as a “gallery and 
                                                 
231 This way, the Friday parties could become more than “Levine with a cooler [full of] beers [and] hot 
dogs on the grill,” as Melissa described the first edition. 
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performance space” with a “purpose… to provide a nurturing venue for artists/humans to 
perform, experiment, grow, and unite” (website, www.myspace.com/cornerstonemiami). 
It was a relatively small and short-lived project (2005-2007). The five event organizers 
and main artists rented an apartment above the storefront venue (it was never clear 
exactly who lived there), which could accommodate no more than 60 or 70 people (40 
was more comfortable). Weekend events, which were well enough attended to request a 
“donation” upon entry (typically $2-5 dollars), helped pay for supplies.232 On weeknights, 
the regular artists and their friends gathered and experimented artistically. The space 
drew mostly college-aged people, including many who actually studied performing arts in 
different Miami universities (I heard about Cornerstone through friends at FIU). For 
many of these young people, Cornerstone was also seen as a different option to the other 
mainstay of alternative youth culture in Miami, Churchill’s pub, the punk rock and 
“hipster”233 bar and music venue near the eastern edge of Little Haiti. At Churchill’s, 
experimental, performing arts were relegated to an outdoor project, covered under a tent 
at the back of the property, known as “Theater De Underground.” It was precisely those 
performers who took center stage at Cornerstone. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
232 The rent was paid mostly by one of the wealthier founders of the party who was a former CNN en 
Español broadcaster “in a previous life,” as he told me. 
 
233 Although hipsters are commonly associated with “indie rock” music, the term has come to refer to an 
increasingly diverse group of “counter-cultural” youth, described elsewhere (e.g., Lloyd 2006; Erlich and 
Bartz 2010). 
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Figure 6.11: Image of Cornerstone Experiential Art Scene in 2007 
 
Source: Courtesy of a “Cornerstoner” photographer and the Cornerstone MySpace website 
(http://myspace.com/cornerstonemiami) where “all content is public.” Photo dated April, 2007. 
Accessed August, 2011. 
 
By the end of 2007, the venue closed when the building was sold. Cornerstone 
seemed to have played an important role in Wynwood’s “arts movement” not only by 
providing a space for young performance artists to hone their talents but also because it 
inspired and facilitated artistic collaborations that have been sustained over the years. For 
example, Cornerstone routinely asked different artists, who benefited from the 
opportunity to perform, to host an “open mic” night each week. Catalina was a poet who 
regularly read at Cornerstone and eventually became a weeknight host. Her experience at 
Cornerstone gained her recognition as a good event organizer and expanded her artist 
network and fan base. After Cornerstone closed in 2008, Catalina initiated a weekly event 
in a Wynwood art gallery called “words and wine,” which started as a poetry series and 
expanded to include all kinds of performance art. Since then, Catalina has established a 
new performance art series in Little Havana (a low-income, inner city Miami 
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neighborhood), in addition to the Words and Wine parties. She was one of several former 
Cornerstone hosts and performers who, after its closing, went on to found their own 
events and/or advance their own artistic careers. Some Cornerstone performers have since 
played at major Miami concerts, recorded their first albums and even been featured on 
National Public Radio. 
The Second Saturday Art Walks contrast Cornerstone’s low-brow status but are in 
service to the same broader process of arts and neighborhood promotion. Initiated in 
2004, the art walks are coordinated events that take place on the second Saturday of the 
month in which the vast majority of Wynwood galleries open to the public and typically 
serve wine and hors d'oeuvres (after the recession the latter were eliminated), and 
sometimes feature live bands or other performance art. During these events thousands of 
people descend on Wynwood from other parts of Miami, many revealing their social 
standing by the expensive cars they drive. Some people who arrive late and can’t find 
parking close to the main cluster of galleries along NW 2nd Avenue opt to secure their 
vehicles in the “safe parking” lots for $10 and expend smaller fees to ride rickshaws to 
their gallery of choice. In 2011, organizers initiated a shuttle service for $10 to $15, 
depending on the distance (the maximum distance is about 8 blocks) (Zimichi 2011). 
Most of these services are facilitated by Levine or Goldman, as they own the majority of 
the vacant land along the art walk corridor where the parking lots are located. 
As I discuss in greater detail below, the monthly event has become a nuisance for 
some neighborhood residents as street parking and traffic becomes congested and they 
find the streets and sidewalks littered with garbage on Sunday mornings. In 2010, Levine 
made one of his empty lots available to food trucks and small merchants to sell their 
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wares, drawing even more people to the already crowded art walks. By 2011, prominent 
gallery owner Bernice Steinbaum lamented that the “art walk has become dreadful” while 
another gallerist owner complained, “now you have stilt walkers and flame throwers and 
food trucks where people buy racks of barbecue they bring to eat in the gallery. It’s 
turned into a total circus. It’s chaos. The day after Second Saturday, the streets here look 
like a war zone because of all the litter” (De Jesus and Casuso 2011). As a result, some 
gallery owners began refusing to participate and have shifted their openings to other 
nights. What the “chaos” of the art walks has revealed is the fundamental difference 
(noted earlier) between gallerists’ interests and that of real estate entrepreneurs – the 
former group’s “endgame is art” while the latter primarily seek profits through real estate. 
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Figure 6.12: Images of “Safe Parking” Sign and Pedestrian Traffic during a Typical 
Wynwood Art Walk 
 
 
Source: Photos by author, December 2010. Foot traffic flows past the band on the sidewalk in 
front of an art gallery. For those who arrive late and have to park further away from the main 
cluster of galleries, “safe parking” costs $10. 
 
 
While Roving Fridays and later Cornerstone and the Art Walks helped draw 
attention to Wynwood from local Miami residents, one of the key events that put the 
neighborhood “on the map” internationally was the annual Art Basel Miami festival 
initiated in 2002 as a “sister exhibition” to the original festival held in Switzerland since 
1970. The Miami edition then expanded through satellite fairs, the largest of which 
(outside of Miami Beach) has been held in Wynwood since 2003. The official Art Basel 
Miami fair draws an estimated 40,000 people during the week-long event (Wooldridge, 
Chang and Santiago 2010; Sampson 2010), although it is not known how many more are 
drawn by the satellite fairs in Wynwood, Downtown Miami and Coral Gables. It was the 
arrival of the Art Basel to Wynwood in 2003 that motivated the neighborhood’s early 
promoters to form the association (WADA), publish a website and brochures, and create 
the first map of Wynwood galleries (recall Figure 6.6 above) (Chang 2003). 
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The international exposure of Art Basel provided the impetus in 2007 for a series 
of coordinated graffiti projects known as Primary Flight (PF, see below).  Graffiti has a 
long history in Wynwood as an art form, displayed in “tags”234 and murals, in addition to 
its traditional association as a territorial market for local gangs. Two prominent and long-
time Miami graffiti artist who lead the annual PF projects explained that graffiti crews 
have been operating in Wynwood for decades, since at least the 1980s, but PF was 
transformative and unprecedented (globally, they claim) because it has raised graffiti to a 
fine art form.235 They also noted the contradictions of this transformation – similar to that 
highlighted in the recent documentary about Bansky, the legendary British graffiti artist 
(Banksy and Guetta 2010): namely, that graffiti, once commercialized, is stripped of 
precisely of that which makes it thrilling: “the adrenaline rush of doing something you’re 
not supposed to do.”  In 2003, some of Wynwood’s long-time graffiti artists (many of 
whom were in their 30s and employed in different professions) were invited by the owner 
of a decaying industrial property to use its walls to make a 550-foot graffiti mural that 
would be clearly visible from interstate 95 (Martinez 2003). Other property owners 
followed this lead and by 2007 Tony Goldman got the idea to work with well-known 
local and international artists to coordinate a series of painting events and transform a 
huge swath of Wynwood walls into an “open air museum” and “the world’s largest street-
level mural installation” (PF website, www.primaryflight.com), giving “wings” to 
                                                 
234 Tags are the artistic opposite of murals – the simple, spray-painted signature of the artist. There are 
different kinds of tags, some of which are intended to merely “represent” while others are meant to cross-
out or override the tags or art walk of rival crews. There is a complex of unwritten rules that govern the 
territorial world of graffiti (interview of the two PF co-founders and directors). 
 
235 Interview with two PF graffiti artists. 
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Primary Flight.236  The PF organization devotes itself to hosting and coordinating projects 
among the world’s best graffiti artists, including the London Police,237 Retna,238 and 
others, who descend on Wynwood in the week prior to Art Basel to re-paint the walls of 
Wynwood (having been painted the year prior). Started in 2007 with a little more than 20 
artists, by 2010 the PF series involved more than 100 artists. Painting the entire exterior 
of buildings became known as “wrapping” walls in paint and during the recent Art Basel 
festival it was common to hear of project managers in charge of wrapping walls. One 
such project manager, Daniel, explained to me that his job was to find housing, paint and 
other supplies, mechanical lifts and, “basically, whatever they need” for the artists, 
including the most important part – establishing relationships with property owners 
willing to “donate” their walls. Rather than be centrally coordinated by the PF 
organization or by Goldman, most of the wide array of graffiti projects that are officially 
considered part of PF (e.g., included in the Art Basel Primary Flight Walls map) actually 
operate through a loose network of such project managers.239 During the 2010 PF series 
prior to Art Basel, I also met artists without project managers who operated largely on 
their own, by asking other artists where to get supplies and which building owners to 
approach about finding a wall to paint on (for some, it was “chaos,” and their wall 
                                                 
236 The arts news media has referred to the opening of PF projects as “spreading its wings” or “taking off,” 
as well as telling the story of how PF “earned its’ wings” (Roux 2010; Spinello 2011). 
 
237 Created in 1998, London Police is a network of mostly UK-based graffiti artists, not to be confused with 
the London Metropolitan Police. See www.thelondonpolice.com.  
 
238 Retna is a Los-Angeles based artist whose outdoor murals are known for looking like hieroglyphics as 
well as the use of historical and religious symbols and figures. See www.digitalretna.com.  
 
239 Interview with Daniel, graffit artist project manager. Not a graffiti artist himself, Daniel grew up on 
Miami Beach and was introduced to the art scene through his own profession as a night club DJ and party 
promoter. 
257 
 
projects were delayed indefinitely for lack of support). In one case, a crew of three (two 
men from London and a woman from Paris) were supported by the sponsorship grant 
provided by Levi Jeans for the French woman’s hotel expenses.240 
 
Figure 6.13: Image of the London Police Graffiti Crew Painting a Wall as part of 
the 2010 Primary Flight Project 
 
 
Source: Authors photo taken December ,2010. This version of the London Police crew included 
two British and one French artist. 
 
 
Under the leadership of the Goldman family (Tony, Thea, and son, Joey), the 
Wynwood Art District Association (WADA) was re-created in 2008 as an effective 
business association that became increasingly influential in government policy processes. 
In 2010, it received a $100,000 grant from the City of Miami in support of its operations 
as a neighborhood association (City of Miami 2010). As I will discuss below, the 
recreation and ascendance of WADA inserted it into city politics as another community 
                                                 
240 Levi’s also paid for her airfare but the British artists paid their own way. These were not starving artists. 
The French woman has a PhD in biology but had deserted an academic career for her love of painting and 
traveling. When asked about the quality of her traveling in Miami, she lamented that in a week she had 
“only seen giant walls” and, because of sponsorship arrangements, was boarding a flight out of Miami the 
following day. 
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development organization, as its clout with local government crowded out other 
organizations. 
While the original impetus for the 2003 edition of WADA was to promote the 
neighborhood as an art destination, the new edition of WADA focused on broadening the 
consumption base. Even though WADA did not have regular meetings during the interim 
years of 2005-2007, the website, art walk maps and other promotions continued to be 
published. The main order of business of the newly recreated WADA led by the Goldman 
was to lobby for the creation of the Wynwood Café District (Bojnansky 2008; Vasquez 
2008). Technically a “cultural specialty district” under Miami’s land use code, the Café 
District was an amendment to city’s liquor license regulations to remove distance 
requirements between establishments that serve alcohol and thereby allow for the 
creation of a cluster of restaurants and bars. The specific Wynwood Café District 
established the boundaries within which up to 25 liquor licenses would be permitted 
according to the restricted distance requirements and waived parking requirements, which 
would have forced new restaurants to build or otherwise provide parking spaces. As 
reflected in Figure 6.14, the special district boundaries, expanded in 2011, were 
gerrymandered around the main cluster of galleries within the Art District south of 29th 
Street and especially the Goldman properties. Indeed, Goldman submitted a map 
detailing plans for the properties his family owned as justification and assistance for the 
City Planning Department in drafting the ordinance (City of Miami 2008c). Goldman 
lobbied241 for this because they had plans to create two new restaurants along NW 2nd 
                                                 
241 The Goldman’s hired one outside lobbyist from a prominent law firm and registered two of their own 
employees (including son, Joey Goldman) as City of Miami lobbyists to support passage of the Café 
District Ordinance, according to the City’s 2008 listing of registered lobbyists. 
259 
 
Avenue, in the heart of the new district.  The first new restaurant and bar, Joey’s, opened 
in 2008 and a second, Wynwood Kitchen and Bar, opened in 2010. Another bar not 
owned by the Goldman’s was opened around the same time within the district. 
 
Figure 6.14: Map of the Wynwood Café District Boundaries as of February, 2011 
 
Source: From the City of Miami legislative archives, February, 2011. The section 
of Wynwood known as “Old San Juan” is located north of 29th street (the upper 
limit of the map) and therefore excluded from the Café District. The arrows 
indicate the locations of the two Goldman restaurants (also see Figure 6.9). 
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 The creation of the Café District followed in the footsteps of other specialty 
districts in other City of Miami neighborhoods created with the same purpose.242 The 
Wynwood case, however, is unique because its creation and implementation were 
dominated by a single property owner – Goldman. There were hardly any opponents to 
the Café District.243 The owner of a “Southwestern-style” restaurant located on 36th 
Street, outside of the proposed district boundaries, complained of the unfair competition 
that would result since he was only allowed to serve beer with food (City of Miami 
2008a). However, his complaint was ignored and, as of this writing, he does not associate 
with WADA even though neighboring businesses do.244 None of the Puerto Rican or 
other small, Latino cafeterias, which have for years been harassed by the police and code 
enforcement for serving alcohol without food,245 voiced concerns about the ordinance, 
which also excluded them. (As I will show in a moment, they likely had no idea about it.) 
On the other hand, the city commissioner who represents the mostly African-American 
district, in which the majority of the Café District is located, insisted that the Goldmans 
conduct “community outreach” to obtain the support of other neighborhood stakeholders. 
A month before the final passage of the ordinance, she entered her concerns about the 
exclusion of Wynwood residents into the public record: 
 
                                                 
242 The Calle Ocho Cultural District created in the Little Havana neighborhood in 2006, for example, 
allowed for more liquor-serving establishments along the popular tourist and consumption corridor in the 
symbolic heart of Cuban Miami. 
 
243 This is revealed in the City of Miami Commission meeting minutes from July, 2008. 
 
244 I heard this specific complaint in 2008 from the owner of Lost and Found Saloon when I ordered one of 
his micro-brews before having decided what I was going to eat. 
 
245 As I discuss elsewhere, patrons were sometimes fined and even arrested for drinking alcohol without 
food. 
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While I am approving this on the first reading, I really expect for the City 
departments to really make sure that the community is very much involved in 
what [is] happening in that Wynwood area… There is a serious fear, a serious 
feeling of discomfort of them being pushed out further. So I really want to make 
sure those that are business owners within that area do whatever it takes to make 
sure the local organizations, the local associations, and the local groups are 
spoken to in those particular communities. It’s extremely important… when this 
item comes back to us, we should have those residents, the folks that live in that 
area [and] that have businesses in that area out here supporting this particular 
issue. I also think that we need to… revisit the map [boundaries] because a 
certain portion of the community, the Wynwood residents that have been 
there for God knows how long are not even included in the new district 
plan… I just want it to be clearly understood that in order for you to have my 
support, which is the district Commissioner that represents most of that particular 
area… the Wynwood residents have to be involved and supporting it… This issue 
for me, you know, and not just in Wynwood, but Wynwood, Overtown, Little 
Haiti, and all of these areas where major development is happening, a lot of times 
these developments are happening in neighborhoods that are not considering the 
people that live there now… the Puerto Ricans, the Dominicans, Nicaraguans, 
all of these people are in my district that live in that particular area are not 
being considered when these major plans are being proposed. 
 
A few weeks later, Goldman came back to the commissioner with 32 letters of 
support representing “a broad section of the Wynwood community” (City of Miami 
2008a; see letters in Appendix). The letters were from 8 art galleries/museums, 4 
community organizations, 16 business and property owners, and 4 residents (City of 
Miami 2008b). The 16 supporting business/property owners include clothing 
manufacturers and retailers, design studios, realty companies and property investors 
(many of whom own properties leased to art dealers), a used car dealership, an auto repair 
shop and an audio/video technology store. Of the 4 community organizations who wrote 
letters, one was WADA. The other three were Puerto Rican organizations – the Puerto 
Rican CDC, the Chamber of Commerce and the educational services organization (PRES, 
discussed later) located in the Puerto Rican Neighborhood Center. At the July City 
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Commission meeting (2008a), the Puerto Rican Chamber claimed that two other Puerto 
Rican organizations – the health clinic and the senior center – were also in support. Of 
the four letters from residents, three are identical, typed templates signed by tenants 
whose addresses indicate they live in the same rental property north of 29th street, in the 
“Old San Juan” section of the neighborhood. The remaining resident was hand-written by 
a tenant whose address was within Wynwood’s warehouse district and the proposed Café 
District boundaries.  
 The letters reveal that the Goldman prepared templates for different categories246 
of supporters (such as arts businesses, manufacturing businesses and Spanish-speaking 
residents) to edit, sign and submit to city policymakers. About half the letter writers left 
the template virtually unchanged. Some actually wrote original letters and a few made 
their support conditional (e.g., instead of 25, the number of licenses should be capped at 
15). Every letter focused on the lack of pedestrian traffic in the Art District area during 
the day, and argued that foot traffic around restaurants would reduce crime. Some 
invoked Jane Jacobs’ (1961) notion of “eyes on the street.” About half of the letters noted 
the problem of the neighborhood’s “desolate streets,” such as the following paragraph, 
which was repeated in six letters: 
 
The new influx of people will not only help my business, but also reduce crime. I 
truly believe that the desolate streets keep people away from the District. The new 
establishments will infuse life to an area that is on the verge of realizing its 
potential. The proposed Wynwood Café District will be the driving force in the 
area’s success. 
 
                                                 
246 The templates are detectable in the many letters that include exact copies of entire paragraphs, some of 
which I quote below.  
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The other letters from area businesses were variations on the theme that new restaurant 
and bar patrons would fill the empty streets. The letters from residents were similar, 
although written in an awkward Spanish. The following translated paragraph comprised 
the three typed letters signed by residents who lived in the same Wynwood rental 
building.  
 
We have received information about the opportunity to create cafés and 
restaurants in the Wynwood area, in which I am a resident of some years. I think 
that it will make [sic] a great opportunity as far as jobs are concerned, since it 
would create more pedestrian traffic in this area as well as the opportunity to 
combat crime, creating a greater future for our children. 
 
Most of the 32 letters of support come from arts-related businesses, many of 
whom are part of WADA, or from other businesses and property owners who stand to 
gain from the increased “foot traffic.” The major concern expressed by some of these 
businesses in newspaper articles, city commission meetings and even in some of the 
letters, was that the new Café District not usurp or otherwise crowd out the publicity of 
the original Art District. Once Goldman conducted outreach among the “community” of 
gallerists, these fears were assuaged (Morales 2008), as he clarified that the policy was 
not intended to create a competing slogan but to allow more liquor licenses within a 
concentrated area.247 Nevertheless, at the final hearing when the ordinance was approved, 
several long-time gallery owners in the area who ultimately supported the proposal 
wanted to state for the record that “we were here first” (City of Miami 2008a). 
                                                 
247 No brochures, flyers or other propaganda for the “Wynwood Café District” have ever circulated, even 
though several restaurants and three bars now operate there. 
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Regarding the Commissioner’s concerns about consulting with “the people who 
live there now,” letters from four residents, none of whom are property owners, can 
hardly stand as evidence of significant resident support in a neighborhood of more than 
5,500.248 So the commissioner’s speech commending Goldman’s outreach to the “whole 
community” during the final hearing seems contradictory: 
 
[When this process started,] the biggest concern I had is that… the people that 
were born and raised in Wynwood that don’t even know what’s going on in the 
galleries most of the time are not being consulted with about what’s happening in 
the area in which they grew up. I understand how [other gallery owners] can get 
on the microphone and say, ‘you can’t really call it a [new] district because… we 
had [the Wynwood Art District] before anybody else. [But] frankly, somebody 
had it before you had it, so those people need to be talked to. And I have to say 
that when I look at these letters… I commend you guys for getting those letters 
and making sure that there was serious outreach to the groups that really have the 
roots in the community. [But] my question becomes, how are we deciding where 
the map actually needs to go? …I’m just going to give you an example and then 
I’m going to shut up because I can feel my Chairman breathing on my neck over 
here. NW 2nd Avenue, which is a lot of small cafes all the way up to 36th street, it 
seems as though the heart of Wynwood – I’m talking about the residents that were 
born and raised there – like they’re not going to get any benefits out of it. [An 
administrative official explains that the map was created based on where the 
galleries are most concentrated] All right. That was my only comment, but I 
support it 100 percent. I’m glad that you guys are now making sure that the 
community, the whole entire community, is participating. 
 
In between commending the Goldmans for their community outreach, the 
commissioner suggests that the small businesses on NW 2nd Avenue that serve 
Wynwood’s existing residents do not benefit from the proposed ordinance (which is 
actually the case). Goldman appears to have satisfied the city commissioner’s request to 
include “the people that live there now” not because he reached out to four residents in 
                                                 
248 According to the 2010 U.S. Census data for the two census tracts that comprise Wynwood. If we 
consider only the census tract where the Café District applies, the resident population is 1,212. 
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two apartment buildings, but rather through private negotiations with the commissioner in 
which Goldman agreed to specific commitments that would enhance Wynwood residents’ 
chances to benefit from the creation of the Café District.249 The most important of these 
commitments seemed to be “good faith efforts” to hire people from the neighborhood.250 
When asked about these by a reporter, a spokesperson for the Social Justice Center, a 
relatively new activist organization in Wynwood, said that “if there is a true commitment 
to the community, there needs to be a ‘community benefits agreement’251 with open 
consultation with residents, local businesses, and institutions” (Morales 2008), implying 
that “good faith efforts” are not enforceable and accountable to local residents.  
The policy process that created the Café District is an example of how a new 
community organization has inserted itself into political territory in which decisions 
about Wynwood are made. The Goldmans and WADA make claims about what is good 
for the neighborhood and its residents.  The Café District was the first moment when the 
gallerists were organized and mobilized to participate collectively in a policy process, 
                                                 
249 The commissioner revealed that these negotiations too place at the second city commission meeting 
where the ordinance was approved. 
 
250 As stated, these included (1) working with an existing job placement program to hire “youths residing in 
Wynwood” as “ambassadors” of Wynwood during the Art Walks (i.e., hosts or ushers who help orient 
patrons) and to clean up after Art Walks; (2) participating in the Hospitality Institute Program managed by 
Miami-Dade College and the City’s Community Redevelopment Agency, which links city residents with 
hospitality jobs; (3) “use good faith efforts to give preference in the hiring process to qualified residents of 
the City for non-construction jobs for each new business operated by Goldman Properties in this new 
district, with the goal of having Wynwood residents fill at least 25 percent of entry-level positions and 25 
percent of managerial positions” and they promised to try to contract with qualified “local small 
businesses”; (4) attend “quarterly meetings of neighborhood businesses” hosted by the Puerto Rican 
Chamber of Commerce to address any concerns that arise in the neighborhood; (5) help the Chamber with 
the publication of an annual directory of businesses in Wynwood; (6) developer a security plan for the 
district; (7) meet with the Puerto Rican senior center to discuss the new ordinance with residents there.  
 
251 Community benefits agreements are contracts signed by community groups and a real estate developer 
that requires the developer to provide specific amenities or other concessions to a defined community. In 
exchange, the community groups will support her project at least not oppose it (see e.g., Baxamusa 2008). 
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even though the Goldman’s did most of the legwork. Moreover, WADA’s organization 
occurred just at the moment when government agencies and services were contracting, 
increasing the competition to get city officials’ attention. For example, during the last 
decade, the Wynwood Community-Based Policing (CBP) office gradually contracted, 
first by losing its public service aid, a key liaison between residents and government, and 
eventually when it was consolidated into the CBP office of neighboring Allapattah.252 
This undermined the purpose of the CBP system to be a “mini city hall” inside of 
neighborhoods, reducing the distance between residents and city agencies. It also 
overwhelmed the CBP directors. As Levine put it, “it got lumped in with the Allapattah 
[CBP] office [where the director] is a wonderful guy but it’s too much - you can’t take a 
guy who has a big area called Allapattah and throw him into Wynwood and Edgewater 
and lump them together and not give him extra personnel.” The current CBP office 
director said that responding to WADA and covering the rest of his terrain is 
overwhelming, noting that “I receive maybe three, four, five, six emails a week from 
[WADA]. So [we’re] very close. Levine: he knows that he can just call me right away. 
Thea,253 they’re all hooked up with me here.” When I saw him a few months later at a 
funeral for Elsa, the longtime Puerto Rican activist, and asked how he was doing, the 
CBP director let out a sigh and responded, “I’m always getting calls from WADA.” He 
added that “Wynwood is the next South Beach” and therefore he is also inundated with 
calls from developers who need help with building permits. During our earlier interview 
                                                 
252 In 2004 the Clemente Park Community Center, where the CBP office was located, was condemned and 
closed (which I will discuss below). The CBP officers and other staff worked out of trailers until 2008, 
when the CBP system contracted and Wynwood’s CBP functions were folded into the Allapattah office 
more than 20 blocks away. 
 
253 Thea is Goldman's ex-wife. 
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he explained that WADA is better able to deal with government retrenchment than the 
lower-income residents of Wynwood. 
 
I think [by] removing the CBP office from there, groups like WADA do not suffer 
because, you know, we’re a little further over here or over there, you know, but 
there is communication by email, by phone, and they’re very aggressive. But 
definitely, Wynwood, you know, I’m seeing a great absence. Elsa [the long-time 
Puerto Rican activist] is already 101 years old, poor thing, she can’t do what she 
used to do. And what I see going on in the neighborhood, I don’t know…254  
Definitely there is a lack of enthusiasm... not by the ‘cultural part’ [art district] of 
Wynwood but rather the residents that live there. We need something more.  
 
 As I will also examine in the next section, there is a widespread perception that 
Wynwood’s residents are disengaged from government processes and, as the CBP 
director suggests, from taking care of their streets. Increasingly, organizations like 
WADA step into the space provided by such disengagement, to the point of literally 
cleaning the streets (see below), creating a “win-win situation” according to the CBP 
director. In the case of the WADA-CBP office relationship, the win-win situation refers 
to the fact that “the city is cleaner” and city agencies “have more control,” as the director 
put it. In exchange for its assistance in securing the neighborhood, WADA is increasingly 
accepted and supported as one of Wynwood’s community-based organizations. 
The scene at a recent Town Hall meeting in May 2011 at Roberto Clemente Park 
revealed the shifting balance of neighborhood stakeholders. The meeting was called by 
the City Mayor to hear from Wynwood residents. But about half of the 30 attendees and 
the most vocal participants were realtors, developers and gallerists. Six were elderly 
residents who walked to the meeting. The rest were city staff, police and representatives 
                                                 
254 He was also referring to recent complaints from residents about a surge in heroin dealing along NW 2nd 
Avenue. 
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from neighborhood service agencies. A few days earlier, Levine had joked that he 
planned to attend “as an honorary Puerto Rican,” but he did not attend. During the 
meeting the Mayor summarized in English and Spanish how his staff had solved a list of 
problems previously brought to his attention by residents. He then gave the speaking turn 
to four elderly residents who, each addressing the Mayor by his first name, complained 
about trash in the streets, drug sales on NW 2nd Avenue, cars blocking their driveways, 
power lines caught between tree branches and other “quality of life” problems, as the 
Mayor described them. During these exchanges in Spanish between the Mayor and the 
elderly residents, the chatter increased among other meeting participants who grew 
restless, causing the Mayor to physically move closer and closer to the residents until he 
took a seat in the row in front of them. For the remainder of the meeting, different 
property owners south of 29th Street raised their own concerns in English and even made 
some proposals. One commercial property owner suggested the city create a special 
taxing district to improve infrastructure and support the expansion of restaurants, to 
which the Mayor responded, “hey listen, if you wanna pay, I’ll see you tonight.”  The 
mayor then projected his voice to the broader audience and said in Spanish, “If we have 
more business, we have more jobs. And if we have more businesses and more people 
coming to the area, the bad guys can’t do what they do.” Switching back into English, the 
discussion turned to crime prevention and a disagreement arose over the extent of city 
police protection. While the police commander for the area asserted that “policing the 
area is difficult to do with the current resources, outside of special events,” Harold, a 
major commercial realtor in the Warehouse District and a former garment manufacturer, 
retorted, “You got to understand that because of the Arts District, taxes have gone up, 
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values are up, so we’re entitled to extra policing.” Then Goldman, who arrived late, 
sought a consensus that would benefit WADA: “We cannot expect the city to do it all. 
We’re proposing to be partners in watching out for crime. If you find $100,000 in the 
next city budget, we have property owners [WADA] who will match it. We will 
supplement that with eyes on the street.”255  
The Town Hall meeting, the first held by the current City Mayor, was a 
microcosm of the changes in Wynwood. The spaces traditionally used by neighborhood 
residents, such as Clemente Park, increasingly become venues where art district 
stakeholders make claims to entitlements, such as increased police protection. Such 
claims ignore the fact that it requires capital to invest and raise property values; yet, 
investment and property value impacts are cited as the rationale for increased police 
protection. This logic slips into the argument that poor people, lacking the capacity to 
raise property values, may not be entitled to increased protection, too. But this 
contradiction is made to be invisible partly because meetings such as the Town Hall are 
conducted in Spanish and English. Some points are lost in translation. As I walked with 
the elderly residents back to their houses after the meeting, all expressed positive 
impressions of the art district stakeholders and agreed with the Mayor that they brought 
jobs and security to the neighborhood. As I discuss below, the extent to which such 
benefits are realized, and by whom, is highly uneven. This is especially true when it 
comes to security, as WADA hires private security services to patrol the Café District and 
related events. 
                                                 
255 Since the city granted WADA the same amount in 2011, it seems likely they will do so again in 2012 
(the Mayor confirmed as much at the end of the meeting). 
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 Figure 6.15: Image of one of the Private Security Vehicles within the Wynwood 
Arts District Patrol 
 
 
Source: Authors photo taken February, 2011.  
 
 
Regarding direct economic benefits, there has been no monitoring or other follow-
up research to evaluate the extent to which the Café District or even whether the broader 
Art District provides employment or other benefits to Wynwood residents. However, 
there are a few examples of gallerists and developers hiring locally and generating other 
economic benefits for local residents. The most obvious examples are residents who can 
be seen cleaning, painting and performing other handy work in the art district. George, 
who moved to Miami from Honduras about five years ago, is a handy man hired by and 
renting an apartment from Levine on the north edge of Wynwood.256 When I met him in 
December, 2010, he was painting over unwanted graffiti on the side of a warehouse but 
he also picks up garbage, patches roofs and other construction work. During the winter, 
                                                 
256 Levine does not own the buildings that George cleans or rents an apartment in. George named him as the 
boss because that is who pays him and collects his rent. Levine’s company provides property management 
services to commercial and residential property owners. 
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the peak of the art season, George works from dawn until dusk (winter hours), five days a 
week at $100 per day, paid in cash. As long as work is steady, he makes about $2,000 a 
month, and splits the $735 monthly rent for a 2-bedroom apartment with his brother and 
roommate. His only major expense other than rent is food, as he relies on a bicycle for 
transportation; most of what remains from his monthly income he sends to his wife and 
child in Honduras. Although he was earning more money working with construction 
crews before the economic recession set in, he claimed to live very comfortably in 
Wynwood and even insisted on staying in the neighborhood when his brother wanted to 
move closer to Biscayne Bay.  
The Goldmans, Levine and gallerists have contributed to social service programs, 
particularly free art training for children. Levine listed the ways he has cultivated 
relationships, or at least a certain reputation, with existing residents.  
 
The old-time residents have welcomed [us] because we helped the schools, which 
in turn helps the community. We do a lot of things for the Hartner Elementary 
School. I do an art show every year of the students’ art work. I draped the back of 
Museo Vault [an art storage building he owns] with their art work. We put it up 
banner size and you can go by and read it – it says, created by the arts students of 
Hartner Elementary. The local CBP officer hits me up for money for turkeys 
every year at this time. I have an intern from the young men’s preparatory 
academy three days a week after school. He’s in 11th grade. So we want to be part 
of the neighborhood. We don’t want to be isolationists. We want to ingratiate 
ourselves to the neighborhood and we have. I think for that reason, the 
community has taken to us well. Chuck and his twin brother have grown up in 
Wynwood their whole lives. They do all my maintenance, anything for the 
association, hanging the banners, I hire them. 
  
During my interview with Melissa, the former CBP office director, her voice 
began to tremble with emotion as she described how, during the creation of the graffiti 
murals known as Wynwood Walls, Goldman and some internationally renowned graffiti 
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artists invited some children and teenagers from the neighborhood to paint with them. 
“Any millionaire can bring masters. Not all of them let the kids paint with them. It 
touched me so much.” Thea Goldman who, together with her son, owns and manages 
Joey’s restaurant, has raised money for the Lotus House thrift store and shelter (operated 
by Mrs. Margulies, of another art collecting family) to hire homeless women as street 
cleaners, initiating a program known as “Women of Wynwood.” The women, who patrol 
two at a time, wear pink smocks as they push rolling garbage cans up and down NW 2nd 
Avenue where they have been seen picking up trash. Yet, several residents I interviewed 
were critical of the Women of Wynwood because they do not believe they are 
neighborhood residents. One respondent, a man from the Canary Islands who owns and 
manages a rental property on the strip of 2nd Avenue where the women clean, cited the 
fact that the women were Black (by which he meant African-American) as evidence they 
are not from the neighborhood (his own tenants are Haitian). He and others also 
questioned whether the work program is effective in cleaning the streets. For example, 
two sisters who live across the street from Clemente Park began to argue about the 
Women of Wynwood when I asked if the Art District had generated employment 
opportunities for neighborhood residents. 
 
Sandra: [The Women of Wynwood] is about the only thing. I’ve seen them. 
Gema:  Where? They were supposed to be working, cleaning around 30th and 5th 
Avenue. I saw this [piece of] wood sticking out from the sewer opening. You 
cannot even make a turn because that branch was just sticking out. And I’m like, 
‘what are these women waiting for?’ And I remember telling them, ‘look, that’s 
been there for awhile.’ What are [they] waiting for to get rid of it? 
Sandra: I haven’t seen them around. I know that once they come here to work, 
they disappear. You don’t see where they go. I don’t think they’re from here. I 
think they just put the Wynwood [label] because they’re doing their job here. 
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Gema:  They [the gallerists] don’t give a damn, all they want is money. And then 
they want to take people’s properties away from them. Because they wanted to 
take Jose’s Fruit Stand for the gallery. They also wanted to take the corner house 
for a gallery. 
 
Knowing that the Women of Wynwood are associated with major gallerists and 
developers, the sisters were highly skeptical about their work in the neighborhood, 
viewing it as an extension of the gallerists’ penetration into the neighborhood’s property 
market.  
Stories about how gallerists have tried to “take over the neighborhood” abound in 
Wynwood. As I will explore in greater detail below, many residents complain of the 
increased automobile traffic, congested street parking (unlike wealthier neighborhoods, 
there are no residential permit parking zones in Wynwood) and the trash found strewn 
throughout the streets the morning after Art Walks or major art fairs. During 2008, a 
satellite art fair called Scope occupied Roberto Clemente Park during the week. Although 
it was criticized for the aforementioned reasons (added traffic, noise, garbage), and for 
tearing up the grounds of the park, many recalled that Scope had hired several 
neighborhood residents to set up and clean and had given away free passes to residents in 
the vicinity of the park. 
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Figure 6:16: Image of a Construction Site with a “No Hiring” Sign in Wynwood 
 
 
Source: Authors photo taken October, 2007. The need for work was apparently so great that a 
construction site in the center of Wynwood advised workers (in English and Spanish) not to 
bother applying. 
 
 
The hiring of a few neighborhood residents to service Art District activities is 
clearly not a means of upward mobility. Even as a reliable source of income, the benefits 
of the “arts economy” for Wynwood residents are dubious. As was the case with the 
Midtown complex discussed previously, the few employment opportunities given to 
Wynwood residents within the “arts economy” function more as good community and 
public relations, particularly because of their impermanence. As for benefits to small 
business, described below, the arts economy pulses during brief periods of the year. 
Moreover, the relationship in which benefits accrue to workers and residents is 
hierarchical; residents and workers have little say in the process. This exclusion is 
especially true for the many Central American immigrants who live in Wynwood, even 
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though some of them clearly benefit from jobs painting, cleaning and other handy work 
in and around the arts economy. 
During pick-up soccer games at Clemente Park, I met other Central American 
immigrants who did similar work to George in the Art District. Their occupations were 
easy to deduce from the paint-spotted jeans they played in. Not all were as optimistic 
about the economic benefits of the art district as George. One man eventually quit 
working for the owner of a warehouse who had not paid him in three weeks, thereby 
surrendering his wages.257 For undocumented workers, confronting the boss would be 
unwise because, as another Costa Rican immigrant explained, “before the recession 
nobody asked for papers.” He did not mean to suggest that art district employers ask for 
documentation but merely that the threat looms larger in a struggling economy, 
particularly as stories of deportation raids circulate in Wynwood. Sandra and Gema, the 
Puerto Rican sisters who have lived across the street from Clemente Park for more than 
20 years, have seen and heard of many deportations. 
 
Sandra: It’s kind of sad what’s going on because all this immigration thing going 
on, not having legal documents, a lot of houses are actually for rent now in 
Wynwood because people are being deported or the people are moving out [for 
fear of being deported]. What happens, unfortunately, I’ve met people personally 
where, OK, maybe you had a problem with your neighbor and that neighbor 
decided to get even with you, I will call immigration [authorities] and they will 
bust you. And I know someone from the corner of 34th and 1st Avenue, that they 
called immigration on them. And they took her. And if you asked [immigration 
authorities], they said, “Well, we received a call.” 
Gema: [It’s] nothing new, unfortunately.  
Sandra: My sister can tell you, I have a lot of Central American friends and some 
of them don’t even have documents, and coming to Wynwood was very scary for 
them. When immigration [authorities] started picking up all these undocumented 
                                                 
257 For more on the widespread problem of, and solutions to wage theft nationally and in Miami, see 
research by Bobo (2009) and Hernandez (2010), respectively. 
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people, it was very tough, because they no longer wanted to come to the park and 
play soccer. We haven’t been back here, you know, with the group that we used to 
have because they’re afraid of, “oh, maybe somebody’s going to call 
immigration.” So that actually has messed us up [as a community]. I think the 
beginning of this year was one of the worst. I saw people at Jibarito [the Puerto 
Rican grocer], you know, immigration [authorities] going in there, asking for 
documentation of the employees. They actually deported, I think, they deported 
two women. They took them out of Jibarito because they didn’t have papers. 
 
Jose’s Fruit Stand, mentioned above, was threatened not so much by gallerists but 
by the city’s building code department, which in 2006 began citing him for not cleaning 
up the environmental contamination in the ground of the former gas station where he 
operates despite the fact that Jose has owned that property and operated the market there 
since 1989.258 However, the building across from Jose’s Fruit Stand became home to 
artist studios in 2008 and prior to that was the subject of intense real estate speculation 
that disturbed the popular neighborhood beauty salon on the first floor. The building was 
owned by Felipe259 since the late 1970s but sold in 2005 for $618,000 to a developer with 
plans to undertake major renovations. The Argentinean owner of the beauty salon 
downstairs, who had been styling hair in the neighborhood since 1980, explained to me 
that her lease was not renewed and because her business depended on loyal clients, she 
had to seek another viable commercial space nearby. Several months later, after investing 
more than $5,000 in her new venue, she realized that a contractor had installed the wrong 
plumbing and the City of Miami rejected her business license to operate the beauty salon. 
She then returned to her former landlord to ask about the status of the building, desperate 
to reestablish her business and generate some income. She was told that she could return 
                                                 
258 This apparently happened in connection with complaints about the dumpsters full of decomposing 
produce from the homeowner who lives behind the Fruit Stand, according to several informants. 
 
259 Recall that he is the Puerto Rican businessman and former resident discussed in Chapter 3. 
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but that should she would “need to be patient through all the renovations, that there was 
going to be crews and dust and trucks, and that I might even have to close a few days, 
once in awhile.” Instead, in 2007, before any construction began, the economic downturn 
caused the developers to cancel their plans and sell the property to a gallerist for the same 
price. “So,” she concluded, “the housing explosion cost me five thousand dollars,” not 
including several months of lost business income. 
 
 
Figure 6.17: Image of the Argentinean-Owned Beauty Salon below an Artist Studio 
  
 
Souce: Google Street View image (2008). Across the street from Clemente Park and a popular 
Fruit Stand, the “white building,” as it is known to some residents, is home to a popular beauty 
salon and, recently, an artist studio upstairs. 
 
 
Further systematic research is needed to understand the extent to which 
neighborhood businesses that serve Wynwood residents benefit from the Art District and 
Café District. In brief conversations with the owners of four neighborhood business (two 
discount stores, two sandwich shops), an interview with a cafeteria owner and my own 
experience as a resident and patron of various restaurants, I found that the 
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neighborhood’s cafeterias and small businesses benefit in largely indirect and highly 
inconsistent ways, such as when the area is “cleaned up” during special events. For 
example, the Cuban-owned Enriqueta’s sandwich shop, a very popular and cheap lunch 
spot on the eastern edge of Wynwood (most clientele do not live in Wynwood), reported 
that they made less money during art festivals and opted to close an hour earlier than 
usual (3pm instead of 4pm). The owner of the most popular small eatery in the heart of 
Wynwood estimated that about half of his clients live in the neighborhood while the other 
half work nearby. He indicated that during the annual art festivals new customers who he 
believed to be art consumers – “Europeans,” he thought, because of their accent – 
stopped into his cafeteria for small items such as coffee, water or cigarettes. He noted that 
the only year this business was substantial was when in 2008 the Art Basel satellite fair, 
Scope, was held in Roberto Clemente Park, two blocks from his business. Two dollar 
store managers on the block had similar views, having benefited from spillover traffic in 
December of 2008, typical sales including cans of Coke, cigarettes, cigars or bottled 
water. All these business owners expressed that the main benefit of the growth of the Art 
District has been to help “clean up the neighborhood,” even while acknowledging that 
police presence is greater during special art events and “they hardly do anything” during 
the rest of the year. Some restaurants seem to have no chance of drawing customers from 
the Art District events. I was walking east down 29th Street during the 2010 Art Basel 
festival when I noticed the Central American manager of the Boricua Café, one of the 
few remaining Puerto Rican cafeterias in the neighborhood, learning out of the small 
coffee window yelling in her accented English, “Happy hour! Happy hour!” to no avail. 
Her cafeteria, located across the street from the Rubell Family Collection, was empty 
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except for two children sitting at the back. With a shrug of her shoulders, she explained 
that tourists and art patrons never stop in, but she still tries. On the other hand, newly 
arrived merchants in the historically residential part of Wynwood north of 29th Street, are 
keen to capitalize on the growth of arts patrons. A Bangladeshi man who bought and 
renovated a small Puerto Rican cafeteria along NW 2nd Avenue explained that after 
“cleaning up the place,” his first order of business would be to offer cheap, traditional 
Indian dishes and distribute a new menu to the galleries and artist studios south of 29th 
Street. His only employee, a Puerto Rican woman who grew up in the neighborhood, 
acknowledged that the first Indian restaurant must be viewed as a sign of how Wynwood 
is changing. 
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Figure 6.18: Image of the Boricua Café, one of the few remaining Puerto Rican 
Cafeterias in Wynwood 
 
 
Source: Photo by author on a Saturday evening during Art Basel, December 2010. 
 
 
 
 These few examples are not meant to evaluate the extent of the costs and benefits 
to neighborhood residents and businesses of the growth of the Art and Café District in 
Wynwood. But they do suggest that the reality of the changing contours of the 
neighborhood does not match the rhetoric of an inclusive transformation (in which the 
“whole entire community” participates) espoused by the new Arts stakeholders, city 
officials and other enthusiastic proponents of the new Wynwood. More than this, 
however, the above examples of “cultural production” processes reveal the growing 
political clout of WADA and the “arts economy” in Wynwood. The arts sector’s 
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penetration into the political terrain of the neighborhood has proceeded not only by virtue 
of the production of events, boundaries, commerce, and so on. The creation of the Art 
District has also involved the removal of social and physical obstacles in order to enhance 
the profitability of investments. 
 
The Teamwork of Neighborhood Redevelopment 
Levine is known for saying that Wynwood is an ideal “clean canvas” for 
redevelopment (Del Campo 2006), a phrase parroted in newspaper articles and headlines 
(“Wynwood a Blank Canvas for Urban Renewal,” Shepherd 2009). Wynwood has come 
to be seen this way because of the aesthetic qualities of large blank walls, which, once 
painted, transform the neighborhood into “the world’s first outdoor museum” (Duran 
2010). But Levine means more than blank walls and empty warehouses. He also refers to 
the political environment in which, as he says, “getting shit done” (see below) is made 
relatively easy. In Chapter 4, I described how the depopulation of Wynwood’s warehouse 
district was carried out by a combination of the failure to implement economic 
development programs, public and private sector disinvestment from, and housing 
demolition. In the remainder of this section I examine examples of the more recent forces 
that have helped remove obstacles to the rooting and growth of an art district. It has also 
been made possible through collaboration with city agencies. The following is illustrative 
of such an example facilitated by the CBP office. 
 
Levine: When I was new here, [Melissa] was invaluable at getting shit done. I’ll 
give you an example. I had a building where the tenants were taking over the 
“asylum.” They weren’t paying me, they were selling drugs out of there, 
prostitution, and I did a quick and dirty analysis with my partner and said, you 
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know, we should tear this fucking building down. We’ll lose less money without 
them there. And this building was a big problem for the police. [It had] eight 
units. And the police were fed up. I called Melissa [and] said, “I want to tear the 
building down.” She goes, “when?” I said, “As soon as possible.” She goes, “Let 
me get [Joe Gonzalez]260 over, the policeman.” The policeman comes over, he 
goes, “Levine, realistically, when?” I said, “a week from today.” He said, “Great.” 
I said, “I’m going to park a backhoe in front of the building tomorrow.” I parked a 
backhoe, I told ‘em [my tenants] (and he raises his voice as if yelling outside the 
building), “I’m tearing the building down. You’re all going to have to fuckin’ 
move.” (He acts out their response.) “‘Fuck you! You’re not tearing that building 
down. You’re a joke. We’re gonna keep this fuckin’ building, buddy.”   
Marcos: Did you have to do a formal eviction? 
Levine: Nothing. Parked the backhoe. The demolition guy pulled a permit.261 
Took him five-six days to get the permit. I called Gonzalez, I said, “Joe, I got the 
permit.” He goes, “Great, I’ll be there in 20 minutes.” We knocked on every door, 
told them to pack their shit and get out, that the demolition was starting in three 
hours. And they were like in disbelief, but with the policemen they had to listen. 
All eight of them were on the sidewalk with their worldly possessions. The guy 
started the backhoe up, started tearing into the building three hours later. 
 
Figure 6.19: Images of Vacant Lot where Housing was demolished by Levine 
 
 
Source: One of the first photos I shot in Wynwood in 2008 (left) was of a mural facing the lot 
where Levine’s building once stood. The image on the right, captured from Google Street View 
(2010), is of the entire property. 
 
                                                 
260 Not his real name, this refers to the community-based policing officer for Wynwood – the same position 
held by Bobby who had moved on to become chief of security for the Midtown complex. 
 
261 He told me the exact location of the building, which I have omitted from this passage. Records from the 
City of Miami Building Department confirm the permit and “total demolition” of the building late in 2004. 
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Similar to the Catholic Church leaders and members discussed earlier, the next 
generation of “pioneers” on the “urban frontier” of Wynwood endeavored to tear down 
dilapidated housing. Melissa proclaimed, “My first year here, we demolished 11 unsafe 
structures,” and not only by working with Levine, but also at the behest of a 
neighborhood association in Edgewater that “did a lot of bulldozing of crack houses.” 
Levine had many examples of “early Wynwood,” when “you could do whatever you 
needed to do if you were bettering the neighborhood” because the local government was 
“desperate” for revitalization. “I was taking buildings full of animals and I was evicting 
‘em all, cleaning it up, rebranding it, repositioning it, bring in better tenants.” The 
following example also reveals how such work sometimes went beyond dealing with 
tenants, with implications for neighborhood residents and the broader public.262  
 
I had a bus stop in front of a building of mine, which shall remain site-less. The 
bus stop was a problem for me because the retailer in the space there on the corner 
was always being bothered by these people that wanted change, they would lean 
up against the building and block his windows, waiting for the bus. So on a 
weekend, we decided, we moved the fuckin’ bus stop. We jack hammered the 
pole out of the ground. We moved it 50 yards west. Cemented it in. Moved the 
bench and by Monday, the bus started stopping up there. Problem solved. 
  
 As the neighborhood contains a concentration of thrift stores, soup kitchens and a 
major homeless assistance center and shelter, a major focus of the CBP office’s work has 
been reducing or masking the presence of persons who are homeless in order to facilitate 
the construction of the image of an art district. Even though this continues to be one of 
gallerists and arts proponents major complaints, the current CBP officer is adamant that 
                                                 
262 Although I could not confirm this example because he hid its’ location, Melissa also independently 
made reference to the “bus stop” story. 
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the “numbers have been drastically going down,” although he had no idea where they 
these individuals might have gone in the middle of an economic recession. 
 
Melissa: There was a lot of homeless people around [the shelter] – a lot of 
encampments on those lots that nobody wanted back then. I remember across 
from where SoHo studios, there was an actual homeless house. They’re very 
creative, obviously. They had little appliances. They had stuff like that. You 
know, and I had to go and take that out. 
 Marcos: How did you feel doing that work? 
Melissa: It’s hard. But you know what? Pushing forward a neighborhood is hard. 
Here’s how I think about it. And I’m kind of weird. OK? And having kind of been 
exposed to it, this is how I can reconcile it. Do you remember the lands of like, 
fiefdoms and manors and all of that stuff? You had the people that lived within 
the manor. But then you had the people who lived in the forest, right? And they 
lived in the forest because they weren’t happy with the rules of the manor or the 
fief. There you have it. We ain’t got no forests. But we have ignored spaces and 
that’s where those people gravitate to. Ignored spaces, frontier spaces. 
 
It is not clear what the analogy accomplishes other than clarify the emphasis on 
interventions upon those who disobey rules. She later opined that people who do so, 
particularly in the case of homeless encampments, are drug addicts who have gone 
crazy.263 Here the imagery of the frontier individualizes the symptoms and causes of 
disorder, rationalizing interventions upon individuals. In Wynwood, asserted Melissa, 
“people, business men and women gotta have balls or they’re not going to make it,” 
noting that the typical characters in early Wynwood were “developer types and people 
who carry guns.” 
The pioneer character and the frontier concept pervade narratives of neighborhood 
gentrification (Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008). The pioneer on the urban frontier was long-
ago exposed by researchers as a “myth,” since “it is apparent that where the ‘urban 
                                                 
263 “I asked the cops once. I kept thinking, what comes first, the madness or the drugs? Unequivocally, they 
said: ‘Drugs, homeless, madness.’ [Marcos: But what comes before the drugs?] Oh well, I’m sure there’s a 
whole bunch of… everybody’s personal drama!” 
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pioneers’ venture, the banks, real-estate companies, the state or other collective economic 
actors have generally gone before” (Smith 1986, p. 18-19).”264 Nevertheless, the myth 
persists and in the case of Wynwood, it is precisely these collective economic actors who 
consider themselves the pioneers operating on the frontier. 
 
It was private sector, art, government, media, frontier. Wynwood is a frontier 
place. Anything can happen. You’ve got a big industrial part that doesn’t have a 
lot of residents nitpicking about… you know, you’ve got a lot of renters, so you 
don’t have a lot of people with the traditional stake in American civics. Right? So 
it’s media, government, private sector, art and frontier.265 
 
The mythical narrative survives, adapted to fit the well-resourced public-private 
partnerships of contemporary urban development, because “the imagery of frontier serves 
to rationalize and legitimate a process of conquest, whether in the 18th-19th century West 
or in the 20th-century inner city” (Smith 1986, p. 17). In this case, it is also clear that 
renters and people “without a stake” refer to the high proportion of immigrants in 
Wynwood. As Nijman (2011) has argued elsewhere, high rates of transience lead to low 
civic engagement in Miami. But as we see when contrasting Melissa’s account to 
Marta’s, below, the arguments about disengaged publics, “people without a stake” in 
their place in the world, function as a justification for ignoring them, removing the 
                                                 
264 In particular, Smith (1986) noted “the importance of urban development to national and international 
recovery [in the 1980s, made] acutely clear in the enthusiastic language used by supporters of the urban 
Enterprise Zone, an idea pioneered by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations.” It was precisely the 
Wynwood Neighborhood Assembly, the governing body for implementation of projects within the 
Empowerment Zone (EZ) in Wynwood, which was the historic remnant of the governments’ long-standing 
interest in Wynwood’s redevelopment. Under the Federal Enterprise Zone program, Empowerment Zones 
were local areas targeted for redevelopment within Enterprise Communities, which was the designation for 
municipalities such as Miami-Dade County, through which the federal funding was channeled. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, previous projects supported within the Zone – affordable housing construction, the 
Free Trade Zone – fell far short of expectations and potential. “[At] the beginning, that’s what you had,” 
recalled Melissa. “Those were the tools.” 
 
265 Quote from interview with Melissa. 
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remnants of their social life and redeveloping the spaces they once used into something 
else. 
However, the use of the frontier rationality to implement redevelopment ebbs and 
flows. Even though Wynwood continues to have high poverty, crime and the presence of 
homeless persons, the frontier rationality seems to have softened. Levine was recently 
forced to evict a contractor who leased vacant land from him for use as a staging area for 
construction elsewhere in the city. After the contractor had leased the site for more than a 
year, residents’ complaints prompted city code inspectors to investigate and ultimately 
cite Levine for lacking a permit and for improper storage of constructional materials in a 
residential neighborhood (Goyette 2011). The complaining residents owned and rented 
units in one of Levine’s loft buildings, which reveals that the developers of artistic space 
and its inhabitants do not necessarily have the same interests, and reinforces the point that 
artists may be in a vulnerable position when gentrification is led by developers in the 
name of artists. On the other hand, the frontier is not so empty; as more investors, 
consumer and residents come to occupy it, the political environment is also gradually 
transformed.  
However, before there were either developers or artists, low-income workers and 
families lived in Wynwood. The next section explores the exclusionary pressures 
generated upon existing residents by the growth of the art district. 
  
Pressures of Exclusion and Displacement 
Goldman and son have claimed that one of the unique characteristics of 
Wynwood, compared to other neighborhoods they have worked in, “was that the district 
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could be redeveloped without displacing the surrounding Puerto Rican neighborhood” 
(Pristin 2010), having elsewhere referred to their work as “gentlefication” as opposed to 
gentrification (Triff 2005). The claim that there is something about Wynwood that makes 
it possible to avoid displacing residents seems to refer to the way the center of the historic 
Puerto Rican enclave is separated from the warehouse district by 29th Street. In his 
interview with Triff (2005), Goldman explained his notion of “gentlefication.”  
 
Triff: Some people are scared of the bad aspects of gentrification: the 
displacement, the Gaps moving in, the homogeneity. We’re a poor city with a 
nasty history of highway construction policies.266 
Goldman: I think the arts community does need to come together almost as a 
community development group, and we would like to help and participate with 
that. We need a balance between the community vision and what you call the 
“romantic developer” vision. This shared vision needs to be built into the plan. 
I’m talking about a place that has a broad artistic base. Not gentrification, but 
“gentlefication,” which would be a redefinition of the term. I introduced this idea 
to the National Trust [for Historic Preservation], this point of view that as you 
improve the quality of the buildings, you won’t displace the people who have 
roots in the community. They provide sense of color, of diversity given by the 
embedded family. There needs to be a proactive approach with the community, 
because government will respond to what the community thinks it needs. 
 
Although there is a clear emphasis on the need to work with and retain the “arts 
community,” it is not clear whether these are also the people with “roots in the 
community,” the embedded families that provide “color” and “diversity.” Does this 
definition of the community that “government will respond to” also include Wynwood’s 
low-income residents? Goldman’s comment ambiguously conflates references to the 
darker skin color of the original residents and the colors of artists. The equally ambiguous 
concept of “gentlefication,” as with “community,” seems to suggest that displacement is 
                                                 
266 Recall the history of the construction of the interstate highway system (I95, I395, I195) through 
Overtown, Wynwood and Allapattah from Chapter 2. 
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avoided because the Goldmans are not demolishing and rebuilding the neighborhood but 
rather, they argue, enhancing its latent architectural and urban qualities, specifically in 
vacant buildings (former manufacturing warehouses). 
However, such a claim seems to rest on a conceptualization of “direct” as opposed 
to “indirect” displacement (Marcuse 1986; Betancur et al. 1995) and therefore neglects 
the historical nature of exclusionary “pressures” generated by gentrification. Marcuse 
(1986) argued that residents may be displaced directly when landlords’ actions force 
residents to move (e.g., rent increases or building deterioration) and indirectly when low-
income residents are prevented from moving in because of expensive (gentrified) living 
costs or a transformed socio-cultural environment in which they would feel 
marginalized.267 Davidson and Lees (2010, p. 400-401) note that the failure to account for 
exclusionary “pressures” has led many gentrification scholars “who search for the spatial 
moment of displacement [to] contradict themselves,” such as the case they cite of 
Hamnett and Whitelegg (2007, p. 122): “Their arrival [gentrifiers] and the associated 
commercial gentrification have, however, significantly and probably irrevocably changed 
the social mix and ethos of the area which was dominated by social rented housing 
tenants. This [change] has not, however, been accompanied by significant residential 
displacement.”  “They have missed Marcuse,” write Davidson and Lees (2010, p. 401), 
“for what they are describing is Marcuse’s (1985, 1986) ‘displacement pressure’.” I argue 
that so, too, have the Goldmans missed Marcuse. They have not directly displaced 
Wynwood residents as indeed their efforts have focused on re-developing former 
                                                 
267 This applies to residents who already live in another house in the neighborhood as well as potential 
newcomers. In other words, the neighborhood is taken “off the market” for prospective residents with low 
incomes.  
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manufacturing properties. However, by developing an upscale consumption infrastructure 
that contributes to escalating living costs and a transformed social environment in the 
neighborhood, they create “pressures” that exclude low-income residents and also shape 
residents’ thinking about the place where they live. Consider again the example of Marta. 
As hers is one of the few homes in the heart of the art district, along the path of 
the monthly art gallery walk and down the street from Levine’s real estate office and 
Goldman’s new restaurants, Marta is positioned to experience and describe how the 
exclusionary pressures operate. In addition to her experience of losing two neighborhood 
cafeterias and social lounges to rising commercial rents (discussed earlier), Marta 
lamented that “since the galleries arrived, this [area] is madness… the galleries have 
created un revolú.”268 By madness (esa locura) she meant the many indications of a 
broader transformation – how, for example, during the crush of monthly art walks and the 
annual Art Basel festival, “the people [gallery patrons] are so dirty, they leave bottles, 
everything thrown there in front of people’s houses.”  
 
When [the galleries] came over here, all of this happened, to remove bodegas,269 
[and] everything here is now galleries. They’ll [eventually] take this house for a 
gallery. There in front [of my house] a factory was emptied – gallery, everything 
is gallery, gallery, gallery! And when [people] come to the galleries you cannot 
even go out because there is such a huge traffic jam. There is no parking [for us] 
anywhere... Not a person can walk the streets! They get like this (she forms firsts 
with each hand and presses them together at the knuckles) of cars. 
 
                                                 
268 Marta (who is Cuban) routinely uses Puerto Rican sayings, including “revolú,” which refers to 
“revolution” but also to the notion of a mess, disorder or lacking organization. 
 
269 Since bodega refers to a grocery store, restaurant and social lounge, none of these individual terms 
would suffice as a translation. 
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Not surprisingly, although she once visited the gallery two doors down and across 
the street from her house, she asserted that the art “doesn’t matter to me at all, nor do I 
want to see it, because they’re spoiling all of our [things].” As she does not read English, 
she did not understand the ironic message painted on that gallery’s outer wall during the 
last Art Basel festival, which still reads, “remember that u’re not doing it for money.” 
When I translated the message for her into Spanish, she reacted angrily: “How shameless! 
They even brought their cars [over from Europe].” 
 
 
Figure 6.20: Image of Message on the Wall of an Art Gallery that reads, 
“Remember that u’re not doing it for money” 
 
 
Source: Authors photo taken September, 2011. 
 
Marta got increasingly agitated as I asked her how the growth of the art district 
makes her feel. As she responded, she sometimes made repeated, rapid flicks of her wrist 
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through the air (leading with the back of her hand, as if swatting a fly), seeming to wish 
away the subject of our conversation, “that mess,” represented by “all the galleries.” But 
the translation into “mess” does not fully express what Marta meant by her use of the 
word “lio” (perhaps also “revolú” and “locura”) in reference to “all of that” signified by 
the presence of galleries.270 Her reference to “ese lio” indicated her understanding that 
gentrification – albeit not termed this way by Marta – is not just a threat (trouble) but also 
something that one gets embroiled in, as it comprehensively shapes various aspects of 
neighborhood life: property ownership, living costs, the cultural environment, the 
everyday performance of street life, and so on. 
The pressure of real estate speculation has also made her think about her family’s 
role in the neighborhood as homeowners. Marta’s family, who since 1993 has owned 
three neighboring properties,271 was invited to sell several times by investors who walked 
up to the house or left notes in the mail or taped to the front gate. 
                                                 
270 About Midtown, for example, she said: “I like that [project] a little bit more [than the art galleries], but it 
also brought all of this lio.” About the political conflicts between some neighborhood organizations and 
city agencies supportive of development projects, she was dismissive: “I don’t get involved in that lio.” The 
Spanish word “lio” refers to “mess” or “trouble” but also, as a verb, “liar” means to “wrap up,” “involve,” 
“complicate” and “confuse,” making possible its’ use to refer to a problem (un lio) that is encompassing 
and that one can become caught up or enveloped in. 
 
271 The cluster forms an L shape –two of the properties are next to each other while the third is on the next 
block north, directly “behind” Marta’s house. While the third house is owned by Marta’s late sister, her 
mother-in-law bought the other two homes for $14,000 and $17,000 in 1993. By 2007, similarly sized 
homes of varying conditions in Wynwood sold for between $150,000 and $250,000. Marta indicated that 
her mother-in-law had no plans to sell in the near future. Her mother-in-law had purchased the properties 
from the Hungarian woman who was her landlord since the 1970s and who also lived in the back of one of 
the partitioned homes. When the Hungarian woman sold the properties, Marta and her husband were living 
somewhere else in the neighborhood but were asked to move into the newly-empty house next door by 
Marta’s mother-in-law, who felt alone after the Hungarian woman moved away. Eventually, she filled the 
back apartment where the former landlord lived with a Puerto Rican tenant who was friends with her son. 
In 2000, one of Marta’s nephews arrived from Cuba to rent the partitioned one-bedroom apartment in the 
back of the house where she lives with her husband and daughter. Marta and her mother-in-law explained 
that it was important to rent to people they trusted, even though this meant charging less in monthly rent. 
For example, the Cuban nephew who is a limo driver paid Marta about $250 monthly in 2003 and since 
then his rent has increased only in accordance with his income, such that in 2007 he paid $400 for awhile 
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Marta: Now we have these houses and they [would just] demolish and put up a 
building and it’s all over [this life of ours]… They [who offer to buy our house] 
pressure us, because if they’re interested in this little piece they will pressure you. 
[They tell us] that downtown is going to extend all the way over here. Have you 
heard this? This [area] just disappears.  
Marcos: What I have heard is that they changed the rules so that they could build 
more stories. 
Marta: But if I don’t have any money? I only have this [one]-story [house]. Look 
at the condition it’s in. It’s more or less fixed up. But look at how ugly the outside 
is. I can’t afford to fix it. How am I going to build 10 stories if I don’t have 
[enough] for the bottom [one]? 
 
Although not interested in selling her properties, the transformed housing market, 
represented by these “pressures,” made her think in new and different ways. Ideas are 
introduced by speculators, for example, who promote the properties’ profitability in 
relation to downtown expansion; or maybe by myself (or the presence of a new 10-story 
condo tower 2 blocks from Marta’s house), contributing to her understanding (or at least 
articulation) that many of the neighborhood changes, such as high-rise zoning, are not 
beneficial to her. Moreover, in her expression that by selling her home and facilitating the 
ongoing transformation of the built environment, “it’s all over,” she seems to recognize 
that as a homeowner she is an important stakeholder in a way of life. In such ways, then, 
the various impacts felt by residents such as Marta are also more than impacts (i.e., 
unidirectional effects); they envelop residents in new considerations and contribute to 
                                                                                                                                                 
but is now paying only $350 because the economic downturn affected his earnings. His rent included all 
utilities except gas for the oven he rarely uses. This price and arrangement is likely to be similar to the 
kinds of partitioned “efficiency” apartments rented among family and friends in other parts of Wynwood. 
But compared to typical real estate listings in the area (as low as $500), that is, so-called arms-length 
transactions, the Cuban nephews’ rent is very inexpensive, especially for the size of his apartment, which 
included a large bedroom (it used to be the master suite in the house before it was divided), full kitchen 
with a separate dining area, bathroom, and a living room in a converted (enclosed) porch, in addition to the 
back patio connected to the rest of the families’ common space. In 2007, I paid $575 for a smaller studio 
apartment a few blocks away from Marta’s house, not including utilities. 
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new ways of thinking about where they live. The multiplicity of impacts makes for a 
confusing “lio,” one that Marta would rather not get involved in. 
  
Figure 6.21: Image of a New 10-story Condo Loft Building built in 2007 two blocks 
from Marta’s House 
 
 
Source: Photo by author, November, 2010. The new building of live/work lofts, located two 
blocks north of Marta’s house and one block south of the Midtown shopping complex, towers 10 
stories above the typically low-rise structures of Wynwood. 
 
 
Wynwood was produced as a frontier by a collective of political and economic 
actors who also constructed their own identities as pioneers willing to carry out the 
“quick and dirty” (Levine) work of “pushing a neighborhood forward” (Melissa). The 
conception of wealthy developers, collectors, gallerists and even government officials as 
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grassroots activists in the redevelopment of the neighborhood is made possible by the 
Miami Model of art collection. Independent of tradition and government, Miami’s 
powerful collectors have collaborated with real estate developers to remake Wynwood. 
One of the renowned practitioners of the Miami Model, Steven, is also the director of the 
Miami office of a national philanthropic foundation that supports a variety of the artistic 
and cultural projects remaking Wynwood, including large projects such as Primary Flight 
and smaller endeavors such as a poetry collective made up of artists affiliated with the 
former Cornerstone space.  
A similarly networked assemblage of relations, albeit somewhat simpler to 
imagine and diagram, led to the creation of the Midtown complex. In this case, the 
political players involved were relatively fewer because two developers controlled the 
vast capacity to act (resources). “Partnership” was no less essential to the project’s 
approval and development, although in the case of Midtown the partnership was 
primarily between city agencies and the developers. In both cases, complex legal and 
technical changes to planning and zoning policy were necessary to re-regulate (perhaps 
more appropriate than the term, deregulate) parts of the city to facilitate redevelopment. 
In the case of Midtown, more than a decade of “scientific” rationalization combined with 
the patron-client relations of the CBO office and neighborhood-level NGOs provided the 
basis for “community input.” As with the Art District, the “mini city hall” represented by 
the CBO office was also essential to coordinating and implementing the “disciplinary 
normalization” (Foucault 2004, p. 56) of space through public and private policing and 
building code enforcement, in addition to the physical interventions constructed in the 
1990s (see Chapter 4).  
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Taken together, the network of power relations described above spans variegated 
geographies and social groups: the Wynwood Art District Association and its diversity of 
investors, merchants, artists and gallerists; neighborhood associations and nonprofit 
service providers; numerous city agencies; independent, artistic and entrepreneurial 
collectives; private security forces; and not to mention national foundations and 
multinational construction and finance corporations. Residents are also incorporated into 
these arrangements, typically through their relationships with the neighborhood-level 
service agencies which are mobilized and arranged by broader governing arrangements.  
These ad-hoc policing and policymaking arrangements are what some scholars 
refer to as the “post-political” or “post-democratic” ethos of entrepreneurial urban 
governance because of how conflict is foreclosed in favor of processes biased toward 
consensus and accommodation (e.g., Purcell 2008, Swyngedouw 2011). As was evident 
in the case of planning processes that preceded the construction of Midtown, antagonistic 
perspectives are minimized and become less salient when meetings about the future of 
the neighborhood include more future investors and residents than current ones. In the 
case of the Puerto Rican CDC’s shift to artist services, the director could ignore market 
research that found some residents feared gentrification because the research and 
planning itself was a privatized, unaccountable endeavor. Each public funding pool and 
the nonprofit agencies they fund has its own advisory board; any one of them can be 
mobilized in an ad-hoc, policymaking process. It is no wonder that Marta or other 
residents, who may know very little of what actually transpires in such governing 
arrangements (and between whom), views politics as a “lio” that she would rather not get 
enveloped in. This is not to say her social world is free of politics, of course; she is well 
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aware of the exclusionary pressures transforming her social space, and the hypocrisy of 
the contradictions she perceives is both infuriating and alienating.  
To help understand why community politics might alienate residents, the next 
section focuses specifically on an attempt to challenge the governing arrangements that 
produced and facilitated gentrification in Wynwood.  
 
Case 3: The Campaign to Take Back Roberto Clemente Park 
 As developers converted Wynwood’s warehouses into art galleries, the spaces of 
the northern, residential half of the neighborhood either fell into disrepair or closed, such 
as the cafeterias discussed earlier. The most dramatic example is that of Roberto 
Clemente Park Community Center, which in 2001 was slated for major renovations but 
eventually closed in 2004 and nearly succumbed to a terminate infestation that damaged 
nearby homes. Activists from the Social Justice Center (SJC), an organization based 
outside of Wynwood (see Figure 6.22 below), created a campaign to hurry along what 
eventually became a complete reconstruction of the center. Although activists achieved 
their larger objective to re-open the community center, the campaign was marked by the 
discord and divisions among the members of the Coalition to Take Back Roberto 
Clemente Park.  
 In this section I examine this episode of activism in defense of the neighborhood 
in the context of rampant gentrification. The case not only demonstrates how the 
neighborhood’s history of community politics acquiesced to the local state’s development 
interests and weakened the prospects of contesting or mitigating gentrification in 
Wynwood, but also reveals how contemporary social justice organizing interacts with 
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established traditions of community politics, such as those practiced by Puerto Rican 
service organizations. As noted in the introduction, the purpose is not to critique the 
framework or practices of any single organization but to consider how the interaction of 
these organizations shape the political terrain in which gentrification unfolds.   
 
Figure 6.22: Map of the Social Justice Center's location in Liberty City and near 
Wynwood 
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Wynwood’s Community Center: Island of Decay in Seas of Renewal272 
 After Roberto Clemente Park was expanded in 1994 (see Chapter 4), the park 
received only minor upgrades during the next 10 years.273 Although in 2001 the city 
allocated $1.1 million for various renovation projects including the park’s community 
center as part of $255 million county-wide bond package, by 2004 the community center 
was closed because its decaying roof was infested with termites. The allocation of funds 
and implementation of the program was mired in delays, as revealed in the minutes of 
several City Commission and Bond Oversight Board meetings where city commissioners 
vented their frustrations.274 The problem, as some argued in retrospect, was that in the 
rush to get the plan approved by voters,275 “the city didn’t do much research on cost,” 
                                                 
272 Writing about areas of New York and Chicago, Wyly and Hammel’s (1999) article entitled, Islands of 
Decay in Seas of Renewal, charted the reversal of fortunes from the inner city conditions that led Berry 
(1985) to publish Islands of Renewal in Seas of Decay. 
 
273 From the City of Miami’s $28 million share of Miami-Dade County bond funds for parks, Clemente 
Park received a $28,400 “facelift” to resurface basketball courts and replace doors on the community center 
(Herald Staff 1997; Kidwell 1998) and in 2004 a $150,000 “splash park” for children was built (Nahed 
2004). 
 
274 The following remarks by a commissioner, annoyed by the ballooning costs of parks’ projects initiated 
through no-bid contracts, is representative of the discord over the expenditure of the bond funds: “We now 
have $34 million of no-bid contracts given to clients of the same lobbyist that now have $17 million in 
change orders. That’s not appropriate… Where is this money come from [to satisfy the change orders]? It’s 
dipping into the interest earnings from the unspent money and all of that, [which] is drying up because we 
didn’t spend the money within the three-year period and now we’re on yield restriction. So we can’t make 
interest earnings on the unspent money, and what happens? … The building at Roberto Clemente is still 
closed. Two years. Screw up after screw up after screw up. Fix a roof; it's inundated with termites; now 
we've got to build a whole new building. We don't know when we're going to build it, don't know when that 
money's coming back to Roberto Clemente Park. We have a very active park there that our community 
wants to use. It was their community center. It was our CBP office. Our CBP officers [are] working out of 
trailers, but yet, we can increase 8.1 million in no-bid contracts by 15.3 million so that they now total 23.4 
million [for a park and gymnasium in Little Havana].”  (MCC 11/9/2006). 
 
275 According to Corral (2001) and Zeitlin (2008), the City of Miami rushed the bond referendum so that it 
would coincide (on the ballot) with a November runoff election as well as take advantage of the 
“environment of fear.” Approved just after September 11, 2001, the bond package was pitched to voters as 
the “Homeland Defense/Neighborhood Improvement Bond.” The Miami City Mayor Carollo refused to 
endorse the bond program arguing that “it’s extremely deceptive” and “wrong to use the situation we have 
in our country today to try to get these bonds approved” (Corral 2001, p. 1B). 
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according to the chairman of the Bond Oversight Board, while city officials cited 
unforeseen costs such as rapidly rising property prices (Zeitlin 2008). Although the 
oversight board allocated $300,000 to Wynwood in June, 2004, for the renovation of the 
roof, a few months later city inspectors discovered that it was infested with termites and 
closed the building, prompting the need for updated cost estimates and design proposals 
from contractors. Armed with new estimates, in July, 2005, the Bond Advisory Board 
approved an additional $500,000 for the reconstruction of the roof, bringing the total 
funds approved to more than $800,000. While the center remained closed through 2005, 
termites spread to nearby houses.276  When contractors began tearing off the roof in 2006, 
they saw that the termites had spread into the building’s trusses. The community center 
would have to be rebuilt, which would cost at least $1.6 million, twice as much as what 
was originally allocated.277  Services and activities (including the CBP office) previously 
housed in the center were moved into trailers while some recreational activities, such as 
the police baseball league organized by the Puerto Rican Chamber of Commerce, were 
cancelled because of insufficient space as well as the “embarrassment” of the dilapidated 
structure (Boyd-Barrett 2008; Morales 2008). 
 By 2008, an organized response to the park’s deterioration emerged, led by a 
coalition of organizations, most of which are historically Puerto Rican social service 
agencies. The only non-Puerto Rican organization involved, the Latinos Unidos 
Grassroots Organization (LUGO), catalyzed the creation of the activist coalition, as I 
                                                 
276 Interviews with several neighborhood residents and activists and the Clemente Park Manager. 
 
277 A city audit would eventually find that the city’s “due diligence” in previous inspections was 
“inadequate,” concluding that over $200,000 was “needlessly” spent on design plans and preliminary 
repairs (Igwe, Blake and Dobrev 2008). 
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describe below. LUGO was an offshoot of the Social Justice Center (SJC), a community-
based organizing and strategy center founded and based since 1999 in the African-
American neighborhood of Liberty City. Until 2004, the SJC’s work largely focused on 
organizing public housing residents against the neglect and deterioration of their housing, 
for inclusion in public housing redevelopment plans, and against punitive welfare reform 
practices. Organizing public housing residents led to the formation of SJC’s first 
grassroots organization of mostly African-American women active in different housing 
and welfare rights campaigns. The SJC cultivates social justice leaders by offering 
training and political education programs in which members and staff analyze local 
injustices in order to link them to broader theories of gentrification, neoliberalism, white 
supremacy, and others. 
 LUGO grew out of the SJC’s initial work in Wynwood during the summer of 
2005, when organizers canvassed over 300 households to learn about residents’ problems 
and needs. This entry into Wynwood was part of a broader conceptual restructuring of 
SJC to expand its power base beyond Liberty City and form an alliance between 
Blacks278 and Latinos that might better challenge the status quo of urban development. 
According to the SJC executive director, “[W]e wanted to build power in Miami [beyond 
Liberty City], to figure out how we actually build a black-brown, multi-ethnic alliance.”  
Thus, the SJC wanted to get closer to where gentrification was occurring in order to be 
able to resist or at least impact it, also realizing that gentrification would affect their 
traditional organizing base. The SJC director recalled: 
 
                                                 
278 Includes African-Americans as well as Jamaicans, Haitians and others of Afro-Caribbean descent. 
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We had started to already see by 2002, 2003, the bubble, the cranes… the 
gentrification impacts of the building boom. So we had [for years] been biting 
around just… public housing in Liberty City. Even in Liberty City which was 
further out from where the center point of the building boom was, the ideology of 
the boom was moving towards… previously unmarketable areas, [now] being 
targeted for market rate [housing].  
 
 The SJC director emphasized the importance of adopting and articulating a 
broader strategy in order to attempt to match the power of developers and others in the 
urban growth coalition279 who “declared a vision for the city, the county, and the region, 
that was all-encompassing and broad, putting forward a vision for everybody.” As an 
African-American neighborhood, Liberty City is too socially and politically remote to 
impact the broader systems shaping urban revitalization in the City of Miami, where a 
majority of residents are Hispanic. SJC leaders also recognized that Liberty City was 
geographically distant (recall Figure 6.22) from the perceived “center point” of the 
housing boom and therefore would not (by itself) be an effective platform for framing 
alternative ways of thinking about and implementing urban development. However, the 
expansion of SJC’s campaign work into Wynwood was not the only strategic choice 
made to address unequal urban development; it was part of a broader strategy that 
incorporated new tactics beyond base-building, i.e., organizing a base of support among 
residents for a given cause. As the SJC director explained, in contrast to the 
organization’s traditional work in Liberty City in which “you build a base [of support] in 
an area, you have a campaign and then you project… communication about that fight,” 
by 2004 he felt that the organization needed to “have a visionary coalition that speaks to 
                                                 
279 As in other U.S. cities (see Logan and Molotch 1987; Jonas and Wilson 1999), Miami’s pro-growth 
coalition is made up of elected officials and business elites, including those from the finance, real estate, 
tourism and mass media sectors.  
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what progress in the region looks like beyond… your particular neighborhood interests 
[and] beyond where we may or may not have base building.”   
 The SJC thought that residents and organizational leaders in Wynwood might 
make strong allies in campaigns to challenge the status quo of urban development in 
Miami. In contrast to Cuban-Americans, who are generally perceived to be politically 
conservative280 (Portes 2005; Girard and Grenier 2008), particularly compared to the 
SJC's critique of neoliberal urban development, Hispanics in Wynwood were thought to 
be more ideologically compatible with the work of the SJC. 
 
Our sense was that [given] the perceived politics around the Cuban population, 
that Central Americans and Puerto Ricans, Caribbeans, Latinos, would be a much 
better, natural partner with the African-American community to build a 
progressive, working class political block… Wynwood was the area that was 
closest and most well-known… for being a Puerto Rican stronghold, but 
increasingly Central American too. (SJC director)  
 
 
As the former organizing director, Frank, also explained, the organization’s African-
American members were prepared for this transition though the SJC’s political education 
programs, in which “people started saying, ‘Hey, the history of Puerto Ricans, we can 
relate to that. The racism that they ran across, the economic injustices they faced, the 
colonialism of the U.S. in Puerto Rico.’” Frank recalled that once members began 
                                                 
280 Many social justice activists in Miami, such as those at the SJC, perceive the Republican party voting 
patterns and anti-communist exile ideology of many Cuban-Americans as a sign that they are less likely to 
support U.S. social justice movements.  However, Cuban-Americans’ political practice has been more 
complex, such as in the case of the Miami Community Coalition for a Living Wage (Nissen 2000). 
Although advocates of the Miami-Dade County Living Wage Ordinance expected Cuban-American 
Republican politicians to be staunch opponents, these turned out to be not only the most receptive but were 
key sponsors of the successful ordinance. Grenier (1992) previously noted the strength of the Cuban-
American labor movement in Miami and militancy of many of its members. 
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spending time in Wynwood and getting to know residents, the extent of poverty and 
physical disrepair in the area was “revelatory” for members who “started to identify” 
with the hardship of living in such conditions. In addition to cultivating a sense of 
common cause among Blacks and Hispanics, the expansion of the SJC into Wynwood 
after 2003 was part of a larger organizational restructuring that requires elaboration. 
 Between 1998 and 2008 “the Miami area… changed from being relatively 
underdeveloped in terms of social justice activism into a relatively active locale” (Nissen 
2009, p. 163). The SJC is at the forefront of the growth of a “social justice infrastructure” 
in Miami, made up of faith-based groups, neighborhood and labor organizers, unions, 
advocacy organizations and a research institute, among others (Nissen 2004; Nissen and 
Russo 2006; Nissen 2009). In recent years it has spearheaded various coalitions (Gittel, 
Ferman and Price 2007),281 expanded its work beyond neighborhoods to regional 
campaigns, and founded a new organization to carry out state-wide electoral and 
legislative advocacy. The SJC receives more in foundation grants than any other social 
justice organization in Southeast Florida. According to data from the Foundation 
Center,282 the amount of grants the SJC received annually increased from $160,000 in 
                                                 
281 In addition to the Ford Foundation report cited here, which relies on self-reported coalition activities of 
various social justice organizations in Central and South Florida, I have observed and sometimes 
participated in the SJC’s coalitional work during my tenure at the university-based research institute, noted 
in Chapter 5. 
 
282 The Foundation Center, a philanthropic support and research organization (see 
www.foundationcenter.org), produced a database that includes grants of more than $10,000 awarded by the 
1,000 largest national foundations. Only discretionary funding from local community foundations is 
included.  The SJC receives relatively little from local foundations (over 8 years, less than $70,000 in 
numerous small grants, according to annual reports from two Miami-based foundations) and little in private 
donations. 
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2002 to $410,000 in 2005 to nearly $1 million in 2009.283 It had quickly become the 
largest social justice organization in Miami doing community organizing work,284 and 
this growth was transformative. The SJC diversified its strategies and tactics, not just its 
geographic focus, to include media/communications work (or “strategic messaging”), 
coalition building and policy advocacy by 2005. Since then, it has diversified further to 
address and participate in other geographic and political scales of work, such as electoral 
turnout, state-level legislative advocacy and national networks of social justice action. 
Examining the nature of this different work is beyond the scope of this research. But I 
draw on the context of the organization’s transformation to understand the implications of 
these multiple scales and dimensions of political work on community politics in 
Wynwood. The beginning of this expansion and transformation is the context in which 
the SJC entered Wynwood, formed the grassroots organization LUGO, and participated 
in the campaign to “save” Roberto Clemente Park, from 2005 to 2008. Further 
organizational transformations during the 2008-2009 period shifted the SJC’s campaign 
work away from Wynwood (and from other neighborhood-based campaigns, to a large 
extent), as I will discuss below. 
 One way in which the SJC’s work expanded beyond specific neighborhood cases 
at the same time as it entered Wynwood was to implement a regional communications 
campaign (the “air war,” as the SJC have described it) to publicize the negative impacts 
                                                 
283 This is not the same as their annual operating budget. The awards reported by the Foundation Center are 
spread over several years and sometimes divided among several organizations working within a coalition or 
on a campaign led by the SJC. 
 
284 The social justice organization doing similar work (community organizing/base-building) that was 
funded at comparable levels until the FBAC (discussed in Chapter 5) with a budget of more than $400,000 
in 2006. However, with the departure of its’ director the FBAC struggled to raise funds during the 2007-
2009 period and has not fully recovered as of this writing, according to its’ former staff who stay abreast of 
the FBAC progress. 
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of gentrification. To this end, in 2005 the SJC launched the campaign, Regional Equity 
for Neighborhoods and Tenants (RENT), which included town hall meetings in African-
American, Haitian and Latino neighborhoods (including Wynwood), press conferences 
and other events to draw media attention (Jeffers 2005; Sohn 2005; Vasquez 2005), and 
the presence of SJC staff and members at key public policy hearings to speak out against 
gentrification. SJC also created and sold posters and T-shirts with the RENT logo and the 
message, “Gentrification Stops Here,” in English, Spanish and Haitian creole. 
  
 
Figure 6.23: Image of the Social Justice Center’s Anti-Gentrification Poster 
 
Source: Authors photo of the SJC’s poster which reads, in three languages, “Gentrification Stops 
Here!” The same image was used for T-shirts and flyers. 
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 The SJC staff organizers spent the second half of 2005 and most of 2006 
recruiting Wynwood residents and integrating them into existing campaigns, including 
RENT and other campaigns related to the mismanagement of public housing funds 
discussed in Chapter 5. In 2006 they formed the Wynwood Anti-Gentrification 
committee, which carried out protests in Wynwood linked to the broader campaigns of 
the SJC. That September, for example, as part of the SJC’s countywide “fill the 
vacancies” campaign, Wynwood residents and SJC organizers rallied in front of a public 
housing structure that had been shuttered for several years because of physical disrepair. 
They hung a banner that read “Housing Now” from the fence enclosing the housing 
project, located half a block from the rising Midtown complex. The first public mention 
of the new grassroots organization, LUGO, came in the announcement of a second 
protest in front of the same housing project January of 2007 (Phelan 2007). 
In September of 2007 the SJC announced it was launching a campaign to renovate 
and re-open the Clemente Park Community Center. The SJC executive director explained 
why the organization made the community center, and not Midtown, its major campaign 
in Wynwood: 
 
We had considered… the biggest glaring thing to take on was Midtown. But we 
didn’t feel like at that time that we had the established base or… the coalition 
relationships to be able to take on… a huge power in Midtown. We went back and 
forth about it a lot. I still think, should we have just taken a few people and taken 
it on? [Given] such a big fight for that neighborhood, we didn’t feel that we had 
been established enough to be able to [be] the leading voice of that fight. So we 
did the [more modest] work and kept building the relationships… with them 
[Puerto Rican service organizations] and other people to try [and] take on smaller 
things… We can start preserving the neighborhood and cultural institutions that 
are anchors for the existing community, [such as] Roberto Clemente Park… If we 
do that well, then we can earn our keep… as neighborhood champions, rather 
than… landing in Wynwood to fight [Mayor] Manny Diaz on Midtown. 
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 Frank, SJC’S former organizing director, raised another point. Building alliances 
within the neighborhood was crucial to organizer’s work in Wynwood, he said. “Let us 
build it on this smaller scale [because] if difference is going to come up, let that 
difference arise before we get in over our heads.”  Moreover, the choice to address the 
community center may have been unavoidable because of the nature of the problem. By 
the time LUGO decided to take on the park campaign, it was an issue that many different 
groups were affected by or cared about and could be united around. It was also too 
obvious to ignore. 
 
Figure 6.24: Image of the Clemente Park Community Center, Condemned and 
Closed, with Midtown Condo Building in the Background 
 
 
Source: Photo taken by the SJC in May, 2008, posted on their photo sharing website. 
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During the last months of 2007, SJC and LUGO collected more than 1,000 
signatures to petition the city district commissioner to expedite the reconstruction of the 
community center as well as agree to a list of other “community benefits” from the 
project, such as local hiring and additional amenities. SJC organizers convened 
neighborhood meetings to generate support and publicize their actions. In December, 
2007, they requested the participation of the city commissioner in a “community 
accountability” meeting held at the Wynwood Baptist Church.285  About 40 people 
attended, including six LUGO resident-leaders.286 Teresa, an SJC organizer, explained to 
residents the list of “demands”287 that were being presented to the city commissioner and 
placed the neglect of the park in the context of “fighting against gentrification.” 
“Everyone is trying to sell Wynwood as the next thing for the artists,” she asserted. “But 
what about the needs of the people that already live here?” As the city commissioner 
arrived (late) with two assistants and settled into the back row of wooden church pews, he 
was given headphones and a receiver by an SJC volunteer to listen to the translation she 
provided in English. A few residents stood to speak but rather than address the park’s 
problems or the activists’ demands, they began a polarized debate about the Midtown 
                                                 
285 The SJC never found strong allies in the neighborhood Churches. Noted in a previous chapter, the 
Catholic church did not oppose them but neither did priests actively support LUGO. The same was true for 
other churches, including the Baptist church, other than offering the building for a neighborhood meeting 
on this particular occasion.  
 
286 I assisted with translation for the mostly Spanish-speaking audience. 
 
287 The demands included, as written: (1) A community led process with public meetings that allow for 
community participation in decisions including the following: facility design, programs for youth and 
adults, community space, environmentally sustainable development; (2) expedite the construction process; 
(3) ensure local residents are given opportunity for job training and placement on this project; (4) continue 
to meet with LUGO after the February 9th Town Hall to address concerns regarding gentrification; (5) 
ensure immediate and long term funding for the Community Center and explore funding options from 
moneys generated from Midtown Miami. 
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project (see also previous cases in this chapter).288  Moments later the commissioner took 
the stage and was presented the list of demands through the translation equipment. 
Ignoring Teresa’s instructions to respond “yes or no” to the demands, the commissioner 
abruptly removed the headphones and scolded the activists for their tactics. “Where I 
come from in Brooklyn, good manners say that you don’t make demands, we make 
requests.”289 Noting that he “could have easily approved a cheaply built [center] but I 
wanted to give you a community center deserving of Roberto Clemente Park,” he 
explained that he was looking for an additional $1.2 million. “Now I am prepared to 
answer your questions.” Ultimately, the commissioner seemed to agree to most of what 
the activists wanted.290  Over the next few months the SJC and LUGO attended city 
agency meetings and convened other reunions in the neighborhood to try to shape the 
final plans for the new center. 
But in March 2008, the SJC and LUGO decided to create a coalition and escalate 
their protests when they realized that the requests of neighborhood residents and 
                                                 
288 A man spoke about the “hypocrisy” of the “politicians and investors” who “offered pretty designs” in 
the Midtown project “but now they’re building a parking lot.” (Midtown amounted to more than a parking 
lot. He may have perceived it this way because he did not care for any of the rest.) He concluded that “if 
you don’t vote, you don’t have the right to benefit.”  The Puerto Rican leader of the neighborhood 
homeowner association (even though she did not currently live in the neighborhood) listed several critiques 
of the Midtown project in a brief, carefully thought out statement. “They gerrymandered the political 
districts [to build Midtown] and they’re not fulfilling promises. They don’t hire local people in Midtown. 
Meanwhile, our costs are rising.” Hector, whose views were discussed in Chapter X, argued in favor of 
Midtown: “Just because Midtown comes doesn’t mean it’s going to give [specific] things to the 
community. It brings generally good things to the community.” 
 
289 His translator’s Spanish version of the message was, “it’s very important to have dialog.” 
 
290 “Of course the community should participate in the conception of the new Community Center.”  
Regarding the timeline for reconstruction, the commissioner retorted that “this is not a yes or no demand. It 
will take between 24 and 30 months to complete the whole process,” adding that he would expedite it as 
much as possible. Regarding local and minority hiring, the commissioner argued, “I can't legally require 
contractors to hire particular people. I can make a request of contractors to hire from the neighborhood and 
usually with city contracts they are willing to do this request.” 
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organizations were largely ignored by city officials. During a meeting organized by city 
officials at the De Hostos Neighborhood Center, residents and representatives of several 
neighborhood service organizations packed a conference room to express what they 
would like to see at the park: a library, pool, gymnasium, improvements to the baseball 
field and some kind of museum or memorial to Roberto Clemente (Boyd-Barrett 2008). 
But toward the end of the meeting they learned that they were providing input to a plan 
that would not change. Instead of finding more money, the city had reduced the size of 
the proposed community center by 3,000 square feet (Boyd-Barrett 2008; Zeitlin 
2008b).291 The SJC announced its opposition to the city plan in a March 21st letter to the 
editor of El Nuevo Herald (LUGO 2008). “The community should decide what type of 
facility it wishes to see built,” read the letter. “The city is making excuses to not provide 
more funding to the community while focusing the money in projects292 that hurt the 
community” (Ibid). 
As a new organization in the neighborhood, the SJC joined forces with existing 
neighborhood organizations in order to increase pressure on city officials. Faced with 
intransigent city officials who refused to seek additional funding or redesign the project, 
various neighborhood organizations were motivated to join the coalition. The most 
important of these was a Puerto Rican-led educational services organization (PRES, 
                                                 
291 At a March meeting, city officials told residents and activists that they had increased the centers’ size to 
accommodate a “reading room” to serve as a library. But this was done by eliminating the plans for a 
gymnasium. It seemed to activists that city officials had substituted the library request for a gymnasium 
because the former was cheaper. 
 
292 The letter refers to $619 million in city and county subsidies for a new baseball stadium for the Florida 
Marlins, arguing that the project benefits developers and “well-off people” but not low-income city 
residents (LUGO 2008). 
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hereafter).293 The history of PRES in the neighborhood since 1982 facilitated the 
incorporation of other service organizations. In addition to the SJC and PRES, the 
Coalition Recupera Tu Parque Roberto Clemente (“Recover Your Park”) included 
several Puerto Rican service organizations – the Puerto Rican Chamber of Commerce, 
the Puerto Rican Child Care (PRCC) organization and the De Hostos Senior Center. 
Members included Orlando, a Puerto Rican long-time resident who ran the park’s softball 
league, and Miriam, a Puerto Rican commissioner of a wealthy municipality in 
northeastern Miami-Dade County. These organizations and individuals shared a desire to 
help the neighborhood and protect an important Puerto Rican symbol in Miami. 
Furthermore, PRES’ and the Senior Centers’ interest in expanding services at the new 
center were also likely related to the threat of their own displacement from the nearby De 
Hostos Center. By 2008, half of this neighborhood center had been vacated and closed 
because of disrepair and was slated for major renovations (as of this writing, the designs 
have been finalized but funding for reconstruction is still unavailable). The PRES director 
recruited Miriam to the coalition because she was a graduate of the PRES program. 
Meanwhile, the Chamber’s director was involved in the park’s baseball programs with 
Orlando.  
 Although the SJC-written vision statement that was approved by other 
organizations emphasized the role of gentrification, coalition members avoided rhetoric 
that they thought was too radical or militant throughout the process of meeting, planning 
and carrying out public actions. The April 2008 vision statement stated: 
                                                 
293 PRES is a well-known, national educational services organizations (e.g., tutoring, school clubs, dropout 
prevention) formed by Puerto Rican activists in New York and Puerto Rico in the 1970s.   
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We are fighting to ensure that the community is controlled by those who live in it. 
We believe it is those most affected by gentrification who can see the best ways to 
fight these system and should lead the way.  Furthermore, we believe it is critical 
for those most affected to unite with other sectors in the fight for self-
determination and progressive development in our communities. 
 
Gentrification and fighting the system were never specifically mentioned in the two 
coalition meetings I attended (out of four that were scheduled). As I discuss below, 
disagreements over messaging were a common source of friction between coalition 
members. An invitation for a May press conference, only a month after the previous 
communication mentioning gentrification and “the system,” focused on the 
neighborhood’s share of public investments: 
 
We have been waiting for the reconstruction of the Dorothy Quintana Community 
Center for over three years now. The City of Miami recently approved a plan to 
spend billions of dollars to construct, among other things, a new stadium for the 
Marlins, a Port Tunnel, and a Streetcar that will run through downtown and to 
Midtown. Now, the Recover YOUR Roberto Clemente Park Coalition has come 
together to present a petition to City officials voicing the concerns and hopes of 
the neighborhood for a Community Center and a park that will honor the legacy 
of Roberto Clemente. 
 
Press coverage of the event repeated similar statements from different 
participants, including the SJC staff and LUGO members. But the coalition fragmented in 
the three months following the press conference. Some coalition members had been 
invited to a series of meetings with the City Mayor’s staff and other city officials to 
reconsider the reconstruction plan. Specifically, the SJC was not invited to a key final 
meeting in August. But the SJC organizers showed up anyway, arriving without their 
resident members. They were not allowed in the meeting room at City Hall where most of 
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the neighborhood’s major Puerto Rican organizational stakeholders were already inside. 
According to Teresa, one of the organizers: 
 
Frank and I went representing LUGO. That day we did not take any of our 
members with us because, to cap it all, Leticia got sick, Denise had to work. It 
was really a bad day to bring members because nobody could make it. However, 
[we] went to the meeting and when we arrived, Paul [the PRES director] totally 
denied us entry. 
 
She went on to explain that the PRES director’s justification for not letting them in to the 
meeting was because it was “for community members only.” The three were standing in 
the partially open doorway of the meeting room. Then, Teresa said, “Frank got crazy.”  
 
He even told them they were going to die, basically. He said everything. He called 
Paul a traitor. So after that impression, I imagine they viewed us as crazy, no? But 
that’s Frank’s style and I think it was fair because he was super angry because 
they were throwing away all of my work and they appropriated it [for 
themselves]. 
 
Later, Frank reflected that the problem was “not only political difference and whose side 
you’re on, but there’s a question of process.” “We potentially could have some allies, 
tactical allies, who have differences with us [but] we had a dialog [and] we had 
understandings [with PRES].” He reasoned that “there was obviously conversations 
going on prior to that [between the Mayor’s office and the PRES director] to get him [the 
PRES director] at the table, that we weren’t privy to, and he was at the final table.” One 
of the people in the conference room during the August meeting was a PRES 
administrator who felt that the conflict in the coalition stemmed from the SJC’s 
“approach.” When I interviewed her in 2010 she reflected: 
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With the whole thing with Roberto Clemente Park, we were trying to work 
together with [LUGO] and… I’m not sure [about] the incident that happened but 
there was an incident between Paul and… ummm, LUGO and so we don’t work 
with them in that capacity anymore. It’s related to their approach… there’s a time 
and place for everything and you can be militant or progressive or whatever you 
want to call it when the time calls for it. And then there is also – especially when 
you are part of an organization like ours –[a] politically correct approach that you 
have to take. And so they weren’t, from my understanding, as willing to work 
with us and understand that perspective. And they disrespected Paul in a very 
public form. 
  
A few days after the fateful August meeting, the SJC and LUGO members held a 
protest in the park. About 20 people spread around the basketball courts with large signs 
that read “no dirty deals,” “community process,” “clean play” and a quote from Roberto 
Clemente: “I always try to lead the clean life.”  Unlike previous events that were covered 
by The Miami Herald, the only reporters on the scene were from Spanish-language 
television. In September, as the center was being demolished, the SJC sent an email 
update to supporters reporting that “community demands for the park have not been met” 
and lamenting the “hard lessons” learned after “the head of PRES struck a backroom deal 
with the politicians and claimed to represent the community that [was] locked out of the 
meeting.” 
Later, the SJC and LUGO organizers attended or, as they put it, “crashed the 
party” of the official groundbreaking ceremony. They had not been invited nor did they 
appear in the official photo of city leaders and the directors of Puerto Rican service 
organizations holding shovels against the dirt.294 Eliza, a neighborhood resident and 
former LUGO member who attended the press conference, recalled that a Cuban-
                                                 
294 They did not appear on the photo shown in news stories or on the city website, but they did take their 
own photos holding shovels to the dirt, as city officials looked on. 
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American city commissioner from the district representing Little Havana “asked Teresa 
[the SJC organizer] why she was involved when in reality she didn’t belong there,” to 
which Teresa apparently responded that she was helping the neighborhood. Regardless of 
how accurately Eliza remembered the exchange between Teresa and the Little Havana 
commissioner, such stories (recall also Hector, Sandra and Gema) reveal how residents 
are attuned to the fluidity of the construct of “belonging” and its manipulation during 
specific conflicts in order to include and exclude people.  
City officials announced that the new center would cost $1.8 million (up from the 
previous $1.2 million allocated), include a large multi-purpose room (“a social hall for 
community and family functions”), a children’s play area, a computer lab, an arts and 
crafts room, and a fitness center. Paul, the PRES director, said, “We want it to be more 
than just a recreation building. It should have services for the elderly and a child-care 
program” (Morales 2008, p. NW13). At that time, and still as of this writing, there are no 
public records or any other evidence indicating that the coalition organizations that 
provide some of these services will be granted office space in the new center.295  
 The final weeks of that summer, when PRES seemed to break ranks with the SJC, 
clearly indicates there had been tensions within the coalition during the previous months. 
Pedro, a former LUGO member and Puerto Rican resident of Wynwood, noticed that 
during the coalition process LUGO and PRES seemed to be “at war with each other.” 
 
There were many battles [between them]. Some people would talk [negatively] 
about the SJC, other talked about PRES. Instead of everyone together hammering 
the commissioners - no, some went through this door and others went through 
                                                 
295 There was no mention of these services or any other specific programming during the public hearings in 
which the cost increases and design specifications were approved, nor in any of the supporting documents.  
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another door. What they had was an internal fight to say, ‘Oh, they did that 
[community center] because of me!’ And I think whoever does that, does a 
disservice to the neighborhood. 
 
Miriam, one of the original coalition members, stopped participating when her advice “on 
how to word communications both verbally and in writing… was not heard.” She 
reflected on the coalition experience: 
 
The group [SJC] was well organized in terms of that representation, but we were 
not very well organized in terms of message. There appeared to be a struggle from 
the get-go…  What I remember most was discord over messaging… There also 
appeared to be a power struggle as to who was in charge, and that is never good in 
a “coalition.” 
 
Former LUGO members agreed with the SJC’s interpretation that they had been 
betrayed by PRES, which, according to some, sought all along to take credit for the 
coalition’s work. Eliza,296 for example, who was involved in some coalition meetings and 
“would go with the big signs to protest,” opined that “after [the campaign was over] it 
appears like the ones who fixed all that was PRES when in reality it was… LUGO that 
called all the people and asked PRES to help out.” Sandra, a former LUGO member who 
lives across from the park, was explaining “the tensions” she noticed between PRES and 
LUGO when her sister, Gema, interrupted: “Those were two rabid dogs!” “Yeah, it was 
kind of a big tension there,” acknowledged Sandra, reluctantly. “Because to be honest, 
LUGO came up with the idea about the park. We – Teresa, walked through the 
neighborhood, she got people walking, signing the petition.”297 
                                                 
296 As I will discuss below, Eliza eventually chose to disassociate herself from LUGO. 
 
297 Mauricio, an elderly, Costa Rican immigrant and current LUGO member, explained what happened in 
one of the early coalition meetings in his typically polite style. “That was when people got upset [with 
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Despite the discord, coalition members I spoke with thought that the outcome of 
the community center was a worthy improvement, even if the final project did not 
incorporate everything that the coalition asked for.298 After several change orders, the 
center’s cost increased from the original $1.2 allocated to $1.8 million in 2009, then to 
$2.9 million in 2010. Paul, the PRES director, hoped that Art District developers would 
contribute to the cost of the community center project (Morales 2008b),299 but the extra 
funding came from the Obama administration’s first stimulus package (City of Miami 
11/28/2008). When it was finally built in 2010, the new center included a reading room, 
an exercise room with treadmills and weight machines, a computer lab, a large multi-
purpose room, and offices for the park manager and other city employees. The front 
lounge has two large display cases sparsely populated with Roberto Clemente 
memorabilia. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Paul]. That is when a lady told him a bunch of things, and he got upset, too. But they told him the truth. 
Because he had not lifted a finger to create all this and now he was trying to own everything. That wasn’t 
fair because people had done a lot of work to accomplish [the coalition]. But he didn’t like it [so] he left 
and said, ‘ok, I’m not needed here.’ Later he came back but that time it was not that we had to do 
everything he said.” Other current LUGO members had similar perspectives, such as that of Wilma, who 
recalled that at the meeting “with the old people and the government… they called PRES but not us,” 
adding that PRES got credit in newspaper articles for coalition work that LUGO had actually carried out. 
 
298 Those who acknowledged that the park lacks a pool, indoor gymnasium, library and other things that 
were requested by residents, also expressed views akin to, “you can’t have everything you ask for.” Some 
residents I spoke with are not happy about new fees to use the fitness room, the application of which 
appears to be a trend at other parks in low-income neighborhoods amidst the city’s growing budget deficit 
(Sanchez 2010). A few others have complained that there is not enough parking. The City issues a waiver 
so that the new center could be built with 11 less parking spaces than required by its’ zoning code (City of 
Miami 11/13/2008). 
 
299 The City of Miami had enough funding from the Neighborhood Improvement Bonds to finance the 
demolition but a shortfall delayed construction until April, 2009, several months after it was demolished 
(City of Miami 4/29/2009). Since during the summer of 2008 Goldman had promised to contribute funding 
“to the community” north of 29th street in exchange for passage of the Café District ordinance, the head of 
PRES mentioned this at the groundbreaking ceremony as the reason why Goldman should help finance the 
shortfall for the new center’s reconstruction (Morales 2008b). 
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At the grand opening of the community center in October, 2010, the SJC claimed 
the reconstruction as a victory.300 Wearing their typical yellow T-shirts, LUGO members 
stood silently throughout the press conference and held up large signs that read, “Justice 
for Wynwood.” It was fitting that these messages were written on the back of SJC posters 
leftover from the 2005 RENT campaign, emblazoned with the message, “Gentrification 
Stops Here,” as if to not only “reclaim” the community center (as they wrote in their 
press release) but to also reclaim the rhetoric that was compromised in the work of the 
coalition. LUGO members told El Nuevo Herald (the only press at the opening), “we’re 
here because we’ve been in this struggle for five years” (Sanchez 2010a). 
The coalition was vulnerable to breaking apart or, at least, breaking away from 
the SJC for several reasons, reflected in the aforementioned tensions over messaging. The 
Puerto Rican service organizations were funded by the government whose plans they 
opposed. This made them more willing to negotiate and compromise with the Mayor’s 
office. These organizations also had a stake in the new center’s office space. As noted 
earlier, the De Hostos Center is slated for major renovations,301 which will displace its 
current service organization tenants. The Senior Center and its’ lunch program has been 
assured temporary space at the new center during these renovations, but there is no 
indication that PRES, which occupied the most office space in the De Hostos building, 
                                                 
300 In the official communication of the event via their website on October 28, 2010, the SJC wrote that, 
“Now, 3 years later, Roberto Clemente Park is once again the heart of Wynwood. We won a community 
center, with computer lab, fitness center, and afterschool program and a ballroom.” 
 
301 Half of the De Hostos Center is closed because of structural deterioration. As I learned at a January 2011 
neighborhood meeting, the City of Miami has yet to allocate funding for the demolition and reconstruction 
but the reconstruction plan and designs for the new neighborhood center are complete. The shell of the old 
building will be preserved but the interior will be rebuilt into office space for the service agencies that now 
operate there. A third floor will be added to the current two-story design in order to incorporate a library, 
something which the Coalition to Save Clemente Park had asked for. 
319 
 
will be accommodated in the newly built community center.302 Although the SJC 
suspects that PRES and PRCC may have been promised office space during private 
meetings, it remains to be seen whether the allegedly promised concessions are actually 
given.  
Unlike previous decades, during the 2000s there were no leaders clamoring for 
attention in Wynwood. The Puerto Rican service organizations had long become 
accustomed to conventional avenues of negotiating for funding, largely limited to 
lobbying at City or County Hall. During the 1980s and 90s, the Catholic Church revived 
the art of protest in Wynwood under the influence of the FBAC, and sometimes built 
alliances with service organizations to attain neighborhood objectives (e.g., the Save Our 
School campaign). But by the 2000s, at the height of the housing boom, the faith-based 
protest activity largely receded from Wynwood and, as I discussed earlier, the FBAC in 
general found it increasingly difficult to win concessions from government during this 
period. Therefore, the Puerto Rican service organizations in Wynwood needed a new 
organization like the SJC to generate the protest activity that might compel a greater  
response from public officials. 
For the service organizations, getting back to the negotiating table was all that 
they wanted, as this resumed the conventional politics of community-based service 
funding that had broken down under the pressure of a development boom that consumed 
the city’s administration. As discussed earlier, during the early 2000s, the CBP office had 
become a sort of “community outreach” extension of developers. CBP office 
                                                 
302 There are no records, such as in memorandums between city agencies, minutes of city hall meetings or 
legislative actions that indicate which services and organizations may use the new center’s office space. 
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administrators devoted increasing time and energy to facilitating the growth and 
operation of the Art District. Community-based policing itself was transformed under the 
influence of the Midtown developers, as years of “serving” and “protecting” could be 
leveraged into political support for the new development project. In the terms of urban 
scholars, in this moment Wynwood experienced “the fundamental difference between a 
politics of income redistribution and a politics of growth” (Hall and Hubbard 1996, p. 
153-174). The prolonged closure of the park’s community center confirmed and reflected 
these transformations. Notably, service organizations were doing nothing to change this, 
even though some may have been frustrated by the situation. The director of PRES, 
considered by some colleagues a militant and outspoken leader,303 never spoke at the city 
commission meetings or other public hearings about the condition of the community 
center until 2008, when he partnered with the SJC. The Chamber president asked for 
updates on the project in his role on the Neighborhood Improvement Bond advisory 
board. But not until the SJC mobilized residents to speak out during town hall meetings 
did any of the service organizations publicly express their own disappointment, creating 
the conditions for an alliance. Even though the objectives of the coalition were expressed 
in terms of tangible outcomes for the community center, in practice the resumption of 
negotiation between Puerto Rican organizations and city officials seemed to end the 
collaboration between the SJC and the other coalition members. 
                                                 
303 For example, the Carlos Jr. who was assistant director of PRES programs in Wynwood, referred to Paul 
as the “bad cop” in their lobbying partnership. “It was the whole good cop, bad cop thing. He’d be the bad 
cop and I’d come in and be the good cop and do the negotiating kinds of things and get programs for the 
kids or get the city to understand that you can’t walk all over Wynwood and not expect people to call you 
on it.” He went on to point out that Paul “was part of the young lords movement back in Rochester, New 
York… from the early 60s [when] you had to confront people in order to get things done.” Nevertheless, he 
explained that because “the circumstances have changed and… the people in power also understand that 
[they] just can’t keep neglecting the neighborhood,” militant tactics are no longer the most appropriate or 
effective for working with government.   
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It is not clear if and when the service organizations would have been invited to 
negotiate the terms of the community center reconstruction; or, even, if and when the 
community center would have been rebuilt without the pressure generated by the SJC. 
Moreover, the pressure created by the SJC may not have been limited to the 
mobilizations and protest in Wynwood. The City of Miami preferred not to deal with the 
SJC for other reasons. During the 2000s, the SJC had challenged the Mayor’s 
administration on many issues and the summer 2008 negotiations over the community 
center coincided with the SJC’s involvement and leadership in new national alliances of 
activists and major protests against the Diaz administration. The broader context requires 
some elaboration, as the SJC’s involvement in more radical protest activities, 
independent of the coalition, became a source of friction within the coalition. 
During the winter of 2007-2008 the SJC helped create a national alliance of social 
justice organizations known as the Right to the City Alliance (RTTC) to advocate and 
lobby for specific national urban policies as well as support the city- or neighborhood-
specific campaigns of its member organizations. A regional sub-section of the alliance 
was created to represent South Florida, comprised of the SJC and two other South Florida 
social justice organizations. The creation of the national RTTC has been written about 
elsewhere (Goldberg 2008; Gladora 2009; Horlitz and Vogelpohl 2009), but some key 
aspects are relevant to understanding the processes of gentrification in Wynwood. 
The formation of the RTTC represents a shift in urban social justice organizations 
that once exclusively addressed neighborhood problems toward multi-dimensional social 
movements that are rooted in, but “transcend the local” (DeFilippis, Fisher and Shragge 
2009, p. 40), including building alliances between organizations or constituencies at 
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various political and geographic scales. The basis for this shift lies in the critique that 
urban social justice movements were not “scaling” their work to match the forces they 
were confronting: “Unlike the fiscal system [supporting unequal urban development], the 
urban and peri-urban social movements of opposition, of which there are many around 
the world, are not tightly coupled; indeed most have no connection to each other” 
(Harvey 2008, p. 37). The last decade has seen a trend among social justice activists 
toward the construction of social justice alliances across neighborhoods, cities, regions, 
states and even countries (Goldberg 2008; Smith and Guarnizo 2009; Sugranyes and 
Mathivet 2010). The RTTC is an example of the “coupling” of diverse social justice 
organizations with the aim of transforming urban development systems within the United 
States.  The RTTC leaders describe it as “a national movement for urban justice, human 
rights and democracy,” which, “in the process [is] building new ways to work and 
organize,” including “new ways to build reciprocal knowledge and common cause 
between locally based organizations and networks” (RTTC Funder’s Guide 2008, pp. 3-
4). The alliance is organized flexibly to address a variety of injustices at different 
geographic and political scales, from state education policies to national housing policy 
to local and regional issues. Flexibility is facilitated by a network structure as opposed to 
a more rigid single organization or coalition. The RTTC created regional and national 
working groups, and specialty groups to address specific injustices across different 
locations, such as environmental degradation or disaster recovery. One of the RTTC’s 
first major coordinated actions was a “March on the Mayors Conference” in Miami, 
which took place the same summer of the community center reconstruction negotiations 
at City Hall. 
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Miami hosted the U.S. Conference of Mayors in June 2008, months before the 
leadership of this institution would be passed to Miami Mayor, Manny Diaz. The 
Mayors’ Conference is not only an annual meeting but a national lobbying organization 
for urban policymakers. Therefore, the conference was also seen as an opportunity for 
activists from Miami and elsewhere to publicize their policy demands on the streets and 
mobilize neighborhood residents around a variety of urban policy issues. The RTTC held 
its own two-week long conference, dubbed the People’s State of the City Conference, at 
the downtown campus of Miami-Dade College. It was attended by more than 30 activist 
organizations from across the country whose leaders organized various planning 
meetings, festivities and a “people’s summit” made up of educational workshops for 
members and supporters about why a national alliance was needed and what policy 
reforms it sought. The conference culminated in a protest march, fashioned as a “New 
Orleans Jazz Funeral March,” from the edge of a controversial redevelopment project in 
Overtown to the hotel where the Mayor’s Conference was taking place (Hargot and 
Torter 2008; Wakefield 2008). More than 300 protestors from organizations representing 
seven urban regions (San Francisco, Washington D.C., Los Angeles, New Orleans, New 
York, Boston/Providence and Miami) marched for an hour in the rain, under the shelter 
of black umbrellas that read, “Take Back the City.” Protestors also carried cardboard 
funeral boxes and 6-foot tall skeletons inscribed with the names of different urban 
problems, such as “privatization,” “gentrification,” “deportations,” “police harassment,” 
“racism,” and so on – props which symbolized activists’ desire to end these urban 
injustices. 
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Figure 6.25: Image of Protests Convening in Front of the Mayors Hotel during the 
“March on the Mayors Conference” 
 
Source: Photo from June 2008, courtesy of Carlos Miller’s (2008) online article available at: 
http://www.pixiq.com/article/march-on-the-mayors-protest-proceeds-through-downpour  
 
 
 
The SJC’s lead role in both the RTTC and the 2008 “March on the Mayors” 
clearly identified them as opponents of the Miami Mayor’s urban policies at the same 
period that the Coalition to Recover Clemente Park was beginning to negotiate 
concessions with the Mayor’s office.  Their opposition in 2008 was not the first time the 
SJC had challenged the Miami Mayor (e.g., the 2005 RENT campaign). However, the 
SJC’s leadership role in the RTTC protests, in addition to the prior oppositional 
campaigns, may have made the Mayor’s office even more reluctant to deal directly with 
it. The SJC director argued that what the city gained from the “backroom deals” 
negotiated with PRES “was not having to deal with us.”  Moreover, the SJC’s 
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autonomous work during the summer of 2008 increased frictions within the fragile 
coalition,304 although SJC staff members do not believe that it caused the coalition’s 
fragmentation. The other organizations’ disapproval of the SJC’s autonomous work305 
merely reflected and confirmed the fragility of the coalition rooted in ideological and 
political differences. The service-providing organizations funded by local government 
were apparently more willing to compromise on the coalition’s broader objectives in 
order to meet the needs of their individual organizations. 
 
Neighborhood Organizing as part of Social Movement-Building 
The case of the coalition to re-open the community center revealed the challenges 
not only of organizing in relatively new terrain, i.e., Wynwood for the SJC, but also 
highlighted the challenge of building alliances in Wynwood within a social movement-
building project that integrates neighborhood organizing as one of a diverse array of 
strategies implemented across different geopolitical scales. As the SJC’s then-lead 
organizer, Frank, explained, “we believe that we will not achieve the power we need to 
bring out about the fundamental changes that are necessary unless alliance building is a 
fundamental part of our strategy,” adding that it was therefore crucial to learn lessons 
                                                 
304 In response to my question about the coincidence of coalition work and RTTC protests, the SJC director 
noted that compromise within the coalition became “tricky.” “Compromise gets tricky because the coalition 
doesn’t want you to do your own autonomous work and wants you to compromise in the coalitions work. 
So we both built the coalition… staffed it, respected its consensus. Did the work for it, succumbed to what 
it was willing to agree to even if we didn’t agree, but they also then didn’t want us to do our own work. 
Because they didn’t want us to increase our relative power within the coalition or to have our own work 
impact them in the coalition. And so I think that’s where we had to insist, we will respect you in the 
coalition but we have the right to continue to have our own voice, our autonomy, et cetera.” 
 
305 Another segment of the SJC’s autonomous work was the Galeria del Barrio, a photography exhibit 
(subtitled, “This is Wynwood”) that took place during the Art Basel festival December, 2008, held in an art 
gallery in the Wynwood Art District. LUGO members from Wynwood took pictures of their neighborhood 
as a way to highlight the social environment that existed before the arrival of the Art District. 
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“when it [alliance building] fails.” Frank alluded to some of these lessons through 
rhetorical questions about whether more could have been done to build alliances with 
small businesses. “What are we doing to not just build with [PRES] but with the small 
businesses and the small business formations [such as the Chamber of Commerce]? Can 
we build a tactical alliance and, if not, are there subsets of [that formation] we need to be 
building with or is it a tiny little sector of the businesses that [can] have unity with us?” 
Alliance building is increasingly seen by activists and scholars as a way to build 
power to the scale of the political and economic forces driving unequal urbanization – the 
problem emphasized by Harvey (2008) and others (DeFilippis, Fisher and Shragge 2010). 
But there are questions as to the durability of such networks and whether “smaller, 
weaker organizations federated through flexible networks can accomplish more than 
large, strong organizations weakly federated with each other” (Nissen 2009, p. 164).306 
Across South Florida, the “constantly shifting constellations of alliances that so far have 
not shown great organizational stability” (Nissen 2009, p. 166) may eventually be 
effective through repeated collaboration and/or during moments of political opportunity 
(such as a particular state election or legislative cycle), or even by eventually settling on a 
more permanent formation. The RTTC South Florida region organizations or the more 
                                                 
306 Nissen examined the work of the CBC “coalition” formed in Miami between 2004 and 2008, discussed 
in Chapter 5, and concluded that “the evidence from the local Miami scene and/or the national scene gives 
scant verification for the belief that [the network] will be a stable or permanent form of interaction” (2009, 
pp. 165-166). 
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recent state-wide alliance, Florida New Majority,307 may represent more durable 
formations, but are still too new to judge. 
Scholars of community organizing and movement-building have highlighted the 
need to balance flexible alliance-building with longer-term investment in grassroots 
organizing, widely recognized as the most important and labor-intensive aspect of 
movement-building (e.g., Dreier 1996; Goldberg 2008; DeFilippis, Fisher and Shragge 
2010). Grassroots organizing seems especially important in the context of South Florida, 
where social justice organizations such as the SJC are relatively young and have small 
residential bases of support. On the other hand, this may also make alliance-building 
crucial, as small bases of support can be pooled to build larger, more powerful 
constituencies during specific campaigns. At the same as the SJC was building an 
alliance to Take Back the Park, they were also involved in canvassing operations to Take 
Back the Vote and RTTC actions to Take Back the City and later became involved in 
state-wide alliances to affect legislative processes. The SJC’s former lead organizer, who 
now works for the national RTTC, reflected on the challenge of balancing these different 
projects: 
 
When we started the SJC we kind of glorified [grassroots organizing] to the 
degree that we didn’t see the significance of communications strategy, alliance 
building, etc, beyond the significance of base building and leadership 
development. I think what dynamic you see happening now is not any lessening 
of the significance and importance of base building and leadership development… 
[But] with that said, there’s tensions as we’ve gone through processes [of] 
deepening [our] understanding of the different aspects of movement building. One 
example is, we’ve learned that no matter how powerful you get locally, there’s a 
lot of forces at work nationally, that need to be addressed and one strong, locally 
                                                 
307 In 2009, the SJC created Florida New Majority (FNM), an independent organization to mobilize voters 
in support of “progressive” policies in Florida. Although FNM is formally independent from the SJC, at the 
time of my field research the two organizations shared office space, staff and other resources. 
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based organization can’t address that. This understanding led to the SJC back in 
around, starting 2006, to start investing some time and energy in connecting with 
other local organizations that believe in aggressive organizing on the ground, 
direct action, similar to what Alinksy would say, but also believes in ideology and 
understanding the root causes of problems and importance of leadership 
development and political education. We reached out to them and ultimately the 
result was birthing a national alliance. With that reorientation there’s always a 
tension: Well, we got to invest in that, but at the same time, you know, we can’t 
let go of the bread and butter of the movement, which is [organizing]. It’s a real 
tension, because you only have so much capacity… Now, one way we resolve 
some of that tension is we go out and get more resources. So you’ll see our 
commitment to every move, whether it be the birth of RTTC or the birth of 
Florida New Majority, you see an increase in our budget and our staff. So it’s not 
like, oh my God, no one’s working in Wynwood or Liberty City… We have new 
staff. But I say all that to say… there’s a real tension there always around capacity 
and the need to always build the base, focus on leadership development, but at the 
same time, realizing the importance of other aspects of building the movement.  
  
Indeed, through 2010 the SJC’s presence in Wynwood continued through its 
outreach work in relation to broader campaigns (e.g., voter mobilization) but also through 
the creation of a weekly walking group to promote exercise and health among Wynwood 
residents. However, the SJC’s work in Wynwood, despite the formation of LUGO in 
2007-2008, was not to create a neighborhood-based organization or to conduct long-term, 
neighborhood-based organizing. Mobilization around the Clemente Park community 
center was a way to integrate Latino residents from Wynwood into the SJC’s broader 
goal of “movement-building.”   
Without sufficient history and credibility in Wynwood, the SJC had to build 
alliances to implement a social justice campaign on neighborhood issues. Given the 
existing organizations in Wynwood, an anti-gentrification campaign could not be the 
basis for such an alliance. Although the SJC clearly positioned itself as an opponent to 
gentrification through its “strategic communications” work (e.g., the “Wynwood Anti-
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Gentrification Committee”), it did not seek to address gentrification as manifest in a 
specific development project. In this way, the SJC, like other organizations that have 
worked in Wynwood (whether social justice or service organizations), chose not to 
directly address gentrification as a complex of processes manifest in specific projects or 
policies. It opted instead to publicize the problem, perhaps in the hopes that in the future 
residents might be more receptive to supporting a specific anti-gentrification campaign. 
Minimally, the goal was to “make gentrification a counter-message to progress,” as the 
SJC director explained, “so that we were successful at having gentrification become a 
household name.” The strategy chosen was that of “visibilizing what the development 
was coming on top of and giving voice to those communities, which meant that we 
started doing work - but it wasn’t really base-building work - in Wynwood and Little 
Haiti and Opa-Locka and a bunch of places, really being able to put out a frame and a 
message to visibilize those communities and having activities and tactics that put them as 
the counter-balance to the [downtown] development coalition.” 
While framing gentrification may have been the broader movement-building 
strategy – and appears to have been effective in terms of publicizing the issue in the 
broadcast media and within the neighborhood308 – neighborhood residents used existing 
frames to interpret events which sometimes complemented and at other times conflicted 
with the SJC’s framing of political action. Although the SJC linked the neglect of the 
community center to gentrification, the coalition campaign to re-open it fit into the 
                                                 
308 Indeed, much of the debates and discord surrounding the value of the Midtown complex was centered on 
gentrification – whether new wealthy investors and residents are more of a cost or benefit to existing 
residents. These debates took place in the Town Hall meetings organized by the SJC and between 
organizational leaders and stakeholders who came into contact with the political processes catalyzed by the 
SJC. 
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neighborhood’s history of struggle against disinvestment, including protest-based 
campaigns that led to the creation of service agencies, demolition of abandoned housing, 
resistance to environmental pollution, and so on. “They don’t care about Wynwood” or 
“the police don’t do anything” are typical remarks from Wynwood residents who believe 
that local government is not responsive to their neighborhood. Note that the anti-
gentrification narrative used by the SJC at the outset of their alliance-building gave way 
to more moderate claims about collective consumption – demands for government 
services added to the place-based narrative of Puerto Rican honor (“a park deserving of 
Roberto Clemente’s name”). The recent community center campaign resonated with 
residents’ sense that politicians ignore Wynwood until residents mobilize to make 
demands. However, the view that political action in Wynwood should target city 
government also suggests that some Wynwood residents are unlikely to agree with or 
even understand the community center campaign as did the SJC: as part of a broader 
strategy for achieving political change in the Miami region or across U.S. cities – that is, 
for bringing about the “right to the city” for all low-income city-dwellers.  
Although almost all of the Wynwood residents I spoke to expressed appreciation 
for the SJC’s work, several also suggested their limited presence would necessarily result 
in limited impacts on the status quo of urban politics that affect the neighborhood. For 
example, Sandra’s opinion was typical of a small group of residents who were involved 
in or supported the community center campaign but have not remained with LUGO as 
dues-paying or otherwise active309 members. “I think that it’s a shame, in a way, that you 
have people from your own community that could fight for justice, like Teresa is doing, 
                                                 
309 I explain membership requirements and categories below. 
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and that someone else has to come from outside310 to do it. But at least she’s doing 
something,” added Sandra. She then agreed with her sister that the neighborhood will not 
be able to defend or even express itself in the face of development pressures “unless that 
[internal] pissing contest stops,” referencing the divisions and competition between 
coalition leaders.  
Others were more critical of the SJC’s lack of presence in the neighborhood and 
particularly of its apparent departure from the perceived aim of increasing their 
membership base in the neighborhood. Wilma, who was still participating in SJC protests 
in Miami when I interviewed her in 2010,311 argued that “The membership is declining 
and I would like to increase it, but they [the organizational staff] did not want to support 
me in that.”312 Pedro, a former LUGO supporter mentioned earlier, argued that the SJC’s 
small membership base resulted from its lack of commitment to the neighborhood.  
 
Look, I say this because I belonged to them [LUGO], I say it with some pain. 
When you pretend to be an organization to lead a neighborhood, so that in the 
neighborhood people can see a difference, you have to be immersed in the 
neighborhood. So I can’t put an office in Broward to fight for Wynwood or for 
Little Havana, I have to be there! Not just say, ‘Now I represent Wynwood.’ Here 
[in Wynwood] there is a widow who does not have anything to eat – nobody will 
know that and it won’t show up in the newspaper but it is my problem with the 
organization. ‘Let’s get some soup together and go visit her in the afternoon.’ 
                                                 
310 This part was said in Spanish: “y que tenga que venir de afuera otra persona.” 
 
311 Wilma explained that she was initially attracted to the SJC’s housing campaigns because she was herself 
struggling to get into a subsidized apartment, but also because she was angry about the mismanagement of 
the public housing system (Cenziper 2006, 2007). When we met at the SJC offices in 2010, she asked me 
for help with the use of a fax machine in order to obtain a government-subsidized phone service for the 
public housing unit she had recently moved into after years on the public housing wait list. 
 
312 While a certain degree of confidence may not have been placed in Wilma’s leadership abilities, other 
Wynwood residents such as Mauricio have been elected to the Grassroots Leadership Council and feel 
highly supported by the SJC as well as their member-peers. Mauricio was not concerned about the size of 
LUGO membership, asserting that in the near future they would be developing new campaigns which 
would draw more members and supporters. 
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Here no organization does that. Here the organizations appear – and I say this 
with anger (con coraje, in the original Spanish) – when the press is around. You 
know, here in Wynwood there are a bunch of problems! There is an incredible 
drug problem. And nobody cares about that! 
 
Pedro is clearly exaggerating, as the SJC’s office (2 miles from the edge of Wynwood) is 
not in Broward County and it continues to maintain a limited presence in the 
neighborhood.313 Although as a member Pedro participated in some of the SJC’s other 
campaigns and is aware of how Wynwood fits into the SJC’s broader movement-building 
strategy, his primary concern was the extent to which any organization claiming to 
represent Wynwood spent time and energy building and sustaining relationships in the 
neighborhood.314  He asserted the same critique of the Puerto Rican service organizations, 
opining that they spent too much time in their offices instead of on neighborhood streets 
recruiting and helping residents. While he recognized that the “galleries are coming on 
top of the neighborhood” instead of “lifting up the community to the level of the 
galleries,” Pedro was not critical of the Puerto Rican service organizations for their 
willingness to support, or at least, reluctance to oppose gentrification.  
The point here is not to analyze the SJC’s membership and leadership 
development or residents motivations for affiliating (or not) with the SJC but rather to 
highlight how some residents expectations of community political practice are at odds 
with the SJC’s broader and shifting approach, which I elaborate on below. The ways in 
                                                 
313 They do this through the exercise groups mentioned earlier and have occasionally organized fundraisers 
for residents in need of different things (e.g., food, funeral ceremonies). 
 
314 Like Wilma, Pedro has fond memories and feelings toward SJC staff and members, even though he 
disagrees with their tactics. He is mentioned on the SJC website as someone who developed political skills 
through their organization before moving on to become involved in immigration reform campaigns. But as 
the SJC’s work appeared to become increasingly distant from Wynwood, Pedro became less involved with 
the SJC. 
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which political organizing and action was framed by the SJC as compared to by some 
neighborhood residents, including the current and former LUGO members cited above, 
reveal differing expectations and assumptions about organizational practice. Wynwood’s  
history includes many service organizations but little sustained, neighborhood organizing 
and collective action. Moreover, residents who have participated in the activism of 
Wynwood’s service or faith-based organizations in prior decades became accustomed to 
these organizations’ strategies and practices. Service and faith-based organizations have 
tended to be either accomodationist or otherwise become partners in relationships with 
government and developers. They have also been continually present as “caretakers” in 
the neighborhood. The more confrontational practices of the SJC and their more limited 
presence in the neighborhood was a different mode of operation than what residents were 
accustomed to. 
The SJC had neither set out to build a mass organization in Wynwood nor is it 
singularly focused on grassroots organization as the only way to create social change. 
The organization’s grassroots council is made up of six members, half African-
Americans and half Latinos.315 Membership in LUGO, which grew to 16 people in 2008, 
required payment of annual dues of $24 (reduced to $20 in 2010) in addition to other 
commitments.316 The SJC draws on the tools of grassroots “base-building” (community 
organizing) as just one strategy for “building the movement,” which also includes 
                                                 
315 The SJC staff, including executive director, organizers, communications team, researchers and clerical 
staff, number 8. Sometimes duties and roles are shared and interchangeable. 
 
316 The SJC has two general categories of membership, which can be described as full and partial. The 
former includes members who not only agree ideologically with the mission of fighting racial and 
economic justice (demonstrated by signing a membership form), participate and/or take leadership of 
specific organizing tasks (phone banking, door-knocking), and pays their membership fee. Some residents, 
such as Elsa who lived in Wynwood, paid the membership fee and made other donations (clothes, 
kitchenware) even though she participated in hardly any SJC/LUGO events. 
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“strategic communications,” alliance-building and the creation of flexible networks of 
individuals to achieve specific, limited objectives. They use intensive leadership 
development (political education and organizational skills training) to create a small but 
capable and deeply motivated cadre of grassroots leaders.317  
The importance of grassroots organizing in the broader work of the SJC seems to 
ebb and flow as the organization becomes more multi-dimensional. Or more precisely, 
the reasons for grassroots organizing, and thereby the geographic focus and intensity of 
organizing, shifts with broader movement-building strategies. 
After building the small LUGO membership between 2005 and 2008, the 
organization restructured away from neighborhood-specific “bases” and campaigns (e.g., 
in and from Liberty City and Wynwood) in the next two years, and toward a united 
grassroots leadership. In this 2010 restructuring dubbed “We Are One,” the SJC 
transformed neighborhood-specific campaigns into geographically broader but issue-
specific committees, including: Work and Housing; Women and Youth; and Citizenship. 
An SJC organizer explained that the “main purpose [of this restructuring] is that there 
should not be campaigns by neighborhood [and] separated by race, which is really how 
we were functioning, but instead to integrate the campaigns.” Thus, “We Are One” was 
also a process of “internal organizing” (as another SJC organizer put it) or intra-
membership relationship building between longtime African-American members and the 
                                                 
317 Intensive political education appears to be a tool used by social movement organizations (SMOs) since 
at least the 1970s to overcome to non-ideological orientation of Alinsky-style neighborhood organizing, 
criticized for not developing residents’ understanding of the root causes of the injustices they faced. As a 
result, many neighborhood organizations settled for “getting what they could,” a modus operandi of 
“neighborhood protection,” but did nothing to change the broader structuring of inequality that caused their 
problems in the first place (Stoecker 1997; DeFilippis 2004). Intensive political education focuses on the 
deep-rooted causes of injustice and the long-term strategies needed to create structural change so that 
participants will be better prepared and more willing to invest in longer-term campaigns. 
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new, Hispanic LUGO members. The expansion of the grassroots base through LUGO and 
its integration with the previous membership base was not free of tension, as both current 
and former staff and members have attested.318 During the process of constructing new 
scopes and scales of activism, some members left the organization, not entirely accepting 
the broader objectives of the SJC, while the new campaigns recruited new members (e.g., 
RTTC electoral canvassing or mobilization around state-wide legislative issues). LUGO’s 
membership is illustrative. Its founding  members (16 partial, 10 full members) were 
from Wynwood and Allapattah, but the broader scope of more recent campaigns attracted 
new members from Little Havana and the cities of Hialeah and Opa-Locka. While some 
“Black-Brown” relationships have been developed and stabilized within the leadership 
structure, there is also some turnover and transience.319 
                                                 
318 Some current and former SJC staff have lamented, for example, how integrating Latino residents from 
Wynwood into the organization’s leadership structure, formerly dominated by members from Liberty City, 
created tensions between members. One staff organizer expressed that she would prefer not to be assigned 
the painstaking work of leadership development because it sometimes involved mediating disputes between 
Black and Latino members over seemingly insignificant things, such as what type of food to order for 
events (e.g., traditionally Latin or African-American cuisine). Another organizer pointed out long-standing 
beliefs about racial/ethnic relations in Miami had to be addressed in building relations (“a multi-racial, 
multi-ethnic base”) across boundaries that, in the popular imagination, were zones of conflict. She noted 
that a Puerto Rican member from Wynwood had “a rich language against the Cubans even though I see her 
with some Cuban friends.” But more importantly, SJC staff encountered conflict between Blacks and 
Hispanic members, such as African-American members who “may say things like, ‘Latinos are taking our 
jobs’” or Latinos who fear violence in African-American neighborhoods, among other things. A Mexican-
born SJC organizer noted that it took some of the African-American organizers more than a year to realize 
that she was not Cuban – a misunderstanding that is perhaps unique to Miami’s history of inter-ethnic 
conflict. As Frank put it, there were “different levels of consciousness, different levels of unity” among the 
various grassroots members. To help build unity between African-American and Hispanic members, 
organizers developed educational workshops within the “circle of consciousness” process that focused on 
race relations in the unique context of South Florida, such as one titled, “Black, Brown and Sunny.” It 
focused on the exploitation involved in the different migration histories of Bahamians, Jamaicans and 
various Caribbean and Central and South American nationalities – cases representing the ancestral 
backgrounds of different SJC members, who shared their own experiences of migration and discrimination. 
 
319 In addition to leadership turnover for reasons of strategic disagreements, a member’s death or other 
personal life changes, in some cases immigrant status, influences the duration of their membership. For 
example, Mauricio, an elderly man who is part of the grassroots council, has for the last two years been 
weighing his return to his native Costa Rica, at the urging of his kids who argue he has no need to continue 
working or to live without stability – adequate wages or health insurance in the U.S. “Well, I’ll think about 
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The SJC continues to be involved in state-wide campaigns that involve mobilizing 
already-established grassroots bases (including those of ally organizations throughout the 
region) toward legislative advocacy. But, at least of this writing, there has been some 
winding down of campaigns through the national networks, such as the RTTC. The SJC 
appears to be shifting back to community organizing and recruitment, although not 
specifically on a neighborhood basis. In 2010, the grassroots council’s citizenship 
committee began a campaign to pressure  county and city government to create an 
immigrant ID card acceptable to local law enforcement authorities, banks and other 
institutions as a way to protect undocumented immigrants from deportations. The 
immigration ID campaign includes organizing residents in neighborhoods with a large 
share of recent immigrants, including Little Havana and Allapattah..320  
The increasingly multi-scalar and changing strategies for social movement-
building are sometimes lost on residents who, while generally supportive of the SJC, 
have also expressed concern that base-building is declining in importance.  
 
Discussion: Community Organizing, Movement-Building & Gentrification 
The SJC-led coalitional campaign to re-open the community center was a means 
not only to improve the building, but also to recruit and develop “conscious” grassroots 
members to help build the SJC organization and participate in broader strategies for 
                                                                                                                                                 
it” – he recounted a recent phone conversation with his son in December, 2010 – “it’s that I have a 
commitment to an organization that doesn’t want me to leave, so I don’t know what to do yet, but it’s most 
likely that I’ll leave soon, maybe at the end of the year [2011].” 
 
320 This geographic focus developed not only because these are areas with many undocumented immigrants 
(as there are many similar neighborhoods throughout Miami-Dade County), but particularly because many 
of their grassroots members live and/or have connections to these particular neighborhoods. These 
neighborhoods are part of their turf. 
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political change. The tensions between radical and pragmatic ideologies of change made 
the coalition unsustainable. To work with Wynwood’s Puerto Rican service 
organizations, the SJC needed to temporarily adopt a more practical rhetoric devoid of 
attacks on gentrification or “the system.” Adopting a more practical rhetoric enabled a 
workable coalition that pressured the government to rebuild the community center more 
quickly. But the end result was compromised, as the City ignored additional concessions 
demanded by different neighborhood stakeholders. The SJC recognized that in the future 
it will have to build more effective alliances, seeking a greater diversity of partners and 
supporters. But beyond the tactics of alliance-building, the case of the community center 
coalition in Wynwood raises other questions about the multi-dimensional, movement-
building approach. One question has been raised in the literature with regards to the 
effectiveness of flexible networks for building a durable base of support for progressive 
political change (Nissen 2009). Another question is: what is the function of 
neighborhood-based, social justice organizing – essential to resisting gentrification – 
within the expanding political strategies of movement-building? 
In some ways, the campaign to re-open the community center was reminiscent of 
previous mobilizations in Wynwood for neighborhood services; but in more ways, the 
campaign represents a new kind of neighborhood organizational practice in Wynwood.  
Like previous cases – the formation of the Puerto Ricans United and service 
organizations in the 1970s and faith-based activism to “clean up” the neighborhood in the 
1980s and 1990s – the community center campaign focused on obtaining some kind of 
service from the government, what Castells (1983) referred to as the politics of 
“collective consumption.” Never did grassroots organizing in Wynwood give rise to 
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radical political demands. In addition, all episodes of grassroots mobilization were 
catalyzed and supported by professional activists who worked but did not live in the 
neighborhood. In these two ways – the role of outside activists and the absence of radical 
politics emanating from the grassroots – Wynwood is a microcosm of the history of 
neighborhood organizing found in many U.S. cities. In other ways the neighborhood 
exhibits the limitations of neighborhood organizing in the contemporary “neoliberal” 
urban context (Goldberg 2008; Shepard 2010). 
Even in some other U.S. cities, where neighborhood residents are more 
ideologically predisposed to radical proposals to ameliorate injustices, neighborhood-
based movements have often fragmented along ideological lines (e.g., radical vs. 
pragmatic) or else settled on a pragmatic strategy that resulted in co-optation by 
government sponsors and/or narrowed objectives (Castells 1983, pp. 106-137; Fainstein 
1987; Heathcott 2005).321 These effects – fragmentation, co-optation, narrow vision – are 
thought to be a function of the transformed urban political context in the latter half of the 
20th Century, “shifts… that have dulled the political edge of organizing” (Fisher and 
Shragge 2000, p. 1). In the wake of the 1999 “anti-globalization” protests in Seattle, 
activist scholars were calling for “the community movement [to] reconsider its shift to a 
politics of moderation and collaboration. It needs to reinsert more protest” (Ibid, p. 2). 
Others have called for organizers and activists to broaden their vision to better match the 
                                                 
321 A recent analyst and former community organizer, while calling for renewed neighborhood organizing, 
noted that Alinksy-style neighborhood organizing “failed to build permanent institutions that could connect 
for city, state, and national action, go deeper into local power structures, and do more than win concessions 
from the powers-that-be. Alinsky himself observed that the life span of one of his organizations was five 
years; after that it was either absorbed into administering programs (rather than building people power) or 
died” (Miller 2010). 
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globalized economic forces that affect urban neighborhoods (Harvey 2010).322 In the U.S. 
some argue that focusing on the metropolitan region is most effective way to affect the 
distribution of resources in cities (Benner and Pastor 2008), while others advocate 
political organizing at local, state and national levels (DeFilippis, Fisher and Shragge, 
2010).  
One of a few recently created social justice alliances across U.S. cities,323 the 
RTTC seeks “to develop a common frame and approach to unify our diverse struggles for 
housing, social wages, public space, and culture” (www.righttothecity.org). South Florida 
differs from other RTTC regions in that its labor movement is relatively weak and social 
justice organizations are young (Nissen and Russo 2006; Nissen 2009). In addition, with 
a few exceptions, Republican politicians and conservative political organizations 
dominate much of state and local politics (Colburn and De Haven-Smith 1999; Stepick et 
al. 2003; Mormino 2005; Girard and Grenier 2008; Shell-Weiss 2009).324  
It was precisely this combination of forces, together with Florida’s importance in 
national elections – made clear during the 2000 Florida recount (New World 2005) – that 
led progressive political organizations and liberal philanthropic foundations to invest 
heavily in the state during the last decade. This investment is evident in the emergence 
                                                 
322 In Urban Activism in a Downsizing World, Heathcott (2005, p. 289) writes: “Perhaps the days of broad 
social vision are over. Indeed, in a world fragmented by consumer capitalism and market imperatives, 
social struggle has become increasingly piecemeal, dislodged from overarching ideological agendas in 
favor of pragmatic, winnable tactics or identity politics. It may be the case that broad social visions were 
only conceivable in an era marked by broad social compact, where mass institutions such as immigrant 
churches and synagogues, labor unions, and the Democratic Party shaped common agreements about the 
nature of working class civic life and the form of citizenship in a democratic order.” 
 
323 Other alliances include the Domestic Workers Alliance and the Partnership for Working Families, which 
also incorporate scholars cited in this text (e.g., Theodore, DeFilippis, Pastor). 
 
324 A majority of Miami-Dade County voters chose the Democrat in the 2004 and 2008 elections, and many 
elected officials (regardless of party affiliation) have support from major labor unions. 
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between 1999 and 2005 of the main organizations in South Florida’s  “social justice 
infrastructure” (Nissen 2009) and also in major funding initiatives. Two prominent 
examples were the Ford Fund for Community Organizing (FCO) “Second Phase” 
investments from 2004 to 2007 (Gittel, Ferman and Price 2007)325 and the New World 
Foundation’s New Majority Fund (since 2005) and Social Justice Infrastructure Funders 
program (2006-2007), “a learning community of program officers from various 
foundations” established to coordinate investments in Florida (New World 2005, 
2007).326 Similar to New World’s investments, “the extension of the [Ford] FCO into 
Florida” was seen as a way of “augmenting the state’s organizing infrastructure,” 
particularly by helping existing organizations “to scale up their activities and effectively 
collaborate” as well as reduce intra-organizational competition for grants (Gittel, Ferman 
and Price 2007, p. 109). The Ford investments were specifically designed so that “besides 
organizing to increase their capacity to address the concerns of their constituencies, the 
community organizations in Florida must make a concerted effort to work together to be 
more effective in some policy areas” (Ibid, p. 109-110). For its part, the New World 
Foundation sought to support what it envisioned as “new majority structures” (New 
World 2005, p. 13):  
 
New majority structures are civic alliances; they may emerge within one umbrella 
organization or in a looser consortium of complementary organizations. They are 
alliances with organizing capacities that connect and integrate multiple 
constituencies, expanding the core and reaching the new. The most common 
structures are labor-community-interfaith collaborations, though several have 
                                                 
325 The Second Phase added Denver and Central and South Florida to the list of FCO locations. 
 
326 While these were some of the earliest foundations that emphasized alliance-building and the creation of 
regional and state-wide infrastructures for political change, several other major foundations also invested in 
south and central Florida since 2005. 
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been initiated by social service providers and advocates. They are also multi-issue 
alliances with applied research and policy capacities, and they create common 
agendas that are pro-active and escalating. They coordinate their activities 
through strategic planning, and also through intensive civic leadership 
development across their constituencies. 
 
 Although several foundations have invested in South Florida, the visions 
espoused by Ford and New World most aptly characterize the direction that the funding 
and organizing strategies have taken during the last 10 or more years. While many of 
these community-based organizations were born in the late 1990s or early 2000s, it is 
only with the support of major national foundations (on which they are virtually entirely 
dependent) that South Florida’s social justice organizations, especially the SJC, have 
been able to move beyond “the limits of local organizing” (Cloward and Piven 2004; 
DeFilippis, Fisher and Shragge 2010). In theory, this permits them to avoid the either/or 
choice of local vs. extra-local (state, national) organizing.327 
However, in practice, local vs. extra-local organizing seems to be an ongoing 
“tension” and strain on organizational capacity, as the SJC’s former organizing director 
made clear. Not all community organizers value the broader aspects of movement-
building in the same way, either. In 2010, Sheila, the former director of Activists in 
Defense of Overtown (ADO), another social justice organization that addresses 
                                                 
327 “At first glance,” wrote Cloward and Piven (2004, p. xii-xiii) in the forward to a well-known community 
organizing manual (Staples 2004), “the juxtaposition of local organizing with the nationalization and 
internationalization of economic and political power appears to render local efforts weak or even futile. 
There are two typical responses by organizers. One is to turn to efforts to build national instead of local 
organization. The other is to call for the decentralization of economic and political decision making so as to 
make it accessible to local organizations. Neither strategy stands up to scrutiny. If the solidarities and 
leverage that underlie the possibilities of popular power are yielded by the local institutions in which 
ordinary people play important roles, then popular power can only be organized locally. Concentrating on 
the development of the formal apparatus of a national organization is no substitute for the mobilization of 
these local resources. At best, national organization can encourage the spread of local protests and perhaps 
coordinate them, but they are not themselves a source of much influence. At worst, efforts to build national 
organizations become an exercise in illusion.” 
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gentrification and participates in the RTTC alliance, was more critical of the funding that 
has supported a reorientation of organizing toward electoral mobilization. 
  
I think funding in the last three years made a big shift to an investment in electoral 
politics and, so then that sucked a lot of money out of [other] things in order to for 
people to invest in electoral politics. It got framed as two things: we can actually 
have change if we have someone we want in office, and the other thing being, this 
is how we get to scale on base building. Because then you have influence and 
increasing power and this is going to help build organizations. Right?  For me, the 
jury is out on both. I’m remaining kind of quiet because maybe I’m wrong, but 
the work that I’ve seen on the doors [to mobilize people for elections after 2008 
or state legislation] is not moving people. They’re not committing to doing a 
fuckin’ thing. It still to me says, all you have to do is just go vote on November… 
It’s important to have better candidates in there… but I think if we’re saying that 
we’re about radical change, then that’s not the end game. 
 
As a close ally and collaborator with the SJC (particularly through the RTTC in 
which they both participated), the former ADO director recognizes that electoral 
mobilization is not the only aspect of the SJC’s shift into broader, movement-building 
work. The difference for the Overtown organization is that it lacks the funding328 and 
therefore capacity to balance electoral mobilization with the need to “hold down” its 
territory in Overtown, a neighborhood perpetually threatened by gentrification from all 
directions – the expanding downtown district to the southeast, the University of Miami 
medical complex to the west and the Wynwood Art District immediately north.329  
                                                 
328 According to the former director, ADO’s budget grew to more than $300,000 around 2007, 
“plummeted” by about 25% in 2009 and has since rebounded somewhat. Other than support to be part of 
the RTTC Alliance, the Overtown organization has not received funding from the foundations supporting 
FNM or other regional- and state-level political organizing. 
 
329 In addition to their work to stop or modify specific redevelopment projects on the edge between 
Downtown and Overtown, ADO has most recently (2010-2011) sought to obtain concessions (e.g., jobs and 
job training) for Overtown residents from the University of Miami’s expanding Medical Complex, 
specifically a new, partly subsidized BioTech laboratory, abutting the eastern edge of Overtown (Vasquez 
2010). As of this writing, the first facility of the two-part project has been built while ADO continues to 
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Electoral organizing “is not something I would not do at all,” reasoned Sheila, “but it’s 
certainly not going to be my main squeeze… where for four months, that’s all I’m 
doing.”330 
The SJC’s ability to expand into a broader array of issue areas (e.g., state 
legislation, voter mobilization, federal stimulus advocacy) may be partly a function of 
having achieved a partial resolution to the original issue around which the organization 
was created – a federal HOPE VI project to demolish and redevelop an 850-unit public 
housing complex in Liberty City. Although the project was eventually demolished, the 
SJC’s organizing combined with the exposure of fraud and mismanagement at the Public 
Housing Agency (Cenziper 2006, 2007; Pinzur 2007), pressured the county into an 
agreement to replace all of the demolished units, which was not part of the original 
redevelopment plan (Phelan 2007; Wakefield 2007). Since 2007, its role has been largely 
to continue to apply pressure and oversight to ensure that former residents are given jobs 
and housing. This reduced role has freed up some of its capacity to do other work. But 
the SJC’s ability to “attach their wagon to the national work,” as the ADO director put it, 
also partly results from the combination of the effective work of its staff in cultivating a 
                                                                                                                                                 
pressure for a written agreement to provide more tangible benefits to Overtown residents (Scott 2011; 
Vasquez 2011). 
 
330 The former ADO director does see the value of the RTTC Alliance, however. “[The RTTC] gives them 
[members] clout. Many times when I would say, in the local struggle, we’re part of Right to the City, and 
there’s seven major cities out there who are in this same fight that we have resource and access to, and that 
the March on the Mayors, all these people come, right? That kind of access to help you win your local fight 
– it doesn’t mean you’re going to win some big national thing and that we’re going to have rent control 
across the nation or we’re going to change public policy next week. I mean, that’s the hope but it does help 
move [locally], and it gives you access, it gives you information, you meet new people, you have the 
training, it is what helps build local groups… I was totally down with Right to the City - my initial thought, 
though, was, ‘oh, this is some thinking that’s critical to help us understand gentrification more politically 
and to help deepen the analysis for our membership.’ But then the other side of me was like, this is a 
fuckin’ opportunity we need to cash in some money, you know, and so of course we’re going to jump on 
the band wagon. It turns out that it was the right thing, and we got so much more out of it.” 
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positive reputation nationally331 as well as building relationships with funders during the 
key window of opportunity opened by the 2008 Obama campaign.332 
The tension between neighborhood and broader scales of political action is not 
only evident in the distribution of organizational capacity, however; it is also observable 
in member recruitment. While experienced practitioners warn to guard against 
membership stasis, what are the perils of high membership turnover? With each new 
campaign, the SJC gained new supporters and members. At the same time, when the 
scale and scope of organizing constantly shifts from the neighborhood to the city to the 
state and beyond, some members are demobilized and disengaged. The Faith-Based 
Activist Coalition experienced this when Wynwood’s Catholic Parish leadership 
gradually lost interest as FBAC campaign objectives shifted beyond the neighborhood’s 
particular interests. There is some evidence of the same taking place with LUGO, as 
some members and supporters became uninterested in the broader movement-building 
project. The question is not whether losing members is itself a negative outcome, for the 
former LUGO members I spoke with all came away from their experience with a more 
critical analysis of political processes. Even if they criticized the SJC and opted out of 
                                                 
331 This positive reputation is evident not only from my own observations of SJC staff members during 
meetings with funders, but also from the perceptions of colleagues in the social justice movement, 
including activists and academics. For example, at the March, 2011, Urban Affairs Association conference, 
I asked a panel of scholars discussing the potential of contemporary urban activism, what they thought of 
the challenges of scaling up organizing and advocacy to state and national levels while trying to maintain 
local-level organizing in cities and neighborhoods. The respondent, a member of the national RTTC and 
prominent urban sociologist, asserted that challenging as it may be, there was no other way to build a 
movement without building power “vertically” to affect policy across multiple levels of government. 
Having identified myself as from Miami, he added that the SJC was among a handful of organizations 
nationally at the forefront of this type of work. 
 
332 Sheila noted how the 2008 Obama campaign provided financial opportunities for social justice 
organizations to move into electoral work, which, in turn, helped savvy organizational leaders such as the 
SJC’s director build and strengthen relationships with foundations.   
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formal membership, they are closer to being allies than enemies of the SJC and may 
prove to be key supporters in future campaigns. 
Instead, the question is whether and how this multi-scalar, multi-issue movement-
building model can build membership faster than it turns over, thus allowing the slow and 
steady growth of a cadre of neighborhood-based leadership, albeit spread across diverse 
sites in Miami and perhaps Florida. A key challenge highlighted by the examples from 
Wynwood stems from the ways in which residents are accustomed to the rationalities and 
practices of community politics embedded in the neighborhood’s institutional history. 
The experience of successes and failures in the past may lead residents to have 
expectations and assumptions about political organizing and action that differ from those 
of contemporary social justice activists, and may dampen efforts to build alliances and 
leadership in the neighborhood. Organizers may confront, for example, an environment in 
which the failures of established CBOs and CDCs to achieve change or implement 
development has narrowed the political frames available for mobilizing people. The 
potential for misunderstanding may be heightened in the particular case of attempts to 
resist gentrification in the context of contemporary approaches to social movement-
building. 
The complexity of gentrification exemplifies the challenge of linking local and 
extra-local political action. Gentrification is felt by people at the neighborhood level and 
affects very few neighborhoods within a metropolitan area – typically the poorest, inner 
city neighborhoods. While neighborhood-level mobilization is the source from which 
political pressure may be generated against specific, inequitable development projects, 
mobilization from one or more neighborhoods within a single city is insufficient to affect 
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the broader regional, state and national level housing and land use policies facilitating 
gentrification (Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008; Wacquant 2008). Political advocacy at 
multiple levels as well as alternative development practices are needed to more 
permanently alter the way the costs and benefits of development are distributed (Benner 
and Pastor 2008, 2011). Such are the insights that informed the creation of the RTTC 
Alliance and which may inform and animate political action in Miami in relation to one 
or more of the many sites where gentrification is unfolding.333 
Yet, the “tension” articulated by the SJC’s former organizing director between 
“the need to always build the base” and “the importance of other aspects of building the 
movement” is accentuated in the case of gentrification of because of the nature of the 
injustice – gentrification not only advances a complex of harmful urban development 
practices (e.g., rental-to-condo conversions, upscale residential and commercial 
development, and the associated rise in evictions and punitive policing, etc.) but also 
implies the absence of beneficial ones, such as affordable housing and residents’ control 
over land use patterns (e.g., community land trusts, housing cooperatives, etc.). In other 
words, it requires not only preventing but also proposing and implementing, at least in 
order to more fundamentally reform urban development. Although gentrification is not 
                                                 
333 A few recent social justice campaigns have taken a multi-scalar approach to the organizing, albeit in 
limited ways. A labor-community coalition launched a campaign in 2006 to protect mobile home parks 
from demolition and redevelopment that included not only organizing residents to improve park conditions 
prevent the closure and sale of parks, but also lobbying and advocating at County Hall and, most recently, 
the state legislature to obtain policy changes. Currently, the organization is working with consultants to 
figure out how to help residents to collectively purchase and renovate mobile home parks. In contrast, 
SJC’s broader, movement-building work is not linked together in a singular campaign. The SJC’s work 
within the RTTC and state-wide legislative alliances address a variety of specific issues (e.g., 
accountability in federal stimulus spending or state unemployment compensation reforms) but these efforts 
are not integrated with the SJC’s local work in Miami. In fact, the various strains of work are led by 
formally independent organizations (the SJC and the national and state-wide alliances), even though SJC 
leads the work of these other two entities in Florida and South Florida. 
 
347 
 
unique in this respect,334 it is different than other social justice causes taken up in recent 
years, such as living wage campaigns that focus on passing specific legislation, which 
can be (and have been) won without a mass base of support.335 Political organizing that 
focuses on passing a particular law or halting a specific pattern of abuse (e.g., wage theft) 
need not be limited to a singular strategy; passage of the living wage may also be a 
stepping stone to building a social movement that seeks not only to curb abuses but 
propose new labor and even development policies.336  
The key difference, at least in the context of Miami’s rapid urban growth and pro-
growth political climate, is that it is extremely difficult to oppose development without 
also advancing an alternative. As discussed previously, the pressure for growth was 
unrelenting, which led activists to avoid opposing gentrification projects unless the 
political conditions were ideal. Among neighborhood residents the debate was also 
polarized as growth vs. no-growth (recall Hector’s pro-Midtown plea: “do you want to go 
back to what we had before!?”). Moreover, stopping a gentrification project and 
advancing a more equitable proposal requires more than a large base of support, most of 
which is likely to come from neighborhoods affected by gentrification; but as the 
Clemente Park case demonstrates, this support has to be local in order to reduce the 
                                                 
334 This duality applies to different injustices associated with “development,” such as pollution associated 
with industrial growth, and is especially pronounced in areas experiencing rapid growth. During periods of 
growth, when many people are interested in the potential to profit from development, opposition to specific 
projects typically lead to polarized debates of growth vs. no-growth. Opponents are pressured to envision 
viable alternatives.  
 
335 In Florida it was passed because of advocacy efforts (without a mass support base) and sympathetic 
policymakers (Nissen 2000). 
 
336 This is precisely the strategy of the Partnership for Working Families, a national alliance of social 
justice organizations that work in several political arenas (industrial policy, urban development, etc.) 
through the mechanism of labor organizing. 
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possibility that activists are construed as illegitimate outsiders. Because gentrification is 
by definition a neighborhood problem, to challenge development practices at the local 
level requires a groundswell of local support. Gentrification may be the quintessential 
social justice issue in which both the localism that stirs masses of people and the policy 
advocacy that is more distant from them are indispensable to “winning.” 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 My dissertation has examined, through historical analysis and ethnographic 
methods, how gentrification is produced to be uncontested by organized groups and the 
implications for neighborhood residents. In the remainder of this chapter I reiterate the 
key empirical findings of this research through a reflection on how the creation and 
formation of these governing arrangements is made possible through spatial, material and 
discursive practices of “place-making,” particularly the “flexibilization” (Fraser 2003; 
Lepofsky and Fraser 2003; Cox 2004) and redefinition of place-based “community.” 
 Many analysts have located the disappearance of conflict from urban politics in 
the proliferation of processes dubbed “community.” On the one hand, this refers to the 
specific field of “community development” and the transformation of its “logics” under 
the aegis of urban entrepreneurialism (Jennings 2004; Newman and Lake 2006; 
Kirkpatrick 2007; Thibault  2007). As was the case with Wynwood's oldest community 
organizations, “the politics of identity and difference that energized the community 
development movement of the [1970s] has been replaced by an accommodationist 
politics in which the celebration of difference is antithetical to the dynamics of urban 
capital investment, the exchange-value denomination of urban neighborhoods, and the 
operational requirements of bureaucratized community development institutions” 
(Newman and Lake 2006, p. 45). The ethnic politics that inspired the creation of 
Wynwood's Puerto Rican organizations was subdued when these organizations were 
integrated in the community development funding and social service system. Their 
bureaucratic enfranchisement turned political energies inward, leading to internal 
divisions that weakened organizational cohesion and leadership. By the 1990s, to the 
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extent that Wynwood's Puerto Rican organizations celebrated difference, it was for 
largely symbolic purposes, such as the naming of streets and buildings after Puerto Rican 
independence philosophers or the installation of San Juan-inspired street lamps 
(guacaras). In the context of the burgeoning Art District, the Puerto Rican CDC created 
to support local small businesses and build affordable housing for existing residents 
shifted its’ orientation in the 2000s to begin to serve artists and help create and 
implement a vision for live/work artist housing in the neighborhood, despite some 
residents’ and other stakeholders’ fears about gentrification. The CDC’s shift was 
perhaps unsubstantial in terms of the impact of their work on the built environment since 
the Puerto Rican CDC did not actually build artist housing (though others did, following 
the CDC’s lead), but their shift represented a weakened capacity to serve existing 
residents and exemplifies the transformation of the neighborhoods’ political terrain under 
the pressures of gentrification. 
But beyond representing the collapse or weakening of what appeared once as a 
potentially opposition politics, the evolution of community development organizations 
should be understood as productive of community-based governance. Analysts have 
drawn attention  to “how particular locales become envisaged as communities in order to 
facilitate the mandates of the postwelfare state” (Fairbanks 2007, p. 112). Notions of 
“community voluntarism,” service, and self-help are posited as an “unequivocal good in 
American political culture that distrusts government and exalts the individual” (Katz, 
2001, p. 165). Yet, researchers may actually find, as Maskovsky (2006, p. 93) did in the 
case of a gentrifying neighborhood in Philadelphia, that 
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It is the very inclusion of African American residents in the new devolved 
institutions of urban governance—and, notably, the insistence that they participate 
in a diverse, not a black, community—that produces a new sense of racial 
inequality and new forms of class division in the new inner city. In this regard, it 
is the very social construct of community—the sublime ideal and enabling 
condition of neoliberal governance—that disrupts the relation of significant 
segments of the urban population to governmental authority and creates new 
patterns of inequality. 
 
 
 In Wynwood, too, the inclusion of residents is part of the creation of exclusionary 
governance arrangements. In the name of community participation the Midtown 
developers used the CBP office as the conduit through which they could manufacture 
political support. The $200,000 spent to support the Puerto Rican child care agency and 
other thousands for neighborhood service programs represented a tiny fraction of the 
$170 million in subsidies and unknown hundreds of millions in profits the developers are 
actually earning. More important were the unaccountable processes through which these 
governing arrangements and payments were made between the developers, Bobby and 
city officials in conversations and meetings that left no public record revealing how the 
choices were made prior to the official political resolution documented in City 
Commission meeting transcripts. Residents waved silently from the back row as 
developers and Bobby assured politicians of the benefits to “the community.” 
The fallout from these processes was divisive, pitting the neighborhood 
association leaders against the CBP office, the directors of the Senior Center and the 
facilitating Community Action Agency (CAA). In 2010, the homeowner association 
director was voted out of her position as CAA board chairperson in elections organized 
by a new CAA coordinator who sought to “change [the] negative environment [that took 
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hold] for a very long time,”337 generated by the association directors’ persistent criticism 
of the CAA for its' role in facilitating the political support for Midtown. The newly 
elected chairperson is a fraud investigator who worked as a police officer in Wynwood in 
the 1990s. Although the leader of the homeowner association continues to attend the 
CAA meetings, she does so to keep watch over the processes of community participation. 
 Local government has been instrumental in these changes in other, largely 
unintended, although perhaps not unforeseeable ways. The neighborhood-based CBP 
office, the hallmark of a nationally renowned community-based policing system devised 
in the 1990s to be the “government closest to the people,” has, ironically in the Miami 
context, become a crucial instrument of social and political control. Despite years of 
critical service provided to residents – building code enforcement, permitting and 
certifications, coordinating neighborhood services, and helping poor residents in myriad 
other ways – under the pressure of gentrification, Wynwood’s “mini city hall” became a 
highly malleable conduit through which developers and investors could manipulate the 
micro-processes of “street-level bureaucracies” (Proudfoot and McCann 2008) and 
neighborhood service agencies to help transform the neighborhood. Control over these 
administrative offices and their government service networks has been wrested, at least 
temporarily, from the residents whose activism in the 1990s was the impetus for their 
creation in the first place. 
 Symbolic of the contradiction between the reality of gentrification and the 
discourse of inclusive partnership was Levine’s teasing reference to himself as an 
honorary Puerto Rican as he considered attending the Mayor’s Town Hall meeting at 
                                                 
337 Interview of Wynwood CAA coordinator. 
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Roberto Clemente Park. Without knowing the history and context behind the statement, it 
can seem as a benign and even charming endearment that reflects his desire to ingratiate 
himself to his new neighbors, to form a diverse partnership for “pushing a neighborhood 
forward,” as Melissa put it. But despite working out of an office down the block from 
Marta, these two are worlds apart in many other ways. The presumption of partnership in 
the face of such distance is not the problem, per se, as difference is arguably inherent 
urbanism (Lefebvre 2003[1970]). Rather, the problem is in the constitution through such 
partnerships of a political space called “community” that is exclusionary and 
unaccountable to residents.  
 Research on gentrification has in many ways been at the forefront of this critical 
understanding, for gentrification entails the establishment of new spatial and political 
practices for the “new middle classes” returning to inhabit the city (Zukin 1989; Bridge 
1995, 2001; Butler 2004; Ley 2003; Davidson 2007). Case studies of the activities of 
gentrifiers reveal how new residents and real estate investors aggressively manipulate 
building code enforcement and other “street-level bureaucracies” (e.g., Goode Bryant 
2005; Proudfoot and McCann 2008), policing and security forces (e.g., Merry 2001; 
Herbert 2008, 2011; Beckett and Herbert 2010) or other regulatory systems to implement 
their vision for the neighborhood. In Wynwood the new art district association has 
increasingly dominated political relations between the neighborhood and city 
government, and newcomers such as artists and gallerists have increasingly become the 
beneficiaries of government and nonprofit services. 
These changes are made possible by a redefinition of “community,” or through 
processes that make place-membership flexible and redefine-able. Lepofsky, Fraser and 
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colleagues (Lepofsky and Fraser 2003; Fraser et al. 2003; Fraser 2004; Fraser and Kick 
2007) have examined “community building projects” in terms of their effects beyond the 
amelioration of poverty (through the provision of social services) on the political terrain 
of the city.  
 
Community-building initiatives occur in an increasingly globalized context, 
providing opportunities for stakeholders other than residents to promote certain 
productions of space and place and that urban restructuring and the development 
of inner-city neighborhoods may be viewed as arenas where developers, realtors, 
lending institutions, and a host of other private ventures extract profit and 
instigate a particular vision of the city. (Fraser et al. 2003, p. 417)  
 
 
Moreover, Fraser and Lepofsky (2003) argued that “the reconstruction of the local” 
through the spatial practices of community building may be understood as a shift in the 
meanings of belonging and citizenship. Thus, community-building initiatives represent 
 
a shift in the meaning of citizenship from being primarily guaranteed as a status 
(although a status dependent on certain performative acts) to being primarily 
guaranteed as a performative act (although still only accessible to those of a 
certain status). In moving toward the performative, the notion of flexibility takes 
on importance and does the ideological work to reframe who can be a citizen, 
what a citizen can do and how citizenship is important to claim one’s right to the 
city and the production of that space. 
 
 The place-making practices were evident in the variety of individuals and groups 
who claim to be of, or speak on behalf of Wynwood, usually in contradistinction to 
others. Residents such as Hector who want to discredit the critics of gentrification or 
specific projects such as Midtown challenge naysayers legitimacy as neighborhood 
representatives with questions about where they live, how long they have been there, and 
what they have done for “the community.” Other residents emphasized the skin color of 
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the Women of Wynwood or the association with arts entrepreneurs to discredit this 
program for providing jobs to people from “outside” of Wynwood. Even the former City 
Mayor (1973-1985) asserted that “the so-called leadership of the community, none of 
them lived in Wynwood.”  Yet, living in Wynwood is not a requirement for governing in 
the neighborhood. The Mayor's remarks reflect the way the “political and economic 
elites... have prioritized certain forms of civic engagement over others” (Fraser 2005, p. 
439), such as those “contemporary reconfigurations in the relationships of civil society, 
state and market [that are] conductive to supporting the spread of market forces in areas... 
beyond the reach of capital” (Mayer 2003, p. 109). 
 The so-called Miami model of private art museums may also be viewed as a 
hyper-entrepreneurial gentrification strategy in which wealthy collectors who double as 
real estate developers have been portrayed as the grassroots “community” that 
government must increasingly respond to and engage with. The “lash-up of 
organizations, practices, [and] institutional logics” (McQuarrie 2010, p. 239) produced by 
these stakeholders have not only transformed the relationships between government, the 
market and “civil society” actors and organizations in Wynwood, but the emergence of 
this new community politics has materially and politically displaced existing 
neighborhood residents. This displacement occurs through, not despite, the discourses 
and practices of partnership and inclusion in which some residents become involved. 
Many residents and organizational leaders perceptions and engagement with 
gentrification processes are shaped by the “false choice” of gentrification and 
displacement or a return to the political and economic neglect of the past (Wacquant 
1997; Jennings 2004; Slater 2009). This false choice between deprivation or displacement 
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came to be perceived as real through decades of efforts at community-based self-
governance. Each turn toward a new way of building “community” in order to 
accomplish “development” led practitioners closer to the market logics of gentrification 
and away from the kinds of political and economic changes needed to give residents more 
control over the future of their space and place in the city. Each respondent, from 
Rodrigo and Felipe to the leaders of the Catholic Church and the Puerto Rican CDC and 
even recent social justice activists articulated a clear sense of the limitations of their 
actions to change the politics of urban development. Perhaps the most dramatic 
expression was that of the Catholic priest who, despite assembling considerable “people 
power” at the height of his involvement in the FBAC, came to view the struggle for 
alternative urban development in Wynwood as “struggling in vain” or, as he put it even 
more dramatically in Spanish, dando coces contra el aguijón¸ which amounts in 
theological terms to the sense of futility in resisting the will of God.  
 The discourses and practices of Wynwood's community organizations help 
explain the problem I noted at the outset - “why most often the property sector works 
unopposed” (Gottdiener 1994, p. 227). It is not sufficient to say that residents, 
community organizations or activists are overwhelmed by the power of real estate 
investors and the governing arrangements they work through. Since the 1970s, the 
“citizen” and the “community” have become increasingly responsible for managing their 
space and place in the world, and the proliferation of programs to advance this 
community-based responsibility have transformed community politics (Chaskin and 
Abunimah 1999; DeFilippis 2004). Governing must happen in the neighborhood even 
though the resources for implementing policy decisions - particularly in the case of 
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Wynwood - are not located there. This leads to the situation noted above in which 
“residents' rights to the city become based more on what they do as active citizens than 
who they are as urban neighborhood residents” and “as residency status loses significance 
with increased attention placed on civic participation... non-resident stakeholders... gain 
legitimacy in their claim to place-making rights” (Lepofsky and Fraser 2003, p. 132). 
This was especially clear in the growth of the Wynwood Art and Cafe District and the 
growing power of WADA. 
 But while this growth in “performative” and “flexibile” citizenship empowers 
non-resident stakeholders, it also transforms the rationalities and practices - the self-
conduct - of existing residents and community leaders who participate in the new and 
evolving forms of community-based governance. The insights of Foucault's notion of 
“governmentality” and the “conduct of conduct” are useful here (Foucault 1979, 2004). 
In the context of the retreat of the state from welfare provision and the expansion of 
flexible, performative citizenship, it is easy to lose sight of government, increasingly 
extended over multiple sites and process through the forces that shape self-government 
within the “community.” As Fairbanks (2011, p. 2557) writes,  
 
The concept of governmentality allows us to see how devolution, retrenchment 
and the withdrawal of the state do not constitute merely a retreat from public 
space, but rather enact a set of interrelated political strategies designed to 
redistribute the disciplines of governance throughout the interstices of the social 
body. In this light, we can consider the question of whether an increasingly 
privatised or decentralised state is any less governmental and regulatory than its 
counterpart at the high water mark of Fordism. 
 
 The City of Miami agencies and the government's community organization 
partners in Wynwood reveal a variety of ways in which regulation is not removed but 
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merely decentralized, reconfigured and internalized by neighborhood-based actors. 
Whether CDC leaders or neighborhood residents or the staff of service organizations, 
many of the respondents I interviewed asserted that there was a “proper” way of 
maintaining relationships to local government that precludes “negativity.” A key 
condition for participating in the various processes of service provision and urban 
planning is managing and minimizing oppositional politics. Organizational actors come 
to embrace this through the experience of their failures and successes in different 
community development projects.  
 Crucially, it is not only nonprofit managers such as Rodrigo or those at PRES and 
the Puerto Rican CDC who have become convinced that they cannot and must not 
fundamentally challenge the politics of urban development; social justice activists in 
Miami across a range of organizational ideologies and tactics have also concluded that 
resisting gentrification is not possible given the present context and resources. This is not 
unique to Miami, although the effects of this choice may be pronounced since there is a 
less established history of anti-growth activism (with the perhaps notable exception of 
activists in Overtown). Nevertheless, social justice activists across the globe have 
increasingly embraced social movement approaches that do not necessarily prioritize or 
privilege “the local,” instead seeking to build multi-local and flexible networks in 
response to and to capitalize on the opportunities afforded by transformation of 
governance itself. If non-residents become increasingly able to shape the built 
environment of residents, then activism may come to be managed by non-residents as 
well. As the director of the SJC put it, developers felt they “had a right” to put forth a 
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“vision for the whole region” regardless of where they lived; activists must respond 
accordingly.  
 Amid the shifting tactics of social justice struggles, however, how can we keep 
sight of the broader questions about democracy? While compelled to “win” against the 
forces of unequal development, how can our response not merely recreate the governance 
processes in which the right to participate is determined by the willingness to perform in 
certain ways, potentially excluding neighborhood residents? In a place such as Miami 
where people come and go often, and few have been here for long (Nijman 2011), we 
must pay careful attention to the potential for governance to be transformed into a 
arrangement of place-based performance between non-residents, or at least ask how and 
why residents are not involved. 
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